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In this work I investigate the concept of biopolitics as it emerges in the particular 
historical setting of twentieth and twenty-first Century Italy. Framing biopolitics as the 
foregrounding of labor-power, i.e. of the potential to produce, I define three historical  
moments in which this notion is articulated and gives rise to new social practices in 
Italy: the 1920 Factory Councils Movement and the philosophy of praxis of Antonio 
Gramsci, the student Movement of 1968 in its dialogue with Pier Paolo Pasolini, the 
Marxist neo-feminist discourse on reproduction carried out by Lotta Femminista, and 
finally the thought of Antonio Negri and its notion of the multitude in the context of 
the Anti-Globalization Movement. Each of these turning points stages a biopolitical 
struggle of a determinate subjectivity against the mode of production in power: the 
workers of the Factory Councils faced the introduction of Fordism; 1968 and Marxist 
neo-feminism that of Fordism in its advanced phase of automation of production; the 
multitude of the Anti-Globalization Movement that of post-Fordism with its emphasis 
on immaterial production. If the biopolitical is today the substratum of our mode of 
production, from the perspective of Italian political thought, my genealogical 
reconstruction aims at clarifying the degree of oppression and the contradictions of the 
biopolitical at a global level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In his usual counter-intuitive style, Slavoj Žižek asks “what if philosophy – the 
need for authentic philosophical thought – arises precisely […] when (other) parts-
constituents of the social edifice cannot play their proper role?”1 Italian society makes 
a perfect case for this hypothesis, and the peculiarity of its best Marxist philosophy 
(and perhaps the reason for its widespread interest today) resides precisely in the direct 
confrontation with repeated social blockages. As they were forged in the dicey 
environment of political praxis, with its shares of defeat and repression, these forms of 
Italian Marxism developed a capacity to interrogate the social in order to transform it 
that usually produced innovatory and advanced theories and practices.  
I believe a key object for the understanding of our social edifice is the 
biopolitical dimension of labor, especially as it comes to the foreground in the 
particular setting of twentieth and twenty-first Century Italy. In the following pages, I 
argue that its preliminary articulation takes place in 1920 with the Factory Councils 
Movement and the workers’ self-management of production. Antonio Gramsci, 
founder of the Italian Communist Party, is the systematizer of the bulk of knowledge 
growing out of this experience and of the consequences of the Councils’ defeat with 
the introduction of Fordism under fascist dictatorship. The second stage is represented 
by the series of struggles which coalesced around 1968 and grew in intensity until 
1977 when the Italian State violently repressed them. This wave of social 
experimentation was heterogeneous and stratified, involving not only workers but also 
students and women as autonomous entities. The third and last stage I explore is very 
close to us. In fact it is still in the making and no one can really predict its outcome or 
                                                 
1 Slavoj Žižek, Organs Without Bodies. On Deleuze and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
x. 
1 
future shape. This global round of protest has been called by the media Anti-
Globalization Movement or No-Global Movement; others preferred a more positive 
denomination such as Alter-Globalization Movement, or simply the Movement of 
Movements.2 In Italy, the Anti-Globalization Movement faced its baptism of fire in 
the summer of 2001 during the G8 summit, though the emergence of a modern 
biopolitical subject had been theorized years before by Antonio Negri in the notion of 
the multitude following the philosophy of Italian operaismo.3 To simplify my 
argument: there are three turning points that define the emergence of the biopolitical 
in Italian society. Each of them staged the struggle of a determinate subjectivity 
against the mode of production in power: the workers of the Factory Councils faced 
the introduction of Fordism; 1968 that of Fordism in its advanced phase of automation 
of production; the multitude of the Anti-Globalization Movement that of post-
Fordism. 
What is the connection between the revolt of the workers as occurred in 1920, 
the long insurrection inaugurated by 1968, the recent protest of the multitude, and 
biopolitics? If we are to understand biopolitics as the modes by which the biological 
                                                 
2 See David Graeber, “The New Anarchists,” New Left Review 13 (2002): 61-73; Tom Merters, ed., A 
Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible? (London: Verso, 2004). 
3 For a definition of operaismo see among others Steve Wright, Storming Heaven: Class Composition 
and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism (Pluto Press: London, 2002); Robert Lumley, States of 
Emergency: Cultures of Revolt in Italy from 1968 to 1978 (London: Verso, 1990), 36-39. The Seattle 
riots of 1998 started a planetary protests that reached Italy at the turn of the millennium. In Genoa 
during the G8 summit the Anti-Globalization Movement held a massive demonstration that was 
severely repressed by the Italian government. The Italian police killed a young protester, Carlo Giuliani, 
and tortured hundreds of activists. See Amnesty International, Public Statement, 21 July 2006, Amnesty 
International USA, 
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGEUR300052006 >; Haidi Giuliani and 
Giuliano Giuliani, Un anno senza Carlo (Milano: Baldini e Castoldi, 2002). On the Italian opearismo 
see Cristina Corradi, Storia dei marxismi in Italia (Roma: manifestolibri, 2005), 199-294; Guido Borio, 
Francesca Pozzi and Gigi Roggiero, Futuro Anteriore, dai Quaderni Rossi ai movimenti globali: 
ricchezze e limiti dell’operaismo italiano (Roma: DeriveApprodi, 2002); Sylvere Lotringer and 
Christian Marazzi, eds., Autonomia: Post-Political Politics, (New York: Semiotext[e], 2007); George 
Katsiaficas, The Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements and the 
Decolonization of Everyday Life (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997); Steve Wright, Storming 
Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism (Pluto Press: London, 2002). 
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and the social body come under the control of the state apparatus, that is, as the 
“politicization of biology,” my choice may seem rather arbitrary.4 In the specific case 
of Italian history, the forming of the state and its institutions (for instance the school, 
the asylums or the army) would appear to be a much more apt case study. Yet as I 
argue here, biopolitics grows out of a precise set of social problems that involve, but 
are not limited to, the control and power over population.  
When Michel Foucault, the inventor of the term, talked about biopolitics in his 
Lecture at the Collège de France (now published under the title The Birth of 
Biopolitics), he focused on governamentality, or the art of governance as the 
conceptualization of a technique with very little reference to population as the distinct 
modern element that comes under the control of the state. The real novelty in 
Foucault’s argument is not the examination of the technologies of power and control, 
but the new form that the concept of labor takes up. In his account of the development 
from liberalism to neoliberalism, Foucault underscores the shift from a classical notion 
of wage-labor to the idea of human capital. The wage-laborer is an individual who 
sells his or her ability to work and receives in return an income. Human capital is 
instead “a machine that produces an earnings stream.”5 Once labor is conceived of as 
human capital and every worker is endowed with the capacity to produce gain, the 
typical capitalist process of accumulation is extended over the whole population – i.e. 
every individual now competes on the job market as an enterprise-producing profit 
and investing in him or herself in order to remain competitive.  
                                                 
4 Timothy Campbell, Introduction, Bios. Biopolitics and Philosophy, by Roberto Esposito (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008), vii. As Graeber ironically argues “states have been concerned 
with promulgating health and fertility since the time of Frazer’s sacred kings,” “The Sadness of post-
Workerism or Art and Immaterial Labor Conference a Sort of Review,” The Commoner, 1 April 2008, 
<http://www.commoner.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2008/04/graeber_sadness.pdf>. 
5 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 224. 
3 
Well into his discussion, Foucault admits: “I would like to assure you that, in 
spite of everything I really did intend to talk about biopolitics and then […] I have 
ended up talking at length, and maybe for too long, about neoliberalism.”6 
Notwithstanding this reassurance, unfortunately Foucault mentions biopolitics only 
twice in the entire series of lectures. The impossibility of defining biopolitics in a 
work consecrated to the investigation of its genealogy is obviously a symptom of 
something larger. Foucault is exploring a transformation which redefines how modern 
society regulates itself – a transformation that takes place on the terrain of the social 
relationships of production. His key assumption seems to be that, insofar as it is self-
regulatory, the transformation of the art of governing is biopolitical. Not requiring an 
external authority to direct operations, biopolitics is an immanent, self-multiplying 
mechanism that operates from within the social body. Still, what is inherently 
biological and what is political in this transformation?  
Several studies have picked up on this question. Italian scholars, in particular, 
have contributed copiously to the exploration of the concept of biopolitics. As I soon 
argue, Antonio Negri grafted his investigation on a free re-interpretation of Foucault’s 
concept. Giorgio Agamben and, most recently, Roberto Esposito instead have traced a 
wider historical trajectory for biopolitics, reaching back to Aristotelian philosophy. 
Revising Agamben, Esposito for instance argues that biopolitics refers “to the 
dimension of zōē, which is to say to life in its simple biological capacity [tenuta], 
more than it does to bíos, understood as qualified life,” but that both of them are also 
traversed by “technē,” i.e. modern technology.7 There are serious problems with 
Agamben’s and Esposito’s articulation of the concept, especially in the juncture, or as 
Laurent Dubreuil has argued, in the “disjunction between bíos and zōē,” that is to say 
                                                 
6 Foucault, 185. 
7 Roberto Esposito, Bios. Biopolitics and Philosophy, 14, 15. 
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in the relation between the political and the biological substratum.8 To what extent is 
life in its biological form already something political for humans, which thus tends to 
be subsumed under the social? And to what extent does biological life, as an 
“invariant’s variation,” play a role in the political dimension of human life?9  
Were the biopolitical only a politicization of the natural, there would be no real 
use for the term biopolitics. In fact philosophy has investigated the relationship 
between the human and nature since its inception. For my part, I believe biopolitics 
can explain a great many things, especially our present condition, but only insofar as it 
does not loose concrete historical referents. In my opinion, this implies a rigorous 
work of historical and critical reconstruction of biopolitics in its connection to the 
notion of labor and its conflicts. This is why I base my cultural genealogy of the 
biopolitical transformation in Italy on two basic assumptions. The first principle I 
draw from Raniero Panzieri – though to a certain extent it can also be found in 
Gramsci.10 Expanding on Panzieri’s notion of “sociological inquiry,” we can state that 
a comprehensive materialist inquiry of societal transformations 
 
Refuses to identify the working class with the movement of 
capital and claims that it is impossible to automatically trace 
a study of the working class back to the movement of capital. 
The working class requires a completely independent 
scientific treatment because it operates as a conflictual – 
                                                 
8 Laurent Dubreuil, “Leaving Politics. Bios, Zōē Life,” Diacritics 36.2 (2006): 88. 
9 Dubreuil, 92. 
10 This methodological assumption is the turning point that gives birth to what has come to be known as 
operaismo [workerism]. 
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hence capitalist – as well as an antagonistic – hence anti-
capitalist – factor.11
 
There is something radically different in the subjectivity of subordinated groups that 
cannot be reduced to the level of capitalist development. It is out of the conflict 
between labor and capital that new societal arrangements are worked through and 
spread over society. This suggests that the question of subjectivity is the blind spot of 
Agamben’s and Esposito’s discourse on biopolitics. Notwithstanding their 
philosophical affiliations, it is probably in Foucault that we can locate the origin of 
this absence, since Foucault predominantly studies the transformation of the modes of 
governamentality as theoretical shifts in political economy. He never truly addresses 
the conflicts that these transformations sought to contain or dissolve. I base my 
analysis instead on the recovery of the role of subjectivities and their conflicts. 
Hence, the second assumption I borrow from Paolo Virno. This is my re-
formulation: the biopolitical dimension of labor is bound to the foregrounding of 
labor-power as it becomes a predominant productive feature in a given society. I want 
to emphasize the difference between labor-power and labor. We must not confuse the 
two. Labor-power refers to the “potential to produce,” and not to the concrete 
production of the laboring process.12 This is a basic difference that Marx posits as the 
foundation of his work when he says that the capitalist buys the worker’s capacity to 
work for an agreed amount of time, not its actual work, its execution.13 Virno argues 
that labor-power reaches a pure biopolitical dimension when its potentialities are 
valorized as such, that is as a pure capacity. It is only today in the “post-Fordist era,” 
                                                 
11 Raniero Panzieri, “Socialist Use of Worker’s Inquiry,” Generation-online, <http://www.generation-
online.org/t/tpanzieri.htm>. 
12 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude (New York: Semiotext[e], 2004), 81. 
13 Marx, Capital, vol. 1, ed. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch06.htm >. 
6 
Virno says, that labor-power is not reducible to an “aggregate of physical and 
mechanical attributes,” and thus “encompasses within itself [...] the life of the 
mind.”14  
It is with the rise of an economy predominantly based on the providing of 
services as well as cognitive and affective labor that labor-power can be articulated in 
all its material and immaterial dimension. The reasons for this transformation are, 
however, not to be found in governamentality itself. The new technologies of 
production and the employment of labor as pure potential are dialectically connected 
to the struggles of those individuals who perform that labor. It is the struggles and the 
practices of the subordinated groups that one needs to unearth in order to find the 
reasons for the organizational answers of the ruling class. These struggles have a 
scientific, genealogical value that lurks within the successive stabilizations of labor 
that power dictates. 
This is why in the first chapter I take under consideration Gramsci and the 
movement of the Factory Councils. Historically, these councils represent a 
preliminary stage in the birth of biopolitics. There are differences of course. In an age 
of scarcity, society must deploy all of its labor towards the production of material 
goods. This kind of production is predominantly mechanical and physical, and 
consequently labor-power is put to use only in a reductive form. But the Factory 
Councils Movement too was setting up to develop an enhanced and free dimension of 
labor-power. For instance, as the conclusion to a series of articles on the theory of the 
councils, Pietro Mosso, Gramsci’s personal assistant at L’Ordine Nuovo, studied a 
school system integrated with workers’ factories. He argued that Taylorism assessed 
only “a particular side [of the worker] and cause[d] him to become an automaton.” 
Hence the need for a “vivification of the harmony” between the producers and 
                                                 
14 Virno, 81. 
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collective life through the establishment of a network of councils’ schools dedicated to 
“1) the educating of the mind, 2) the training of all who can engage in social activities 
3) the attainment, for all who can, of high culture.”15 The emphasis on education is not 
a cultural tick but rather aims at surpassing the mechanism of brute production for 
profit, infusing the former with a scientific and intellectual quality functional to the 
development of society as an organic and balanced whole.   
The stabilization of this wave of social unrest incorporated certain ideas of the 
Factory Councils, adopting a planned economy that rationalized society to increase 
profitability. With many contradictions fascism, soon after, embraced Fordism 
imposing a rigid authoritarian observance of Frederick Winslow Taylor’s scientific 
management. But Fordism still demanded a firm political (i.e. external) control. As 
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt note, Fordism did “not succeed in consuming 
[individuals] completely in the rhythm of productive practices,” and it did not “reach 
down to the ganglia of the social structure.”16 In other words Fordist mechanical logic 
precluded a vital permeation of the organic. During his prison years, especially in an 
essay entitled “Americanism and Fordism,” Gramsci instead embarked on the titanic 
effort of translating the Fordist re-organization into a potential revolution.17 Here, the 
difficulty in interpreting Gramsci’s articulation of Fordism lies in the fact that we read 
                                                 
15 Pietro Mosso wrote under the pseudonym of Carlo Pietri, see “Il sistema Taylor e i Consigli dei 
produttori. La Scuola,” L’Ordine Nuovo, reprint Feltrinelli, 27 (1919): 209. From here on all translation 
from Italian are mine unless otherwise indicated. Emphasis is in the original text unless otherwise 
indicated.  
16 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 24. 
17 See chapter 1. Fascism was born out of the general discontent of 1919 and the passiveness of the PSI. 
Benito Mussolini was swift in channeling this generalized anxiety and putting it to the service of the 
great capitalists and land owners who could not totally rely (as in the case of Giolitti’s moderate 
government) on the state’s repressive apparatus and needed a loyal military force to strike down a 
growing opposition. Yet just as Italy was only the first experiment of a certain type of fascism that 
would soon extend its dominion to other European countries, this brief but intense history of anti-
bourgeois rebellion followed a larger European pattern. Gramsci perfectly delineates this contradiction 
in order to work out the institutions that the proletariat would have to resort to in its revolution. See 
Gramsci, “La settimana politica,” Paolo Spriano, ed., L’ordine Nuovo, 1919-1920 (Torino: Einaudi, 
1963), 302. 
8 
his understanding of production through the lens of the transformation that occurred 
later. Said differently, the reader tends to translate Gramsci’s open reflection into the 
fixed coordinates of capitalist modernity to come. But Gramsci had to make use of the 
Fordist conceptual equipment that was available. Consequently, it was on the basis of 
Fordist automation that he imagined a use of labor-power exceeding its mechanical 
limits, almost rising it to a biopolitical level. Hence Gramsci’s focus on the body, on 
the nervous-muscular training of the worker at the assembly line, and its connection 
with the worker’s life, and with other needs such as sexuality. 
Even though he does not elaborate upon it, Gramsci taps into a problem that is 
crucial for the definition of biopolitics. Reproduction and its subcategory, sexuality, 
will come to the foreground in the revolt that exploded in 1968. When in the fall of 
that year, students joined workers in their protests, the stratification and the force of 
the insurrection reached a degree of virulence that paralleled very few other 
movements in the twentieth Century. Its magnitude and heterogeneity makes it also a 
difficult subject to assess comprehensively. This is why I dedicate the second chapter 
to Pier Paolo Pasolini’s much written about debate with the so-called Student 
Movement. His insights serve as point of entry and critical counterpoint for my 
investigation. Starting from a relatively unknown documentary on Italians and sex, 
Love Meetings, and moving to the late essays included in Lutheran Letters, I explore 
Pasolini’s reflection on the process of secularization in the field of sexuality caused by 
the rise of consumer culture and the modernization of the productive infrastructure. I 
also take into consideration Pasolini’s ecological concern as a boundary for a society 
based on unlimited development. This is an issue that becomes central for the last part 
of my work when I assess the challenge that the multitude faces today.   
In the third chapter, while assessing the cycle of students’ and workers’ 
struggle, I try to respond to Pasolini’s (at times) too dismissive arguments. I provide a 
9 
political historical contextualization for the Student Movement and stress how it 
indeed promoted a strong critique of consumer society. Here I also trace the 
emergence of a concrete dimension of biopolitical labor which is dialectically defined 
by the conflict between the capitalist plan of development and the students’ and 
workers’ response. When I use the term “dialectical,” I do not imply any definite 
synthesis, rather I am interested in the antagonistic link that the two alterities (capital 
and labor) establish more than in a final resolution. Thus, on the one hand, I deal with 
the new social figure of the mass worker produced by the mechanization of industry 
which empties out the content of any laboring process. On the other, I study the 
student as a new figure that grows out of the accumulation of larger quotas of 
intellectual work among the new generations who are kept in reserve as labor force in 
the university system. Both subjectivities strike an alliance based on the refusal of 
authority (in the factory and in the school) as well as on the refusal of operating under 
the exploitative regime of wage-labor. In breaking away from a linear path of 
education, employment and consumption, these subjectivities discover a new form of 
production. The famous slogan echoing the days of May – L’immaginazione al potere! 
[The rule of imagination] – developed into myriad new social practices.  
These forms of social cooperation brought to light the fact that elements such 
as communication, creativity and knowledge were becoming decisive factors of 
growth. In other words, activities usually considered unproductive were becoming 
more predominant and so sanctioning the supremacy of reproduction over production. 
It is, in particular, with the so-called 1977 Movement that these practices openly 
exhibited their biopolitical potential. In this sense a key strategy was that of refusal of 
work. Arising from the student’s and worker’s insubordination to bosses and state 
authority, refusal of work made available time for experimentations which were still 
productive, but certainly not in terms of profit making. These activities were thought 
10 
to embody a new political dimension that surpassed any political organization. They 
were political insofar as they established and kept on expanding alternative and 
radically non-exploitative forms of sociality. With its rich cultural milieu, 1970s 
Bologna was one of the liveliest environments. Here I take as a literary study case the 
novel Boccalone (1979) by Enrico Palandri and the collective work Alice 
Disambientata (1978). These documents are exemplary of the demands of social 
transformation that this new sociality was engendering. They are a very rare kind of 
literature appearing “in the emergent sector” of biopolitical labor creating “new 
meanings and values, new practices, new significances and experiences.”18   
Yet, this revolution also became integrated and normalized by the advent of a 
more flexible form of control and production. Post-Fordism here is the photo-negative 
of the potentiality of reproduction imagined between 1968 and 1977. Post-Fordism 
shows how capitalism “put to work the Movement of 1977.”19 The possibility of 
deserting work, “a certain entrepreneurship,” the distinctive “taste for autonomy of the 
individual and experimenting”--all these elements define today’s post-Fordist labor.20 
For the Movement of 1977, the flight from the factory and union discipline was a way 
of sabotaging the machine, but capital too was interested in a similar process. In its 
restructuring of the 1980s, capital did not simply get rid of workers, but rather it 
emptied out factories from “workers’ organization.”21 With that loss the conflict 
against capital took on a much more disorganized and episodic nature. 
In the fourth chapter I pose a different set of questions that complicate the 
linearity of the rise of biopolitics. If we define biopolitics as the valorization of the full 
potentiality of labor-power – that is to say in its immaterial and material components – 
                                                 
18 Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture (London: Verso, 1980), 41. 
19 Nanni Balestrini and Primo Moroni, L’orda d’oro 1968-1977. La grande ondata rivoluzionaria e 
creativa, politica ed esistenziale (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1997), 648. 
20 Nanni Balestrini and Primo Moroni, 648. 
21 Nanni Balestrini and Primo Moroni, 637. 
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one does not need to look at 1968, nor to post-Fordist information technology in order 
to establish a correct genealogy. Procreation and the work of reproducing the workers’ 
means of subsistence are already a totalizing activity that involves affective labor, 
communicational skills and a good deal of physical abilities. Women were a 
biopolitical workforce long before the advent of post-Fordism. In other words, if 
biopolitics is the employment of the full potential of labor-power, women’s work of 
reproduction constituted its primary occurrence. As it involves the totality of women’s 
physical, emotional and intellectual capacities, the work of procreating and providing 
for the workers’ restoration of physical forces is inherently biopolitical. Yet the task of 
taking care of present and future labor-power in all their aspects also emerges as an 
enormous source of unlimited and unpaid labor. The insight of the Marxist neo-
feminist group Lotta Femminista that I study along with a play by Adele Cambria 
entitled Nonostante Gramsci [Despite Gramsci], is that the work of reproduction 
represents the matrix of women’s oppression as it is intertwined with a set of desires, 
habits, needs and hierarchies that makes it a perfect self-functioning mechanism.  
The famous feminist slogan “the personal is political” should now be rewritten 
as the personal is bio-political. Yet, this also implies that the epic history of ruptures 
and transformation that operaismo discovered in the new biopolitical dimension of 
contemporary labor slips unexpectedly on the waxed floors of women’s kitchens. This 
is one of the critiques I direct towards Negri in the fifth and last chapter, where I 
examine the long trajectory he articulates in the transformation of labor-power from 
the Fordist worker to the mass worker of the 1960s, to the social worker of the 1970s, 
and finally to the new global political subject of the multitude. My argument is not 
ontological, that is, I am not stressing a hidden teleological assumption in Negri’s 
thought that invalidates his theory. These are formal tricks that do not lead far. Rather, 
I argue that it is only from the full understanding of the ambiguous status of biopolitics 
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today that we can establish a solid theoretical ground for the understanding of the 
historically varying nature of the biopolitical constant. The biopolitical potential of 
labor-power was already active in the work of reproduction; what changed was the 
function it played in the transformations of capitalism.  
The only way we can maintain the specificity of the biopolitical dimension of 
work today is by recognizing that, in the dialectic between labor and capital, a new 
form of production is worked out which sets the work of reproduction as a paradigm 
for the whole of society. Here the biopolitical dimension comes to the foreground, 
appearing as substantially new, even though it had been present for a long time. The 
feminist subjectivity is one of the primary agents for this transformation. Furthermore, 
there is also an evolution in Italian Marxist feminist thought shifting from a 
productivist to a re-productionist perspective. Previous feminists such as Camilla 
Ravera, for instance, advocated the socialization of domestic work in order to include 
women into production. It is only when neo-feminist militants clearly define the 
biopolitical dimension of the work of reproduction, and knowledge becomes a 
decisive factor of growth, that reproduction establishes its hegemony. This is why I 
argue that the biopolitical dimension of labor is tied to the foregrounding of labor-
power as it becomes a predominant productive feature in a given society.  
Unfortunately, as reproduction becomes hegemonic, the oppressive traits 
typical of the pseudo-servile condition of domestic work take over. Far from 
embodying the positive biopolitical potential for liberation that Negri theorizes, the 
modes of relation of the multitude bear the marks of this domination. In my opinion, 
the colonization of non-working time by working time is one of the major problems of 
his argument. It fosters a subjectivity that strives against a precarious life; a life that is 
disorganized and dispersed by a social cooperation that, at a formal level, gives the lie 
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to a unified global community, but that, in the everyday, generates a cynical form of 
individualism.  
Against Negri’s optimistic understanding of the multitude, I claim that the 
emancipative potential of this biopolitical subjectivity is highly ambiguous and needs 
to be worked out.22 We question categories as they fail to express practices of social 
change, in other words, when we cannot use them to discriminate between 
mechanisms of oppression interiorized by the social body and the cases in which, 
instead, that same social body affirms “a new dimension and direction of radical 
change.”23 Once defects and flaws are individuated, once harmful consequences are 
clearly understood, then a series of new practices can be elaborated. 
I am not resorting to an essentialist and naively rationalist form of materialism 
here. I am instead embracing a revivification of what I call the principle of immanent 
or materialist finitization.24 Material reality is the problematizing field in which 
contradictions arise and social beings operate through a task-solving methodology. In 
disclosing the subjective, self-positing, element of every objective determination, the 
human process of finitization is immanent without falling into a quietist acceptance of 
the matter of fact. Simultaneously, while expressing this dialectical relation to the 
                                                 
22 Galvano Della Volpe’s lesson is still valid today. We can “arrive at an objective, non-one-sided, 
understanding” of our present condition only if our analysis “is capable of self-criticism. In other words, 
finding itself in crisis, it [our analysis] apprehends that crisis as the dubiousness of its own categories,” 
Logic as a Positive Science (London: NLB, 1980), 192. 
23 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 26. 
24 Open-ended but determinate, this notion of materialist finitization does not mourn the lack of a 
totality (the grasping of a comprehensive and immutable totality), nor the outside of a transcendence 
that goes beyond the operativeness of our theory and practice. I borrow this idea of finitism from a 
series of sources. The first is the German linguist Harold Weinrich, who uses it to express a secularized 
idea of totality in a linguistic field, see The linguistics of lying and other essays (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2005). I rephrase the concept through Karl Marx’s principle of the absolute 
immanence of praxis that states that “mankind […] inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to 
solve […] the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present 
or at least in the course of formation,” Preface, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, ed. 
R. Rojas, Marxists Internet Archive, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-
economy/preface.htm>. I was also influenced by Bruno Bosteels’ use of the term especially during his 
talks on Borges at Cornell, 2006-2008. 
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material world as a limit, immanent finitization seeks to spell out the conceivableness 
of transformative practices in order to carry on, and eventually win, the political 
struggle against oppression.  
It seems to me that Negri’s notion of the biopolitical is deficient in this regard. 
Negri’s philosophy is obviously a philosophy of immanence, but eventually it 
embraces a utopian tendency that weakens a concrete analysis of the multitude and its 
situation. More specifically, Negri endows the multitude with such a positive and 
constructive force that its internal contradictions vanish or are cast onto its opponent. 
Thus paradoxically transcendence re-emerges in the form of power/capitalism. As 
Negri argues, modernity “is a crisis that is born out of the uninterrupted conflict 
between the immanent, constructive, creative forces and the transcendent power aimed 
at restoring order.”25 I don’t agree with this simple Manichaeism: immanence qua the 
positive vs. transcendence qua the negative. Immanence is neither good nor bad in 
itself; it represents the condition of possibility for something to be actualized. I follow 
Deleuze on this point. Immanence is “a transcendental field,” that is, “a life of pure 
immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil.”26 If immanence is a liquid surface, human 
processes are the crest of the waves. Human actions are immanent to their material 
reality and, as humans actualize them, they acquire a distinct value which is 
historically judgeable. Hence the problem one encounters in Negri’s work: having 
attached a positive transcendental value to the historically determined concept of the 
multitude, his theory cannot really attend to the contradictions of the multitude. The 
multitude’s project of social change must include instead a laborious work of critique 
and definition of our categories. We need to sift through the multitude’s dynamics of 
oppression and behaviors in order to define and possibly change them.  
                                                 
25 Hardt and Negri, 76. 
26 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 26, 29. 
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In the last chapter I take into consideration a set of contradictions that entangle 
the multitude’s everyday life. Here I want to draw attention to two key issues. The first 
one is sexuality. In my opinion, assuming Pasolini’s and the neo-feminists’ view of 
reproduction as a function of the capitalist process of accumulation implies the 
dismissing of a project of social change based on the pure political value of the 
libidinal drive and its free circulation. This is a battle that the 1968 Movement fought 
long time ago under the Fordist rule. Post-Fordism integrated a liberalized form of 
sexuality and now feeds on flexibility, free circulation, transitoriness and hedonism as 
an infinite motor for consumption and economic dynamism.  
Secondly, assuming Pasolini’s critique of consumer society and capitalist 
development also implies taking charge of the impending ecological catastrophe we 
are facing. To be sure, the very self-regulatory mechanism that mobilizes production 
and consumption is blindly pushing humanity towards early extinction. But the 
multitude too is a main factor in this massacre play. The planet, what Marx called 
humanity’s “inorganic body,” is our outer limit.27 The protection and reproduction of 
our relation with the earth should be an immanent principle in the multitude’s project 
of liberation. The technical capacities to achieve such a goal are at hand. What is 
lacking are planning and the organizing of the multitude’s political force.28  
Silvia Federici and Mario Montano recently argued that with the Factory 
Councils Movement “the workers democratic-self-management c[ould] only pre-
                                                 
27 Karl Marx, Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, ed. Martin Mulligan, Marxist Internet 
Archive, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm>; see also Masao 
Myioshi, “The University, the Universe, the World, and “Globalization,” The Global South 1 (2007): 
24-37. 
28 In revisiting Gramsci’s thought on Fordism and the Factory Councils linking it to my genealogy of 
radical thought from 1968 to the present day, I go against Richard J. F. Day’s notion that post-1968 and 
no global practices “cannot be understood from within the horizon of (neo)liberal and (post)marxist 
theoretical traditions, which are dominated by the hegemony of the hegemony,” Gramsci is Dead. 
Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2005), 13. In Day’s 
thought, hegemony becomes synonymous for state order. My work instead attempts to underscore how 
hegemony is linked to ideology as a collective worldview which is objectively effective. Certain 
features of the multitude are in fact hegemonic even though they are not coextensive to state policy.  
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figure […] the workers’ management of their very exploitation.”29 Today this very 
exploitation runs society from within. There are no ready-made recipes. As always, the 
correct framing of the problem and its translation into the praxis of social 
transformation falls on “those classes and layers which have to sell or divest their 
labor power to the capitalist machinery of accumulation and regulation in order to 
survive.”30 The following pages are I hope a contribution to this cause. 
 
                                                 
29 Silvia Federici and Mario Montano, “Thesis on the Mass Worker and Social Capital,” libcom 
<http://libcom.org/library/theses-on-the-mass-worker-and-social-capital-silvia-federici-mario-
montano>. 
30 Karl Heinz Roth, “Global crisis – Global proletarianisation – Counter-perspectives,” Wildcat, 21 Dec. 
2008, <http://www.wildcat-www.de/en/actual/e068roth_crisis.html>. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
FACTORY COUNCILS, GRAMSCI AND THE RISING OF BIOPOLITICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Hello, who’s there?” 
“This is Fiat Soviet!’ 
“Ah… pardon… I’ll ring again…” 
 
(Conversation between a Fiat worker and a 
costumer during the occupation) 
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1.1 “Two Red Years,” Factory Councils and Worker’s Antagonism 
Every society defines what it considers to be progressive or conservative. But 
every society needs to carve this definition out of its historical roots. A pre-capitalist 
society organized around a rigid hierarchy, led by an unproductive caste tends to 
attach a high value to the qualitative uniqueness and authenticity of the single object.1 
In a society such as post-War World I Italy, where capitalist relations of production 
were rapidly molding a new nation, but where there were still struggles with a 
“prevailing system of material scarcity,” the value of progress tended to be identified 
with quantity rather than quality.2 Productivism – as the “natural alliance of all 
producers … against all parasites” – was its ideological base.3
From the beginning, the philosophy of Fiat (the first car industry of Italy) was 
to give concrete form to this modern type of industrial ideology. This understanding of 
production entailed the surpassing of the earliest conception of the automobile as a 
manufactured product. In Italy, up until Fiat started their mass production in 1903, 
cars were considered a luxury artifact that demanded a remarkable work of ideation, 
labor and execution. The pioneers who dedicated their lives to this work were at the 
same time engineers, inventors, amateurs pilots, with some pretension if not of art, at 
least of a highly refined craftsmanship. When at the turn of the century Giovanni 
Francesco Agnelli (1866-1945), an offshoot of a wealthy Piedmont family, decided to 
set up his industrial enterprise, he broke the link between the creative/artistic and the 
actual production of the vehicle. He bought the rights of the Welleyes model invented 
by the Ceirano brothers, slightly modified it, and sold it as a Fiat car. It was clear to 
him that in his industrial philosophy the issue of invention had to be progressively 
                                                 
1 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of its Reproducibility,” second version, Selected 
writings, vol. 3. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 103. 
2 Murray Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Berkeley: The Rampant Press, 1971), 37.  
3 Martin Clark, Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution that Failed (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1977), 17. 
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“secularized,” that is, it had to develop “the capacity to renounce personal invention, 
when the time dedicated to produce this invention contradict[ed] that of initiating the 
production.”4 To industrialists like Agnelli it was already clear that quantitative 
production defined modernity. Authenticity and uniqueness were romantic ideals, 
whereas serial, standardized production was the scientific goal. But in order to achieve 
these high levels of productivity, Italian industrialists had to develop and extend 
properly productive structures: gigantic factories and a functioning and effective 
system to manage the thousands of workers they employed.  
In a largely underdeveloped nation like Italy, which from 1908 to the 
beginning of the First World War was also in a serious economic depression, 
capitalism found a decisive aid to emerge from the crisis and to re-organize its 
productive infrastructures when the country entered World War I.5 At the cost of 
innumerable human lives, the conflict forced heterogeneous and largely 
underdeveloped areas to become more homogenous. First in the horror of the trenches, 
then in the factories fueled by the war effort, these realities were molded together 
under the iron law of an all embracing form of state monopoly capitalism which 
involved “mass industrialization and mass mobilization.”6 This mass mobilization 
entailed a growth of the state apparatus whose power was exercised in a usually 
authoritarian fashion in the direct politicization of the economy and a militarization of 
                                                 
4 Angelo Tito Anselmi, ed., Catalogo Bolaffi delle Fiat. 1899-1970. Repertorio completo della 
produzione automobilistica Fiat dalle origini ad oggi (Torino: G. Bolaffi, 1970), 15. This principle 
became a source of serious disagreement between Agnelli and his engineer and chief designer Aristide 
Faccioli, who had previously designed the first Welleyes for the Ceirano brothers, and who, upset by 
this materialist turn, threatened to resign. In 1903 with the real beginning of Fiat mass production, 
Giovanni Agnelli had in fact decided to utilize the honeycomb radiator already employed by others, 
thus betraying Faccioli’s belief in the unique, quasi artistic status that an automobile, as a mechanical 
but still original creation, was supposed to retain. 
5 Alberto Caracciolo “La grande industria nella prima guerra mondiale,” Il capitalismo italiano nella 
prima guerra mondiale, by Giorgio Porosini, (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editore, 1975), 120. 
6 Gwyn A. Williams, Introduction, The Occupation of the Factories: Italy 1920, by Paolo Spriano, 
(London: Pluto Press, 1975), 9. 
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daily life.7 Through the creation of auxiliary firms the government took under its 
direct control those factories that were related, even remotely, to the war. These firms 
enjoyed a “military discipline, with the workers supervised by armed soldiers.”8 The 
advantages for the owners were enormous: class conflict was under the firm grip of 
higher productive interests.  
Thus a large “military-industrial complex” developed rapidly and production 
directed by war necessities scored great profits for big capital.9 Prices, distribution and 
consumption were under strict state control; net industrial investments skyrocketed. In 
1915, when Italy entered the war, they amounted to L. 78,616,000. By 1918 they had 
rose to L. 3,035,453,000.10 All fields related to the war effort took their share of profit. 
Between 1914 and 1917, steel production increased by 5.6 per cent, engineering by 
10.2 per cent and automobile production “from 9,200 in 1914 to 20,000 in 1918.”11  
The core of the industrial and financial expansion was the traditional Turin, 
Milan, Genoa industrial triangle which was to dominate Italian economic history 
throughout the course of the entire twentieth Century. Ansaldo, the giant shipbuilder 
and artillery producer during the war, had its base in Genoa; Milan was the 
headquarters of Pirelli tire producers and Romeo, the automobile factory. But the most 
advanced Italian heavy industry was Turin with the impressive productive structures 
of the Fiat automobile factory. Just as the steam locomotives for the Second Industrial 
Revolution of the eighteenth Century, the mass production of automobiles was going 
                                                 
7 See Porosini, 10-17 and Rosario Romero, Breve storia della grande industria in Italia 1861-1961 
(Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1988), 89-97. 
8 Clark, 16; on the consequences of the war, Gramsci notices: “As a result of the necessities of the war, 
the Italian State took over the regulation of the production and distribution of material wealth as one of 
its functions. A sort of industrial and commercial trust has been set up, an equalization of the conditions 
of exploitation of the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses – which have had their revolutionary 
effects. One cannot hope to understand the essential character of the current period if one fails to take 
account of these phenomena and their psychological consequences.” Antonio Gramsci, “Workers and 
Peasants,” Selection from Political Writings (1910-1920) (London: ElecBook, 2001), 131.  
9 Clark, 16. 
10 See Porosini, 29. 
11 Paolo Spriano, The Occupation of the Factories: Italy 1920, (London: Pluto Press, 1975), 44. 
21 
to play the role of the economic engine for the new century. Turin, the industrial 
“Capital of Italy”, was the future; it had all the prerequisites required to embody the 
mechanical face of modernity.12  
Yet the psychological consequences of this mass concentration and 
technological advancements contained a revolutionary potential, for the administration 
of this mass industrialization implied a qualitative leap in class conflict. This leap 
became not only a reaction concerned with the basic means of existence, but 
something more: a fight over the very basis and control of the productive structure of 
the entire system. The shaky ground of the political situation provided the ideal 
condition for a popular revolt. The bourgeoisie had dragged the European nations into 
a war where millions had lost their lives, and in the aftermath of the conflict, despite 
the technical achievements, the liberal state was unable to find any real solution to the 
economic crisis that struck an exhausted population. What’s more, notwithstanding 
spectacular gains, in the years after the war capital’s growing tendency “towards 
stock-exchange and financial speculation blend[ing] with old protectionist attitudes 
[…] and lucrative supply contracts with the state” resulted in the “total failure to 
redirect production and accept marginally lower profits.”13  
The productive contradictions intensified until they become unsustainable. 
Without the support of nationalist war rhetoric and the menace of a foreign invasion, 
the cohesion of the Italian nation was rapidly showing signs of a dangerous 
degradation. The economic burden of the war was enormous, with economic 
difficulties fueling social unrest.14 A vast mass of mostly middle or higher military 
rank veterans were struggling with their re-entry into a society in which their 
                                                 
12 Gramsci, “The Turin Factory Councils Movement,” Selection from Political Writings, 433. 
13 Spriano The occupation of the factories, 44. 
14 See Roberto Vivarelli, Il dopoguerra in Italia e l’avvento del fascismo (1918-1922) (Napoli: Istituto 
Italiano per gli studi storici, 1967). 
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economic status was unacceptably lower than the social prestige they achieved on the 
battlefield. Most of the labor in the factory had been replaced by women, and now a 
gender conflict crashing class solidarity was fueled by rightwing groups and the 
government itself who showed recognition to its soldier by firing women from state 
employments. As for regular infantry men, once home, they had to face the fact that 
the promises of redistributing uncultivated lands made by the government after the 
military collapse of Caporetto had been forgotten as soon as the war was won.15  
Antonio Gramsci was keen to pinpoint the dead end in which the bourgeoisie 
had wound up. On one side, the central government had to face the war debts and its 
“serfdom toward international finance” which implied greater taxation, while on the 
other side the social bloc that elected those officials opposed state intervention and 
drifted toward an “indisciplina borghese” [bourgeois indiscipline] threatening national 
unity.16 This objective push toward fragmentation was the result of “reactionary 
insurrection against the central government.”17 But the reactionary role played by the 
Italian bourgeoisies ultimately derived from its weakness, from not having learned 
under the war’s mobilization to “work coherently for unified goals. Smaller firms 
sought only an end to intervention, and the giants pursued their own private 
interests.”18     
                                                 
15 The only achievement the peasants reached was the establishing of the “Opera nazionale 
combattenti.” This foundation was in charge of purchasing land and redistributing it to framers’ 
cooperatives, but it face strong resistance by landowners. Aurelio Lepre, La formazione del partito 
comunista d’Italia (Torino: Editori Riuniti, 1971), 127.  
16 Gramsci “La settimana politica,” L’ordine Nuovo, 1919-1920, Paolo Spriano, ed., (Torino: Einaudi, 
1963), 301-302. 
17 Gramsci “La settimana politica,” L’ordine Nuovo, 1919-1920, 301-302. In Gramsci’s reading, 
Gabriele D’Annunzio’s seizure of Fiume (September 12, 1919) best embodied this drive towards the 
undermining of the national institution, toward fiscal irresponsibility, towards a particularism that 
would ensure continuing high profits and social prestige. 
18 Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy after 
World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 86-87. 
23 
Meanwhile in only two years, from 1918 to 1920, the dollar rose, tripling in 
value. “Prices followed the same index and only wages lagged behind.”19 Food riots 
against the cost of basic necessities spontaneously spread out in “Liguria and 
Romagna and in the Socialist North and Emilia. In some towns and villages, ‘Soviets’ 
were set up.”20 In the year 1919 the conditions for a revolutionary upheaval seemed to 
be ripe. As Charles S. Maier writes: 
 
All Western nations experienced new restiveness on 
the left after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and 
continuing radical turmoil from the 1918 Armistice 
through the spring of 1919. The forces of order had to 
make their peace either with political overturn, as in 
Germany, or, at the least, new attacks on capitalism.21
 
In Italy, in the brief window between 1919 and 1920, the “two red years,” the anti-
capitalist forces challenged the bourgeoisie’s social hierarchy and their ideological and 
practical power. They confronted capitalism and the state power declaring they were 
ready to establish a new form of social organization that would solve the 
contradictions that were tearing apart society. For as Gwyn Williams pointed out, the 
social conflict that exploded between the spring and the fall of 1920 “was not over 
wages or hours. It was a battle in defense of the workers’ new Factory Councils which 
were threatening managerial autocracy.”22 If Williams is right, then we need to look 
                                                 
19 Denis Mack Smith, Modern Italy. A Political History (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1997), 291.  
20 Clark, 75; see Pietro Nenni, Il Diciannovismo (Milano: Ed. Avanti!, 1962).  
21 Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 4. 
22 Gwyn A. Williams, Proletarian Order. Antonio Gramsci, Factory Councils and the Origins of 
Communism in Italy 1911-1921 (London: Pluto Press, 1975), 69; see also Darrow Schecter, Gramsci 
and the Theory of Industrial Democracy (Brookfield: Gower Publishing Company, 1991). 
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closely at the Factory Councils and their story and understand why they were 
considered such a menace.  
Theorizing and Practicing the New Counter-Power: L’Ordine Nuovo (1919-1920) 
The struggle for the Factory Councils takes place chiefly in the most advanced 
outpost of Italian capitalism: Turin. Turin represented the future, but at the same time 
had a weighty past, for the city and its socio-economic reality had a long-standing 
history of class conflict. Turin was the stage of such antagonism with the great 
metalworker strike in 1911 and 1913 and the insurrection of the summer of 1917 
mostly led by women.23 Despite the losses and the high tribute paid in human lives, 
this class antagonism had extended and grew stronger in the present: the eight-hour 
workday was first won in Turin by the autoworkers before the agreement was ratified 
at the national level; in 1918 the Turin proletariat grew large enough to sustain 
economically a local issue of the Socialist newspaper Avanti!24 And lastly it was here 
that May 1, 1919 a group of young socialists – Antonio Gramsci (28), Angelo Tasca 
(28), Umberto Terraccini (24), and Palmiro Togliatti (26) – founded a weekly review 
called L’Ordine Nuovo. 
In its first issues, the review concentrated on a general attempt to find 
“solutions to great social problems that can be reconciled and vivified into a harmonic 
and compact whole through the socialist ideology.”25 But soon this broad scope 
became more and more precise. For the L’Ordine Nuovo intellectuals, production and 
its living dimension had to be thought as the logical point of entry in the revolutionary 
practice. A year later, in the article “The Programme of L’Ordine Nuovo” Gramsci 
wrote that the first, however still vague, objective of the magazine was to “study the 
                                                 
23 See Chapter 4, 244-247 and Paolo Spriano, Torino operaia nella grande Guerra (1914-1918) 
(Torino: Einaudi, 1960). 
24 See Spriano, Introduction, L’Ordine Nuovo, 1919-1920, 15-16.  
25 Angelo Tasca, “Battute di preludio,” L’Ordine Nuovo, 1919-1920, 116.  
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capitalist factory as the necessary form of the working class, as a political organism 
and the ‘national territory’ of workers’ self-government.”26 The driving force of the 
journal thus became the close study of how human skills and dexterity were put to 
work. Zooming in and on the dynamics of modern production meant not only 
disclosing the core of Italian capitalism, but also cultivating a possible new counter-
power that generated its own political and social structure. Thus L’Ordine Nuovo was 
keen on listening to workers’ opinion and printed several writings by workers. The 
writing that follows below penned by Enea Matta, employer of the Lancia firm, allows 
us to catch a glimpse of what was happening at the time in a common Turin body shop 
as well as to understand the possible developments of the conflict over the structures 
of production.  
 
A worker completes a given job in a very short period of 
time, an achievement that would be impossible for other 
workers. This could be due to a higher intelligence, a more 
developed technical ability, sometimes only to stronger 
muscles, or more often to the avidity for earning that can 
debase the worker to a level lower than the beast. [...] One 
may remark that this hunger for profit is useful for the 
increase of production. But this remains open to question, 
and in any case, it would be worth questioning if this 
increase would happen at the price of the creation of an 
environment completely opposed to that which we 
Socialists want to create for the workshop.27
                                                 
26 Antonio Gramsci, Pre-Prison Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 179. 
27 Enea Matta, “Vita operaia. Psicologia da proprietari,” L’Ordine Nuovo, 1919-1920, 138. 
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Here Matta argues against a diffused individualist mentality fostered by work 
organization in the shop. Yet the particular mode of this individualism reveals the 
condition of production in the body shop. At this point, even in the best factories, the 
control over the actual execution was still something that to a certain extent the worker 
could exercise. The most skilled workers could perform their tasks in limited 
productive areas, for the assembly line was introduced in the brand new Lingotto plant 
only in 1919. Though still not completely incorporated into the whole cycle of 
production, the worker had some margins of control over the time and the space s/he 
inhabited. The kind of life lived in the factory environment was geared to production 
only in so far as it pertained to the limited, circumvented realization of a part of the 
labor process.       
To return to Fiat and the figure of Agnelli, it is well know that the latter was an 
admirer of the principles of scientific management of Frederick Winslow Taylor, and 
that he visited the Detroit plants in 1913. Once back the slogan “do like Ford!” 
became Agnelli’s priority, but he probably understood little of the potential of his 
doctrine. He certainly overlooked the most refined non-coercive forms of compulsion 
that the most advanced American factories were developing as the first drive to sustain 
production. Rather than employing extensively the high paying strategy, Agnelli 
preferred the war-time practice of coercive administration of labor. Thus other than the 
oppressive control by the shop intended to prevent soldiering and increase production, 
it was probably the piece work method the only technique introduced to have workers 
embrace the management’s productivist ethic.28  
                                                 
28 Taylor’s book knew in fact only on three re-printings (1915, 1928 and 1952), see Giancarlo Zinoni, 
“Soldiering,” Altronovecento 1 Nov. 1999, 
<http://www.altronovecento.quipo.it/numero1letture1.html>. For the feudal framework of Agnelli’s 
understanding of industrial and labor relations see Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks (New York: International Publisher, 2003), 286.  
27 
This is what Matta (even if working in a different firm) pointed out: piece work 
labor could be effectively contrasted through workers education and active 
solidarity.29 Yet he is careful to stress also the novelties that socialist production had 
to develop from the current modes of production. Such changes were to have a direct 
effect on the life of the worker: the reduction of the toil and the time he or she was 
spending in the factory. In Matta’s words it was important “to produce more and 
better, reducing at the same time the physical effort. For if it is by now self-evident 
that in reducing working hours, one does not need to decrease production, but rather 
one tends to enhance it. Thus it is necessary to study the deficiencies that oppose this 
change.”30 Working less, while producing more--this is the solution that would be 
reached by the demise of the bourgeois command of production. Factory Councils 
were grafted onto this set of labor relations. They were the weapon which the worker 
could used to dismantle the capitalist apparatus of exploitation.  
At this stage of development and despite the management’s harsh, feudal 
control, this notion of the workers self-management of production was still a viable 
option since the formalization and standardization of the labor procedure was largely 
underdeveloped. What F. W. Taylor called “the mass of traditional knowledge” was to 
a certain extent still in the hands of the workers. Even if in fragmented fashion, the 
workers possessed individually specific know-how.31 The task was to recollect and 
reorganize that partiality in a new organization of production which was to be 
qualitatively better than the bourgeois system (though the final result was still 
industrial production). For in an “era of material want and relative limited 
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technological development,” survival was guaranteed only if the productive system 
was protected.32 As Gramsci argued in his polemics against “For Ever” – an anarchist 
who collaborated with L’Ordine Nuovo – failing to meet human necessities and well-
being even “in a village of hundred inhabitants,” will render laughable (or dramatic) 
any “rhetorical enthusiasms and unbridled ranting” on the revolution.33 These were the 
two moments of the revolution: first a transformation of production within the limits 
of certain socio-economic conditions, which is to say of a society still dealing with 
overall material scarcity. Only then, that is to say after overcoming material scarcity, – 
i.e. “the insufficiency of resources that are objectively or subjectively necessary to 
realize any given end valued by human beings” – could a new era emerge, establishing 
a new paradigm for dealing with promoting, and sustaining collective life.34    
Factory Councils were to be this vitalizing structure, the catalyst for a new 
upsurge of social energy that would define a new society with “the cells of the new 
order spring[ing] up spontaneously.” 35 Yet I want to stress that this new birth was 
linked to a framework where the struggle against the realm of necessity was crucial. 
Enea Matta reported “the principle that the workers grasped best is that, before taking 
the revolution to the streets, the problem of creating primary organs for the future 
productive communities must be posed.”36 The workers and their families knew too 
well the outcome of impending poverty and deprivation if production were to fail. In 
order to promote that structural change that would put an end to this misery, the 
ordinovista group devised the simple but revolutionary decision, which was direct 
representation for the workers. It was made public in the famous “editorial coup 
                                                 
32 Bookchin, 37. 
33 Spriano, Introduction, L’Ordine Nuovo, 1919-1920, 652, Gramsci, “The State and Socialism,” Pre-
Prison Writings, 102. 
34 John Kincaid, “Of Time, Body, and Scarcity Policy Options and Theoretic considerations,” 
International Political Science Review 4 (1983): 401. 
35 Gramsci, “The sovereignty of Law,” Pre-Prison Writings, 89.    
36 Matta, “I Consigli di fabbrica all’opera,” L’Ordine Nuovo, 1919-1920, 254-255. 
29 
d’état” against Angelo Tasca in the issue number 7 of the review.37 Here Gramsci, 
together with Palmiro Togliatti, asked a more direct question: “How can the present 
and future be welded together, in such a way as to meet the urgent needs of the present 
and also to work usefully to create and ‘anticipate’ the future?” The response was that 
socialism and “the socialist State already exists, potentially, in the social institutions of 
the exploited working class.”38 The two major institutions of the working class were 
the Italian Socialist Party (henceforth PSI) and the General Confederation of Labor 
(henceforth CGL). The Factory Councils were to be connected, but for reasons that I 
will now turn to, they could not, nor should not, be reduced to them.  
The Intellectual Landscape of the Councils: the Unions and the Party 
The two pillars that sustained the Italian working class were both powerful 
organizations. On one hand there was the union: CGL by 1920 “numbered 1,930,000 
members, of whom over half were industrial workers.” Within this union the 
metalworkers (henceforth FIOM) lead by Bruno Buozzi claimed 160,000.39 On the 
other hand, with the first male suffrage election of 1919, the PSI stood out as the 
single most powerful party – along with the Italian Popular Party (PPI) – and obtained 
as many as 156 seats in the parliament. As we will soon see, during the “two red 
years” the unions and their federation, while claiming to fight for workers’ power, 
were not able and did not intend to embrace such revolutionary change. For Gramsci 
this was because their “syndicalist theory failed completely.”40 He claimed that “trade 
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unionism organizes workers not as producers, but as wage-earners: that is, as creatures 
of the capitalist regime of private ownership, as vendors of the commodity of labor.”41 
The CGL followed in fact a reformist platform. It built its consensus at the beginning 
of the century thanks to a capillary organization of the proletariat that proved effective 
in the struggle for higher wages and the diminution of labor time, but it viewed strikes 
only as an extreme measure and pursued a politics of compromise with the 
government.42 Its unionism fully operated within the capitalist framework and 
ultimately did not undermine it. 
The PSI was in a better position and retained (at least until the occupation of 
the factories) a strategic role for Gramsci and the whole ordinovista group. The 
maximalist faction, the radical anti-capitalist wing of the party, outnumbered the 
reformists of Filippo Turati (1857-1932) and Claudio Treves (1869-1933) and decided 
in the Bologna congress of October 1919 that “the existing institutions of local and 
national government [could] be transformed into organs that [would] help to liberate 
people.” They expressed the need to “use new proletarian organizations such as 
worker’s soviets,” and the will to “adhere to the Third International.”43 As it will 
become clear during the struggle of the Factory Councils in Turin, the gap between 
this “orgy of revolutionary language” and its practical application was unassailable. 44 
Party members’ “social power” was exercised not on a real direct participation of the 
base but “by indirect means, by prestige and enthusiasm, by authoritarian pressure – 
even inertia.”45  This was due to the failure of its leadership to understand and exploit 
the revolutionary process. It was probably a suspicious approach, if not a mistrust of 
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the Russian Revolution as a political event, at least with regard to the theoretical 
import that this radical break had produced in western history. 
Gramsci was one of the first to understand the theoretical consequences of the 
October Revolution. In a monumental article written for Avanti! he argued that this 
was “a revolution against Karl Marx’s Capital.”46 Gramsci believed that Bolsheviks 
generated a rupture in history because “they [were] not Marxists; they [had] not used 
the Master’s works to compile a rigid doctrine, made up of dogmatic and 
unquestionable claims. They [were] living out Marxist thought” free from “positivist 
and naturalist incrustations.”47 I will address this gesturing toward subjectivism later 
on, but for now it is important to underscore that Gramsci understood the unexpected 
seizure of power by the Bolsheviks as the opening of a new behavior that radically 
corrected the mechanist direction that guided official Italian Marxism – a widespread 
optimistic fatalism that saw in the purely linear unfolding of the means of production 
an inexorable road towards the revolution.    
This theoretical discovery became the key for answering the impending 
catastrophe that was threatening modern western societies, i.e. the understanding for 
Gramsci that the bourgeoisies as the champions of progress qua nation-state building 
had “become incapable of this domination, because they ha[d] brought into being in 
the present destructive forces like crisis and unemployment, etc., every bit as 
dangerous and terrifying as those of the past.”48 In the essay “The Programme of 
L’Ordine Nuovo,” Gramsci remembers the general apocalyptic feeling that in fact 
loomed over the nation: “we felt desperate, disoriented, swept up in the fervor of those 
months that followed the armistice, when it seemed as though Italian society was 
                                                 
46 Gramsci, “The Revolution Against Capital,” Pre-Prison Writings, 39. 
47 Gramsci, “The Revolution Against Capital,” Pre-Prison Writings, 40. 
48 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 358. 
32 
heading for an imminent cataclysm.”49 The apparent closure of this political situation, 
despite the great changes that were taking place in the international context, was due 
mainly to the two dominating political forces and the theoretical framework in which 
they were operating. The capitalists, even if in the agony of an imminent collapse, held 
on tightly to their power while the working class still lacked the force to overthrow 
them.  
Was this due to the military weakness of the anti-capitalist movement? It 
probably was, but only in so far as the real theoretical approach to the overturning of 
the capitalist order did not have its own solution. The urgency of the situation was 
widely understood, but the think-tank of the PSI sublimated it to the rhetoric of the 
ineluctable collapse of capitalism itself. This position was best embodied by Socialist 
maximalist leader Giacinto Menotti Serrati who “fully shared the ‘fatalism’ of the PSI 
leadership in the sense that he thought a revolution could not be forced or even 
‘prepared’; in the crisis of capitalism the revolutionary moment would come.”50 The 
menace paradoxically fed on an even more passive attitude: of a general and abstract 
preparedness which, instead of pushing towards concrete action to take hold of the 
course of events, fomented an intellectualization of the problem which was released 
into the ranting of a (rhetorical) call to arms.   
Against this mixture of stoic expectation and dogmatic historical determinism, 
the ordinovista group had a concrete answer. The transformation had to begin inside 
the factory and then reach out to the whole of society. Thus they proposed changing 
the existing institution of the internal commissions into the more organically 
combative structure: the Factory Councils. The unsettling force of the Factory 
Councils was so disturbing that when confronted with the campaign launched by the 
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ordinovisti, Serrati bawled “This is the realm of aberration!”51 The Factory Councils’ 
scandal had to do with a basic and radical democratic principle or in Gramsci’s 
language a structural element of “proletarian freedom.”52 Councils had to be 
constituted on the basis of a principle of one head, one vote. The notion was one 
ordinovisti advocated for all the workers, even the unorganized, along the lines that 
workers and peasants had to be organized by unity of production, i.e. not along craft-
lines as in usual trade-unions.53 In “Worker’s Democracy,” echoing the platform 
traced by the Industrial Workers of the World (henceforth IWW), Gramsci and 
Togliatti declared:   
 
The workshop commissions are organs of worker’s 
democracy which must be freed from the constraints 
imposed on them by the bosses, and infused with a 
new life and energy. At the moment, these 
commissions have the task of curbing the power the 
capitalist exerts within the factory, and they perform 
an arbitrational and disciplinary function. In the 
future, developed and improved, they should be the 
organs of proletarian power, replacing the capitalist 
in all his useful managerial and administrative 
functions.54  
 
                                                 
51 Williams, Proletarian Order, 157. 
52 Gramsci, “The Programme of L’Ordine Nuovo,” Pre-Prison Writings, 181; on the development of the 
internal commissions into Factory Councils see Battista Santhià, Con Gramsci all’Ordine Nuovo 
(Roma: Editore Riuniti, 1956), 50-60 and Mario Guarnieri, I consigli di fabbrica (Città di Castello: Il 
Solco, 1921).  
53 Lepre, 114. 
54 Gramsci “Worker’s Democracy,” Pre-Prison Writings, 98. 
34 
The idea was to give direct representation to that “disorderly and chaotic energies” 
brought into the class struggle by mass industrialization and the forced recruitment of 
thousands of new (mostly peasants and women) workers. The change in class 
composition is central here. The unorganized represented a menace for the power 
structure that CGL – or as for the Turin shops, FIOM – had built in years of struggles 
against the owners. It was a mixture of loyalty to the union and to the party’s doctrine 
and a relative passivity in the delegation of powers to these institutions. On the one 
hand the union leadership overlooked the revolutionary potential sprouting from the 
subjection to capitalism of this new segment of the population, recently eradicated by 
its semi-feudal country life. They not only looked down upon this experiment, but saw 
it as a threat to the vertical organization (along craft-lines) of their institution. The 
result was that they set out to wage a conservative, corporate battle against it.55  
The ordinovista experiment, on the other hand, aimed at opening spaces of 
freedom in the crystallized union bureaucracy of workers’ representation. It promoted 
a vitalizing of the structure of workers’ power against its ossified institutionalization. 
Furthermore, they not only understood theoretically that the renovation of the internal 
commissions had to cling to the new composition of the labor force and give voice to 
it, but they were also keen in embracing a growing autonomist way of thinking that the 
workers themselves began to develop in 1918.56 Martin Clark writes that  
 
a group of workers at the Farina factory in Turin 
wrote to the Socialist Party newspaper Avanti!, 
asking whether the Internal members of the 
Commission should represent the working class or 
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the Union; and three members of the Commission 
replied that they represented the workers in the Farina 
plant, not FIOM, since they were elected by the 
workers, not the Union.57
 
By 1918 internal commissions already had a sound history behind them (they were 
first officially recognized in “an agreement signed between […] FIOM and the Turin 
car firm Itala” in 1906), and they acted mainly as “temporary bodies for specific 
grievances, with very limited functions and well under the control of the Unions.”58 
Pressed by the needs of their members, the institutional functioning of the 
commissions was slowly producing the conditions of their own mutation. This 
explains why for Gramsci the structure of workers’ representation had to be closely 
tied to the form of the labor process; they had to be nourished from this new form of 
life that labor itself was gradually engendering. Accordingly, the task of L’Ordine 
Nuovo was to provide a space for voicing and at the same time, clarifying the 
problems and directions of this new form of life, the “real life of an avant-garde 
proletariat such as the Turinese proletariat.”59 L’Ordine Nuovo was a communicative 
(propagandist) tool and simultaneously a meaning making-mechanism aimed at 
defining the stakes, the conditions of possibilities, and the virtual lines of projection of 
this new structure of workers’ power.  
Yet it was not only the union or the PSI who opposed the ordinovista platform. 
Even the left of the Socialist Party openly attacked the Councils Movement. Amedeo 
Bordiga’s magazine Soviet for instance, often criticized the Councils because he 
believed they could easily turn into a masked form of gradualism. Targeting his men 
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as well who in Turin participated in the Councils Movement, Bordiga stated that this 
“technico-economic training in the communist system […] whether it is called 
reformism or syndicalism, is defined by the mistaken belief that the proletariat can 
achieve emancipation by making advances in economic relations while capitalism still 
holds political power through the State.”60 One can see the theoretical point Bordiga 
wants to score. He does not emphasize the danger of a possible cooptation of this new 
institution, but instead declares its artificiality precisely on the basis of two 
assumptions he shares with the ordinovisti: the critique against syndicalism as a 
regulator in labor commodity, and the idea that it is production that grounds class 
conflict and its potential resolution. Consequently, when articulating his theory of the 
new communist party, Bordiga limited membership on the basis of a strict 
understanding of the proletariat. Artisans and medium lower classes sympathetic to 
communist ideals were to be excluded if they proved to “liv[e] on the labor of others.” 
He argued that “some workers, even union men, could be excluded from the electoral 
lists of the civic political soviet, if, in addition to their labor in the factory, they lived 
from proceeds of a small monetary or landed capital.”61  
Bordiga’s critique of the Councils, however, seems still locked in a strictly 
deterministic understanding of the stages of development of society. As a result, his 
political thought seems blocked by the split between the misery of the present and the 
promise of the plenitude of the future. The latter cannot be extracted from the present 
as Gramsci believes. Only the struggle for the conquest of political power via the 
communist party military action can achieve such a change.62 Control over production 
by itself merely reproduces the productive mode in force. As the break must be 
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absolute, the difference of the social order must be produced through a radical process 
of negation of the capitalist order.  
To this disjointed understanding of the relations between the present and the 
future revolution, Gramsci argued that one cannot simply anticipate the future by a 
pure political act of an enlightened minority. The function of the Factory Councils is 
precisely to form a sort of bacteriological colony that incubates the new. For in a 
society dominated by the bourgeois class “the actual unfolding of the revolutionary 
process takes place subterraneously, in the murky depths of the factory and of the 
minds of the countless multitudes that capitalism subjects to its laws.”63 This 
unfolding, molded in the sphere of production, is political insofar as it is related to the 
contradictions arising from the clash between the forces of production. For Gramsci, 
revolution as the radical change that creates a new form of life cannot arise from “an 
arbitrary act of an organization that declares itself to be revolutionary.”64 The Factory 
Councils are precisely the first site where workers practice the emergence of the new 
society, by understanding their own nature as “instrument[s] of production in a given 
organic system.”65 So that if workers “build upon it a representative apparatus that has 
all the hallmarks of a State,” that is “the absolute, organic, closely corresponding to a 
reality that must be organized if bread, clothing, housing and industrial production are 
to be guaranteed,” they are actually beginning to produce and fully live that future that 
capitalist modernity is giving them in a mutilated, distorted and oppressive form.66  
The life engendered by the Factory Councils was for Gramsci the multiple and 
open-ended actualization of the new order. A new order though that was grafted onto a 
common base, that of productivism as the way of escaping from scarcity. Proceeding 
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from the transformation of workers from wage-earners to producers, the Councils 
Movement aimed at radically altering every aspect of everyday life. The dissolution of 
social relationships constituted by wage-labor and their replacement with a system of 
production which was collectively owned, developed and managed would have 
determined a new concept of life both at an individual as well as a public dimension. 
The scope of this project was essentially biopolitical, for as Guy Debord explained “in 
the power of the Councils […] the proletarian movement is its own product and this 
product is the producer himself.”67 Its practical realization however was crashed 
before it had any chance to take its first steps.     
The Councils drawn into the Struggle: 1920 April’s Occupation and Defeat 
It was in these conditions, caught between the Scylla of Bordighist 
sectarianism and the Charybdis of the PSI mechanistic position, that the Turin 
Councils were pushed into a major conflict by the newly reorganized General 
Confederation of Industrialists (henceforward Confindustria). Early in 1920, several 
strikes (polygraphists, rail workers) had paralyzed the Italian state, creating great 
apprehension among the bourgeoisie. For the industrialist leadership, the times were 
ripe to strike the first blow. The pretext concerned the introduction of the legal time 
certified on March 21. “Legal time was a characteristic feature of war-time Industrial 
Mobilization, and its introduction was thought to indicate the bourgeois government’s 
desire to maintain war-time industrial conditions.”68 On March 22 the members of the 
Internal Commissions of FIAT reset the clock and were “dismissed for 
insubordination, whereupon the workers decided on an ‘internal strike’ – i.e. they 
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stopped work, but remained inside the factory.”69 The next day workers from the 
FIAT Acciaierie [steel plant] too went on strike since “their demand that members of 
the Internal Commission should be paid for the time they spent on their duties was 
refused. […] Both these disputes were seen by workers and employers alike as matters 
of principle; in both of them, the employers’ authority within the workshop was the 
issue at stake.”70 The internal strike spread throughout Turin and “on March 29 the 
industrialist retaliated with a lock-out” supported by the army. But it was only on the 
day of the settlement (April 11) that the industrialists launched their frontal assault.  
They “put forward a scheme to deprive the Internal Commissions of most of their 
functions.”71  
As the Prefect of Turin wired the Ministry of Interior the “point of 
disagreement consist[ed] mainly in the industrialist’s firm intention to introduce norms 
into the agreement to regulate and discipline the Internal Commissions… this would 
represent a withdrawal of recognition from the present state of affairs agreed on, or at 
least tolerated, in the factories.”72 Their intentions were already articulated in the 
March Congress, when Gino Olivetti, the general secretary stated that it was 
unacceptable “to admit inside the workshop a power independent from the company 
management.”73 The industrialist’s new scheme was the ultimate consequence of the 
war against the Councils, for the chances of a victory would have had a deep impact at 
a national level.74 Workers were quite aware of what was at stake and, in the whole 
Piedmont area, 120,000 metal workers stop working for a whole month (the rest of 
them for at least ten days). As Gramsci proudly recalls, this meant that “in these last 
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ten days, the general strike encompassed the whole of Piedmont, mobilizing about half 
a million industrial and agricultural workers, which is to say it involved about four 
million of the population.”75  
The reaction of the industrialists backed by the government was impressive. 
The scope was to isolate the hotbed of the movement. The city of Turin was rapidly 
put under siege with almost 50,000 soldiers patrolling the streets: “around the city, 
cannon and machine-guns were placed at strategic points.”76 In the middle of this 
fierce struggle the PSI not only disavowed the strikers, but also decided to move the 
national convention from Turin to Milan. Later Gramsci sarcastically wrote:  
 
At that time the Party National Council [PSI] was due 
to be held in Turin; however, its venue was 
transferred to Milan, for a city “in the grip of a 
general strike” was not thought to be a suitable 
theatre for socialist discussion. […] While in the city 
of Turin the workers were courageously defending 
the Factory Councils – the first organizations to be 
based on workers’ democracy and embodying 
proletarian power – in Milan the leaders were 
chatting about theoretical projects and methods for 
creating Councils as a form of political power to be 
won by the proletariat. There were discussions on 
how to systematize conquests not yet won, while the 
Turin proletariat was abandoned to its fate and the 
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bourgeoisie given the opportunity of destroying 
whatever power the workers had already won.77
 
The rest of the PSI was equally unsupportive. Even its maximalist faction barely went 
as far to express a general solidarity with the Turin workers. So as the forces withered 
away, the isolation of the Turin workers became unbearable. By the end of April, the 
strike was over and the leader of the CGL was charged with signing an “honorable” 
agreement.  
The industrialists had won their first battle; they were able to create a more 
cohesive coordination, while the workers’ claim over the control of production was 
beaten back. At the national level, this implied that the Turin vanguards were 
marginalized. A severe break was introduced between them and the rest of the 
socialist movement in the country. Yet this defeat provoked not only an unequivocal 
split between the workers and their institutions (the unions and the party), but it also 
produced a deep internal crisis in the ordinovista group. Gramsci was practically 
isolated: Togliatti and Terracini sided with the maximalist group; Tasca with the 
union.78 During the Second Congress of the Third International, the group was 
portrayed by the Italian delegates as a bunch of adventurists, undisciplined idealists 
and anarchists. But only a few months later, Lenin made clear that the ordinovista 
platform and the struggle in the factories were “in the main correct and […] fully in 
keeping with the fundamental principles of the Third International.”79  
Meanwhile, by the summer of the 1920 the economic situation worsened. The 
omens of an imminent new economic crisis loomed over the whole country. The 
FIOM was negotiating salary increases, but the industrialists, well aware of their new 
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strength, decided it was time for the showdown. A Confindustria representative made 
this clear at the end of a three day meeting which achieved nothing. He said “since the 
end of the war, they’ve [industrialists] done nothing but drop down their pants. We’ve 
done enough. Now we’re going to start on you.”80       
Bouzzi’s answer was obstructionism. FIOM opted for a tactic of slow-down 
(also known as go-slow), a form of struggle designed to lessen the consequences for 
the workers who, while slowing down hurt production, but still maintained their 
salary.81 This sort of strike on the job had proved very effective in the summer of 
1917, when the IWW mobilized the lumber workers paralyzing the entire state of 
Washington. The FIOM had also decided that “if any industrialist tried to counter 
obstruction with a lockout, then the workers would have to take possession of the 
factories.”82 From the beginning, the new Giolitti government chose a different 
approach to worker agitation. Giolitti had appointed the socialist philosopher Antonio 
Labriola as Minister of Labor, who had tried from the outset to bring the two 
opponents to an agreement. On August 30 of 1920 the lockout began in Milan at the 
Romeo factory, and then later the occupations rapidly spread. By the beginning of 
September they took over almost the whole peninsula.83 The industrialist pressed for 
military intervention, but Giolitti simply decided to wait it out. The fear of an armed 
revolution skyrocketed. In a telephone conversation between Luigi Albertini the 
director of Il Corriere della Sera, and the journalist Giovanni Amendola, Albertini 
argued that it was time to “give power to the CGL,” prompting an astonished 
Amendola to reply: “But isn’t there anything we can do not to make the revolution?” 
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to which Albertini replied “Precisely. The only way to avoid the revolution is to give 
power to the CGL.”84  
The revolution almost happened. During the national council of the CGL in 
Milan, the leaders of the union met the party directorate and asked them to take the 
full responsibility for the military insurrection, submitting at the same time their 
resignation. The day after the revolution was decided by ballot. It was rejected by a 
majority of 591,245 against 409,569.85 The political solution that the government 
imposed on the industrialists that the union boasted of as victory spoke generally of 
workers’ control, and it remained a parliamentary project which was forgotten as the 
economic crisis deepened. Giolitti had accomplished his masterpiece. He would do the 
same thing with fascism a few years later but tragically failing to obtain the same 
results.  
Thanks to what Angelo Tasca called a “retreat forward,” the incorporation of 
the institution would come full circle.86 At the national level, the reformists, in accord 
with Giolitti, chose as the output of the occupation to transform workers’ control into 
“a trade-union corporative control.” The arrangement “of a top-down control, devoid 
of any real power in the hands of workers” was a “stimulus to production, an 
instrument for economic renaissance,” which injected in the workers’ a certain form of 
optimistic mentality while reinforcing a strong productivist ethic.87   
After the two red years, the situation was finally stabilized through an 
institutionalization that carefully blocked any real production of alternative modes of 
living. In Charles Maier terms:  
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 To reconsolidate that social order was the overriding aim of 
conservative thought and action after 1918. It was the 
essential effort for the old right, often catalytic for the 
emergence of the radical new right, and a preoccupation as 
well as for many progressives not on the right at all. […] It 
was an effort that was largely successful, even if the victory 
required significant institutional transformation. For there 
was no simple restoration. While Europeans sought stability 
in the image of a prewar bourgeois society, they were 
creating new institutional arrangements and distributions of 
power. […] In each case corporatism meant growth of 
private power and the twilight of sovereignty.88
 
It is here that capitalism leaves behind its liberal phase, to create a new equilibrium 
while transforming itself, and leaving untouched the prerogatives of its system. It is 
the realization in full of state capitalism, of something Marx had seen already 
developing with the rise of the first stock companies, which is to say the “abolition of 
capitalist private industry on the basis of the capitalist system itself.”89 It is also the 
second phase of Gramsci’s thought that I will now readdress in a more explicitly 
theoretical perspective. 
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1.2 The Councils and their Philosophical Translation 
Historian Charles S. Maier has argued that “the major proposals of the socialist 
left during the 1919-1920 centered around Factory Councils, nationalization, and 
economic planning,” but “it was the Councils Movement that embodied the most 
radical potential.”90 This potential was at once practical and theoretical. As I noticed 
earlier, even if grafted onto the productivist needs of modernity, the Councils for 
Gramsci functioned as virtual structures that contained the seed of a new political 
order and of a new way of fashioning collective life. In the following pages, I will 
underscore the role played by Councils in philosophical terms. I will argue that from 
the Factory Councils’ practice Gramsci forged a theoretical apparatus for the critique 
of mechanist and idealist doctrines. In other words, the Councils as a structure of 
worker’s subjectivity are the means to bring into being a materialist theory of totality 
devoid of any metaphysical residue that would render its application in practice 
inadequate – i.e. the metaphysical (dualistic) positions of Benedetto Croce and 
Giovanni Gentile’s neo-idealism, and the orthodox Marxism of the leadership of the 
PSI and the reformist agenda of the unions.91 Once I clarify this point, I will explore 
Gramsci’s theorization of the experience of the Councils and his gesturing towards a 
biopolitical dimension of production. This is not a mere digression, for the critique of 
an idealist and positivist approach is key to the proper understanding of the issues 
biopolitics raises. Insofar as it brings to the foreground the natural dimension of 
production, biopolitics in fact needs to be linked to its human-like form without 
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loosing contact with the natural substratum it relies on. Idealism and positivism, on the 
contrary, chose one element over the other, thus creating distortions and dangerous 
consequences at a political level.  
Labriola’s Influence: Understanding Materialist Finitization  
In order to understand Gramsci’s discovery of the Councils as revolutionary 
structures, I followed the historiographical tradition that usually mentions Gramsci’s 
famous piece on “The Revolution against Capital” in which his “anti-positivist critique 
takes on a direct political meaning.”92 Yet despite the Russian example he advocates, 
theoretically Gramsci’s anti-positivism owes much to the philosophy of Antonio 
Labriola (1843-1904). The Neapolitan philosopher was the first to open a space for an 
effective elaboration of Marxist principles in Italian philosophy, the first to position 
historical materialism as that philosophy of praxis that would supersede the other two 
major currents of Italian philosophy: idealism and positivism, particularly its orthodox 
Marxist offspring, or as Labriola called it “naturalistic materialism.”93 For the sake of 
synthesis, I will condense the many contributions of Labriola’s thought to one 
element: the de-mythologizing of a peculiar subjectivist tendency, spread through 
Gentile’s actualism and Croce’s thought, that seemed to be the only antidote to its 
opposite, but correlative process of positivist naturalization.94  
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As the young Gramsci would say, the positivist vulgarization of Marxism had 
turned Marx’s insights into “a kind of natural law, operating deterministically, quite 
outside men’s will.” People such as Claudio Treves or Filippo Turati (the reformist 
wing of the PSI) had fashioned Marxism into “the doctrine of the inertia of the 
proletariat.”95 Against the erosion of a concrete space of action, which orthodox 
Marxists branded with the shameful accusation of voluntarism, idealism seemed to 
provide a more practicable ground for the developing of men’s capacity to intervene in 
reality. Yet, it was precisely Labriola who carefully marked the differences between a 
Marxist practice and the idealist-subjectivist concretion of reality. Let’s begin with 
Labriola assessment of idealism in general.    
Returning to Frederick Engel’s Anti-Dühring (1818), Labriola argues that the 
kernel of idealism is in general metaphysical.  
 
The metaphysical way of thinking has the following 
characteristics: In the first place, it regards as self-
dependent things, as things independent of one another, 
those modes of thought, which are in reality modes 
only to the extent that they represent points of 
correlation and transition in a process; in the second 
place, it regards these modes of thought as existing 
before the fact.96
 
By taking into account instead the concrete historicity of humankind, the philosophy 
of praxis “gives the last blow to all forms of idealism which regard actually existing 
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things as […] a priori thought, thought before the fact.”97 These idealist 
generalizations that tend to elevate a singularity to the degree of an a priori are 
criticized by the understanding, on one side, of the specific relations that everything 
maintains with its (social) totality, and on the other, with the purposive nature of any 
human construct. Against these determinations, the philosophy of praxis’s thought 
always takes up the form of labor, i.e. a human-processual activity, “a process of 
creation in perpetuity.”98  
The interconnectedness and the purposive nature of any human activity also 
helps de-mythologize the vulgar form of materialism in use among the Socialist 
leadership of the time, a sort of scientism that worked via “a short cut from economic 
conditions to mental reflections.”99 Here the epistemological problem of cognition that 
idealism poses is pushed to its full consequences. We cannot determine the univocal 
relationship between the economic and the anthropological dimension, which is to say 
that we do not know the thing in itself, for if it exceeds the subject-object relation it is 
by definition unknowable. Idealism here has easily the upper hand. Giovanni Gentile 
rightfully maintains that reality 
 
Is not posited as the result of a process already completed 
and perfect, and this result does not stand confronting 
thought as a mystery. It is a mystery, for it is posited and 
we ask in vain: Who posits it? The positive is posited in so 
far as it actually posits itself, re-entering into that being 
which is in so far as it is thought. The positive rather than 
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something posited is really the self-positing [of a 
subject].100
 
The moment we ask who posited reality we are shaping it in its relationality with us. 
This is correct, but for the people who are not well versed in philosophical subtleties, 
the reality that stands in front of them is not a self-positing act of their thought. It 
stands as the harvest or the flooding that could kill the peasants. It is something very 
concrete and out of their direct control. Consequently, unless you snobbishly dismiss 
people’s common sense as boorish, idealism, praised as the sacred limits to knowledge 
by “a vast number of quietists on the field of reason,” drifts toward an awkward kind 
of “agnosticism” that naïve Marxists mistook for an undisputable sign of bourgeois 
crisis.101 Labriola instead argues that Marxism cannot neglect this point by simply 
affirming a presupposed superiority to bourgeois weakness. Such an attitude falls into 
an empty arbitrary empiricism, i.e. one that lacks that historical relational quality that 
serves as a correction of idealism. Moreover it pushes toward that fatalistic optimism 
that contaminated the think-tank of the PSI which endorsed an all-powerful rule of the 
economic (the revolution due to the imminent collapse of capitalism) over the non-
economic (the actualization of the subjective/revolutionary goal).    
On the contrary, Labriola believes that idealist “agnosticism renders us 
[Marxists] a great service.” The idealist agnostic dogma is the attempt to solve a 
concrete problem in a distorted way, or as Labriola phrases, it is an endeavor that lacks 
“the courage of truth.”102 “By feeling regret for the impossibility of knowing this 
alleged mystery,” the agnostic thinkers “arrive in their own way” at the “same result 
that we [Marxists] do, only we do not regret, but rather seek knowledge without the 
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assistance of imagination.” The epistemological limit as the foundation of knowledge 
is not mystified in the sacred dogma of the unknowable, in the mourning of the 
absence of a fixed truth, but rather it is vivified as a dynamic principle of praxis. The 
result is that “human beings learn all they must know by an infinite process of labor, 
which is experience, and of experience, which is labor.”103 Labor is action and then 
the experience of that action, just as the understanding of the physiographical situation 
of a territory grows out of the close relationship of the peasants who work the land. 
This collective knowledge, one may call it science, is the product of a specific society 
that orients its labor and energies to fulfill the needs established by its ruling strata.  
But through the experience of their labor, humans are also subjected to further 
change. As Engels wrote “the hand is not only the organ of labor, it is also the product 
of labor.”104 The philosophy of praxis represents a secular understanding of the 
impenetrability of agnosticism as a logical boundary that furnishes the basis for human 
self-transformative activities. Antonio Labriola’s main contribution was to bring to the 
foreground one of Marx’s fundamental discoveries that Gramsci used as a guiding 
principle in his definition of the philosophy of praxis. It is the principle of the absolute 
immanence of praxis as it appears in the preface of The Critique of Political Economy. 
“Mankind,” he writes, “inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve […] 
the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already 
present or at least in the course of formation.”105  
The working out of a series of solutions of course does not imply its ultimate 
solution. But through this infinite process of individuation of solutions, in short 
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through labor, the subject comes into its own, and simultaneously through that same 
labor’s mediations the subject changes its being. This is the critical understanding of 
the condition of possibility not of the subject as an abstract entity (i.e. the idealist a 
priori), nor as a merely empiric agent, but rather as a concrete task-oriented agent that 
operates upon and against reality. This is the subjective space that Labriola assesses 
and urges an investigation of without falling into an improper subjectification or an 
equally empty determinism.  
Immanence as Theory: Overcoming Croce and Gentile  
The problem for Gramsci was criticizing the mechanist view without falling 
into the metaphysical and dogmatic assumptions of idealism. This is a narrow passage, 
because there are at least two similarities between philosophy of praxis and 
neoidealism that could generate confusion: immanentism, i.e. reality as fully inherent 
to the self-transformative activity of subjectivity (or the Spirit), and monism, i.e. the 
absence of a duality between these last two. Neoidealism is a philosophy of becoming 
as a human, historical process. But what is the object of this becoming? For Benedetto 
Croce the being of the becoming is human history, for Giovanni Gentile the 
spontaneous/pure act of the subject.106 Gramsci argued that both conceptions were 
metaphysical and carried out, without acknowledging, different ideologies. 
It would be impossible to summarize the philosophy of Benedetto Croce 
(1866-1952) in a few lines. Suffice to say that in his reformulation of Hegel’s 
dialectic, the Spirit does not move thanks to the overcoming of contradictions 
(oppositions), but organically circulates among distinct forms that are not reducible to 
a final synthesis. The four categories of the Spirit (theoretical, practical, universal, 
particular) are distinct even though they implicate each other. The Spirit never 
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synthesized these categories, but circulates indefinitely among them, manifesting itself 
precisely in distinct forms. For example, as the theoretical thought that thinks the 
particular (sensuous) the aesthetic embodies a distinct and determinate moment of the 
Spirit. As the theoretical activity that thinks the universal (ideal), the Spirit reaches a 
philosophical stage which is always idealism. But as the understanding of a truly 
universal and, at the same time, determined content, it is also historical knowledge. 
Being the pure reflection on concrete human-like becoming, idealist philosophy is thus 
always historiography.107  
Gramsci valued the subjective element of neoidealism, and especially Croce’s 
insistence on philosophy as history. The problem is that this variant of neoidealism 
appears as the “retranslation into speculative language of the realist historicism of the 
philosophy of practice.”108 Severing theoretical (philosophy, aesthetic) from practical 
activity (ethics, economy), neoidealism falls into the mystification of its own activity, 
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for it generates a theory that masks its position and frames history into an essentialist 
notion of truth. What is lacking in Croce is the awareness of the ideological nature of 
his reflection, that is to say the “concrete instrumental value” that every philosophy 
carries within a given society.109 On the contrary philosophy of praxis is linked to  
 
the subjective [philosophy as history] conception of reality 
in so far as it turns this latter upside down, explaining it as 
a historical fact, as the ‘historical subjectivity of a social 
group,’ as a real fact which presents itself as a phenomenon 
of philosophical ‘speculation’ while it is simply a practical 
act, the form assumed by a concrete social content and the 
way that the whole of society is led to fashion a moral 
unity for itself.110    
 
Croce’s idealism is only apparently an open dialectical thought, by masking its social 
character through its logical categories; it fails to express the ideological content that it 
carries. It determines the truth of becoming, not in its historical determinations, but 
through a subjective point of view that is posited as comprehensive, where in fact is 
partial. Croce for Gramsci represents the ideologue of the liberal state that praises an 
overarching idea of liberty which is instead the result of a hidden oppression, and that 
produces the illusion of change only within its accepted limits, never questioning the 
exception that funds its domain.   
In this line of thought, idealism is also responsible for another kind of 
partiality. “Immanentist philosophies in general consist precisely in the fact that they 
                                                 
109 Gramsci, Further Selection, 344. 
110 Gramsci, Further Selection, 348. 
54 
have not been able to create an ideological unity between the bottom and the top, 
between the simple (common people) and the intellectuals.”111 Whereas a universal 
philosophical movement “in the process of elaborating a form of thought superior to 
‘common sense’ and coherent on a scientific plane, it never forgets to remain in 
contact with the ‘simple,’ and indeed finds in this contact the source of the problems it 
sets out to study and to resolve.” It is only through this contact that “a philosophy 
becomes historical, purifies itself of intellectualistic elements of an individual 
character and becomes “life.”112 Gramsci here targets Croce’s elitism. His assumption 
of having thoroughly comprehended the universal nature of change is shown to be 
utterly partial and hierarchical. Life for Gramsci is instead an organic connection 
between common sense and science, one that is truly universal as it expresses the 
understanding (theory) and thus the changing (practice) of the conditions of 
oppression (necessity).   
The subjective/historical relationality prompted by philosophy of praxis also 
differs from the subjective synthesis of Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944), the illustrious 
minister of education under fascism (1922-1924) and the regime’s most prominent 
philosopher. Gentile’s idealism tended toward a strong actualization of reality – that is 
to say reality is always related to the activity of a thinking subject – which may be 
misunderstood for that unity of theory and practice that Labriola and Gramsci shared. 
It is true that for the young Gramsci, Gentile’s actualism represented “a radical 
reaffirmation of the freedom of human will,” as well as “a starting point for [his] anti-
determinist dispute.”113 It is also true that Gramsci’s language shows a distinct 
actualist flavor when, for instance, he calls the Russian revolution “an act of the 
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proletarian spirit.”114 Historically, it can even be demonstrated that for some militants 
of the younger generation, Gentile’s emphasis on the “creative élan” as a call to act 
upon reality played the role of the occult master of Italian communism.”115 Yet, 
theoretically speaking, the distance between the two schools is noteworthy. For 
Gramsci, Gentile’s “ultra-speculative philosophy” is an always interior (partial) 
subjective determination of a non-critical subjectivity. 
According to Gentile, dialectic unfolds between the “thing thought” (as a 
reality that is thought about) and the “thinking outside of which there is no 
thought.”116 Now the thing thought is not an abstract given entity, but an “activity” 
which involves a “will” to re-create the world in the very act of apprehension.117 Thus 
reality is the Spirit as it is actualized in the present, in a lived reality. Gentile 
recognizes Hegel for having posited reality as the movement of the Spirit, but he 
criticizes him for having thought becoming as something that grows out the 
indefiniteness of being, that is to say an encompassing totality non-reducible to the 
activity of the subject.118 Gentile’s actualism instead sees the becoming of the Spirit as 
radically immanent to the act of thinking, “outside of which,” as we said, “there is no 
thought.”119  
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The result is often an authoritarian crystallization of power relations or worse, 
as in fascism, the justification for a reactionary violence, for the subject, unaware of its 
own mediations, enjoys the illusion of unrestrained power. This subject swallows 
everything, but in smashing the deterministic view of naturalist materialism, it pays a 
high price. Its process of interiorization knows no outside to the extent that the 
external is repressed and projected onto the subject’s own self-activity. As Benito 
Mussolini argued: “one must recognize in the relativism of life and action [of fascism] 
an absolute supremacy over intellect.” Thus fascism’s “elating [elevatistica] critique 
has erased [the positivist/Marxist] historicist and democratic mentality in which the 
historical outcome is always known beforehand.”120 What is left to the subject is an 
open, blank territory to dominate. The world reverses into the manifestation of the 
subject’s will: without being a purely solipsistic exercise, this concrete but crudely 
arbitrary act of force gives the lie to the righteousness of its praxis, forgetting the 
importance of “safeguarding precisely exteriority (contingence, eventfulness).”121
Summarizing Gramsci’s critique of Gentile and Croce entails the uplifting of 
two of their most important philosophical contributions.122 From Croce, Gramsci 
derives indefiniteness as the organic process of change that avoids the reductions of a 
strictly deterministic philosophy. Only he does not predicate it on an abstract claim for 
the infinite circulation of the Spirit, but on the concrete, dynamic contradictions that 
are at work in society. From Gentile he derives exactly the opposite, the concretion 
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that human processes take up as task oriented activity. Only he disavows the subject’s 
unrelatedness, and the authoritarian and essentialist nature of its determinations. 
Concretion and indefiniteness come together in a constantly open process of 
individuation that guides the philosophy of praxis. In emphasizing this process of 
immanent finitization, I slightly depart from the reading that Leonardo Paggi offers – 
probably one of the best readers and systematizers of Gramsci’s thought. Paggi argues 
that the break with orthodox Marxism entails for Gramsci the reassessment of the 
relations between the economic and the social, i.e. structure and superstructure. The 
economic represents the realm of the immanent, the non-economic the locus of the 
“subjective conception of reality.” Paggi goes on to say that “between the two 
moments, immanence and subjective conception, it is the latter which Gramsci 
emphasizes more” and uses in criticizing “positivism” as well as idealism via “the 
concept of prediction, the historicity of ideologies and their identification with 
philosophy.”123  
These last three elements constitute the point of arrival for Gramsci, but only 
as forms of an unbreakable dialectical relation between immanence and a subjectivist 
conception of reality. Let’s first begin with immanence. The immanence of production 
does not constitute a plane of univocal determinations, but rather a problematizing 
field. A simple example that Gramsci uses in the Prison Notebooks while discussing 
the nature of men would make this point more intelligible. Gramsci quotes 
Feuerbach’s famous statement “man is what he eats,” that is to say: structure 
determines superstructure. But ironically he remarks that “if this assertion were true 
[…] the revolutions would coincide with radical changes in the diet of the masses. 
Historically the contrary is true.”124 It is after a revolution that diets are changed. Does 
                                                 
123 Paggi, Gramsci e il moderno principe, 15. 
124 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 354. 
58 
superstructure dominate structure? Gramsci answers that the statement “man is what 
he eats” is true insofar as diet is one of the expression of social relations taken as a 
whole.”125 The breaking of a tradition based on a strict hierarchy brought about, for 
example, the French Nouvelle Cuisine, and in that it exemplified the bourgeois 
revolution, its ideology and its new customs.   
Consciousness is the logical point of entry into the historicity of the discourse 
of production. Gramsci argues that “one ‘is’ only when one ‘knows oneself to be,’ [...] 
A worker is only a proletarian when he ‘knows’ himself to be one, and acts and thinks 
in accordance with this knowledge.”126 This is why the accusation of “voluntarism” is 
for Gramsci an arbitrary, instrumental attack. For “will, in a Marxian sense, means 
consciousness of ends, which in turn implies having an exact notion of one’s power, 
and the means to express it in action.”127 Will is neither a detached moment of the 
spirit, nor a purely reflective state of mind, but rather a coefficient of friction with the 
organized system in which every individual lives. So that it is only in conjunction with 
the marking out of the mechanics of oppression that this apparatus is pierced through, 
as the artificiality of its institutions are apprehended in the twilight of their crisis.128   
The subjectivist conception of reality is inextricably geared to the immanence 
of the social relationships of production. It is an anamnesis in that it measures scales 
of subjective recognition of a living objective condition. But the agency of this 
cognition is not extinguished in the re-cognition of a fixed, unchangeable state. It is 
labor in that the inquiry over reality is mediated and transformed by the development 
of the latter. The crisis of capitalism is not determined with the precision of a natural 
law, but it flashes out in the conflicts among the “unified whole of social activity.”129  
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Subjectivist and common sense conceptions are thus objective visions of the 
world in so far as they are historical, manlike constructs. In fact here “objective 
always means “humanly objective” which can be held to correspond exactly to 
“historically subjective.”130 This is truly an open-ended process. Gramsci will call it “a 
struggle for objectivity,” with no real final truth, but with different levels of 
appropriateness depending on the task assigned. The objectiveness of truth is a 
function of its historical verification, i.e. the prediction of results is based on a self-
aware and comprehensive analysis of the situation and problems that arise from it.   
Theory tests itself through the moveable forms of the social, developing 
knowledge and producing degrees of true self-activity by grasping the purposive form 
of the social whole, where social is defined as the multiple interrelations between 
competing social groups and the productive system. The responsiveness to a given 
reality and its problems is the specific theorization of immanence. We become active 
in a given reality, only on the condition that we address the fungibility of its 
components. This is the conjunction of theory and immanence. As Gramsci will later 
write in the Prison Notebooks, “the term ‘immanence’ has in the philosophy of 
practice a quite precise meaning […] such a definition would in reality have been 
genuinely theory.”131 For Gramsci the unity of theory and practice implies “the 
assertion of the historicity of philosophy made in terms of an absolute immanence, of 
an absolute this-worldliness.”132 The critical participation in the dynamisms of one’s 
environment entails a visualization of the logic, of the forces and lines of direction of 
that environment.133
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Pure theoretical contemplation is instead a form of empty “scholasticism” for 
theory/practice is “real knowledge” in that it becomes a mode of comportment, “a 
mass conception,” “that of a mass which operates in a unitary form, i.e. one that has 
norms of conduct that are not only universal in idea but generalized in social 
reality.”134 As Paggi notes, this is the burden of ideology. Properly logged in its 
concrete historical framework, ideology characterizes any philosophy, even those 
which claim to testify to epistemological points of no return such as Gentile’s or 
Croce’s neo-idealist agnosticism. Every philosophy is form of ideology, that is, a 
worldview that registers a historical condition. Far from being a relativist claim, the 
ideological nature of philosophy welds it to an intricate ensemble of human activities. 
Without any regret for a transcendent point of reference, it measures degrees of truth 
on the basis of its own operativeness.   
Finally, this historical clinging to social formations, to the material changes 
and struggles of specific societies is also the best warrant against the “possible 
aberrations that the idea of the coextension between truth and politics implies.”135 So 
that, against the fideism of orthodox Marxism, as well as the tragic bureaucratic 
totalitarianism of Stalinist Soviet Union “for Gramsci, whenever the letter contradicts 
the spirit, it is the power that must yield: life is always more important than any of its 
abstract expressions.”136 For Gramsci the uninterrupted breeding of forms of 
collective life constitutes the working principle of the process of finitization of 
philosophy of praxis.  
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The Councils and New Way of Producing 
Now that we have detected the specifics of the philosophy of praxis, we can 
reassess the theoretical and concrete valence of the ordinovista thesis. In this way we 
can also better evaluate Gramsci’s total adherence to the material conditions of the 
form of labor he tried to understand, i.e. the immanence of the ordinovista theoretical 
experience. Theory is the meticulous result of the actualization of the problems society 
posed in its particular time. Gramsci’s theorization is buttressed by the smell, the 
sounds of the workshop and by the heated discussions in the socialist workers circles 
after work. Thus the democratic experiment of the Factory Councils was not an 
intellectual elaboration post facto, nor was it a detached academic rationalization of an 
empiric reality. Rather it grew with it and kept on growing while changing this reality 
and, in turn, being changed by it.  
It is important to underscore immediately the difference between the union’s 
attempts to institutionalize Factory Councils through the internal commissions, and 
Gramsci’s capacity to apprehend the virtual function of the formers as implementation 
of new forms of life. The union’s institutions were regulative factors. They aimed at 
channeling the conflicts in appropriate spaces which they managed along or in conflict 
with the owners. Unions reproduced their power by positioning themselves from a 
specific vantage point: that of a stronghold safeguarding a suitable exchange in labor 
commodity. The union’s suitability for the capitalists resided in that syndicalism 
“prevent[ed] a still subaltern group from becoming hegemonic, by confining it to 
trade-union struggle alone […] so that it is unable to take the state as its objective.”137 
The form of life they managed, replicated itself in the precarious balance of power 
between capital and labor. The union heads used the inflammatory power of the 
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rhetoric of class struggle not as a tool to transform reality, but as a weapon to secure 
the commitment of its members: the fidelity of the latter was in fact the foundation of 
the union’s capacity to negotiate, but not to change, the economic organization in 
force.     
The Councils, however, were the organisms capable of detonating the stasis of 
Italian society. They were capable of changing the rhythm of production, following 
the objectives of the proletarian order, realizing a correspondence between producers 
and their lives. The Councils are conveyors of this living energy and, at the same time, 
the source of its implementation through the learning of its practice. They are not 
stabilizing factors, nor are they harmonizing instruments in the management of the 
factory. Yet they are not even the embodiment of a small socialist utopia. They are 
still transitory structures who, in their experimental laboring, attempt to increase the 
practical understanding of how to build a new social form of life, that is to say a new 
political entity organically related to the social ensemble. Consequently, it is the 
immanence to their self-aware activity, their best criterion for their success, that is to 
say, “for a new type of state, on the model of the Soviet state.”138  
This is why, compared to Amedeo Bordiga’s conception of Soviets, the 
Councils are not autonomous, for they are not the incarnation of an apriori truth, of 
something determined before the actual process. The Councils are a precise critique of 
the dogmatic crystallization of Bordiga’s thought. For Bordiga in fact, the breeding of 
a new form of life is the abrupt realization of the “possible,” i.e. communism. The 
possible is juxtaposed to reality because when one “pose[s] the question in terms of 
possible and real, [one is] forced to conceive of existence as a brute eruption, a pure 
act or leap which […] is subject to a law of all or nothing.”139 On the contrary the 
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future must be generated dialectically from the present, in a Deleuzean sense its 
virtuality must be actualized through an open-ended social process. “The reality of the 
virtual is structure” and the Councils embodied this lively structure.140 They carried 
out the task of imagining and actualizing a new way of producing and employing the 
workers’ capacity to work. 
Furthermore, according to Gramsci, the process must be kept open and 
receptive to the external inputs the Councils face: first of all the confrontation with the 
institutions of the capitalist power, then their inner sustainability – i.e. the living 
necessities of the workers and their families. Hence the hierarchical structure (even 
though mandates are always revocable) which assumes the direct control of all the 
functions of the system 
 
Every factory has become an illegal State, a 
proletarian republic living from day to day, awaiting 
the outcome of events. […] Life has a logic of inner 
energy of its own that goes beyond the will and 
whims of individuals. While these proletarian 
republics live, they will have to cope with all the 
problems that face any autonomous and independent 
power exercising its sovereignty over a delimited 
territory.141   
 
Sovereignty here means the organic connection with the rest of the country: thus 
military defense, and uninterrupted exchange with the rest of the system (i.e. inbound 
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and outbound flow of supplies). The testing of history however was merciless. From 
the military point of view the workers could barely defend the factories they occupied, 
while the selling of products proved to be extremely difficult and the supply of raw 
material largely insufficient to keep the system running.  
Once again, the sovereignty of these political structures is not a goal in itself. 
The Councils were not self-sufficient permanent entities, but rather merely political 
avant-gardes, the high points of experimentations that can be “conceived as the initial 
moment of an organic period which must be prepared and developed.”142 Indeed the 
failure in protecting and nourishing this organic period, this incubating stage was not 
only due to lack of organization. The active sabotage of the union and the immobilism 
of the PSI were a crucial problem and the Livorno split of the following year was 
meant to be a radical measure to avoid such pitfalls.  
The Councils were responses to the objective problems that society confronted 
at the time.143 Objectively determined in the identification of a set of postulates, the 
Councils were responses that necessarily followed “from the complete conditions 
under which the problem [was] determined as a problem.”144 The ordinovista thesis 
sought to produce a nourishing and a promotion of life which could fully express itself 
in the non-exploitative form of self-governed labor. With the shift from wage earners 
to producers, the workers Councils represented the appropriate structures for the 
continuous individuation of labor capacity in accordance with the needs of the 
community. It was a production rationalized and intensified in order to produce 
material and social wealth for the community. As I will now argue discussing 
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Gramsci’s reflection on Fordism in his Prison Notebooks, managed and creatively 
lived by the workers, this new productive order implied a potential qualitative leap in 
the way production was run and envisioned. Notwithstanding the quantitative limits of 
production, the Councils were posing the bases for the expression of the liberation of 
human labor-power.  
This particular moment in Italian history represents the first attempt to 
rearticulate at a productive-industrial level labor-power biopolitically. In Marx terms, 
it was the springboard to start processing “general social knowledge” as a “direct force 
of production,” not of production for the sake of one class, but for the sake of 
humanity.145 This social knowledge was not the immaterial production that 
characterizes our economy in its global dimension. It is still mechanical and relies 
completely on physical components. But the self-management of production by the 
workers aimed at reducing toil and the fatigue of the long working day. Moreover, it 
intended to infuse production with worker’s creativity, thus opening spaces for 
innovation led by workers themselves. In this workers discovered a way of producing 
knowledge from production that now did not estrange them from their work. Their 
activity was something they mastered and decided upon and had direct use value for 
the collectivity. This is in the nutshell the meaning of the Factory Councils’ attack on 
wage-labor: transforming workers into producers who collectively own what they 
produce and consume. This production is thus social, entailing a collective endeavor, 
because it has as its objective the molding and supporting a new, harmonic collective 
life.146 The Councils would have opened the way to a biopolitical dimension in which 
labor power is endowed with larger quotas of intellectual work. At a theoretical level, 
they represented the experimenting of self-critical, open process of finitization, for in 
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their practice they were aware of their self-transformative nature without assuming the 
latter as an authoritarian will as in Gentile actualist philosophy, nor as the abstract 
universality of Croce’s Spirit. All that humans could do (and do to themselves) had to 
culminate in their own development as a live, growing organic unity. This approach 
had all the potential to liberate human capacity in the least repressive way possible.  
Gramsci, the ordinovista group, and the workers of the Councils for a brief moment 
looked onto this biopolitical territory. But the Council’s experimentation was too 
quickly undercut by political sabotage and then by the violent repression of fascism. 
Once this breach was shut, behind the bars of his prison, Gramsci dedicated his last 
efforts to understand how the capitalist response that replaced this possibility 
(Fordism) could be once again reversed. 
 
1.3 Production and Reproduction in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks 
Although protected by parliamentary immunity, Gramsci was arrested on 
November 8, 1926. A few days before Mussolini had escaped in Bologna an attempt 
on his life that became the pretext for the government and the King to wipe out “the 
little that remained of democratic freedom.”147 In June Gramsci was prosecuted and 
sentenced to twenty years in prison. The prosecutor during the hearing declared: “we 
must prevent this brain from functioning for twenty years.”148  
It was in the prison of Turi, in Puglia, two years after his sentence that 
“Gramsci was finally granted what he needed to work in his cell.”149 In the First 
Notebook he had sketched the outline of the work in sixteen points: here Americanism 
and Fordism appeared as number eleven. Yet in a letter to his sister-in-law, Tania, 
Gramsci reduced the project to three main topics: nineteenth Century Italian history, a 
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theory of “history and historiography,” and once again Americanism and Fordism. 150 
Between February and March of 1934 in the prison of Formia these scattered 
references were gathered in a single work now commonly known as Notebook 22. The 
first title assigned to the topic was “Animality and Industrialism” [Animalità e 
industrialismo], which was later changed to the current “Americanism and 
Fordism.”151  
Even in its final draft, Notebook 22 appears clearly unfinished. Some of the 
opening notes are not taken up in the development of his argument and the writing is 
marked by sudden jumps, as if the need to fix key points were more urgent than to 
elaborate the connections. Giorgio Baratta’s astute claim that Americanism and 
Fordism is a “nervous and discontinuous [saltellante] rhapsody,” cautions the reader 
against a too-straightforward reading of the text. Instead it fosters a broader 
approach.152 I want to emphasize this element because, as we will see, my reading 
takes issue with recent interpretations that tend to reduce Gramsci’s essay to a 
productivist perspective, and to a moralistic/puritanical one in that of human 
reproduction. Undoubtedly Gramsci is our contemporary in what he has to say about 
the function of production, while it is true that he only gestures towards the productive 
element of procreation and the reproduction of labor-force. When faced with that 
possibility, Gramsci retreats. Still that shouldn’t diminish what matters most in his 
argument in Notebook 22.  
The insights of “Americanism and Fordism” are, in fact crucial since they 
outline the consequences of a new integrated control over life that emerged after the 
                                                 
150 Gramsci, Letters from Prison, vol. 1, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 257.  
151 See Giorgio Baratta, “Americanismo e fordismo” Le parole di Gramsci, ed. Fabio Frosini and Guido 
Liguori, (Roma: Carocci, 2004) and “Libri e articoli indicati da Gramsci” Antonio Gramsci Quaderno 
22. Americanismo e fordismo, Franco De Felice, ed., (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 121-124. 
152 Baratta, “Antonio Gramsci critico dell’americanismo,” Modern Times Gramsci, 30.   
68 
Councils’ defeat.153 As I will suggest, this apparatus of control and administration of 
life brought forward by Fordist rationalization is placed at the threshold of the 
biopolitical, for it raises the question of a further exploitation of labor together with 
the implementation and management of life qua labor-power. 
Fordism as the Concrete Translation to the Failing Rate of Profit 
In its fragmentary form, the reflection on “Americanism and Fordism” is an 
analytical inquiry into the new organization of labor (Taylorism), the reorganization of 
the productive system (Fordism), and its ideological apparatus that was brought about 
first in the United States and later in a less homogeneous way, in Europe.154 Thus 
Notebook 22 continues Gramsci’s study of production as he developed it in the 
ordinovista experience, but because of the new historical context and censorship, it 
takes up a less straightforward perspective. For instance, the active element in it, the 
subjective tension that in the Councils’ days was generated by the direct participation 
in the class struggle, is now limited to a few predictive statements.  
The environment of the Prison Notebooks is not that of L’Ordine Nuovo, where 
the problem of working out a revolutionary praxis from the objective situation was an 
organic task, collectively elaborated through the daily confrontation with its 
protagonists and antagonists. Within the walls of the prison, Gramsci “is trying to 
understand the different conditions into which he wants (or had failed) to translate the 
revolution and how these conditions themselves make the translatability of revolution 
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possible.”155 Now these conditions are the historical bulk of notions and events that he 
collects in his Prison Notebooks. In this the Notebooks bear extraordinary resemblance 
with another monumental work of roughly the same period: Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis 
(1946). Written in exile and supposedly without access to the texts he was using, 
Auerbach elaborated the notion of figurality as an interpretative paradigm in which the 
figural relation “between two events or persons” is established “in such a way that the 
first signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second involves or fulfils 
the first.”156 Accordingly for Gramsci Dante’s Cavalcanti, Machiavelli, and the Italian 
Risorgimento, among others, are used to study and define a model of social 
interaction. They work as a figura: “a sign referring in time” and simultaneously 
“manifest and present” in its own historical context.157 Their full significance 
(figurality) is thus the dynamic relation between the function they perform and their 
explanatory potential for the future. But the function they perform is worked out 
(translated) by the interpreter, who gives a “normative judgment that makes the 
translation a historical act.”158 In Gramsci there is always a fundamental subjective 
element that works as a catalyst in this process, but in the Notebooks this endeavor is 
enclosed within the limits of an intellectual operability (i.e., book learning) and most 
important within the impossibility of spelling out the content of this act because of 
fascist censorship.  
Thus, Notebook 22 embodies a particular kind of exercise in translatability. It 
is a negative model presently in operation, which must be prefigured as an instrument 
of liberation. But this present is also the result of reorganization, that is to say capital’s 
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own translation of the revolutionary potentiality of labor, into a more functional 
system of exploitation. In this Fordism represents the antipodal concretization of the 
virtuality that the Councils aimed to engender.  
During the two red years, the forms of mechanization introduced were still 
partial, the workers retained an expertise and a vision of the complexity of the 
productive chain that enable them to run the factory during the occupation without any 
real support by technicians. Even at a micro level, the worker confronted labor as a 
purposeful activity carried out through instruments which, as Marx write “the worker 
animates and make into his organ … and whose handling therefore depends on his 
virtuosity.”159  
The application of scientific management (Taylorism) had precisely the 
objective of expropriating this organic knowledge possessed by the workers.160 Here 
the new optic revolution that the development of film was bringing forward played a 
key role in the quantification, measurement and expropriation of the fluidity of the 
gestures. An associate of Taylor, Frank B. Gilbreth, coined the term “Micromotion-
study” and began vivisecting workers motions with a “specially designed clock that 
show[ed] divisions of time so minute as to indicate a different time of day in each 
picture in the cinematograph film.”161 Work is snatched from its living dimension, 
chopped down into minute units, framed, computed and reconfigured into a new 
                                                 
159 Marx, Grundrisse, notebook 6, ed. Martin Nicolaus, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch13.htm >. 
160 As Taylor envisioned it was a process of formalization through which “the development of a 
science… involve[d] the establishing of many rules, laws and formulae” in order to replace “the 
judgment of the individual workman,” 36. 
161 Frank B. Gilbreth, “Units, Methods, and Devices of Measurement Under Scientific Management,” 
The Journal of Political Economy 7 (1913): 627. See also Clockwork. Dir. Eric Breitbart. California 
Newsreel, 1981. Walter Benjamin would foreclose this connection in his essay on Baudelaire when he 
wrote: “What determines the rhythm of production on a conveyor belt is the same thing that underlines 
the rhythm of reception in the film.” Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” Selected Writings, vol. 
4, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 328.   
71 
representation. What the workers naturally performed was estranged and than imposed 
on them as a new, alien model.     
Fordism further improved this objectification. The extensive use of what Marx 
called the “automatic system machinery” (for us the integrated system of the Fordist 
assembly line) begins acting upon the worker as a totalizing “alien power,” 
transforming worker’s “living-labor into the mere living accessory of this 
machinery.”162 Marx and Gramsci agreed on the fact that this process of dispossession 
and abstraction of the real content of labor was inscribed into the “necessary tendency 
of capital.”163 Thus, in the prison years, Fordism came to represent a “counter-model 
to the state of worker’s Councils.”164 At the same time, in its attempt at understanding 
the necessity, the logic of the new power system, Gramsci’s reflection also 
extrapolates progressive forms qua embryos of possible developments of the field. To 
the best of his knowledge and given the strict restrictions of its imprisonment, Gramsci 
still followed a strict materialist methodology where theory was synonymous with 
immanence. Thus he proceeded to scrutinize and chart the ways in which the new 
productive forces repress, discipline, but also animate the whole of the social body. 
The nature of Fordism is clear. Gramsci says that it represents “the ultimate 
stage in the process of progressive attempts by industry to overcome the law of the 
rate of profit to fall.”165 Marx had argued that “the growing application of machinery 
and fixed capital in general,” “produces a progressive relative decrease of the variable 
capital,” i.e. the salaries of the workers, which ultimately erodes the source of the 
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extraction of surplus-value causing “a gradual fall of the general rate of profit, so 
long as the rate of surplus-value, or the intensity of exploitation of labor by capital, 
remain the same.”166 Croce strongly criticized this law as a clear instance of Marx’s 
mechanicism.167 Gramsci knew well this argument and used this law only as purely 
regulating factor, purged of any deterministic or essentialist claim emphasizing its 
necessitating, but tendential nature.168 He argued it was a material force that “presents 
itself with a certain automatism which allows a measure of predictability.”169 Indeed, 
for Gramsci, the model for the kind of structural necessity that these social patterns 
carry is not natural science, since, philosophy of praxis develops its concept of 
“regularity, laws, automatism” and ultimately “rationality” by way of conceiving the 
necessity of its historical “immanence.”170  
The constant pressure to accumulate capital, properly buttressed by laws and 
state protection, dictates the law of movement of the whole of society. It is an 
incessant process of transformation, which in its attempts to extract more surplus-
value takes the form of technical improvements. Since the mere extensions of working 
time (what Marx calls the extraction of “absolute surplus-value”) has fixed limits, the 
capitalist needs to increase productivity (what Marx calls “relative surplus-value”) by 
means of technical advancements. Capitalists thus realize “an alteration in the labor-
process, of such a kind as to shorten the labor-time socially necessary for the 
production of a commodity, and to endow a given quantity of labor with the power of 
producing a greater quantity of use-value.”171 This is the reason why the law of 
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tendency remains structurally open: an increasing rate of the extraction of relative 
surplus-value can contrast the falling rate of profit. Fordism and the dispositifs it 
mobilizes are the response to this necessity – i.e. increasing profitability by way of 
enhancing productivity.172  
“Americanism and Fordism,” Gramsci says, “derive from an inherent necessity 
to achieve the organization of a planned economy.” In both their respective fields 
Americanism (the non-economic-cultural phenomena) and Fordism (the economic 
phenomena) correspond to the transformation from what Gramsci calls “economic 
individualism,” namely liberal capitalism, to planned economy, i.e., state capitalism in 
its various forms.173 This new phase supersedes the liberal phase of capitalism but, as I 
said, by no means represents the actual realization of the emancipated and stabilized 
organization of society upheld by Gramsci.  
Finally Fordism is also the specific solution as it arises from the struggle of the 
anti-capitalists forces, and the challenge they launched over the control of production. 
It is a form of stabilization of the unruliness of the workforce that, however mitigated 
and transformed, still achieved its goal: the exclusive control over the definition of the 
course of modernity. We posthumously can grasp the consequences of this victory in 
our own difficulty to understand Gramsci’s ambiguous treatment of the issue of 
production. In Notebook 22 the difficulty lies in separating Gramsci’s conception from 
the solution of the problem of productivity and societal organization as prescribed by 
his opponents. It is complicated to agree on those multiple virtualities that Gramsci 
was still able to see, because their actualizations now obey completely the law of the 
movement of capitalism. The eventfulness of Gramsci’s understanding of the 
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rationalization of production seems blocked by the ominous, oppressive mark cast 
upon it by the evolution modern society came to know too well. Yet, on one point 
Gramsci’s reflection is prescient: any attempt to escape the immanence of the 
productive changes for a supposedly original dimension is a romantic misappraisal, a 
theorization that might be reassuring, but one that is also blind. 
The Biopolitical Springboard of Fordism 
Notebook 22 is an analytical inquiry of Fordism as the rationalization of the 
productive system and the new practices of social interaction it imposes on society. 
This inquiry is structured by the following question: how can we conceive a non-
repressive rationalization that liberates productivity, and at the same time abolishes the 
ruling of one group over the other? Fordism is for Gramsci a negative model presently 
in operation, which must be prefigured as an instrument of liberation. 
This goal Gramsci states in the opening of the essay. He writes that the set of 
problems “to be examined under the general, and somewhat conventional heading 
‘Americanism and Fordism,’” springs from “difficulties inherent in both the societas 
rerum and the societas hominum.”174 The conveyor between the human (societas 
hominum) and the natural (societas rerum) is the “process of development” that is set 
in motion, or resisted, by “particular social forces.”175 In general, this transformation 
is constituted by the whole sum of regulations and practices that produce progressively 
more complex forms of social organizations. It is a process of rationalization, in which 
rational choices and decisions are transformational practices that alter social 
interactions. This is true for the way society produces goods and circulates them, as 
well as for the way people stand in relation to one other. I will explore the pattern of 
this rationalization following Gramsci’s dialogue with Freud, and then I will examine 
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Gramsci’s assessment of the relational sphere of reproduction and finally that of 
production.  
The development of complex forms of social organization follows the dialectic 
between repression and resistance that imbues the growth of the forces of production – 
i.e. what humans inflict upon themselves in order to develop their capabilities. It is an 
early example of the articulation of a psychoanalytic Marxist theory of human labor. 
Gramsci was not able to develop it, hence the contracted and sporadic form it shares 
with the rest of the essay.176  
Marx had said that “the object of labor […] is the objectification of man’s 
species,” but these processes of “conscious life-activity” occur, as Gramsci remarks, at 
the cost of immense psycho-physical sacrifices.177 Gramsci argues that to compute 
“the cost in human lives and in grievous subjugation of instinct involved in the 
passage from nomadism to a settled agricultural existence” is virtually impossible.178 
In the note on “Animality and Industrialism” this description of societal changes 
through the repression of what he calls the “animality in man” calls Freud directly into 
question. Gramsci did not know Freud firsthand, and in fact broadly uses the term 
repression to mean civilizing mechanism, when the interplay and struggle between 
life-drives (sexuality) and death-drives (aggression) are in fact much more 
complicated, involving also processes of sublimation which are crucial to the growth 
of more complex social relations.179
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From his Marxist perspective, Gramsci obviously stresses the historically 
changing nature of the mechanisms of repression, and not their a-temporal or cyclical 
dimension.180 He maintains that “up to now, all changes in modes of existence and 
modes of life have taken place through […] the dominion of one social group over all 
the productive forces of society.”181 Here Gramsci succeeds in criticizing two targets 
at the same time. First, the objectivist view of a linear evolution explained through the 
changes of the modes of production (structure). According to this mechanic 
perspective which Gramsci attributed to Nikolai Bukharin’s The Theory of Historical 
Materialism (1921), the structure (production) determines the superstructure (society). 
The quantitative transformations at the level of structure progressively change into a 
qualitative one. Thus in order for a revolution to occur there must be a change “within 
the structure where the various means of production develop and decay.” As we saw in 
the case of Feuerbach’s famous saying, for Gramsci it is instead the conscious activity 
and the level of hegemony consensus of the social group in power (superstructure) that 
determines the “transition” between one structure and the other.182  
The second objective is to signal the historical burden of the civilizing mission 
of a dominant group. For Gramsci the human process of civilization is a series of 
“incredible acts of brutality,” which impose “more complex and rigid norms and 
habits of order,” functional to the establishment of “increasingly complex forms of 
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collective life.”183 These new constructs are not simply negative, since they are the 
result of a struggle of one group against the privileges of a minority “who happened to 
come to power at an earlier moment in history.”184 Civilization is precisely the site of 
this constant conflict.  
The Enlightenment, Psychoanalysis and Libertinism 
But it is through the question of sex that Gramsci articulates the full 
implications of these self-transformative activities. Let us turn again to the opening of 
“Americanism and Fordism” where these re-organizations shape modern society, and 
where the repression of the basic drives becomes necessary to production. 
Psychoanalysis here is mentioned again: 
 
Sexual instincts are those that have undergone the greatest 
degree of repression from society in the course of its 
development. “Regulation” of sexual instincts, because of 
the contradictions it creates and the perversions that are 
attributed to it, seems particularly “unnatural.” Hence the 
frequency of appeals to “nature” in this area. “Psycho-
analytical” literature is also a kind of criticism of the 
regulation of sexual instincts in a form which often recalls 
the Enlightenment. 185
 
Gramsci’s goal is to uncover the ideological aspect of the sexual question, to pierce 
through its distortions in order to visualize the proper socio-economic 
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contradictions.186 Still why the comparison with Enlightenment? In what ways do 
psychoanalysis and Enlightenment resemble each other? What is the form of this 
similarity? 
The limits of bourgeois revolution and its culture (i.e. Enlightenment) 
consisted in that its notion of universality relied on the exploitation of a larger social 
group: the proletariat. But as for its contribution to the process of civilization, in an 
early article on the magazine Il grido d’Italia, Gramsci called Enlightenment a 
“magnificent revolution” that “created a kind of pan-European unified consciousness, 
a bourgeois International of the spirit, with each part sensitive to the tribulation and 
misfortunes of the whole.” It was a mass-collective knowledge dedicated to the 
understanding of the social condition of their class and “the best means of 
transforming what have been opportunities for vassalage into triggers of rebellion and 
social reconstruction.”187 As Yuri Brunello keenly points out, Gramsci here embraces 
a notion of culture influenced by the romantic idea of Kulturkritik as “subjective (and 
collective) will” upon which looms “the birth of a new economic, philosophical and 
political society.”188  
Gramsci’s evaluation of psychoanalysis has been questioned recently in an 
essay by Jennifer Stone. She argued that Gramsci’s moves through different phases, 
“After an initial enthusiasm he rejects Freud as the result of the circumstances of 
Jiulia’s case history which led him to doubt the value of analysis.”189 Ultimately, 
because of this rebuttal, Gramsci can not explain how “his own endorsement of 
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regulation for the sake of production” would not reproduce “the repressive hypothesis” 
that psychoanalysis critiques.190  
It seems to me, however, that the role that psychoanalysis plays in the Prison 
Notebooks is consistent throughout, and that the endorsement of Fordism as a 
repressive apparatus must be read in the context of the counter-model analysis that 
characterizes “Americanism and Fordism.” In another note included in Notebook 15, 
Gramsci clearly explains the status of the discipline. The value of psychoanalysis lays 
in “study[ing] the unwholesome [morbosi] repercussions entailed in the construction 
of any ‘collective man’, any ‘social conformism,’ any level of civilization especially 
in those classes who ‘fanatically’ make a ‘religion,’ a mystique and so on of the new 
type of person that we must work towards.”191 To make a parallel with the 
Enlightenment, the latter was a vast collective movement, i.e. built on common sense, 
or social conformism – struggling to inaugurate a society built on liberty, equality, and 
fraternity, just as psychoanalysis inaugurated the critique of the repression of sexuality 
that the bourgeois were imposing through their new rationalization of society. 
Psychoanalysis translates the “non-authoritarian, spontaneous, libertarian” drives that 
result from such bourgeois disciplining.192 As it is, psychoanalysis is “more a science 
to be applied to the upper class,” but as a historical fact, just as Enlightenment, it 
maintains a figural value.193 Gramsci’s warning against coercion and its unwholesome 
consequences is the base with which to develop a “a collective man without 
unleashing a certain amount of fanaticism, without creating ‘taboos’: in short, 
critically, as the consciousness of necessity, freely accepted because it is recognized 
‘in practice’ as such, through an accurate estimation of the means and ends.”194  
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The criticism that both Enlightenment and Psychoanalysis perform, albeit in a 
limited and different mode, bears testimony to the functioning of philosophy of praxis. 
Their figural value can be read in two ways. First, following their critical capacity, the 
philosophical and intellectual unraveling of human processes and their contexts 
visualizes precedent modes of order and puts them into question. In the case of 
Enlightenment, the rise of reason undermined theology and its pre-modern form of 
sovereignty; while in the case of Psychoanalysis, the discovery of the unconscious 
(sexuality) broke the supremacy of the organic over the psychic. Once the older 
worldviews are properly read back to their limitations, their structure of power is 
questioned and put into crisis. This would be the first and most straightforward 
reading of this strange link. Another more interesting interpretation is the following. 
What if Gramsci perceived in both not simply their logic of demystification, but rather 
a more exterior element? That is to say, one that involves the fictitious nature that both 
Enlightenment and Psychoanalysis assume as their objective conditions. The impasse 
of sexuality on the one hand, and the lack of a pre-modern transcendental foundation 
on the other would constitute, in fact, the fabric of a new sociality that has to sustain 
itself through its effectiveness and operability. This would explain Gramsci’s 
emphasis on regulations that seem unnatural and on the free acceptance of necessity. 
The objectivity of social forms rests thus on the self-positing and regulative nature of a 
social complex and can be investigated as such, that is, formally, without falling back 
onto some transcendence.195 The core of philosophy of praxis resonates in the 
unexpected morphing of the two schools of thought. 
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To return to the specific case of production and reproduction, because Gramsci 
wants to investigate the economy of sexuality as a series of impulses and their 
containment as it is defined by a specific historical situation, he inserts this argument 
precisely in a discussion that regards Fordism, which is to say that sexuality is part of 
a series of factors “within the contradictory conditions of modern society, which create 
complications, absurd positions, and moral and economic crisis often tending toward 
catastrophe.”196 So, while delineating the necessities of the new Fordist system of 
production, Gramsci also warns that “the new type of man demanded by the 
rationalization of production and work cannot be developed until the sexual instinct 
has been suitably regulated and until it too has been rationalized.”197 Given this 
rationalization, what must be avoided are “libertinism,” and a “libertarian 
mentality.”198
Woman as Venerem Facilem Parabilemque?199
As Gramsci censures sexual freedom, Jennifer Stone’s criticism of Gramsci 
appears to be correct, and in her appraisal she is certainly not alone. Several scholars 
have said that “Gramsci commonly reverts to a kind of left Puritanism,” or that when 
it comes to the delineation of the potential development of women’s subjectivity, he 
seems to be advocating for “a traditional idea of the woman.”200 Still one must 
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remember that the idea of libertinism was in Gramsci’s time a tricky subject, since it 
was generally linked to bourgeois feminist’s movements who proclaimed to be trans-
classist in nature.201 Detaching the question of the woman from a social critique based 
on the historical and economic ground represented for Gramsci and his party fellows a 
blurring, a typical bourgeois deviation, a demystifying of class relations.  
As I discuss later, Gramsci indeed dedicated much effort to the improvement of 
women’s organization inside the Socialist party and later in the new born Communist 
party (henceforward PCd’I). Yet no claim of anachronistic over-interpretations can 
deny Gramsci’s reluctance to deal directly with these issues.202 The only (to a certain 
extent) continuous assessment of the problem dates back to when as a theatre critic he 
wrote several reviews of the major works that were performed in Turin.203 It is worth 
dwelling over a review Gramsci wrote on the 1917 Italian production of A Doll House 
(1879) by Henrik Ibsen, and then return to the Prison Notebooks. In this review the 
young critic scorns the deafness of the Italian public to Nora’s “deeply moral action of 
leaving home, husband, and children to find herself, scrutinize her inner depths for the 
roots of her own moral being, and fulfill the duty we all have to ourselves, before 
others.”204 Gramsci understands that the audience’s dismissal was due to their servile 
moral code. For this code “the only manifestation of women’s liberation” is “the high 
class whore,” who is “downtrodden even when she appears to rebel, and when she 
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discovers the only permissible freedom available to her, easy virtue, it makes her more 
of a slave than she was before.”205  
For Gramsci, even small post-World War I advancements that women obtained 
– such as the abolition of spousal permission to own, buy and sell properties – are 
compromised by the class configuration of a society which has created for women “of 
the upper classes a paradoxical social position.”206 Within the mass of exploited 
individuals, there rises a small privileged minority which enjoys restricted power due 
to the extraction of surplus-labor of their class at the expense of the rest. This 
emancipation is still partial since it is built on a fracturing of class and even gender 
solidarity, producing pockets of economic passivity, i.e. individuals living on 
economic rents. 
The liberation of the woman resides instead in another form of relationship, in 
a new code “identifiable with universal morality, which [she] adheres to because it is 
deeply human, and more spiritual than animal.” Here “women are no longer mere 
females bringing up babies for whom they feel a love consisting of flesh and blood 
convulsions, but are self-aware human beings with inner needs.” This critique lays 
bare the delusional shortcuts and narrow-minded understanding of women’s condition 
by the Italian bourgeois. Gramsci’s call is definitely proto-feminist in that he pursues 
women’s desire against the oppressive patriarchal imposition and definition of their 
reproductive role. Similarly, in criticizing the reduction of the female subject to nature 
(“flesh and blood convulsion”), Gramsci does away with the erasure of female 
subjectivity that permeates patriarchal thought.207  
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However in terms of the understanding of women’s actual freedom, one might 
catch here a whiff of familism. When Gramsci proceeds to give his proletarian 
counter-example, he recalls: 
 
I know two proletarian women who understand it [Nora’s 
drama], because they have never needed divorce or the law 
to achieve self-awareness or create a world where they are 
better understood and more human. These two proletarian 
women left their families, with the full consent of their 
husbands, who are not gentlemen but honest workers, and 
have gone off with the men best suited to them. They have 
carried on old familiar customs [hanno continuato nella 
antica dimestichezza] without creating the usual Boccaccio-
like situations.208   
 
The English translation of the article presents some problems. Gramsci usually 
employs the term dimestichezza with its first meaning of “familiarity.”209 So Gramsci 
is not speaking here of domesticity, that is, the traditional duties and customs related 
to the idea of the household, but rather of the knowledge that grows out of the 
experiencing of each other as individuals in a relationship. The familiarity between 
individuals, not the monogamous family, is the locus of value. Familiarity is a 
secularized concept, for marriage is conceived as a moral commitment (hence the 
irrelevance of divorce) as the fulfillment of the needs and well-being of its members 
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which, for what Gramsci argued about procreation, would include also the exemption 
from the marital duty of reproduction.210  
Nevertheless, it is true that the actual space for men and women’s realization is 
conceived only in a relationship. Outside there seems to be only the pointless 
repetition the bourgeois false acts of liberation. The drift towards a supposed libidinal 
affirmation of the individual subject falls also into a saturated cliché: the Boccaccio-
like comedy, or as Gramsci would recall in the Notebooks, sex as sport, which reduces 
the relationships between men and women to a game in which the female is only a 
prey.211 Far from being a real transgression of the social order, it is a congenial tool 
for the reinstatement of power; it is the typical way in which Italian society transforms 
real problems into harmless farce.  
In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci rather pays more attention to sexuality it is 
linked to and influenced by production. Gramsci knew from personal experience that 
the effect of the introduction of a new coercive system of production resulted in a 
heavy burden on women. In a letter addressed to his sister-in-law Tania, dated October 
20, 1930, he reflects on the recurrent crisis that his wife Julia underwent while 
working and raising his sons in Russia. For Gramsci, Julia’s state was due to the 
refusal “to understand how a particular rhythm of work is possible only if the 
organism is replenished and by following a certain way of life.”212 He then mentions 
the measures that Ford had introduced in its factories in order to ensure production.  
 
He [Ford] has a corps of inspectors who check on the 
private lives of the workers and impose on them a certain 
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regimen: they control even the food, sleeping arrangements, 
the room size, the hours of rest, and even their most 
intimate affairs; whoever won’t go along is fired and no 
longer has the six dollars minimum daily salary. Ford pays a 
minimum of six dollars, but he wants people who know 
how to coordinate work with their life regimen.213  
  
With this suffocating discipline, the real purpose of capital’s interest in worker’s life is 
blatantly revealed. The protection of the worker’s health is exclusively linked to 
restore their physical strength. The well-being of the human is functional to the 
productive activity, to people’s capacity to continue operating the machines. The new 
order generated by the application of scientific management aimed precisely at the 
birth of a “new type of worker and of man.”214 In the United States, it was Frederick 
Taylor who defined “with brutal cynicism” this new figure; he argued that the perfect 
worker under task management organization of labor was nothing more than a “trained 
gorilla.”215 This is the result of the process of abstraction/liquidation of active, 
creative components needed in order to carry on that process of serialization, 
quantification and mechanization needed by the labor process.  
The same logic of the machine requires also an iron-like style of life: a 
“rigorous discipline of the sexual instincts” as well as the “strengthening of the family 
[…] and of the regulation and stability of sexual relations.”216 It is here that Gramsci 
makes his prediction. If with Fordism one witnesses the advent of a process of 
animalization-mechanization of the human, reduced to his or her pure functionality to 
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the effectiveness of production, in the relationships between the sexes too, we will also 
see a return, although “in a different form,” to peasant-like unions.217 There will be no 
room for pursuing new sexual encounters. “The peasant who returns home in the 
evening after a long and hard day’s work wants the “venerem facilem 
parabilemque.”218 This easy and always available sexual intercourse is the 
disenchanted but solid union best suited to the form of production in force.  
Gramsci’s description of Fordist family looks like a bleak life between two 
mechanized entities, but it is rooted in the objectivity of a situation where the 
rationalization of society encompasses production and reproduction. As he writes in 
the first draft of “Rationalization of Production and Work,” “the new method of work 
and the mode of living are inseparable.”219 In a famous passage that many have 
critiqued, Gramsci describes the objectivity of this two-faceted development.220 Inside 
the factory, he says, this transformation is carried out thanks to the “mechanization of 
the physical gesture” of the worker, whose brain in his or her repetitive activity 
reaches paradoxically a “state of complete freedom.”221 Outside the factory, this 
intervention is arranged through a complex of initiatives aimed at maintaining “the 
continuity of the physical and muscular-nervous efficiency of the worker.”222 For as I 
said, it is in the industrialists’ interests to protect their workforce, to take care of their 
bodies and health, in short of their life.  
Gramsci in fact frames sexuality as the proper “economic function of 
reproduction,” which operates at a macro, as well as a micro level. As for the latter, 
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reproduction obviously affects natality rates. Low natality rates, Gramsci notes, 
provoke a shortage of labor and the need to import it either from the rural areas, or 
through external immigration. In turn immigration demands a process of “psycho-
physical adaptation” for the new workforce and creates continuous changes in class 
composition. This is one of the “complications” that modern reproduction creates, but 
it can of course be solved, as I recalled at the beginning of this chapter, through the 
example of the militarization of Italian industry and its mass mobilization of the war 
period.  
At the micro level, Gramsci argues that an optimal size of population is “not 
only a general fact,” but also “a molecular fact which operates within the smallest 
economic units, such as the family.”223 The personal desire to have children, he 
maintains, lays in the need to secure the parents’ life when they are not productive 
anymore. It is the demonstration of an “instinctive consciousness of the economic 
need” to have “a certain ratio of young over the entire area of society.” 224 Gramsci’s 
reflection on the molecular implications of reproduction stops here.  
There is a real blind spot in his argumentation however: the consideration of 
reproduction not merely as procreation but also as maintenance, as the restoration of 
the physical energies needed to keep the worker in good health. Marx had already 
clarified that for the worker “the production of labor-power consists in his 
reproduction of himself or his maintenance.”225  In other terms, production 
presupposes reproduction and maintenance as the renovation of the workforce. Yet 
who carries out the work of reproduction? Certainly not the Ford Company inspectors, 
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nor the state bureaucrats. The real work of nurturing and providing for the workers’ 
wellness is carried out by women, and it is definitely women who take care of the 
elders. 
The other difficulty in delineating a linear and comprehensive reflection on 
reproduction is that Gramsci’s rhapsody dances around one key element without 
mentioning it directly: labor-power. Reproduction as the creation and renovation of 
labor-power, that is to say not labor itself, but the capacity to work over an agreed 
amount of time that capital needs in order to function. Gramsci insists on the 
sanitary/disciplinary apparatus developed by Fordism without postulating the fact that 
the real objective of this control is the preservation of the present and future capacity 
to work and thus, as neo-feminism will point out, of the women as the main agent of 
this work.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, it is precisely at this point that Gramsci 
assesses the role of the woman in modern society. Gramsci maintains that “the 
formation of a new feminine personality is the most important question of an ethical 
and civil order connected with the sexual question.” The woman is trapped into an 
“absurd position” (Gramsci uses again the term unhealthy characteristics, caratteri 
morbosi) and will not break free, until she will “attain not only a genuine [reale] 
independence in relation to men, but also a new way of conceiving [herself] and [her] 
role in sexual relations [rapporti sessuali].”226  
This is the most advanced point of Gramsci’s reflection on an issue that would 
become central for the neo-feminist movement of the sixties and seventies. In order to 
shed light on this issue, I need to introduce a basic philological fact from the Prison 
Notebooks. The critical edition of the Notebooks edited by Valentino Gerratana 
distinguishes between three types of notes. The a version is a writing that Gramsci 
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later revised in a final c edition, whereas a b note is a note he drafted only once. I want 
to follow in the next paragraphs Raul Mordenti’s proposal of taking into account 
Gramsci’s rewriting as a process, its “stratification” as the movement of thought. 
Mordenti argues that the passage from what in the critical edition edited by Gerratana 
is the a text to the final c version reflects a dialectical process of Aufhebung, i.e. 
overcoming or uplifting. In the Notebooks the a texts are in fact crossed (but not 
erased) by the author, that is “dialectically up-lifted, not negated or suppressed, but 
“lifted” [tolti] and simultaneously kept in store [tenuti in serbo] as it happens in 
Gramsci’s dialectic.”227  
The a text of “Some aspects of the sexual question” presents a particular case 
of this movement. The a text only states that this situation would not be solved “until 
women had truly attained an independence in relation to men.” The connection 
between independence and a new “role in sexual relations” in the final version has a 
wider set of issues, because it redefines independence in the light of a new model of 
social interaction. Just as “capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons, 
established by the instrumentality of things,” sexual relations involve a wider 
subjective dimension and they are not limited to the sexual act in itself.228 They 
include the private sphere of physical satisfaction, emotions, but also comportments 
and habits in the exchanges between the two sexes. At the same time they pertain to 
the public dimension, for women are the main agents that move the enormous system 
of relations of reproduction. Independence with respect to men is the first distancing 
move; dialectically it represents the lifting out of a condition of subordination that 
must lead to a positive affirmation through the understanding of one’s own 
positionality (“a new way of conceiving themselves”).  
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Now the determination of this self-transformative activity is left open to the 
dialectic between women’s capacity to carry out successful forms of struggles and the 
situation in which they operate. In other words, the translation of the subjective act 
depends on the critical understanding of the means and ends of the objective situation 
of reproduction. In this regard the PCd’I will articulate a series of proposals which 
take as a starting point Gramsci’s viewpoints on the issue. I will discuss them in 
chapter four where I reconstruct the historical context of Italian neo-feminism.  
As for translating production into workers’ control, the subjective 
transformation depended instead on the full understanding of the rationalization 
commanded by Fordism and the Taylorization of production; this issue is crucial given 
that during the reconstruction after World War II, the Italian left openly supported a 
Fordist productivist policy, while preaching in the reproductive field also a certain 
degree of Puritanism. Let us linger first over the issue of Gramsci’s presumed 
Puritanism, and then move on to the Taylorization of production which, as I will show, 
comes close to the understanding of biopolitics as we know it today. 
As with Fordism, Gramsci’s movement of thought regarding sexuality has two 
dimensions, since the establishing of the conditions of possibility demands a punctual 
analysis that recognizes the objectiveness of the situation. I do not believe there is any 
moralist purpose behind the description of monogamy as the proper form of the 
Fordist family. If Gramsci engages in anything it is not morals, but probably ethos: i.e. 
a set of principles devoid of any metaphysical foundations. Gramsci’s reading seems a 
profoundly a-moral approach to sexuality.229 The prediction of the Horace-like form 
of monogamist union does not rely on transcendent principle, it does not state what is 
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just, but simply what is more adequate to a certain mode of production. It is not a 
problem of righteousness (moral), but of adequacy (ethic) with regard to a given 
system. When I emphasize the descriptive character of the essay, I also implicitly refer 
to its constitutive a-morality. This is a basic assumption of a philosophy of praxis. It 
rejects morality as a theoretical guiding principle, just as Freud acknowledges the fact 
that “it is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built upon a 
renunciation of instinct.”230 Furthermore the full historicization of human activities 
requires a total understanding of these practices and their socio-economic reasoning. 
Thus moral principles have an impact on social life, but only insofar as they are 
understood as functioning within the logics of a given environment, not as external, 
universal elements. It is the collective activity of a social block that gives strength and 
content to the direction of their political prescription. Hence the stress on the 
subjective self-aware element again. 
The refusal of a libertarian ethic on sexuality arises here. Gramsci argues that 
in Fordism “the sexual function has been mechanized, but in reality we are dealing 
with the growth of a new form of sexual union shorn of the bright and dazzling color 
of the romantic tinsel typical of the petit bourgeois and the Bohemian lay-about.” The 
bright and dazzling colors of natural sexual relationships are the product of a 
theoretical blockage that the bourgeoisie suffer because of their mutilated existence. 
As Marx argues in the Grundrisse, against the relatively closed feudal world, the 
bourgeois developed a more universal system of interrelations which had also the 
consequence of alienating the “individual from himself and from others.” Incapable of 
taking this interconnection to its ultimate stage (a fully human socialization), 
bourgeoisies resent their own creations and fancy the return to a previous, fuller 
human type. This origin though is a deception. As Marx suggests, “in earlier stages of 
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development the single individual seems to be developed more fully,” but this only 
“because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their fullness, or erected them 
as independent social powers.” Marx concludes that bourgeois’ incapability to go 
beyond this “antithesis between itself and this romantic viewpoint” will accompany 
the bourgeois “up to its blessed end.”231  
Our society is still far away from that blessed end. The fact that the supposedly 
naturalizing power of sexuality is still so central is more proof that we are part of a 
generalized bourgeois society than the confirmation of Gramsci’s Puritanism. Still 
there is more. Marx in fact concludes by stating that “the relation of the individual to 
science may be taken” as an example of this mystification.232 Technology, just like 
sexuality, is one branch of those multifaceted relations that humans develop, but fail to 
universalize and thus rise to their non-oppressive form. Their potential universalizing 
force is reduced to a partiality, unrecognizable from its scope and use. Failing to gain 
access to its universal potential, humans became estranged from their own creation 
and among themselves. Bourgeois escapism works its way through this alienation, 
supplying a release valve, a promise of plentitude that does not exist. The real 
antithesis to this partiality can be worked out only by the proletariat. Yet this can 
happen only if the workers embrace a general vision of the direction for the new form 
of production, overcoming the desire to do away with it (the luddites’ response), and 
thus rejecting any kind of escapism; that is to say only if they are able to develop, on 
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the basis of their present condition, a new knowledge of work and the social 
interactions between individuals as something fully human, as something serving the 
purpose of a multitude of people and not a privileged minority.  
In conclusion, Gramsci’s rejection of libertinism as a path towards liberation 
does not entail the endorsement of a repressive, puritanical model. It is a description 
and simultaneously a hypothesis which must be connected to his thesis on the 
liberation of the Taylorized (mechanized) worker. As the feminists of the sixties will 
make clear, a liberalization of sexuality alone does not engender a real liberation, for 
the marks of oppression at an economic and social level can easily control a higher 
accessibility to sexual intercourse. The first steps in this sense will be taken by others, 
for instance Camilla Ravera, who worked together with Gramsci at L’Ordine Nuovo 
and under his supervision will begin to look at reproduction as unpaid labor. In an age 
of scarcity, the supremacy of the paradigm of production prevented Gramsci and his 
comrades to discover the centrality of reproduction as a factor of growth and thus of 
biopolitics. Sexuality thus suffers this under-theorization which finds very concrete 
causes in the historical situation in which Gramsci was living. 
On the contrary, when it comes to the analysis of production, Gramsci is able 
to arrive directly at the threshold of the future biopolitical nature of labor. Let us see 
how. First, Gramsci criticizes a certain misapplication of Fordism. He notes that in 
Europe the establishment of this collective apparatus for the administration of life was 
far less developed than in the United States. On the one hand, the individuals had not 
properly realized the psycho-physical demands that the new mode of production set 
forward. Gramsci says that “we Europeans are still too bohemian; we believe that we 
can do a certain kind of work and live as we please.”233 This work instead required a 
careful expenditure of physical, muscular and mental energies as well as a social 
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system that supports and preserves these energies. On the other side, because of the 
backwardness of the industrialists and the parasitic nature especially of Italian 
bourgeoisies, the kind of Fordism that was applied failed to comply with the apparatus 
(what today we call “welfare state”) needed in order to make up for such a boost in the 
rhythms of production.  
Gramsci ironically remarks that “Europe would like to have a full barrel and a 
drunken wife,” which is to say enjoy “all the benefits” which Fordism brings and, at 
the same time “retaining its army of parasites who, by consuming vast sums of 
surplus-value, aggravate initial costs and reduce competitive power” of the 
factories.234 This is another instance of a demographic unbalance that must be 
regulated in order to avoid catastrophic consequences. Fordism and its apparatus are 
progressive factors to the extent that they provide an improvement in the standard of 
living, and in so far as they supersede those feudal forms of privileges of unproductive 
sectors of society.  
The exemplarity of Fordism is further developed in four other paragraphs. In 
“Animality and Industrialism” Gramsci sees the contrast between rationalization and 
instinctuality and the subjection of the latter due to the “dominion of one social group 
over all the productive forces of society.”235 A promiscuous and frenetic sexual life is 
once again criticized for it drains energies and time from the restoration of labor-
power. The irregular life of war-time clashed with the new system of production that 
was gaining ground. Only a class, self-imposed discipline can avoid a material 
degradation of the workforce. The case study here is Soviet Russia, which Gramsci 
addresses under the long periphrasis as “a state where the working masses are no 
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longer subject to coercive pressure from a superior class.”236 The problem is still the 
kind of self-imposed discipline to be singled out.  
The paragraph “Rationalization of Production and Work” proposes two case 
studies, both of them negative. Gramsci condemns Trotsky 1920 plan of militarizing 
industry, because even if “the preoccupations were correct,” unfortunately “the 
practical solutions were profoundly mistaken.”237 The second example is Fordism 
which seems to function better, carefully mixing repression and persuasion – here the 
emphasis is on high wages. However Fordism too is starting to show sings of decline 
with the resurgence of parasitism in the high strata of society. These phenomena, 
Gramsci argues, “are determining a psychological split and accelerating the 
crystallization and saturation of the various social groups, thereby making evident the 
way that these groups are being transformed into castes just as they have been in 
Europe.”238 Here again it is the one-sidedness of this discipline that determines its 
oppressive character.  
With “Taylorism and the Mechanization of the Worker,” the figurality of 
Fordism is finally chiseled out. The mechanization of the worker is illustrated through 
a very special kind of laborer, the medieval copyist and its evolution, the modern 
typographer. Both workers increase their efficiency as they detach themselves from 
the content of their reproduction, in short as they eliminate any subjective input in 
their copying. Both examples are cases of immaterial labor whose product is 
communication. The association of the copyist and the typographer with the worker 
operating in an assembly line is certainly too abrupt and lacks the formulation of the 
necessary points of connections. Yet if we grant Gramsci certain flexibility in his 
association, I believe the use of this immaterial labor process can sketch a positive 
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realization of Taylorism. Both figures fulfill their positive pre-figuration in two 
distinctive elements. First their mechanization is a form of abstraction which passes 
from a subjective, conscious activity to a psycho-physical ability, which is active at 
the corporeal level of the worker. Secondly, both jobs create as their output 
communication which entails a totalizing production and consumption, i.e. goods that 
satisfy collective needs.   
Here Gramsci is unbelievably close to grasping a contemporary biopolitical 
capacity, even though he is using Fordist conceptual equipment, which is to say one 
that is typical of an age of scarcity where mechanical production needs to be 
implemented to cover basic needs. Only Marx in the Grundrisse had the same 
awareness. Gramsci envisioned a supersession of the purely mechanical coercion of 
Fordism through the process of abstraction of labor. Its progressive purification from 
mechanical limitation happens via the rooting it in the “muscular-nervous efficiency of 
the worker” of labor-power as such.239  
Fordism, Gramsci says, will be “superseded by the creation of a psycho-
physical nexus of a new type, both different from its predecessors and undoubtedly 
superior.” This is the pre-figuration of labor-power qua potentiality that will manifest 
itself only within a post-Fordist society. In a mechanical age in fact, labor-power 
vanishes as soon as it is transformed into work, for a capacity is the multifaceted 
ability to do something and not its practical execution. This is the paradox of the 
category of labor-power. The capitalist does not buy something but an “undetermined 
potential: where one particular type of labor or another has not been designated, but 
any kind of labor is taking place, be it the manufacturing of the car door, or the 
harvesting of pears […] or the work of the proofreader.”240 When this ensemble of 
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human capacities are not separated anymore but intertwined, immanent to the mere 
potentiality of the body, we reach a form of immateriality that is concrete without 
being definite, constituent without being constricting. The superiority of this new form 
of labor is the translation of the virtuality of the Councils Movement within the limits 
of a Fordist society. Gramsci could not define it precisely, because the 
mechanic/material element of production was still the touchstone of what is 
considered productive labor. But the totality of the capacities involved in a 
communicative/linguistic production refers indeed to the immaterial labor typical of 
post-Fordist economies. Still the stress on the physical acquisition of the work can 
only go so far in expressing the concept of labor-power qua potentiality, i.e. 
biopolitics. As Paolo Virno argues, “only in today’s world […] can the notion of 
labor-power not be reduced (as it was in the time of Gramsci) to an aggregate of 
physical and mechanical attributes; now, instead, it encompasses within itself, and 
rightfully so, the ‘life of the mind’.”241  
Gramsci also stresses workers’ centrality in this process of virtualization: 
Fordism represents a coercive imposition, “external and mechanical, but it can become 
internalized if it is proposed by the worker himself […], by a new form of society, 
with appropriate and original methods.” In this sense even the remark about the 
worker who “far from being mummified, reaches a state of complete freedom” can be 
cleared of its repressive and objectivist residue and translated into its practical 
subjective meaning. The mind “free and unencumbered for other occupation” that 
Gramsci’s sketches must not be misunderstood for the empirical freeing of the 
individual, the beautiful soul who can now speculative about life.242 It is the 
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collective, organic understanding of the structural contradictions and the social 
interconnections of the new phase of production that enables a revolutionary subject to 
rise up to a more fully human level.243 Following Marx, Gramsci suggests that “an 
increasingly perfect division of labor objectively reduces the position of the factory 
worker,” but at the same time “work that is concerted and well organized gives a 
better “social” productivity, so that the entire work-force of a factory should see itself 
as a collective worker.” This entails conceiving technology “not merely separately 
from the interests of the ruling class, but in relation to the interests of the class which 
is as yet still subaltern.”244  
In order to imagine this new dimension, where biopolitics is not denoted by an 
oppressive character, one would need to start imagining a technology, a science 
liberated from the logic of profit. It would be a socialist modernization (quite different 
from the ones we came to know) which Gramsci cannot clearly pin down, but knows 
has to grow out from the modernity that Fordism generated. This task was assigned to 
the proletariat. As Gramsci noted in the final passages of Notebook 22, the re-direction 
of the system is expected “from those on whom is imposed the burden of creating with 
their own suffering the material bases of the new order. It is them who “must” find for 
themselves an “original,” and not Americanized, system of living, to turn into 
“freedom,” what today is “necessity.”245
This necessity became in fact the terrain of the new battle. “A quantitative 
conception of exploitation allows the gathering of great masses in the revolutionary 
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struggle over wages,” and three mass-subjects emerged fueling a new cycle of 
struggles.246 From the Fordist factory emerged the mass-worker, who had started to 
revolt in the 1950s when the new automation system was fully applied. From the fight 
against authoritarianism and a class oriented mass school system the students lead a 
first insurrection during the may of 1968, joining the workers in the fall of the same 
year. The third subject that cut across the other two, but stood out in its full autonomy 
was the woman.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PASOLINI AND 1968: LIFE AND NECESSARY DEATH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feelings cannot change: they are 
historical. It is what one feels that it is 
true (in spite of all the insincerities we 
may have within us). In the end. – that is 
today, at the beginning of 1975 – my 
feeling, I repeat, is one of condemnation.  
 
(P. P Pasolini, Lutheran Letters) 
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2.1 Pasolini, the Student Movement and the New National Character of the Italian 
People 
There is a historical gap between the bulk of knowledge and experiences 
elaborated during Gramsci’s times and the next cycle of struggle brought about by 
1968. This cycle and its critique by a fellow traveler such as Pier Paolo Pasolini is the 
subject of the following pages. In between there was of course a Fascist dictatorship, a 
World War and more than a decade of reconstruction of the economic and social 
infrastructures of the country that do not fall under my direct investigation. Part of the 
reason for this temporal jump is that it is in the nature of social struggles to pop up 
suddenly after a long period of incubation; another reason is that I am not interested in 
a mere chronological account of events. I am attempting rather a reconstruction of a 
cultural genealogy of the moments where the biopolitical element comes to the 
forefront. What I want to investigate is the upsurge of new forms of life, the 
knowledge it generates and how these experiments later get incorporated and 
normalized. To be sure, in the collective narrative of the building of national identity, 
the Resistance represents a foundational moment. I am not arguing against it, but I 
find the exceptionality of armed struggle marginal or not directly connected to the 
development of the biopolitical discourse.  
My narrative is, however, not as discontinuous as it might seem at a first 
glance. The pivotal moments I investigate contain also the residues of what came 
before. Their long incubation represents precisely the historical working out of their 
emergence. Thus fascism, Resistance and reconstruction appear several times in my 
discussion, only they are not assessed autonomously, but rather in relation to the use 
that 1968 makes of them. In general, we can say that fascism and the war of liberation 
against it played a fundamental, symbolic role. In revitalizing a new wave of anti-
fascism, the 1968 Student Movement appropriated in fact at least a specific element of 
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this collective memory, that of the missed revolution, or the unfinished revolution, and 
often used it to critique the institutional left.1 A famous song by Ivan Della Mea 
bluntly makes this point: 
 
During the days of the fight 
Red was my color 
But now that I celebrate 
I carry the tricolor [Tricolore]  
[…] 
What songs and joy 
And cheering, and bangs 
Here is Longo, here is Parri 
And here even Andreotti. 
And here is my boss 
Who fired me 
That dirty capitalist 
He too carrying the Tricolor.2
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(Bolsena: Massari editore, 1998); Capanna Mario, Movimento Studentesco, crescita politica e azione 
rivoluzionaria (Edizioni Sapere: Milano, 1968); Jacopo Fo, ’68, c’era una volta la rivoluzione: i dieci 
anni che sconvolsero il mondo (Milano : Feltrinelli, 1997); Alberto De Bernardi and Marcello Flores, Il 
Sessantotto (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998); Guido Viale, Il 68: tra rivoluzione e conservazione (Rimini: 
Nda press, 2008). For audiovisual material see also the website Archivio Audiovisivo del Movimento 
Operaio e Democratico, 2007, <http://aamod.archivioluce.com/archivioluce/aamod/>. 
2 Ivan Della Mea, “Nove Maggio,” La mia vita ormai. Dischi del Sole 43, 1965. This common 
understanding is echoed by the editorial of the 1962 issue of the magazine Quaderni Piacentini that 
stated “after seventeen years of quarantine the Resistance has been approved (promossa)” and is now 
celebrated by “professional antifascists” and “fascists” together qua the political leading class. 
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 Ivan Della Mea composed Nove Maggio (May 9) in the wake of the twentieth 
anniversary of the liberation in Milan when the political leadership of the country 
came together to celebrate the event. Nove Maggio scorned this unitary attempt to 
domesticate the armed struggle and its revolutionary potential. Having partisans and 
living icons of the Resistance like Ferruccio Parri (1890-1981), Italy’s first prime 
minister, and Luigi Longo (1900-1980) with Togliatti one of the most important 
leaders of the Italian Communist Party (henceforward PCI), shake hands with Giulio 
Andreotti meant for the new generation that the official left had sold out. Under the 
national flag of the Tricolor and independently from their ideologies, the political 
apparatus had agreed to support capitalism against the proletarian class struggle. The 
new generations of 1968 invested highly in the symbolic value of the Resistance and, 
probably going beyond its real historical dimension, reformulated its collective 
memory in terms of a revolution that was not fully carried out by the left.3 To this 
symbolic shift and its consequences I will dedicate part of my discussion. 
I would like to introduce 1968 by addressing the work of an intellectual who 
did not participate in it, but who represents a critical-counter point for the ideas that 
this event produced and divulged. Pier Paolo Pasolini was probably the most famous 
leftist intellectual who openly criticized the Student Movement. Even though he 
occasionally collaborated with them, Pasolini was not shy about accusing the neo-
Marxism of political groups such as Potere Operaio (Worker’s Power) and Lotta 
                                                                                                                                            
Gianpasquale Santomassimo, “La memoria pubblica dell’antifascismo,” L’Italia Repubblicana nella 
crisi degli anni settanta. Culture, nuovi soggetti, identità, Fiamma Lussana and Giacomo Marramao, 
eds., vol. 2, (Catanzaro: Rubettino, 2003), 160.  
3 The confrontations in Genoa and Reggio Emilia between young workers and the police in July 1960 
were the first instance of this transformation. These young people who had not taken part in the 
Resistance, but had close direct memory of it came to be known as the giovani con le magliette a strisce 
[stripe t-shirts youths]. See Diego Colombo, L’estate delle magliette a strisce. Luglio 1960, la rivolta 
contro Tambroni (Milano: Scriba Studio, 2008); Philip Cooke, Luglio 1960: Tambroni e la repressione 
fallita (Milano: Teti, 2000); Quarant’anni fa: lo scontro politico del luglio 60’. L’estate dei Tambroni. I 
ragazzi con le maglie a strisce, Franco Bojardi, ed., spec. issue of Ricerche Storiche 95 (2003): 9.  
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Continua (Continuous Struggle, henceforward LC) of a belated return to Marxism.4 
Yet the peak of the controversy between him and the Movement originated after 
March 1, 1968, when a confrontation between police and students exhibited for the 
first time a qualitative leap in the Movement’s strength. If as I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, workers had a long, and at times, victorious tradition of struggle, 
students on the contrary could never really hold off, let alone, check the police. 
However, that day, near the Faculty of Architecture in Rome, for the first time, when 
confronted by the police the students did not run, but fought back, eventually taking 
temporary possession of the university buildings protected by a considerable number 
of troops. These incidents became known as the battle of Valle Giulia, from the name 
of the neighborhood on the side of the Parioli hills.5  
Writing for the most important Italian bourgeois newspaper, the Corriere della 
Sera, Pasolini responded with a provocative poem that sparked a heated debate. The 
poem Il PCI ai giovani!! (The PCI to the Young!!) is direct and most concise in its 
wording. It bluntly states:  
 
When yesterday at Valle Giulia you fought  
with policemen,  
I sympathized with the policemen.  
Because policemen are the children of the poor.  
 
                                                 
4 See Pier Paolo Pasolini, Heretical Empiricism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 37-38 
and Scritti corsari (Milano: Garzanti, 1975), 196. Pasolini cooperated in the shooting of a political 
movie like 12 Dicembre (1972) that was put up and distributed by Lotta Continua; in the spring of 1972 
served also as director of their magazine. See Laura Betti and Michele Gulinucci, eds., Pier Paolo 
Pasolini. Le regole di un’illusione (Roma: Fondo Pier Paolo Pasolini, 1991), 347; Nico Naldini, 
Chronology, Pier Paolo Pasolini tutte le opere, Walter Siti and Franco Zabagli, eds., vol. 1 (Milano: 
Mondadori, 2001), cvi-cvii. 
5 See Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1997); Giampaolo Bultrini and Scialoja Mario, “La battaglia di Valle 
Giulia,” L’Espresso, 10 March 1968.  
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Because of the populist equation between poverty and righteousness, these apologetic 
lines were immediately attacked by the Movement’s leaders. Young militants like 
Vittorio Foa for instance, argued that Pasolini did not grasp the transformation of the 
Italian working class and had a static, romantic idea of workers. Later on others 
instead praised the accuracy of Pasolini’s insights.6 Yet, these lines should be read in 
connection with the description of the students: 
 
You are scared, uncertain, desperate 
(very good!) but you also know how to be  
bullies, blackmailers, and sure of yourselves; 
petit-bourgeois prerogatives, friends.7
 
Pasolini is pointing to something deeper than the claim of the students’ fake 
revolutionary ideas, or their being bourgeois disguised as proletarian agitators. The use 
of the term “prerogatives” gestures towards larger social patterns, like the social 
conditionings that were putting down roots in his contemporary society and 
determining a new form of political life. Later on, Pasolini explained his point of view 
as follows: 
 
Because the bourgeoisie is triumphing, it is transforming 
both the workers and the ex-colonial peasants into 
bourgeois. In short, through neocapitalism the 
                                                 
6 See the Round Table organized by the journal L’Espresso in 1968, now in pasolini.net, 
<http://www.pasolini.net/saggistica_tavolarotondaEspresso.htm>; for an account of the debate see also 
Andrea Pera, “Borghesia, Rivoluzione, Potere: il ’68 nel teatro di Pier Paolo Pasolini,” Carte Italiane 4 
(2008): 16-45; on the student revolt as a bourgeois struggle see William Van Watson, Pier Paolo 
Pasolini and the Theatre of the World (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1989), 13.  
7 Pasolini, Heretical Empiricism, 150. 
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bourgeoisie is becoming the human condition. Those who 
are born into this entropy cannot in any way, 
metaphysically, be outside of it. It’s over. For this I 
provoke the young. They are, presumably, the last 
generation which sees workers and peasants; the next 
generation will only see bourgeois entropy around it.8    
 
A new term that became fashionable in the sixties describing the expansion of large 
national corporations, state intervention and mass consumption, neocapitalism 
represents for Pasolini the overreaching force that is subsuming the minds and bodies 
of the new Italian generations.9 This process of rationalization transformed the whole 
of the social infrastructure of the country. Pasolini carried out the analysis of these 
processes in a series of newspapers articles, most notably in the Corriere della Sera, 
later reunited under the title Scritti corsari (1975) and in his last writings, Lutheran 
Letters, which were published posthumously in 1976.  
In these essays the poet and filmmaker argues that the cultural mutation 
brought about by neocapitalism thanks to communication (television) and public 
infrastructures for the circulation of motor vehicles was so deep and powerful as to 
determine the first true unification of the Italian people.10 It was obviously a 
unification imposed and not willed by those who were subjected to it, a unification 
that was grafted on the peculiar anomaly of the Italian history – that is to say on the 
lack of a precedent socio-political homogenization, since the country never really 
                                                 
8 Pasolini, 156. 
9 On the transformations of economy that gave rise to neocapitalism see Ernest Mandel, “Workers under 
Neocapitalism,” Marxiste, <http://marxsite.com/workers_under_neocapitalism.htm>; Paul A. Baran and 
Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital. An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967) and The affluent society (Boston: Mifflin, 1958). 
10 See Scritti corsari, 32 and Lutheran Letters (Manchester: Carcanet New Press, 1983), 63-67.  
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underwent a process of unification as others did through a centralized monarchy, or a 
bourgeois revolution.11 Neocapitalism represented for Pasolini a non-coercive 
transformation of social practices, a passive reshaping of forms of life that altered 
society at an anthropological level. As I soon show, this also coincides with what 
Gramsci called a passive revolution. 
With his broad range of interests and multifaceted activity as poet, essayist and 
film director, Pasolini represents an unmatched attempt to analyze and critique the 
passive revolution of neocapitalism in all its tentacular dimensions. In particular, he is 
crucial in pinning down the connection between the process of emancipation and the 
hedonism of consumerism as constitutive of the new social practices that students, 
workers and women were generating. Pasolini is thus a powerful magnifying glass to 
study the transformations and the contradictions that Italian 1968 brought about. 
Yet we need to be aware that there is a fundamental difference between his 
understanding of the emergence of political subjectivities, their relation with the 
power system, and that of the Student Movement. When it comes to the study of their 
nature, Pasolini shows a profound pessimism. The affirmation of these new 
subjectivities for him falls directly within the framework of a further exploitation and 
oppression. They are part of the accumulation of capital and its process of 
commodification of human relations. Unfortunately, when Pasolini states that “the 
student revolt was born overnight,” and that “there were not any real objective 
reasons” for it, he misses the fact that this desire for the revolution was based on 
embryonic social changes occurring in society while Fordism was blocking them.12  
Moreover, Pasolini shows no interest for the question of labor-power. He 
seems to rely on an understanding of production based exclusively on labor whereas 
                                                 
11 Pier Paolo Pasolini e la ragione di un sogno, Dir. Laura Betti. Palomar, 2001. 
12 Pasolini, Scritti corsari, 37. 
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capitalist relations of production are founded on wage-labor as the partial payment of a 
capacity to work. In other words wage-labor is not defined by the compensation for a 
fixed amount of labor, but by a capacity to perform multiple tasks. In Pasolini, 
overlooking the centrality of labor-power produces a static and generally passive 
understanding of class struggle. Subjectivities are simply understood as dominated by 
production. They are not active agents who, while under capital domination, 
contribute to the changing of production through their actions. Hence the impossibility 
to talk about biopolitics in Pasolini, despite the centrality of the thematic of the body 
and life in his work.13 Pasolini’s vitalism is certainly not metaphysical, since the 
attention to the historical determination of life in given societies is a distinct trait of his 
thought; still the absence of the concept of labor-power in his reflection prevents our 
endeavor to search for a biopolitical dimension of social practices.  
Because of this blind spot in his understanding of the events of 1968, which I 
frame as a moment of creation and empowering of the biopolitical element, Pasolini 
departs from a materialist analysis of reality and enters an ambiguously moral realm, 
in which, as Wallace P. Sillanpoa argued, “capitalist society” becomes a “malum to be 
rejected tout court in the name of a purer (pre-industrial) one threatened with 
extinction.”14 Against the “total embourgeoisement” of society the only solution 
available for him is the “conservation of all forms of culture.”15 The preservation of 
alterity, not just as culture, but also as social systems (even feudal ones), is Pasolini’s 
response to the processes of modernization that were changing Italy’s face. Now, 
regardless of the soundness and a-historical nature of this argument, in the next pages I 
will use Pasolini’s critique of the Student Movement and neocapitalism as a way to 
                                                 
13 One needs to mention only the famous trilogy of life: Decameron (1970-71), Canterbury Tales 
(1971-72), The Thousand and One Arabian Nights (1973-74).  
14 Wallace Sillanpoa, “Pasolini’s Gramsci,” MLN 1 (1981): 131. 
15 Pasolini, Lutheran Letters, 124, 125. 
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think about production and reproduction in the context of the Italian modernization 
and its new forms of subjectivities. As I will argue in my conclusion, the radical 
negativity of Pasolini’s reflection becomes useful to engender thought in difference. 
Finally, I will show how Pasolini’s apparently conservative position on abortion, once 
corrected through his own category of necessary death, meets some of the ideas of the 
Student Movement, especially its neo-feminist avant-garde, and becomes the starting 
point for a theory that recognizes the biopolitical capacities of labor, but that 
simultaneously directs them toward a common goal. The deepest pessimism of 
Pasolini can potentially become the reason for a positive affirmation of a new 
collective life. 
The Language of Things 
By the mid 1960s the modernization of Italy was reaching its peak. The signs 
were clear in the changing of the standards of consumption, education and production 
(the latter grew 10, 1% per year). But as many intellectuals were pointing out, this 
model of development was also bringing about social degradation. The focus of these 
engaged intellectuals became thus the study of the processes at work in Italian society, 
particularly the critique of the outcome that a massive amount of commercial goods 
that was flooding the market generated. In a 1960 essay, titled “Il mare 
dell’oggettività,”  Italo Calvino wrote that the sea of objectivity, i.e. the 
commodification of social relations brought forward by capitalism, was submerging 
the subject, neutralizing its capacity to act upon reality and pushing it toward an 
alarming passivity.16 On the opposite side of the literary field, the neo-avant-garde of 
Gruppo 63, with which Pasolini strenuously debated, similarly confronted this 
                                                 
16 “Il mare dell’oggettività,” Una pietra sopra. Discorsi di letteratura e società (Torino Einaudi, 1980), 
39-45. 
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situation and focused on the demystification of the ideology of progress and 
modernization through linguistic experimentalism.17  
Pasolini developed his critique of commodification through what he called the 
examination of the language of things. To do so he chose the form of a philosophical 
tale like Voltaire’s Candide: or, Optimism (1759). Unfortunately Pasolini’s treaty, 
Gennariello, remained unfinished, but since the main ideas are clearly sketched out, 
we can use them as a starting point for our discussion. Pasolini addresses his teaching 
to a young Napolitan boy, Genariello, a new Candide who needs to be rescued by the 
ideology of development and consumerism that was erasing any trace of contradiction, 
any possible discrepancy or social difference, with its powerful optimism. Pasolini 
thus sets out to explore analytically the non-verbal language of commodities in which 
Gennariello has been raised. When I say commodities I do not just mean items sold 
and consumed, but also social spaces, like urban or suburban environments. Pasolini’s 
analysis of the language of things is built on a careful selection of these elements and 
the patient explanation of the dynamics that lie behind it.  
I will begin by assessing commodities qua things, goods to be consumed, and 
then pass to the commodification of the social space. As for commodities, Pasolini’s 
argument is based on the hidden assumption that goods are the modern embodiment of 
a classical rhetorical figure: prosopopoeia, or a personification. Why did Pasolini pick 
such an improbable figure to talk about consumerism? The first answer is that Pasolini 
is quoting Marx’s famous passage on commodity fetishism where he says “could 
commodities themselves speak, they would say: our use value may be a thing that 
interests men.”18 Yet, prosopopoeias are not as fictitious as they seem or, which is the 
same, their fiction produces effects which are quite concrete and disconcerting. 
                                                 
17 See Angelo Guglielmi, Avanguardia e sperimentalismo (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1977), 55. 
18 Marx, Capital, vol. 1, ed. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm>. 
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Consider Etruscan vases for instance, most of them bear inscriptions that make them 
speak. They usually announce the name of their owners and do so in the first singular 
person; they state for instance: “I belong to Avile Repesuna.”19  
Now, there is a very uncanny feeling in confronting the sentence of an object 
that speaks as if it were a human subject: I am the property of… and so on. The full 
articulation of the potential of a prosopopoeia is precisely in the unsettling power of a 
talking thing because, as Slavoj Žižek writes, in this case one is confronted with “the 
shocking emergence of a word where one would not expect it.”20 Pasolini exploits this 
uncanny effect and takes it to its most nightmarish consequences: that of a object that 
is not made to speak in observance of the will of a human subject, but that now speaks 
autonomously and, what’s more, expressing fundamental truths regarding 
contemporary society.  
Thus objects speak; they articulate a discourse that influences the masses so 
that they become true “pedagogical sources” for Gennariello.21 They spell out the 
social relations that dominate contemporary society since they act as active elements 
in the mediation and communication among consumers. At the same time though, they 
also mark the unbridgeable gap between Gennariello’s generation and the previous 
ones. To clarify the point, Pasolini recalls a circumstance related to the staging of his 
last movie Salò that involved teacups.  
 
My set-designer, Dante Ferretti […] had found a very 
precious tea-set, […] the cups were bright egg-yellow 
with white raised spots. Related as they were to the world 
                                                 
19 This particular example comes from a drinking-cup (kantharos) held in the British Museum which 
dates back to 600 BC. 
20 Organs Without Bodies. On Deleuze and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2004), 171. 
21 Pasolini, Lutheran Letters, 26. 
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of the Bauhaus and the air-raid shelters, they were deeply 
moving […] Yet these cups had about them a mysterious 
quality which was shared incidentally by the furniture, 
the carpets, the ladies’ clothes and hats, the furnishing 
and even the wallpaper. […] This mysterious quality was 
that of their workmanship. Up to the fifties and into the 
first years of the sixties that is how it was. Things were 
still made or put together by human hands […] and they 
were things with a human – that is to say, personal – 
destination.22  
 
The mechanization of production erases the previous goal-oriented nature of goods 
and liberates them. Having overcome their original function of satisfying basic human 
needs, commodities are now free from their anchorage to a material referent and assert 
themselves as autonomous objects. They are prosopopoeias that do not stand for 
something else; they do not need any sort of anthropomorphic resemblance. For if it is 
the object that has conquered the subject, as Calvino said, it is the former that most 
truly incarnates the new subject. These goods are so charged with their consumerist 
message that they become autonomous entities speaking for themselves. 
To recapitulate: the pedagogical truth that the language of modern things 
contains rests for Pasolini in the suspension of the link between goods and human 
needs, and thus in the emancipation of commodities as symbolic, free entities.23 As he 
argues “the gap between the consumerist world and the paleo-industrial world is still 
wider and more total than the gap between the paleo-industrial one and the pre-
                                                 
22 Pasolini, Lutheran Letters, 34. 
23 The a-referentiality of commodities had been already assessed by Guy Debord in his ground breaking 
work The Society of Spectacle (1967) and Jean Baudrillard The System of Objects (1968). 
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industrial one. The latter in fact has only today been finally superseded – abolished, 
destroyed.”24 In this older phase, goods were of course still “mystified, falsified, made 
horrendous at the level of power,” yet “they remained real at the level of the power-
dominated world.”25 It is only with the advanced mechanization of Fordism that their 
reproducibility shredded the bond with the uniqueness and thingness of the objects and 
the latter become progressively immaterial, more volatile and versatile just like 
language. Hence Pasolini’s linguistic representation of commodities qua linguistic 
tropes (prosopopoeias). 
That said, certain contemporary readings of Pasolini as the forerunner of post-
structuralist poetics must be reframed in light of his firm condemnation of the 
commodity’s break from referentiality. Gesturing toward Julia Kristeva’s work, 
Francesca Cadel argues, for example, that Pasolini’s linguistic idea is that of the 
“signifier as such.”26 Cadel’s analysis originates from Pasolini’s last poetic production 
that I do not investigate here, and which is certainly flexible enough to sustain Post-
structural readings. But she also contends that this posture informs Pasolini’s 
philosophy in general. Yet, even if Pasolini registers this condition, and attempts to 
explain its causes, he certainly does not embrace it as an emancipative poetics. When 
he talks about language for instance, he summons up a quasi referential notion of the 
sign, as he argues that language “is not an arbitrary abstraction, but a coherent 
physical whole of necessary signs.” Signs become “arbitrary afterwards, in the 
moment in which the purely phonic language […] begins to become potentially also a 
                                                 
24 Pasolini, Lutheran Letters, 34. 
25 Pasolini, Lutheran Letters, 35. 
26 See Francesca Cadel, La lingua dei desideri. Il dialetto secondo Pier Paolo Pasolini (Lecce: Manni, 
2002), 147. I believe that even Pasolini’s idea of poetic expressiveness against the communicative use 
of language should not be misunderstood for a post-structuralist concept of meaning. The defence of a 
deeply humanist content of language is a constant feature of Pasolini’s polemics. See his discussion of 
the linguistic problem in Heretical Empiricism, 46-48. 
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written language; that is, the language of a culture.” 27 Moreover, the expressiveness 
of language, which Pasolini praises, cannot be confused with the constitutive 
indeterminateness of postmodern poetics. As an essential moment of expression of 
still vital and natural energy, poetry is furthermore a weapon against the reification 
and quantification of the real. It is that intensity that breaks away from capital 
abstraction and equalization in which the qualitative difference of things is subsumed 
in a mere quantitative one. In a nutshell, his anchorage to a referent (even if not 
immediate), his being a poet “who is not satisfied with a cognitive act but wishes to 
have direct experience of the magma,” and a Marxist, “who is not satisfied with 
knowing and describing a geometry of reality that is, but wishes to bring order to it, 
both in knowledge and action,” invalidates a hidden postmodern source for Pasolini’s 
theory.28  
Finally, the notion of a ubiquitous free-floating signifier is the stamp impressed 
by consumer culture on things which, as we will see, for Pasolini led directly towards 
a new and more powerful form of fascism. The ideology consumer culture fosters is 
connected for Pasolini to the “wave of formalism and empiricism of the great 
European neocapitalist renaissance,” and to the French avant-gardes of the 60s like the 
École du regard or the Tel Quel group that have been considered the forefathers of 
Post-structuralism.29 But apart from these genealogies of postmodernism, the real 
breach between the materiality of reality and the new immaterial linguistic nature of 
commodities is precisely what Pasolini underscores in his treatise and the lesson 
                                                 
27 Pasolini, Heretical Empiricism, 68. 
28 Pasolini, Heretical Empiricism, 74. I believe my position coincides also with Maurizio Viano’s idea 
of a “certain realism” that Pasolini coined for his cinema. That is to say not a naïve belief in the direct 
representation of reality, but in the performative quality of this realism that would put “spectators in the 
position of asking themselves questions about reality.” A Certain Realism. Making Use of Pasolini’s 
Film Theory and Practice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), x; see also Noa Steimatsky, 
Italian Locations: Reinhabiting the Past in Postwar Cinema (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008), 136-137. 
29 Pasolini, Heretical Empiricism, 74. 
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Gennariello needs to learn, even if he is already fully immersed into this mode of 
living. This is the radical difference that produces a generational gap between those 
who lived in a paleo-industrial world and those who grew up today. Pasolini regrets 
this condition and laments the estrangement between the new generation and his own. 
In a nutshell, Pasolini is still a modern intellectual who, attempting to think through an 
incipient post-modern society, mourns the past and a radical alterity to modernity.  
When discussing urban space, Pasolini’s analysis reaches a remarkable level of 
clairvoyance. The remarks on the city of Bologna are furthermore prophetical of the 
turmoil that were to shake the regional capital of Emilia Romagna only two years 
later. The contradiction that Pasolini points out, perhaps without clearly resolving it, is 
that Bologna lives off a false reconciliation. The local communist government 
embraced a managerial logic that stresses efficiency, social peace and higher standards 
of living for the proletariat. One can argue that in Bologna, as well as in a handful of 
other towns of the centre north of Italy, the true reformist program of the PCI was 
fully developed and applied starting from the end of World War II. Yet these local 
governments also disclosed their inner weakness with regard to a real anti-capitalist 
project, that is, with of a new form of life that promotes social progress, and not 
merely quantitative growth (i.e. development). Pasolini rightly points out that Bologna 
represents a laboratory for “a possible and improbable Italian city of the future.” But 
he also foresees that the two “blessings: wealth and a Communist administration,” that 
characterize this political experiment “create a democratic optimism” which is in fact 
totalitarian. This is what the prosopopoeia of Bologna utters: “as I am both a 
developed and a Communist city I am not only a city where there is no alternative, but 
I am also a place where there is no alterity.” It is the reduction to the same cycle of 
production and consumption that obliterates any difference and agency of 
subjectivities. Bologna is a perfect mechanism that translates “the development of 
117 
transnational consumerism” into the reality of a “Communist regional governing 
body.”30 Furthermore, according to Pasolini the homogenizing of the natural space 
under this apparent positive apparatus is threatening at a social but also at an 
ecological level.  
The process of valorization that the municipality put in motion relies indeed on 
a kind of economic development that brings together two opposite elements. On the 
one hand, it follows a classical capitalist system of production based on the extraction 
of surplus-labor. On the other, it camouflages the exploitation with a set of social 
mitigations: programs of redistribution of wealth, a solid network of services 
supporting the lower strata, and furnishing essential services for the community such 
as collectively owned firms for public transportation, water management, and 
cooperatives which fostered the idea of collective management and solidarity against 
that of profit making. All this was producing a social value that mitigated a still 
capitalist based society. In time though, and one can see it clearly today, even this 
positive value would eventually be turned into profit, and the social progress of these 
experiments sold as any other commodity. This complex social infrastructure had 
advantages, that of a minimal level of class conflict, cooperatives for instance usually 
functioned as mitigating devices, and that of a high level of efficiency reached, not 
through the imposition of the rationalization of production, but through the 
commitment of workers who were also members of the communities benefiting from 
those same product/services they produced. The high efficiency of this apparatus and 
the positive image built on its social mission came in handy when local governments 
decided it was time to privatize and make profits.  
Today it is easy to see how the production of concrete values in terms of social 
needs served the purpose of stimulating a process of economic valorization that was 
                                                 
30 Pasolini, Heretical Empiricism, 38. 
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originally public and social. The very halo that still today surrounds the efficiency of 
the so called “red regions,” like Emilia Romagna or Tuscany, their fame as political 
laboratories of a future sustainable capitalism, is part of that production of value that 
was progressively expropriated from the collective and sold as a commodity. In this 
sense, Pasolini is absolutely right in highlighting the futuristic quality of these social 
experiments. They were not, as the communist propaganda of the time assumed, a real 
alternative to capitalism. They had in embryo in fact a superseding of capitalism on a 
capitalist basis. Under the austere opulence of its red palaces and city arches, the 
prosopopoeia of Bologna cradled the germ of a future in which production was 
constituted by social wealth and a regenerating process of self-valorization. This 
future has become our present, one in which decades of social cooperation with its 
institutions are now sold through expensive services to citizens, while Bologna 
becomes a “super-commodity” for visitors thanks to territorial marketing.31  
If Pasolini reads well the stabilizing power that the PCI exercised and that was 
perfectly compatible with a capitalist modernization, he nonetheless drastically 
overlooks the potential for the opposition and repression that this model incubated. 
Pasolini had already passed away but when the next wave of the student Movement 
gained momentum in 1977, the efficient and democratic appearance of the Communist 
municipality quickly turned into an authoritarian one supporting the military 
repression of the Italian government who sent tanks and put under siege the city. This 
contradiction was perfectly captured by Gad Lerner, back then a militant and now a 
well known journalist, when he stated “Bologna is red, but red with shame” [Bologna 
è rossa, ma rossa di vergogna]. Later on, this became a favorite slogan among 
students.  
                                                 
31 On the notion of super-commodity applied to public spaces, see Vanni Codeluppi, Lo Spettacolo 
della Merce (Milano: Bompiani, 2000). 
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The tea cups and Bologna are two elements that explain the prosopopoeia-like 
nature of commodities. They define the breach between the ideology of development 
as the production of superfluous commodities and of a subject that must consume 
them, and what instead Pasolini calls progress as the satisfaction of necessary needs.32 
Before we move into the anthropological mutation that this change entails for the 
whole of Italian society and especially for the new subjectivities emerging from 1968, 
let us linger on the theoretical framing of this transformation tracing it back once again 
to Gramsci’s thought.  
The Linguistic Nature of the Passive Revolution 
When confronting the processes of mechanization of human labor and the 
social practices that are born out of it, it is safe to keep open the dialectic between the 
new degrees of freedom that are produced and their related forms of oppression. 
Gramsci articulated this linkage through the concept of the passive revolution. He 
borrowed the term from the Neapolitan intellectual Vincenzo Cuoco (1770-1823), who 
had used it to describe the failed revolutionary attempt of the Parthenopean Republic 
of 1799. Initially, Gramsci employed it to describe the Risorgimento as a “revolution 
without a revolution;” but later it became clear that Fordism too was a transformation 
without change, for the latter aimed at surpassing the liberal phase of capitalism 
through the establishment of a planned economy, while keeping untouched the 
prerogatives of its system.33  
                                                 
32 See Pier Paolo Pasolini, Dir. Laura Betti.  
33 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 114. It derives from the two principles that Marx 
established in the Preface of The Critique of Political Economy: “1. that no social formation disappears 
as long as the productive forces which have developed within it still find room for further forward 
movement; 2. that a society does not itself set tasks for whose solution the necessary conditions have 
not already been incubated.” Gramsci quotes Marx by memory, but it is clear the he is linking the 
concept of the passive revolution with what I called the principle of materialist finitization. He also 
adds that it must be understood dialectically. Not as the “belief in some kind of fatalism” fomenting a 
widespread “indifferentism,” but as the postulation of a “necessary […] antithesis which can present 
intransigently all its potentialities for development.” Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 114. 
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Furthermore, even if Fordism was applied in a very limited form and had to 
face the general backwardness of the Italian situation, Gramsci read the “socialization 
and co-operation in the sphere of production” brought about by the fascist regime as 
the “only solution whereby to develop the productive forces of industries under the 
direction of the traditional ruling class,” without obviously “touching (or at least not 
going beyond the regulation and control of) individual and group appropriation of 
profit.”34 For Gramsci fascism was thus a particular form of the larger phenomenon of 
the passive revolution: a modernization that preserved residuals of parasitism, of 
corporativism and a caste’s privileges.35  
Two further considerations merit attention. There is at least one element that is 
connected to the apparatus of Fordism as a passive revolution that Gramsci missed. He 
did not realize that consumption was a far more complex thing than the basic 
fulfillment of biological necessities and the foundation of a caste of parasites that “live 
on so-called past labor, a metaphor to indicate the present labor of others.”36 Gramsci, 
furthermore, ignored the libidinal attachment that commodities exercised, and of 
course had little recourse to first hand information to start considering the profound 
                                                                                                                                            
Althusser does not sense this non-determinist and linear focus, siding with a sort of Crocean critique of 
Marx. See Louis Althusser, “Marx in his Limits,” Philosophy of the Encounter: later writings, 1978-87 
(London: Verso, 2006), 38-39. 
34 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 120. 
35 Italy’s specific conditions created a hybrid that enjoyed a long-lasting fortune in the history of the 
country constituting a solid base for the dominant classes. This compromise held together social groups 
enjoying “situation rent” and other seeking profits, thus combining backward and advanced 
technological forms of individual and collective exploitation. If we extrapolate from these negative 
features, those elements that would define a true revolution we will see that the rationalization of 
society directed at the satisfaction of the needs of the producers would probably constitute the first 
pillar of such a project. Along with it, I would single out the elimination of the many instances of social 
parasitism that burdened on Italian society. Lastly the progressive elimination of class privileges and 
exploitation through the equal participation in production and the redistribution of social wealth 
demanded also a fierce fight against bureaucratization, which is usually a consequence of the 
construction of vast state apparatuses. In this sense, Gramsci’s insistence on parasitism can be 
connected with this idea of a civil society that grows organically, stimulated by active individuals and 
not by a state socialization that uniforms and crystallizes collective life in definite set of rights and 
duties. The post-war PCI did not really follow this organic perspective, often falling in a mystique of 
the state as the guarantor of the socialization of the means of production. 
36 Gramsci, Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: ElectBook, 2001), 363. 
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stabilizing power they had over the whole of society.37 It is true that he sensed the 
danger of the new “necessities” that the system was creating for its consumer, but he 
did not explore the productive element of consumption.  
Lastly, Gramsci warns against the use of the passive revolution as an abstract 
historical schema. For if the latter is not “purged of every residue of mechanicism and 
fatalism,” it faces the “danger of historical defeatism.”38 As any other socio-political 
situation, this revolution without a revolution is in fact always the result of an 
“equilibrium of political forces,” both at the national and international levels.39 The 
engaged intellectual must not forget the historicity of such a situation and read through 
the economic and political contradictions that generated it in order to change them.  
Facing the very first consequences of the mass production and consumption of 
commodities as a powerful homogenizing factor, Pasolini usually fell back on a kind 
of tragic fatalism. The subjugating capacities of the neocapitalist passive revolution 
seemed to him mighty forces that ruthlessly conquered peoples and places. Yet the 
novelty of his analysis resides in his re-articulation of this transformation in the light 
of the linguistic-scientific direction that the developments of the forces of production 
were clearly undertaking. For Pasolini this transformation “which would be a simple 
evolution if it were a question of a purely extensive fact,” it is “instead a revolution” 
because of “the transformation of the scientific spirit into the application of science” 
and “the anthropological mutations that this implies.”40 The scientific factor that 
Pasolini mentions here is, as I mentioned above, the new productive capacity which 
                                                 
37 See Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum, 
1998). 
38 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 107, 114. 
39 To this list Gramsci also adds the “politico-military equilibrium;” see Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, 107, 175-85. 
40 Pasolini, Heretical Empiricism, 64. Pasolini frames this discussion in the light of linguistic practices 
and the diachronic changes they undergo as they register socio-political turmoil provoked by class 
struggle.  
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pushes society to organize its social relations around the consumption of superfluous 
goods. This structural transformation is what Pasolini calls an “internal revolution of 
the system.” It is a revolution that is disjointed from the external (anticapitalist) forces 
and thus produces a transformation grafted on the same prerogatives of its own 
original structure.41 It is still based on exploitation and, if apparently it minimizes 
social discrepancies through the improving of the standard of living, in actual fact it 
subjects lower strata to consumerism rendering them slaves of a more subtle and 
pervasive power. To summarize: Pasolini accepts the main features of Gramsci’s idea 
of the passive revolution, then updates it and, as I show, develops its association with 
fascism.  
What stands out in this analysis is Pasolini’s attempt to identify the 
characteristics of this new normalization and incorporation of subordinated groups and 
its heavy investment in the symbolic and linguistic domains. As I said, it is not just the 
prosopopoeia-like status of commodities that Pasolini discovers, but also the 
immaterial quality that the advancement of mechanization produces. This quality is 
intrinsically linguistic, for as he says the “languages of the infrastructures, let us 
simply say the languages of production, are guiding society linguistically.”42 
Pasolini’s most important contribution to the critical understanding of the new 
modernization takes in fact the form of a linguistic analysis of social processes. Before 
taking that question up, I need to clarify further Pasolini’s stance; in other words his 
theoretical position with regard to this issue.  
Now, the two distinctive characteristics of Pasolini’s pessimistic reframing of 
the passive revolution are: a painful mourning for what the new accumulation was 
sweeping out, the vestiges of non-capitalist territories, and, at the same time, the 
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detailed study of the movement forward in the secularization and commodification of 
Italian society entering into an age of abundance. The mourning for an original 
essence is constituent with Pasolini’s style and his dense, robust language that feeds 
on this primary loss as an engine for narration. Beautiful as it is in its tormenting tone, 
this search for an original fullness is probably the less critical element of his analysis 
and has been labeled in different ways: populism, primitivism, and archaism.43 
However, for Pasolini peasants and urban lumpenproletariat contain some positive 
original element that critics have defined as the longing for a primitive truth and 
innocence, or at least an authentic immediacy to the subject matter he confronted.44 
For Pasolini this pre-capitalist world, or as he calls it the “leftover of a preceding 
civilization,” represented an all comprising source of value.45 Contrasting it with the 
critical knowledge that the proletariat had to develop in order to liberate itself, 
Pasolini, in his famous long poem, The Ashes of Gramsci (1957), argues that this 
 
Proletarian life 
that preceded you; for me it is a religion,  
its joy, not its millennial 
struggle; its nature, not its  
consciousness. 46
                                                 
43 See for instance Alberto Asor Rosa, Scrittori e popolo. Il populismo nella letteratura italiana 
contemporanea (Roma: Samonà e Savelli, 1972). 
44 See Van Watson, 15; Aldo Carotenuto, L’Autunno della Coscienza (Turin: Boringhieri, 1985); 
Colleen Ryan-Scheutz, Sex, the Self, and the Sacred. Women in the Cinema of Pier Paolo Pasolini 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 11-13. 
45 Scritti corsari, 66. 
46 Pier Paolo Pasolini, Poems (New York: Noonday Press, 1982), 11. Consider how Pasolini turns over 
an asset of Marxist philosophy such as Engels firm belief that at least one positive element in 
urbanization had to be stressed. As he argues “the great cities have transformed the disease of the social 
body, which appears in chronic form in the country, into an acute one, and so made manifest its real 
nature and the means of curing it. Without the great cities and their forcing influence upon the popular 
intelligence, the working-class would be far less advanced than it is.” Frederick Engels, Condition of 
the Working Class in England, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/condition-working-class/ch07.htm>. 
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I believe that this concept of nature represents the poet’s re-inscription of a certain 
idea of naturalness expressed in the language of the myth. Pasolini’s critical opponents 
usually overlook this key mythical experience, but it does indeed structure his 
writings. Similarly to Cesare Pavese’s idea of lucore (luminosity), this “sub-
proletarian life” is invested with an aura that touches the deepest emotions of the poet 
and surpasses any attempt of rationalization.47 It embodies a symbolic dimension 
charged with the powerful force of a pre-logical experience of meaning. As Pavese 
explains, mythical thinking builds on “the uniqueness of the gesture, or the event;” this 
implies “doing something once and for all, causing the gesture to fill with meanings in 
a process of eternal re-filling,” so that “thanks to its fixity [this gesture] ceases to be 
realistic.”48 This is why mythical reasoning establishes an unshakable symbolic 
hierarchy. What Pasolini calls in fact a pre-historic “proletarian life” becomes for him 
an all constitutive model, which he longs for and thus conjures up in his work. I will 
not explore this long debated issue. Suffice it to say, however, that this is the kernel of 
a mythical originality that Pasolini sets as a yardstick to measure the damages of 
modern development. For us it becomes only a methodological principle, a reactant to 
initiate and energize our critique, without laying the claim of being a concrete 
solution. Pasolini is a critical counter-point. 
A Critique of Modernization and its Agents 
According to Pasolini, the Church, one of the most solid institutions of the pre-
capitalist Italian society, indeed its true backbone, received a fatal blow not by a 
proletarian emancipation, nor by the official left, but by consumerism. Pasolini 
maintains that consumer culture is an obscene [scandalosa] contradiction that bound 
                                                 
47 See Cesare Pavese, “Del mito, del simbolo e d’altro,” La letteratura americana e altri saggi (Torino: 
Einaudi, 1951), 302. 
48 Pavese, 300. 
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religion, in a self-destructive fashion, to the new era of mass consumption. 
Monarchy’s power, even fascism, as earthly political powers were less damaging for 
the Church than the new bourgeois spirit which aimed at “furnishing people with a 
total and unitary vision of life.”49 New beliefs, new behaviors, and especially the 
construction of a new identity replaced the “authority and form of power” of the 
Church.50  
This point is best explained by Pasolini through a witty analysis of a 
commercial advertisement for clothing. In the wake of Roman Jakobson’s famous 
study of the political slogan “I like Ike,” Pasolini decodes an advertisement by 
Oliviero Toscani for a brand called Jesus Jeans which read “You shall not have other 
Jeans other than me.” For Pasolini the profane tone of the advertisement contains an 
essential truth that goes beyond the mere effect of the parody. The pun on the name 
Jesus lays out a new social architecture in which the commodity marks the subjection 
of a transcendental principle, Jesus, to the utilitarian forces of production. It is a 
totalitarian annexation of the whole of reality, through the replacement of one form of 
power – the dogma of religion – with a new one, consumerism. 
In the same article Pasolini also pokes fun at an article published by the 
Vatican newspaper that reacted with scandal to the profanity of such an 
advertisement.51 According to Pasolini this reaction was unjustified. There had been 
more then one ambiguous relation between capitalism and the Church. Having made a 
pact with capitalism in order to fence off the proletarian forces, now that the former 
was rapidly becoming a totalizing form of life, the Church progressively lost its 
hegemony over the Italian people. But apart from launching useless anathemas, what 
remained to do for this venerable and once powerful institution was only negotiating 
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the transmission of power, and assuring certain exterior protections to the privileges of 
the old caste. Its destiny was doomed. 
Now if an older form of power is replaced by a new one, the disciplinary 
mechanisms of control also vary according to the structure of the new system. In this 
essay, Pasolini seems to be still open to the exploration of political ruptures and even 
to the overcoming of this new form of passive revolution. He thus points to the 
potential field that such a liberation from a hierarchical notion of truth could generate. 
This “unforeseeable opportunity” resides in the politicization of the very 
advertisement “and thus presumably of the entire technological world.” As Pasolini 
argues: 
 
Perhaps this entails that even the future that to us humanist 
and religious people looks like death and blockage will be, 
in a new world, history; and that the existence of 
production’s pure communicability will be somehow 
contradicted. Indeed the slogan of these jeans does not 
simply express the urge to consume, but to a more extreme 
degree, it is a nemesis – albeit an unaware one – that 
punishes the Church for its pact with the devil.52  
 
When it comes to the spelling out of the concrete processes of the liberalization of 
older and fixed forms of social interaction, Pasolini shows all his capacities to read the 
minutiae of everyday life in order to chisel out the footprints of social contradiction.53 
There is in fact a Gramscian afflatus in this last move that stresses the need not just to 
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understand, but also to change reality. Thus also “the future” can potentially return 
under control and become history again. The road toward the overturning of a 
totalitarian capitalist society is gauged as an unexpected result, but its articulation is 
unfortunately missing. Nemesis in fact cannot become a platform for political action. 
Rather it is simply vindication, the belated paying back for a mistake. The nature of 
this mistake however incorporates some truth, as the parallel between religious and 
intellectual people reveals. It is what Pasolini calls in his Apology to the poem The 
PCI to the Young!!, the “last possible choice – on the eve of the assimilation of 
bourgeois history to human history – in favor of what is not bourgeois.”54 What is this 
kernel of truth? How does it connect with those subjectivities that were hoping to 
overturn bourgeois society? 
Pasolini begins exploring the heterogeneous world of the youth Movement in 
another article, “Il discorso dei capelli” [Hair’s Discourse]. Here he makes a curious 
argument for the silent statement uttered by the physical appearance of the first 
beatniks he encounters in Prague. Their long hair voices, according to Pasolini, a non-
verbal message. This is a mute message not because it is expressed through 
constructions other than words or signs, but because of its content. For Pasolini the 
discourse of the beatniks’ look is ineffable and thus highly undifferentiated, because it 
embodies a radical negation. Their “unarticulated language,” he says, was expressing 
physically their no to “the madness of a destiny as executives.”55 For Pasolini their 
negation does not have a constructive, architectonic value. Instead it is characterized 
by the direct rejection of a certain state of affairs. As a result, the fact that their action 
is only a denial silences their utterance. As we will see, things are far more 
complicated. 
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However, at this point Pasolini is still sympathetic to the malaise of the new 
generation, but he cannot help noticing that the beatnik subculture is itself a by-
product of the chaotic movement of capitalism. Now the term subculture is not 
intrinsically derogatory. It simply points instead to the act of separation and opposition 
to common cultural practices that a subset of the cultural system operates. The 
dominant system Pasolini refers to is built around a rigid work ethic, the affirmation of 
patriarchal rules, and a regimentation of sexuality which was strictly imposed on 
women, and generously tolerant for males. Clearly these are also the principles of the 
Fordist family that the new wave of social unrest was ready to kick out of history. Yet, 
according to Pasolini, while strenuously fighting these principles, the beatnik 
subculture reinstates a new set of values that are completely functional to the 
advancement of capitalism. Its tenets were not only a vast process of secularization, 
but also included a strong hedonistic drive, i.e. the rising of pleasure to the level of a 
guiding principle. The young generation was establishing “new religious values inside 
bourgeois entropy, precisely when the latter was becoming perfectly secularized and 
hedonistic.”56 Another way of saying this is that the Movement’s struggle fosters the 
“attainment of one’s own rights [which] merely promotes the person who gains them 
to the ranks of the bourgeois.”57 It is, in short, the turn to the hedonism of 
consumption that consumer culture foments and that, to a certain extent, 1968 was 
using as a picklock to break out of the Fordist cage.  
Clues about the traps that the Movement was slipping into can be found in 
another article entitled “La prima vera rivoluzione di destra” [The First Real Right-
wing Revolution]. The list of titles for high schools’ final examination offers Pasolini 
the opportunity to spell out the material structure of the new power and its 
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compromises with older institution. Pasolini insists particularly on one of the titles 
that, citing Benedetto Croce, asked students to talk about the traditional relation 
between father and son. The subject matter was particularly delicate since it asked the 
students to talk about the issue of generational ties, a social institution that had been 
radically questioned by the Student Movement just a few years before. Still the 
wording of the title stubbornly defended a hierarchical knowledge of the transmission 
of power among generations. A defense of such outdated values appeared to Pasolini 
as the old regime’s pitiful need to save appearances. He underscores the ambiguous 
game that power is playing in the wake of his idea of internal revolution. He argues 
that the “revolutionary reaction” carried out by the right wing is revolutionary in that it 
destroys its “older social institutions (family, culture, language, Church),” but it is also 
conservative in its apparent defense “of these same institutions from the attacks of the 
workers and intellectuals.”58 Here Pasolini perfectly describes the heterogeneity of 
Italian capitalism avoiding a mechanist application of Marxism. Within Italian 
modernization residual elements of past social formation are still crucial and have 
objective value even when they seem in contradiction with new social practices and 
needs.59 Thus what capital defends publicly on one side constantly undermines it on 
the other. This is the two-steps strategy that capital adopts. This double-movement 
constitutes the land-locked space of contemporary power and the space of action for 
resisting subjectivities.  
Pasolini notes that probably the majority of the students wrote their essays with 
great zeal, obeying authority’s imperative of paying homage to the residues of the 
past. Others instead probably criticized this traditionalist father-son relation. These 
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young people, Pasolini argues, are “the younger brothers of the students who revolted 
in 1968.”60 They represent the segment of society that is still fighting to bring about 
change, but under the enormous pressure of consumer culture, their opposition takes 
up the form of a social restlessness, a neurosis which follows two different routes. The 
one that Pasolini privileges resembles an “anxious neurosis, that keeps alive the 
possibility of a protest.”61 Neurosis here must be read in its proper psychoanalytical 
frame, that is to say, as the symptom of an unresolved social conflict produced by the 
desire for a non-capitalist life. Pasolini summarizes this through a beautiful image. He 
states that these students are “young fathers, just like we are old sons.”62 These 
students are young, albeit simultaneously mature, since they still live the conflict 
between the oppression of capital and their desire as subaltern groups; while people 
like Pasolini are the inheritors of this conflict grown old and overpowered by power. 
For Pasolini, both categories are eventually doomed to disappear. They embody in fact 
an externality, an otherness to capitalism that consumerism will quickly erase from 
human consciousness.   
The second kind of opposition is characterized instead by people who suffer 
from an “atrocious euphoric neurosis that makes them accept without any restrains the 
new hedonism with which power replaces past moral values.”63 These students, the 
protagonists of 1968, for Pasolini, unleash their desire for a non-capitalist life, 
precisely in the dispositifs of capitalism’s false freedom. However it is not just mass 
consumption that Pasolini condemns, but also a liberalized form of sexuality. The 
student struggle for more power, for a larger participation in the shares of general 
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wealth, is fundamentally a plunging into capitalist mechanisms of containment and 
control of the dominated groups.  
 
2.2 Capitalism, Fascism and Non-procreative Love 
To be sure, in Pasolini’s perspective, capitalism is an irrational order, or rather 
a process of rationalization that follows an irrational principle. It is entropy, a scheme 
of things that leads toward further chaos. This mounting wave of social and economic 
transformation provokes the disappearance of non-capitalist forms of life and social 
practices. The very spatial assimilation of the landscape into the industrial sphere 
defines a new uniformity, that of commodification, a process that only today has 
reached its most mature form, but that precisely because of the existence of spaces yet 
not colonized had, at that time, an acute impact on Pasolini. Not even a capillary 
system of control like fascism had succeeded in modeling the life of the new 
generations as mass consumption did in a matter of a few years. Pasolini argues that 
fascism did not really reach “the depth of their soul,” rather it superficially regimented 
behaviors of Italians, but not “their way of being.”64 Neocapitalism instead was able to 
extend this control over the totality of Italian society so that, in his last years, Pasolini 
would repeat again and again that this new social organization built around 
conformism, permissivism and hedonism was the true and most perfect realization of 
fascism.  
The link between conformism, permissivism and hedonism is crucial. I believe 
conformism is the point of arrival of a process which can eventually functions by 
itself. First comes permissivism as the liberal smashing of restrictions, i.e. de-
regulation. Once the field is liberalized there rises immediately the need for a new 
productive mechanism: hedonism. So when Pasolini provocatively states that the fall 
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of sexual prohibitions evacuates pleasure he is not upholding the old sex phobia of 
conservatism; rather he is making a fundamental psychoanalytical point, one that 
Žižek posits at the core of Lacan’s understanding of the functioning of superego. 
Departing from a standard Freudian notion of superego as the moral component of 
personality, for Lacan superego is still the site of the imperative, but of an obscene 
kind, that of “an injunction to enjoyment,” So that “freedom-to-enjoy is reversed into 
obligation to enjoy - which, one must add, is the most effective way to block access to 
enjoyment.”65 The injunction to enjoyment takes hedonism to its extremes and, as it is 
combined to a liberalized field of individual determinations (permissivism), it 
constitutes the subtle form of control known as consumerism.  
Saló, or the 120 Days of Sodom (1975) can be read as the visual rendering of 
this entropic but self-controlled order. Power here is displayed in its hidden and deadly 
nature. Hedonism becomes terror, sexuality torture, humans are simply bodies… Saló 
is the allegory of a social system where “any transgression of the imposed nudity or 
sexual perversion classifies as an act of autonomy,” which is thus “punishable by 
torture of death.”66 Through the staging of the private inferno ruled by a fascist-
libertine gang at the eve of the regime’s fall, it is possible to read the degradation 
provoked by consumer society that obsessed Pasolini. As the young bodies of the 
gloomy ending of the film are one by one mercilessly slaughtered, the new generations 
are chewed by the inhuman machinery of consumer society, a new, and highly more 
efficient form of fascism.67 The mighty powers of the new fascism are thus re-written 
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through the allegory of the fascist gang’s absolute sovereignty over a young group of 
victims. Now this point deserves closer scrutiny.  
The unleashing of this libidinal will to power is restricted to the fascist-
libertines who establish their rule through a formal act: the writing of a sinister 
constitution that regulates life in the villa where they have assembled their victims. 
Pasolini recapitulates thus a primary scene of sovereignty: constituent power that 
founds its power through a codification of rules. But this normative setting is empty; it 
has no real norm, except the enforcing of the exercise of power and its desires. 
Consumer society is equally empty, as I said, it grants a freedom that relies on an 
injunction. Pasolini’s use of sexuality is key to understand the consequences of this 
false idea of freedom. In consumer society individuals are at the same time victims 
and victimizers; they take advantage and are simultaneously exploited by a system that 
is based on an endless cycle of production and consumption. In Saló, Pasolini breaks 
this unity into two figures: the fascist exploiters and their victims. Unrestrained sexual 
desire takes on the form of torture, but in its libidinal drive it exhibits much more than 
the depravation of the fascists. It incriminates modern society as a whole for in the 
latter, just like in the fascist villa, the order is one of unrestrained enjoyment. Thus 
what happens in the movie bears testimony to “fascism’s actual ideological 
functioning, which is one of superego obscene enjoyment.”68 The spectator’s 
uneasiness in watching a movie like Saló may lie precisely in the uncanny semblance 
of this sexual excess. The latter looks like something utterly dreadful and yet feels also 
dangerously close. What is this closeness but the hidden biopolitical intensities of the 
social body? Saló’s visualization of power in a naked and unrestrained form reminds 
us of how a pure immanent intensification of biopolitical potentialities would take the 
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subject towards disastrous consequences. Thus the movie works as a photo-negative of 
the secularization process of Italian society and of its conformism as a collective 
disavowal of its real vicious cycle. I will come back to this point when dealing with 
Negri’s idea of the multitude and its biopolitical strength.69
Saló is a difficult movie where, as Pasolini stated, sex functions “as a metaphor 
of the relationship between power and those who are subjected to it.”70 A full 
discussion of the movie and its dark allegory would take me astray from the topic of 
this chapter, and so prefer to focus on the origins of Pasolini’s convictions or, as he 
mentions at times, his feelings towards the social consequences of the Italian 
modernization. Pasolini had reached his conclusions on the falsity of the sexual 
revolution after the making of a relatively unknown documentary that he shot in 1965, 
Comizi d’amore (Love Meetings). The documentary is divided in four chapters, called 
Ricerche (inquiries). Chapter 1 begins with the general questioning of the importance 
of sexuality in the life of Italian people and sets the ground for chapter 2 that deals 
with the issue of homosexuality (or sexual deviations as it was called at the time). 
Chapter 3 deals mostly with the issue of divorce, while the last chapter tackles the 
problem of prostitution and the law that had recently declared brothels illegal in 
1958.71 The coda is a wedding of a young couple, Pasolini’s cousin, Graziella 
Chiarcossi and the writer Vincenzo Cerami.  
As a wonderful exercise in contemporary ideology, the documentary reveals a 
deep emotional involvement in the filming of the expressions of common Italian 
people that is truly remarkable. Along with other works by Bertolucci, Love Meetings 
will stand as sort of anthropological inquiry on the images, sounds and mannerism of a 
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part of Italy that was being rapidly swept away by the modernization of the country. 
Beyond that, however, as Maurizio Viano remarked “the value of Comizi d’amore is 
to be found in the documentary representation of men and women, young and old, 
wearing masks.”72 For instance, Pasolini’s “obsessive frontal close-up […] allows the 
viewer to perceive the physiognomy of lying. In fact, lying is nothing but the 
obedience to codes of self-representation, the codes of the mask.”73 These are the 
expressions of those Italians who are either falling for the new Italy of the economic 
boom or for the bourgeoisies who are hypocritically representing a world that does not 
exists anymore. In fact one could question Viano’s one-sided assumption that the 
wearing of a mask implies lying. As false conscience, ideology is not the intentional 
negation of some truth. These people are not hiding something, rather they are simply 
working their way around difficult questions in order to render them acceptable. 
Hence their simulation, their performing a social (ideological) conformism.74
In the opening scene, the camera moves erratically following the fanciful 
answers of a flock of children who are asked where babies come from. The naïveté of 
their answers and their spontaneity summarizes Pasolini’s understanding of the 
personality of the Italian people.75 Italians are at best innocent creatures, who believe 
in stories passed down to them from above and as such are passively accepted. These 
children represent the core of the discourse of sexuality: they are its product and the 
future of the community. Pasolini’s voice tenderly questions them, and kindly insists 
in asking how they were born. But they cannot explain their birth without using 
elaborated tales involving cranes, Jesus or God. They ignore their origin. They are life 
that runs unaware of its own power and contradictions, and in this fashion they are 
                                                 
72 Viano, 123. 
73 Viano, 124. 
74 For this suggestion I am indebted to Lucia Re. 
75 Bazzocchi, 80; see Viano, 122-123; Michel Foucault, “Grey Mornings of Tolerance,” The Poetics of 
Heresy, Beverly Allen, ed., (Saratoga: ANMA, 1982), 72-74.  
136 
brought up by their parents who are guiltily and equally blind to their own 
contradictions as parents, as lovers and citizens in a country that is undergoing a rapid 
process of modernization and secularization. 
In the preparatory work for the documentary, Pasolini had a clear, almost 
pedagogical goal that during the shooting was progressively invalidated by the reality 
he discovered. The original goal was to combine and confront what common people 
thought about sexuality with more knowledgeable responses by others, such as 
intellectuals, for as it is claimed in the opening, Love Meetings was supposed to be “a 
crusade against ignorance and fear.”76 The plainness and crudeness of the original title 
Cento paia di buoi (One hundred pair of oxen) describes well Pasolini’s intention to 
desecrate the romantic layers that oblate sexuality, to descend in the bare dynamics of 
instincts, conventions and fears. Most of all this title metaphorically describes the 
sexual life of Italian couples as imbued by a generalized unawareness, a 
commonsensical notion that one must procreate, work and consume just like a pair of 
oxen go about in a field ploughing the earth because this is simply their life. Love 
Meetings is the attempt to face “sexual taboos,” “to talk about it, to make of it a 
scientific subject,” it is indeed a sort of agronomy of human passions that attempts 
piercing through its common deceptions.77  
This was Pasolini’s initial project. However, facing a society that was rapidly 
changing under the pressure of consumption and television culture, Pasolini stumbled 
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on a set of contradictions that he had not foreseen and that later played an important 
role in his theorization of neocapitalism. Pasolini finds himself facing a social reality 
which appears fractured between a patriarchal block (slightly differentiated according 
to regional variants) and a more modern section of the Italian population that is a 
victim of an unshakable form of conformism.78 The voice over that introduces the 
different scenes comments on this idea arguing that “in the deep south ideas on sex are 
clear. The North is modern but the ideas on sex are confused… wreckage of an old 
ideology unable to understand and judge reality as a whole.”79 The cleavage between 
these two worlds is produced by the economic boom that, even though it accelerated a 
process of secularization, actually acted as a regressive factor on the whole of Italian 
society. 
Pasolini argues that “from a sexual point of view, ordinary Italian people” were 
“not very repressed.” It is the “petit bourgeoisie” who is “naturally repressed,” even 
though s/he does not really suffer from “a very sincere repression.” Catholicism in its 
popular dimension is not a “rigid religion,” since, as Pasolini believes, it 
“superimposed itself on paganism, particularly among ordinary people, without 
changing them in the slightest.”80 These commentaries seem to overlook the degrees 
of oppression that patriarchal society imposed on men and mostly on women. To say 
the least, driven by his search for pre-capitalist spaces of resistance, Pasolini takes for 
granted the continuous struggle that created some pockets of freedom in patriarchal 
societies and even within these spaces he does not assess the power structure that 
dominated it.  
                                                 
78 On the connection between conformism and embourgeoisement as loss of the sacred see William Van 
Watson, 8-9. 
79 Love Meetings [Comizi d’amore] Dir. Pier Paolo Pasolini. Water Bearer Films, 2003. From here on I 
quote the English subtitles as they appear in the movie. For the script in Italian see Walter Siti and 
Franco Zabagli, 417-474. 
80 Pier Paolo Pasolini, Pasolini on Pasolini. Interviews with Oswald Stack (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1970), 67. 
138 
That said it is the bourgeoisie and its ideology that are the real target of 
Pasolini’s critique. The new rhetoric of tolerance and the social pressure towards 
heterosexuality that it generates unleashes energies against other objectives. It is in 
chapter two of the documentary that Pasolini offers a wide array of reactions to what 
at the time were called abnormal sexual behaviors. The title of the second chapter is 
“Disgust or Pity,” and these are the two invariable responses to Pasolini’s insinuations 
about homosexuality.  
The most representative case is that of a group of upper class men interviewed 
in a train car. Their ideology is articulated through the spatial dimension of a tiny 
place. The closed, geometric and claustrophobic environment visualizes the men’s 
petit bourgeois ideology which is also reinstated by Pasolini’s choices in the cinematic 
construction of the scene. Instead of the usual frontal close-up, he chooses a high 
angle. Pasolini stands in front of the person being interviewed who naturally keeps 
looking at him, but he remains off screen. The result is that interviewee responds to 
the questions while looking away from the camera, as if his incapacity to deal with the 
topic implied the impossibility of visualizing it. This is underscored at the scene’s 
closing, when the man, pressed by Pasolini’s insistent questioning, declares that he 
feels “disgust, horror,” and that homosexuality “should be severely repressed.” 81  
Homosexuality thus enters the visual field as the unseen or the unspoken, so 
that this sequence becomes particularly disorienting because the viewer cannot find a 
point of reference. The usual conveyors that pin down the object of discussion, i.e. the 
characters’ direct look at the camera or Pasolini’s presence, are missing. It is a play 
between mirrors that reflect an object that we cannot see. The scopic here frames the 
social conformism of the bourgeois and while doing this it simultaneously criticizes it. 
Visually absent and verbally only indirectly mentioned, homosexuality emerges with a 
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distinct unsettling force. Everybody is looking away from it: the man who feels 
repulsed, the viewer who looks at the men looking away from it. The visual effect of 
this sequence is possibly the best example of the exercise in the representation of 
ideologies that animates Pasolini’s film. It circumscribes with precision the place and 
the function that homosexuality entertain in the agronomy of passions of Italian 
society, i.e. its irreducible alterity. 
Challenging further the interviewees, Pasolini reverts to another argument that 
displaces the fear of homosexuality from the person to his or her future children. 
Responses here are more articulated, since the interviewee is obliged to face 
homosexuality as a fact (even if hypothetical) and cannot simply deny its existence. 
The majority of the responses, especially by women, are characterized by a more 
casual and superficially scientific tone. They all agree that children should be 
informed etc... But this more than casual attitude is due merely to the mother’s 
preoccupation that her child would follow the sexual norm, would fit in society, which 
obviously precludes any kind of sexual act falling short from a prescribed, albeit more 
permissive, heterosexuality. This false liberation based on the exclusion of what 
remains outside heterosexuality, produces in the best cases pity. For the majority of 
the people instead, it generates a violent form of repulsion based on a very simple fact. 
The transformation of sex from something hidden and prohibited to a new territory of 
social affirmation that, instead of repressing, solicits and makes the instinctual needs a 
social obligation, compresses the space for what deviates from the heterosexual norm. 
Hence for Pasolini, the intolerance, the fierce repulsion against a dark zone that cannot 
be named and whose marginality attracts the hate produced by this new totalitarian 
conformism.  
To be sure, the link between tolerance and homophobic behaviors is not as 
automatic as Pasolini presents it. It is not the concession of larger sexual liberties in 
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itself that produces an immediate reaction against non-heterosexual relationships. The 
distorted dynamics that turn what might seem progress into degradation are grounded 
in the role that reproduction plays in society and only the neo-feminism of 1970s will 
be able to clearly lay them out. In his movies, think of Teorema (1968) for instance, 
Pasolini is however able to unmask the mystifications that the rhetoric of development 
foments when praising the progressive nature of a society that was instead passively 
adapting to the restructuring of production. It is the conforming to this absolute social 
norm that for Pasolini represents the real and degrading factor of the new national 
character of Italian people. 
Against this overarching wave of conformism, writers Alberto Moravia (1907-
1990), along with the father of Italian psychoanalysis Cesare Musatti (1897-1989) 
represent the external, objective point of view of the documentary. Moravia and 
Musatti are the scientists who are capable of explaining the hidden reasons behind the 
conformism of Italian society. Moreover, in articulating a more mature understanding 
of how sexuality affects society, they also present an updated version of the 
Gramscian notion of good common sense as a correction to conformism.  
Moravia lays out the socio-psychological dynamics at work behind the 
scandalized reaction of the Italians to Pasolini’s questions. “There is always a concrete 
possibility to understand things, and what is understood does not shock” Moravia 
asserts; unfortunately “the person who gets shocked is a profoundly uncertain 
person.”82 Scandal, said Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia, “is the sign of the 
presence of a problem that carries the force of a menace.”83 Being shocked is the 
immediate reaction to a danger, to something that is different and simultaneously 
threatening for the individual. It is the fear of “losing one’s personality” and falling 
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prey of the power of instincts.84 For Moravia instead, any behavior can and must be 
examined and then judged, avoiding the blinding dismissal that the usual scandalized 
reaction entails. 
Glossing over Moravia, Pasolini thus remarks: “the shocked person is 
uncertain, hence conformist.” According to Pasolini, this is in a nutshell the national 
disease that affects Italians. But it is here that the psychoanalyst Cesare Musatti enters 
the dialogue arguing against an all too easy condemnation of the notion of conformism 
– later on, he would also criticize Pasolini’s work and Love Meetings, calling it a 
reactionary operation.85 Musatti underscores the civilizing function of the set of 
beliefs and social institutions that constitute conformism. Consequently, conformism 
is a “psychological defense against the aggression of one’s own instinctive impulses” 
that would in fact menace collective life. Scandal is thus the kernel of the “instinct of 
preservation,” as Pasolini ironically summarizes and turns over to Moravia who 
concludes: “I’d say that a belief that has been achieved through reason and an exact 
study of reality is elastic enough never to be shocked.” On the other hand, a belief that 
has been passively interiorized is a conformism and thus, when faced with changes, is 
naturally inclined towards refusal and shock.86 Pasolini calls this typical conformist 
Italian attitude “the stubborn uncertainty of those who are insecure.”87  
Once this structure is laid out, the task for Pasolini becomes twofold and 
follows Gramsci’s idea of the passage from common sense to good common sense, i.e. 
a shared but still popular world view that possesses the rational coherence of a 
philosophy.88 On one side, according to Musatti’s remarks, one must recognize and 
explain the function of beliefs as social infrastructures for the functioning of a society 
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without condemning them because of their foundational task. They are institutions. 
They have an organizational goal, and hence they aim at preserving a certain order. On 
the other hand, if fully understood in their historical nature, beliefs become critically 
aware of their function, in brief they become political elements. They can thus be 
progressively interpreted and changed in order to improve social interactions, but at 
the same time they should not fall prey to an undifferentiated permissivism. As based 
on ethical principles, this good conformism does not react with scandal to behaviors 
that fall outside its ethos. It chooses what is functional to the growth and cohesion of 
society and on that basis can judge what falls outside of it.  
Conformism as bad “common sense” asserts itself instead on the basis of its 
own anxiety, welding together Italian society, in a time when older kinds of 
ideologies, like religion, were progressively being replaced by consumerism. For 
Pasolini, this conformism is reflected by the “average man” who “doesn’t believe in 
passion and sincerity, he doesn’t believe in people revealing himself,” because his 
“consciousness is not a class consciousness, it’s a moralistic consciousness, not a 
political one.”89 Among the many interviews Pasolini had, the one that in this sense 
stands out is probably the aphasia that strikes the Bologna Football Club players when 
asked to express their opinion on sex. Their ascending position in the society of 
spectacle cannot tolerate yet the open admission of their role also as male sex symbols, 
and so they are struck by a long embarrassing silence. Common people instead resort 
to the repetitions of clichés regarding the sacredness of the family, religion and 
country characterizing most common responses to questions about homosexuality or 
divorce.  
Pasolini is more sympathetic with the last strongholds of the peasant’s 
patriarchal society that still coherently expresses the ideology of a segment of the 
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population, with its fixed set of ideas and needs. This ideology is probably the kind of 
common sense that can potentially be corrected and made systematic because it falls 
outside the permissivism of consumer culture. Accordingly, when it comes to the 
problem of honor laws, while disclosing women’s oppression, Pasolini depicts 
southern society and its traditionalist class ideology in a sort of respectful manner. 
Adele Cambria reflects the same critical interventions that Moravia and Musatti 
offered when dissecting the bourgeois mentality. She offers a justification for the 
renowned southerner backwardness by explaining that the objectification of women in 
the south is the result of the peasants’ lack of power. For the southern peasant “who 
posses nothing… woman’s honor is wealth. If that is lost, all is lost.”90 The peasants’ 
disfranchisement structures their behavior towards the only thing they are legally 
entitled to: their wives qua personal properties.  
As an alternative to social degradation and to the persistence of rigid 
patriarchal codes, Pasolini chooses a group of working class people on the Tuscan 
beaches. The episode entitled “Sex as Pleasure,” reflects a choral and polyphonic 
discussion. The scene that stands out here is one shot with low angle, framing the 
serene, tranquil expression of an aged woman who agrees on the importance of sex in 
life, and candidly admits that she had always been happy with her husband. It is with 
this spontaneous and natural response that a good common sense (not a conformism) 
acquires the unitary force able to organize a society, while simultaneously resisting the 
rhetoric of development. Scattered around the documentary, these positive examples 
are usually embodied by women, especially young girls. As Colleen Ryan-Scheutz 
argued “since most were still subject to patriarchal command, positive instances of 
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females subjectivities surfaced in selected words and gestures that revealed women’s 
uncorrupted nature within a relatively oppressive environment.”91  
Even if portraying these positive instances, Love Meetings does not propose a 
real solution to this set of intricate contradictions of consumer society. The rare 
positive examples proposed may clarify certain points, but they are peripheral and 
irrelevant for the majority of the Italian society. As a scientific inquiry in human 
feelings and sexuality, Love Meetings functions mostly as the signaling of 
misconceptions, fallacies, errors. In line with Pasolini’s understanding of cinema as “a 
language [linguaggio] which expresses reality with reality,” Love Meetings ultimately 
functions as a mirror in which Italians stare at themselves, and where they could see 
reflected on the screen their illusions and unconscious repetitions of stereotypes.92 
Thus Love Meetings carries out a difficult task. The pro-filmic event, i.e. the 
uncontrolled reality that the camera shoots, is in fact made mostly of unreal stuff. It is 
the ideological vacuity of conformism that is assembled in the final montage.93 
Pasolini’s goal is not simply to depict reality, but to criticize it. He knows for sure that 
the real is mediated by representation and that the latter produces a reality effect. 
Hence his striving to open fissures within the ideological narration of the bad 
conformism he detects in Italians. In doing so Pasolini employs different techniques. 
He uses extra-diegetic interventions (Moravia, Musatti), formal devices (the train 
sequence), captions and titles that frame the inquiry and finally the voice over of the 
speaker which summarize Pasolini’s ideological position. As Jean Delmas maintains 
Love Meetings represents “a corrective to the widespread idea that Pasolini is the 
director of myth and the irrational.”94 His interventions and desperate search for an 
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awakening of the Italian people and the contribution for the building of a good 
common sense are so blatant that they make the film almost a didactic experiment. 
Yet even the several occurrences of certain didacticism are never dull. The 
critique of conformism is further complicated by Pasolini’s own understanding of life 
in general. Life is endowed with a cruel regeneration that outlives any critical self-
reflection, and any real awareness of the contradictions that structure human behavior. 
Life is precisely the pro-filmic event that the camera shoots, that which the artistic 
critical reconstruction fails to correct or even influence. Love Meetings stages the 
paradox of a reflection that cannot become life. It is a mirror whose critical capacity 
withers away when confronted with prevailing powers. It is the hope for a good 
common sense that shines intermittently in the courage of some young girls; in their 
honest smiles and in the compassionate tone of Pasolini’s voice over.  
In a way, the clash between his testimony of the catastrophe that was 
happening and the plain, rude continuation of that same catastrophe is also the real 
fuel for his work. This is the reason why Pasolini chooses to end the movie with a 
scene of a young couple getting married. They represent this tenacious capacity that 
love as a social force has and that society constantly reproduces. Notwithstanding its 
enormous contradictions, the misery and damages it produces, love stubbornly keeps 
on regenerating itself. On one side, it lives off a hypertrophic process of production 
and reinstatement of its value. On the other, love needs to affirm itself through an act 
of erasure, a constitutive “forgetfulness” of all the elements that contradict its 
harmonious and ideal nature. This is its tragic nature. Love is a force doomed to 
outlive itself, doomed to propagate its ideology while it daily crushes its concrete 
embodiment. 
Because love’s destiny is to forget all its tragedies in order to exist, Pasolini 
pedagogically chooses to insert at the end of the documentary a conclusive remark that 
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resists a kind of passive acceptance of this state of things. In choosing images of the 
wedding of a young couple, he states that those who are guilty are not the two young 
lovers, but rather “those who know and keep silent.” The final wish is thus that in 
addition to the living of their love, the two lovers would also rise to the 
“consciousness of their love.”95  
A Non-Procreative Love: Translating Pasolini’s Politics of Ecology into the 
Struggle of 1968 
What does this consciousness of love entail? In what sense can it be useful to 
1968 and its claims? In other words, in what sense can it be translated into the struggle 
of the new subjectivities, especially the neo-feminism of the 1970s that more 
consciously worked on the problem of sexuality as a political issue? More specifically, 
can we draw a connection between Pasolini’s critique of sexuality and that of the 
family as the matrix for women’s subordination that neo-feminism was elaborating? I 
believe this is possible only once we clear the ground with regards to Pasolini’s 
position on a crucial issue such as abortion. 
In 1975, Pasolini directly collided with the Movement and especially with neo-
feminists by publicly declaring his opposition to the referendum in favor of the 
liberalization of abortion. Pasolini took his stand in an article published by the 
Corriere della Sera which was titled “I am Against Abortion.” At a first sight, 
Pasolini’s argument reflects a standard conservative position. He objects to abortion 
because it is a “petit homicide,” just like “euthanasia,” basing this consideration on the 
projection of abortion on himself as a potential victim: “I live my prenatal life, my 
happy immersion in the warmth of my mother’s womb: I know that there I was 
existing,” thus terminating that life would imply committing homicide.96 This 
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argument is philosophically weak, and Pasolini will not take it up again in the debate, 
but it sheds light on his ideological assumptions.  
The sacredness of prenatal life echoes Pasolini’s superior valuing of what is 
natural and immediate. Furthermore this is reinforced by the reference to the bond 
between the mother and child and the mythical wholeness that it expresses. There is 
not much one can do with it; in existential terms this prenatal wholeness already 
means death. It is what Enzo Paci called the “dangerousness of myth,” that is to say 
the original alienation born out of the longing and the anxiety for the separation from 
the womb. But a return to that womb would also be a death, the end of time, the final 
ceasing of human capacity to choose and invent and reproduce oneself as an 
autonomous entity. It is movement, change and processes of autonomization that 
contains value, not the stasis of a symbiotic life. Even in the aesthetic realm, it is not 
the return to the wholeness of a mythical past that we appreciate, but the movement 
that the translation of this ideal into the aesthetic form (poetry, novel or films) 
produces.97 The potential that is vital to human life is the transformation of reality, its 
aesthetic representation as a multiplier of ideas, of concepts that we can actualize in 
our present condition.  
Pasolini’s position on abortion can be disproved precisely on the basis of his 
own thought. When speculating on the nature of montage in film making for instance, 
he made a much more consistent argument regarding death than his point on abortion. 
The parallel between film and individual death runs as follows: just like in the final 
montage of a film, the present of reality becomes a past ordered in cinematic terms, in 
one’s death one finds retrospectively organized the meaning of one’s life. It is here 
that the “chaos of possibilities,” of the “relations and meaning without resolution” 
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becomes a “clear, stable, certain and therefore easily describable past.”98 Hence 
death’s necessity and synoptic value, as Pasolini lapidarily declares: “death effects an 
instantaneous montage of our lives.”99 Following the parallel, a film is a meaningful 
sum total of a life that is dead.100 Echoing Heidegger’s notion of being toward death 
and Roland Barthes’ similar connection between image, photography and death, this 
simile captures the ultimate ungraspable reality of human life. What is structurally 
outside of it, within the historical and human realm of meaning, thus complicates 
Pasolini crude condemnation of abortion.  
In Pasolini’s thought, the crime of abortion resides in the emptying out of a life 
that has not been lived. Abortion can thus be accused of creating a heuristically blank 
experience, a pointless synopsis of nothing. Now here we understand the ground of 
Pasolini’s fear and the reasons behind his opposition to the legalization of abortion. It 
is the fear of the nothingness that is to say of a total lack of meaning, of nihilism.101 
But this is a fear that only a living subject can have, that is to say somebody who went 
through a whole set of experiences. It is the projection of life as a social experience on 
a not-yet-life that constitutes the ground for making abortion a crime. One takes the 
life history of an existing subject and then casts it on something that is not yet a 
subject in order to say that that subject’s life has been taken away.  
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Now this might seem just a trivial philosophical speculation, and although I 
argue that it invalidates Pasolini’s position I want to point out the second, and most 
important, fallacy. As Laura Betti, Pasolini’s beloved friend, told him, what in his 
reasoning remains “physiologically missing is the woman.”102 There is no 
consideration of any kind of the woman as a subject, or better said the chief subject in 
procreation. It is the “Pasolini qua fetus” in the warmth of the mother, not a woman 
who is pregnant, her life, her compromises, her endless work and the pain and dangers 
she faces. The perfect unity that Pasolini praises is not even remotely gesturing to the 
other subject of the relationship. The wholesomeness of this state/stasis is partial, 
because it is unilaterally predicated on the “Pasolini qua fetus” and not on the carrier 
of the latter. The sacredness of life, feminism will show, has always been a code-word 
for control and disciplining of the women’s labor of reproduction, whereas the idea of 
a sacredness of death as the montage of one’s life, and I may add, of the life of a 
whole society, is a more productive element in Pasolini’s thought. If generalized on 
the whole of society, and sustained by an ethical objective, it may indeed function as a 
liberating organizational principle.   
Pasolini’s argument regarding abortion is based also on a further consideration 
that is more interesting than the one I criticized above. He rejects abortion also 
because it would “make coitus or heterosexual intercourse easier that what it already 
is.”103 As we know from his previous reflection on conformism in Love Meetings, this 
in turn would foment a sexuality already inclined toward heterosexuality, reinforcing 
homophobic feelings in the population. Furthermore, Pasolini also links what he calls 
“the tolerance of consumerist power, which requires a total formal elasticity in daily 
life in order for individuals to become good consumers,” and the phobia of popular 
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classes even in those regions like “Rome, the Meridione, Sicily” that were 
traditionally more tolerant. 104 Sexual liberation is a liberation handed down from 
above just for the elite of the country, whereas the rest of the population “enjoys a 
terrible shadow of tolerance” which pushes them toward “intolerance and an almost 
paranoid fanaticism.”105  
Pasolini’s argument is in this regard more complicated than a standard 
conservative position that sees in the possibility of interrupting pregnancy the 
instigation for free unrestrained sex. Echoing feminist slogans, Pasolini affirms that 
“sexual intercourse is political” and this is the real ground on which to start analyzing 
the problem of abortion.106 Once again, since the liberalization of sexuality is caused 
by the hedonism of mass consumption, it is not liberating in itself, but in fact it 
enslaves individuals under the rule of a new social conformism. This new sovereignty 
is accepted by the citizens as liberation. Pasolini argues that under older forms of 
dominion those who were ruled subjected themselves in a more conscious way. The 
religious resignation of subaltern groups was in fact a form of awareness, whereas 
today people simply buy in consumer culture. It is here that indirectly, Pasolini finally 
identifies a positive, concrete alternative to capitalism. He proposes a platform that 
could be summarized as an ecological form of non-procreative love. In doing so, 
Pasolini also seems to break away from his notion of the sacred, from that mythical 
idea of a sort of regressive utopia outside history.  
Pasolini explains that the sacredness of human life is based on the 
consideration that in an age of scarcity, where productive forces are not developed, 
“every baby that is born, being a guarantee for life, is blessed.” But today, in a society 
of abundance, where a growing consumerist society is rapidly destroying the planet’s 
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physical resources, “every baby that is born instead contributes to the self-destruction 
of humanity.”107 The sacredness of life, historically now tied to the material changes 
of society is, if anything, an ethical principle that is related to the set of behaviors of a 
given society. But now, Pasolini continues, if our “species wants to survive it must 
arrange for births not to exceed deaths.”108 This does not entail that the prohibition of 
killing vanishes, for it would open to a politics of mass death with sinister resemblance 
to Nazism. Life is still sacred in its human dimension and it must be protected. This 
protection demands that certain measures be directed at blocking and moving away 
from a development based on the mass production and mass consumption of an 
exponentially growing number of commodities. Pasolini argues that, instead of 
fighting for free abortion, “it is necessary to fight against such a society at the level of 
abortion’s cause, in other words, at the level of coitus.”109 Pasolini advocates 
educational campaigns of contraception and “alternative love techniques” that do not 
involve procreation.110 This idea of non-procreative love acknowledges the freedom of 
sexuality but, by framing and organizing it, makes it consistent to wider social 
objectives. As Van Watson argues, for Pasolini, a sexual act like “masturbation 
represents an attempt to unify the self with the self in a libidinal narcissism. 
Masturbation, like homosexuality, is a non-procreative form of sexual behavior, as 
neither results in offspring, which would serve as a living reminder of man’s 
individual mortality.”111
Even if based on Malthusian assumptions, Pasolini’s argument represents a 
delimitation and contextualization of the sacred within the boundaries of concrete 
human society. Assessing the problem of ecology through the demographic 
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assumptions of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), may lead towards reductionist 
arguments and solutions, if not to openly discriminating policies which, aiming at 
fighting overpopulation, impose instead restrictions and inhuman treatments on larger 
strata of the population, especially women.112 Pasolini’s critique is chiefly raised 
against the new conformism that consumer culture brings about. Furthermore, he is 
not proposing a simple reduction of population. Hypothetically, if the number of 
people finally reached a zero, exploitation would not cease and, although it might slow 
down, the commodification of spaces and individuals would not stop. The social 
conformism that Pasolini detested so much would not be shaken by such a measure. In 
short, the problem concerns the type of social relationships connected to the changes 
in production that Pasolini critiques. 
Pasolini’s Indirect Critique of Biopolitics 
Antonio Negri observed that, while perceiving the passage from a disciplinary 
form of power to one regulated by a less coercive control, Pasolini could not 
concretely articulate this transition. He only saw it in terms of homogenization of 
social practices, that is to say, in terms of a totalitarian and all-comprising conformism 
that he called fascism. Thus this is Pasolini’s “tragedy: with all his learning and 
theoretical apparatus his [wa]s not capable of taking hold of this transformation.” He 
could only see a negative commodification, whereas precisely in those years the very 
“body was imagined as a more and more powerful entity, as an energy allowing us to 
do more things.”113 Without mentioning it, Negri is referring back to the biopolitical 
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potentiality of labor-power that was rapidly emerging in these years, and that Gramsci 
had already tried to imagine within the framework of a Fordist society. As I 
mentioned, there is no awareness of the biopolitical transformation in Pasolini. His 
humanism prevents him from elaborate a theory of the evolution of labor-power, 
whereas Gramsci was able to do it thanks to his rudimentary understanding of the 
abstraction of the content of human labor. For Pasolini humanism was indeed “a 
signifier of human resistance against the postindustrial nightmare” and the receptacle 
of a set of values that made it a timeless and utopian entity.114 As the case of the 
prosopopoeia of the teacups attests, the superseding of any human content is for 
Pasolini an ultimately degrading consequence of development. 
That said, Pasolini’s early attempt to imagine an ecological perspective that 
could establish a different order from the entropy of consumer society, and a critique 
of the incorporation of the biopolitical powers of the body are in actual fact the most 
decisive. Now that the potentiality of the bodies and minds have been tamed and put at 
work by post-Fordist forms of production, Pasolini’s understanding of how capitalism 
produces a “false tolerance of the new totalitarian power” becomes crucial.115 
Especially when he links sexual liberalization to consumer culture, Pasolini becomes a 
necessary supplement to what Gramsci had said about the link between production and 
reproduction.116 He takes into account the stabilizing power of consumption which 
Gramsci did not resolve and, at the same time, Pasolini also registers the changes in 
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the link between production and reproduction that brought about a superseding of the 
previous Fordist phase and its social organizations, i.e. Gramsci’s Fordist family.  
We need to continue to hold open the dialectic movement. Just as consumption 
uses temporary satisfaction to increase libidinal attachment to commodities, there are 
elements of oppression that certainly function as mechanisms channeling energies and 
needs into further dependency. At the same time, however, there are also new spaces 
of freedom, where the level of struggle of different subjectivities determines important 
progress for society. This is the other side of the coin that Pasolini does not see. Yet, 
once we adopt Pasolini’s ecological insight and the sacredness of death as the 
mobilizing principle capable to preserve and extend the time we were given on this 
planet, we may capture also the kind of freedom and solidarity we need in order to 
shape our collective life.  
In this Pasolini comes paradoxically close to what the feminists were arguing 
even if from the opposite side of the debate. A society progressively organized around 
the principle of non-procreative love would undermine the institution of the family 
that feminism recognizes as the place where a large amount of hidden labor is 
exploited to fuel capital’s growth. Moreover, his stark critique of consumerism as the 
force that fuels productive growth and thus destroys the environment can be used as a 
new theoretical weapon for the neo-feminism reflection on capitalism and women’s 
oppression. Once the first phase of the struggle to radicalize capital’s contradictions 
and make it collapse because of its own incapacity to respond to social problems is 
neutralized, the ecological limit that Pasolini sets as a priority emerges as the new final 
accomplishment also for feminist discourse. Writers like Mariarosa Dalla Costa for 
instance, would come to a similar conclusion in recent years; others like Silvia 
Federici will come close to embracing conservationist ideas on older forms of 
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collective life.117 What is in an embryonic state in Pasolini’s troublesome 
confrontation with Italian society and its transformation are the seeds for a possible 
solution for our contemporary social problem. This solution would be a radical 
transformation guided by the full assumption of the ecologically pending catastrophe 
determined by our model of development and social practices. When I say guiding 
principle, I refer to Pasolini’s idea of the necessity of death, however extending it to 
the whole of our society. If we assume our mortality as a collective fact, and let us call 
it with its proper name, that is extinction, and in Pasolini’s sense as the final moment 
that gives meaning to our life, if we do so the ethical principles that we are in need of 
might well grow organically before our eyes. They would spring from the idea of a 
global solidarity when facing our individual and collective destiny of death. These 
principles would obviously have to be patiently and democratically assembled and 
developed in order to produce a new good common sense. In short, the sacredness of 
our death might tell us much more about how to live than does the sacredness of life.  
In conclusion, my use of Pasolini thus is based on his “laterality,” or better in 
his capacity to engender thought “in difference.”118 His methodological value thus is 
the following: his dialectics conjures up negation as alterity which does not engender 
any synthesis, not even a temporary one. As Viano remarks, Pasolini’s “myth of 
innocence is a mere projection. It projects an ideal alterity onto the backs of people 
who do not have a chance to understand, negotiate, or refute the role into which they 
are forced.”119 In dialectical terms, it is indeed more an abstract thesis that knows no 
development than a concrete antithesis or as Gianni Scalia calls it a “non-dialectical 
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contradiction.”120 It is what remains from the movement forward of civilization. It is 
the residue that has been negated by development. In itself this element is 
irretrievable, but it signals a useful, let us say even corrective element in my argument 
regarding biopolitics. Pasolini, it’s clear, completely ignores the biopolitical because 
he disregards the category of labor-power. Stressing its final subsumption under 
capital, Pasolini does not see the agency involved in the potentiality of labor-power. 
However, it is precisely this pessimistic, catastrophic closure that expresses the need 
for an alterity to its incorporation. Pasolini’s exigency for alterity can be reformulated 
through the principle of immanent finitization. The open process of finitization is kept 
in motion by what societies choose to frame as their general problem. A clear 
understanding of the problem organically produces responses or new social 
experiments as the problem-solving activity that aims to overcome social 
contradictions. It is in short what Deleuze called ideas. 121 The Councils were the 
result of the understanding of the problem of wage-labor in an age of scarcity. As I 
will show, the politicization of the private sphere would be the way feminist social 
praxis reinstated the problem of production on the base of gender difference.  
Pasolini’s claim for the centrality of ecology is the first step in elaborating our current 
most pressing problem. Understanding alterity as the relational bound that we have 
with the planet is today’s crucial task. It is difficult of course and one shall not fall into 
Pasolini’s projection of a mythical past and of an immovable antithetical/thesis. The 
planet’s alterity is in the end a relational concept and humans constitute the immanent 
horizon that has to be addressed. It is in fact the assumption of our individual and 
collective mortality that must be used as a ethical and almost epistemological 
principle. The planet will outlive our species. Life, in a different form, will be 
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regenerated independently from our surprising capacity to exploit and destroy 
resources. Rather than committing a global suicide to maintain the luxury of a few, we 
should instead live as long and as peacefully as we can, accept our destiny: extinction 
as the ultimate horizon. Our attitude toward it, our dignity and solidarity as well as the 
last and most human trait in the final montage of our life as a species is what matters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
1968-1977: THE MOVEMENT AND ITS BIOPOLITICAL ÉLAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Leipzig proletarian of literature who 
assembles books (such as compendia of political 
economy) under the direction of his publisher is 
a productive worker, for his production is from 
the outset subsumed under capital, and only 
takes place so that capital may valorize itself. A 
singer who sells her songs on her own account is 
an unproductive worker. But the same singer, 
engaged by an impresario, who has her sing in 
order to make money, is a productive worker. 
For she produces capital. 
 
(K. Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63) 
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3.1 The First Spark: 1968 and the School 
In the previous chapter, Pasolini served as a critical counterpoint to define the 
claims made by 1968. I now want to scrutinize the Movement and its legacy. 
However, since a comprehensive analysis of such a heterogeneous phenomenon like 
1968 is a virtually impossible task for one writing and, let alone, for a single person, I 
propose to study it by employing three key perspectives. These three interconnected 
views can also be read as responses to Pasolini’s critique and are grounded in the 
biopolitical transformation the Movement helped producing through the intensification 
of the struggle at the level of labor-power. In so doing the Movement gave voice and 
helped bringing about antagonist subjectivities like students (or the intellectual 
workers), workers and women. In this chapter, however, I will mainly explore the 
transformations brought forward by the Students’ and the Workers’ Movement, while 
leaving for the next chapter the treatment of women and their specific contributions. 
The three elements of 1968 I privilege are the following: 1) the origin of the 
Movement, i.e. the political and social contradictions of the economic growth of post-
war Italy that generated its claims and protests; 2) the Movement’s awareness of the 
capacity of consumer society to assimilate subjectivities and critique as a fundamental 
part of its politics and practice; 3) the Movement’s struggle to redefine the hierarchical 
structure of knowledge and power which, on the one hand, promoted the 
secularization of Italian society, and on the other, determined a new global and 
syncretic approach to cultural phenomena. That this attitude was later neutralized and 
converted into a extremely convenient and profitable mass culture is in fact more the 
result of a defeat than of the Movement’s own struggle. This parallels the re-
organization of production elaborated by the Factory Councils that was partly used 
against them in the subsequent Fordist rationalization of production. I will address 
these questions individually.  
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Finally, I want to call attention to the centrality of reproduction in 1968 
thought and demonstrate how the biopolitical dimension of labor-power was 
foregrounded. This will be clear, for instance, in capital’s employment of larger quotas 
of intellectual work among the new generations and in the practice of refusal of work 
that produced innovative forms of struggle which aimed at solving the problem of the 
new social needs that were arising. The literatures that came out of the last cycle of 
revolts, which has become known as the 1977 Movement are the culmination of this 
process of intensification of reproduction and what’s more fully display the layout of 
the biopolitical transformation. I will argue that this is particularly true for the 
Bolognese side of the movement as in the case of the collective work Alice 
disambientata (1978) (Displaced Alice), and the novel Boccalone (1977) (Big Mouth) 
by Enrico Palandri.  
The Historical Political Context 
When Pasolini claimed that “the student revolt was born overnight,” he 
overlooked one fact that the overwhelming majority of historians now agree upon.1 
The long wave of social unrest that exploded in the spring of 1968 and continued in 
the “hot autumn” of 1969 was not an incidental, spontaneous event, but rather it was 
deeply rooted in a series of struggles that had begun at least eight years before. These 
were connected to deep changes at a social, political and cultural level. “The so-called 
economic miracle was attained on the basis of increases in productivity much greater 
than increases in wages;” based on internal migration “of labor from the south to the 
northern cities” it in fact “aggravated social tensions, making existing political 
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arrangements untenable.”2 The Student Movement thus “placed on the agenda the 
possibility of an effective worker-student alliance the likes of which campus radicals 
elsewhere could only dream.”3
From a political point of view, the crisis and the first signs of social unrest 
began at least in July 1960, when the Tambroni government supported by the Fascist 
Party (MSI, Movimento Sociale Italiano) faced a strong popular opposition that 
resulted in the killing of protesters in Genoa and Reggio Emilia. The political 
agreement at a national level paved the way for the Socialist Party to politically 
support the Christian Democrats in the governing of the country. The entrance of the 
PSI in the government changed the political geography of Italy, since from World War 
I, the Socialists had always maintained an autonomous but clear alliance with the PCI. 
As a result a new project of modernization of the state and its infrastructures was laid 
out which challenged directly the same leftist reforms upheld by the PCI. As the 
Italian industrial production was booming, this economic miracle seemed to satisfy 
everybody: the Christian Democrats benefited politically from it; the official left as 
well, although criticizing the forms and the directions of the development, agreed on 
the need of industrializing and modernizing the country.  
The years of the so called “center-left government” had further consequences, 
since as Sidney Tarrow has noted, “the prospect of joining the government led the PSI 
to put reforms on its political agenda – education, planning, and pension reform – 
which later become rallying points for mass protest.”4 It is precisely from the high 
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expectations triggered by the new government that the Movement found its first points 
of unity. Undoubtedly the protest against the reform of education represented the first 
and most critical of these points of contention. 
The baby boom of the post-war years produced a higher demand for instruction 
that the old educational system could not provide in terms of structures and quality of 
teaching. The school reform proposed by Minister Luigi Gui was the inadequate 
response that the centre-left government devised. The reform raised some 
expectations, but immediately afterwards, because of delays and the weakness of its 
proposal frustrated them. As well the effect was to generate a widespread 
disappointment that sparked protests.5 So if the students’ first claims focused on very 
practical needs, like classrooms and laboratories, soon enough larger and more 
fundamental issues were called into question. One concession that the Gui reform 
made was to allow a student representative to sit on school boards expressing a mere 
advisory opinion. The hypocritical nature of this acknowledgment “initiated the 
struggle for student power against the authoritarianism of the baroni,” i.e. the faculty 
elite.6 Soon enough it became clear that this apparent democratization of Italian 
society, i.e. the liberalization of the access to education, was not simply a concession 
but responded to particular exigencies of Italian capitalism.  
The findings of independent researches studying the connection between 
school and industrial production disclosed that with the new phase of mass education, 
“school in Italy was functional for the choices of capitalist development, that is to say 
keeping out of the labor market a consistent quota of potential working force in order 
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to avoid an explosive pressure on the latter.”7 By the beginning of the 1960s, the 
economic boom of the late 1950s was already deflating. If industrial production 
increased on average by 10.1% per year and investments by 13.8%, by 1963 
employment rates inverted their tendency and started to fall, which created a greater 
number of unproductive workforce. It was a mass of relatively more educated men and 
women who could not find employment in the industry and had no jobs.8 The service 
sector and school temporarily absorbed this demographic surplus. 
With the Gui reform and the law passed in the subsequent years, the 
government instituted a series of liberalizations of access to education for larger 
sectors of the population, while leaving dramatically untouched the material, and 
financially more burdensome necessities of building new schools and reducing of the 
student-teacher ratio. For instance, in 1961 the access to university was extended to all 
high school graduates who pursued five-year diplomas (including vocational 
institutions). By 1967 enrollment had doubled, with universities receiving a massive 
inflow of people who were pursuing degrees in the hope of climbing the social ladder.  
Simultaneously, the institutions enforced a strict selectivity producing high 
rates of school drop outs.9 Since the Casati reform (1859) that had unified the 
educational systems of the various Italian states (and thus founded the national school 
system), a strict selectivity, if not discrimination, had been a hallmark of the Italian 
educational system.10 But now that Italian society embraced democracy and 
recognized in its Constitution the right to education for all citizens, selectivity began 
to appear more and more contradictory. Students quickly developed a new awareness 
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of the social dynamics behind these rigid standards. In a collective work which 
gathered the experience of three years of struggle within the secondary school system, 
the Student Movement of Milan drew a parallel between the family and the school and 
their complementary role in society. The family was the primary locus of a “natural 
selection” in a pre-capitalist state; it tied the individuals to the role in society their 
parents had and froze social mobility. In a modern state, the school system provided a 
new and more refined “class selection” that varied “according to the needs of the 
mode of production.”11 Derived by a purely theoretical reading of Marx, this passage 
is rather mechanical and misses the needs and goals of the Italian 1960s economy. Still 
in its generous effort, it points to the widespread realization that the school system was 
not something dysfunctional, but rather it was functional for the capitalist plan.  
The Student Movement of Milan was just one of the various groups born out of 
1968. Discussions and divergences between these various groups were common, but 
ultimately they all drew on an application of Marxist readings to the context of the 
Italian modernization. Even though the general setting up of the analysis was declared 
surpassed by the students who wrote it, the so called “Sapienza Theses” codified the 
idea that the university represented “the mediated expression of a plan organic to 
capital,” and that the student assembly had sovereign power, “thus refusing the 
principle of delegation of authority to any other restricted organism.”12 These were the 
two elements that unified the Movement as they were popularized by the Pisan 
students in 1967. In a second drafting of the Sapienza Theses, the understanding of the 
student as work force subordinated to capitalism was heightened. As Steve Wright 
remarks, the attempts to “grasp the nature of intellectual labor” is one of the most 
“distinctive” trait of this later document in that it made clear that “the student was 
                                                 
11 Comitato di Agitazione Studentesco Medio di Milano, Scuola, studenti e proletari (Milano: Edizioni 
CLUED, 1973), 20. 
12 “Le tesi della «Sapienza»,” Il mulino 4-5 (1967): 377-390. 
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already a proletarian by virtue of a subordinate location within the university division 
of labor.” In fact, “to the extent that existing stipends became a fully-fledged-wage, 
she would be transformed from impure social figure on the margins of the valorization 
process into a fully-fledged wage worker producing surplus-value.”13  
In a famous essay penned by Mauro Rostagno: “Università come istituto 
produttivo” (University as a Productive Company), Potere Studentesco (Student 
Power), which was at odds with the Milan Student Movement, echoed a similar, 
though more refined position. Quoting the famous economist and friend of Gramsci, 
Piero Sraffa, Rostagno argued that the university operates as a regular business 
company carrying out a process of “production of commodities by means of 
commodities.” The commodity produced is the student whose principal trait is that he 
or she is “sold on the labor market either during the productive process (i.e. the study 
period) as a semi-processed good (i.e. as a student-worker), or at the end of the 
process as a finished product (i.e. the graduate).”14 Thus against an apparatus that 
leaves no escape from the commodification of its own subjects, the Movement can 
“only react by organizing an alternative and opposite power.” However, the forms this 
counter-power has to take up are ultimately left to the students’ “willingness to 
struggle” and critique the foundations of the university system.15 Rostagno’s analysis 
of education as a self-generating system is symptomatic of the departure from the 
productivist take of the official left. Drawing attention to the significance of 
reproduction over material production, the students recognized the strategic role that 
education played in modern society.   
                                                 
13 Gian Mario Cazzaniga, “Le tesi della Sapienza,” Università: ipotesi rivoluzionaria, 177 [translation 
by Wright, 95]. 
14 Mauro Rostagno, “Università come istituto produttivo,” Università: ipotesi rivoluzionaria (Padova: 
Marsilio Editori, 1968), 49, 42. 
15 Rostagno, 51. 
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Further articulating Rostagno’s analysis, Guido Viale, who was active in the 
Student Movement of the University of Turin and was later a leader of Lotta Continua, 
wrote in a famous piece titled “Contro l’università” (Against the University), that the 
ground of the university establishment was authoritarianism in its multifaceted forms. 
With authoritarianism Viale did not refer only to the absence of democratic rights for 
the students, let alone any recognition of their active role in the educational process, 
but rather to the perfect mechanism that inhibited any critical capacity channeling it 
into the outlet of “one’s own frustrations,” petty claims and private recriminations. 
Thus, Viale maintained that the “collective dimension of criticism” had to be undercut 
and excluded from the system of production and transmission of knowledge.16 This 
lack of a collegial and cooperative exchange was far more paralyzing than the often-
addressed question of the updating of pedagogy, curriculum reform, and the 
liberalization of the access to higher education. Along with the absence of functioning 
structures like laboratories and classrooms, it prevented the university from producing 
what the country needed the most: a critical form of knowledge that could stand up to 
the challenge of a fast and chaotic modernization. 
The pressure of these unresolved contradictions and the clear unwillingness of 
the political leadership of the country to respond to them fuelled the student protest. 
Students did not limit themselves to reformist claims, but attacked the whole structure 
of the school system and its government. Along with the Università La Sapienza in 
Rome, the universities of Trento and Pisa were hotbeds of this early cycle of 
contestations. As a young student coming to study in Pisa from Naples, Cesare 
Moreno recalls that it was the science students who moved first: “the children of the 
                                                 
16 Guido Viale, “Contro l’ Università,” Università: ipotesi rivoluzionaria, 100. Viale also remembers 
that “the insistence on the everyday aspects of life within the institutions (dissecting in their tiniest 
details the forms of oppression in which the relationship between student and culture took shape) was a 
collective activity.” Qtd. in Luisa Passerini, Autobiography of a Generation. Italy, 1968 (Hanover: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1996), 82. 
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post-War years were entering the university, enrolments were increasing but the 
structures were not adjusting. In December 1966, the first occupation of the Physics 
department was decided because of internal problems, not because of political reasons. 
We were asking for more laboratories, classrooms.”17 In the fall of 1967 Trento and 
Palermo were also the site of a series of occupations that reached its climax with the 
taking of Palazzo Capanna in Turin. When the echoes of the Days of May in France 
spread over Italy, the Movement gained momentum, coalescing around other global 
protests like the one against the Vietnam War. Students received vital theoretical 
inputs also from the Chinese Cultural Revolution, even though it was already in its 
declining phase. But it was the impressive series of workers strikes of the “hot 
autumn” of 1968 that fuelled the protest connecting the Movement to the struggles in 
the factories. 
What interests us here, though, is the specific content of the analysis and 
practice the Italian 1968 brought forward. This leads us to the understanding of the 
new biopolitical dimension that the Movement brought to the foreground. As I noted 
earlier, education was the first battleground. The form and content of teaching, 
hierarchical transmission of knowledge and the subject matter of that very knowledge 
were all drastically criticized and brought into question. It was not simply a problem 
of the backwardness and lack of proper structures; rather what was at stake was what 
was taught and how it was taught. The whole pedagogical field was politicized, and 
turned upside down. The agents of this revolution were the students who, despite the 
heterogeneity of their groups, carried out their plan following a shared route. Like the 
councils in the 1920s and “the hot autumn,” the assembly represented the 
organizational form of their autonomous political practice and because of this 
                                                 
17 Qtd. in Aldo Cazzullo, I ragazzi che volevano fare la rivoluzione. 1968-1978: storia di Lotta 
continua (Milano: Mondadori, 1998), 43. 
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institutions never refuse to acknowledge them. There were no delegates or 
representative body. Formed and run by those who participated in it, the assembly 
embodied the direct decision-making mechanism of the Movement. The refusal to 
delegate power meant the definition of “politics as direct intervention into reality, of 
history as present, that is a collective and autonomous political praxis internal to the 
institutions (the struggle against the school) whose objectives [were] functional to the 
growth of the Movement.”18  
The difficulties of such a project were not small. Managing lengthy meetings 
over time proved troublesome, especially when it concerned assuring everybody of the 
concrete possibility of having a saying in the decision-making. Women for instance, 
realized very soon how difficult it was for them to count in the organization without 
being confined to secretarial roles. As Laura Derossi, a highly respected militant in the 
Student Movement Turin, recalls “the hardest thing was speaking in the great hall, 
overflowing with more than five hundred students, and making a speech from the 
cathedra. Even the men, there weren’t many who could do it.”19 Furthermore, “the 
absence of any institutional acknowledgment of forms of authority highlighted the role 
of charismatic figures,” so that the debate was usually monopolized by the eloquence 
of the leaders of the different organizations.20 Yet it is true that the emphasis that the 
Movement placed on the types of organization and interaction was unmatched in its 
attempt to break away from hierarchical and authoritarian forms of the political life of 
the time. Perhaps only temporarily, the possibility of a new comprehensive social life 
with which the Movement experimented pierced through the fog of the degradation of 
Italy’s industrial development. As a self-regenerative practice which denied any 
                                                 
18 Commissione studenti lavoratori, ed., “Materiali del movimento studentesco,” Che fare? 4 (1968-
1969): 97. 
19 Qtd. in Passerini, 97. 
20 Passerini, 63. See also Luciano Della Mea, Proletari senza comunismo. Lotta di classe e lotta 
continua (Verona: Bertani Editore, 1972), 111-113. 
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dualistic dimension of power, 1968 is truly the first moment of a collective display of 
the biopolitical potential of modern society. This potential resided in the full 
assumption of the task of investigating, critiquing and thus re-orienting reproduction. 
The intellectual and material capacities of labor-power were then directed toward their 
own critical development, in a virtuous cycle of study, critique and practice. 
The theoretical break with regards to the official ideology of the left was 
profound. The politicization of reproduction signified in fact a crucial update of 
Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis. Against the essentially productivist ideology of the 
PCI, the re-discovery of the central role played by reproduction echoed Gramsci’s 
critique of the mechanistic Marxism of Bukharin I mentioned in chapter one.21 As 
Mangano and Schina argued, the radical critique of the Movement thus produced an 
understanding of social life not grounded in “the separation between what is normally 
considered as structure and what, by exclusion, is defined as superstructure, but in the 
great issue of social reproduction of class relationships.”22 The students’ rupture 
rendered fluid again a rigidly mechanistic interpretation of social change. If the PCI 
had assimilated the idea that an ameliorated form of development automatically 
generated progress for the working class, the Movement tore apart this fanciful belief, 
exposing the reality of exploitation and suffering that also the realm of reproduction 
generated. Writing on May 1968 in France, Alain Touraine had clearly pointed out the 
crucial positionality of students in an advanced capitalist society. He argued that for 
the first time “education […] had become a factor of production and decisive growth, 
not merely the transmission of cultural heritage.” It is on this account that students 
express the contradiction of a new phase of accumulation of capital, since they became 
                                                 
21 See Chapter 1, 77. 
22 Attilio Mangano and Antonio Schina, Le culture del Sessantotto : gli anni sessanta le riviste il 
movimento (Pistoia: Centro di documentazione, 1989), 89; for an assessment of the problem that this 
update of the theory of praxis brings about see also 96-98.  
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“the representatives of all those who suffer more from social integration and cultural 
manipulation directed by the economic structures than by economic exploitation and 
material misery.”23 Furthermore, the Movement also made clear that the capitalist use 
of technology improved only quantitatively the standards of living – and in fact 
actually extended and made more intolerable daily life. It is here that the Movement 
conducted its struggle. It is at the level of reproduction that it creatively carried out its 
cultural revolution. 
Against Pedagogy and the Illusory Transformation of the Institutions  
From the rejection of the old system of cultural transmission, the Student 
Movement quickly elaborated a counter-system, a platform of the new knowledge 
that a liberated school system had to produce. Meanwhile, the government made 
some concessions in the attempt to appease the students. The 1974 “Decreti Delegati” 
established that non-academic staff, students and parents were active subjects in the 
management of the school. But probably the most significant result the students and 
workers protest obtained was the so-called 150 ore [150 hours program]. This 
educational program was designed to give free secondary education to people who 
had not had access to it, or university training to those who only had secondary 
school diplomas. By 1974, the experiment involved about 17,000 workers taking 
classes at secondary education institutions and about 1500 at the university.24 Handed 
out as a standard reform redistributing quotas of knowledge among lower classes, the 
Student Movement fought hard to infuse it with an innovative potential. 
 
                                                 
23 Alain Touraine, The May Movement. Revolt and Reform (New York: Random House, 1971), 355. 
24 Antonio Lettieri, “150 ore: strategia operaia e scienza,” Sapere 774 (1974): 89; on the Decreti 
Delegati see Rinaldo Rizzi, La scuola dopo i decreti delegati (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1975). 
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School is not required to dispense a set of notions, but 
rather to become the locus of a permanent testing whose 
protagonists are the carriers of that experience and not the 
depository of a science that is claimed to be unbiased. The 
150 hours program is the continuation and extension of the 
struggle for increasing the power of the workers in the 
factory and in society. By power we mean the capacity to 
directly participate in the analysis of the situation, of the 
social relations and of the relations of production, and thus 
in their mutation.25  
 
For the students and the workers who had obtained these basic concessions, it was 
clear that the latter could have easily been turned into instruments of further 
oppression. The goals and the practice of these institutions drastically changed and 
diverted from a simple vocational training. Disconnected from a critical education, 
training workers meant only, in fact, preparing them to enter the new factory run by a 
more sophisticated automation system which delivered higher rates of productivity. 
The Movement knew only too well that this form of acculturation was practical in the 
worst sense of the word. It ameliorated workers’ conditions in order to achieve further 
exploitation. To break away from it, the verticality of the transmission of knowledge 
had to be smashed. Instead of the handing down of notions, the new horizontal 
configuration had to endorse a co-production of learning. The break between the 
elaboration of knowledge and its diffusion had to be recomposed and reintegrated in a 
new dimension which fused theory and practice. 
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Gramsci here is once again the great inspirer and theoretical guide for the 
reinvigoration of a alternative, critical culture. Compare, for instance, the argument the 
Student Movement made on the 150 hours program with the re-reading of Gramsci’s 
critique of the Turin popular universities which the Socialist Party established as a 
counter-institution for the education of the lower strata of the population. 
Reconstructing the debate of post-World War I Socialist cultural politics, Gianni 
Scalia writes that “Gramsci questions the quality and the structure of popular 
universities precisely because they are not culturally free and socially determined, i.e. 
class oriented. […] The critique of popular universities rests on these two points: one 
dealing with their scientific inadequacy and one with their democratic, social and thus 
political inaptness.”26   
Contrary to what happens in capitalist society, in a socialist environment 
theory and practice have to be interconnected. Gramsci felt that instead of being 
infused with the contents of concrete social practice, the theory and teaching imparted 
by popular Universities remained separated from concrete life and did not generate 
any new knowledge or re-frame in a proletarian perspective the set of truths elaborated 
by the bourgeoisies. Scalia takes up Gramsci’s polemics precisely because of the lack 
of a true, and as I will argue, immanent theoretical component of modern education. 
Thus he can draw a parallel between the attempt to “popularize” education in post-
World War I Turin and the Government’s attempt at reforming the Italian educational 
system. Gramsci’s critique lays out a set of problems that, in a different context, the 
Student Movement was indeed confronting. This critique entails an understanding of 
instruction that, in its democratic and class-oriented functioning, collectively produces 
a shared and socially useful knowledge. How was this thought developed? To see how 
                                                 
26 Gianni Scalia,“Il giovane Gramsci,” Passato e Presente 9 (1959): 1140. The idea of “learning 
through social practice,” one that Robert Lumley calls “substitutionalist” was dropped by the PCI and 
the unions at the beginning of the 1960’s, when “a statist strategy prevailed,” 51.  
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I want to explore the transformation of the educational school system promoted by the 
centre-left and how the Movement undercut it. 
Student protests and the various governmental acts passed in the 1960s shook 
the foundations of the Italian school. One could call this transformation a crisis and it 
was certainly perceived as such by those who lived and worked in the school. Crisis 
though also meant change and experimentation, and to be sure, pedagogy became the 
area where the shifts were felt the most and had long lasting consequences for the 
years to come. Let’s consider for one moment pedagogy and then let’s attempt to 
frame its crisis in the larger picture of the modernization of Italian society. If in the 
sciences, the specialization and mechanization of knowledge were more consonant 
with the restructuring of the system of production, in the humanities the application of 
this logic was more difficult and thus frictions and resistances became more 
noticeable.  
Historically, Italian humanistic education performed the function of 
reproducing elites: be they merely intellectuals or, more concretely, political power 
groups, these elites were not expected to have any sort of practical occupation, let 
alone marketability. However, now that the access to this niche of unproductive labor 
was opened to the masses, its very raison d'être was called into question. Not even the 
widespread policy of patronage of the Italian state could, nor was it willing to, absorb 
the mass of intellectual groups that were knocking at the door of power. 
The fact that the humanities operated merely as places where reserve labor 
force was kept in store became evident to the large majority of the students as soon as 
they entered the university system. These young men and women had no real 
prospects in the job market. All they could hope for was to become teachers in high 
schools, where all their learning had to be distilled in old-fashioned curricula. In short, 
in the humanities more than anywhere else, the notion of acculturation was put into 
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question by the everyday realization that the university was in fact producing 
“retrogression” against “specialist selection” in the sciences.27  
Speaking about the insights of a worker science, Mario Tronti had said that 
“knowledge is tied to struggle. Who knows truly hates truly.”28 The same can be said 
for the students. Discovering their destiny as “victims manipulated and rendered 
functional to the system,” the students revolted and this revolt became “their discovery 
of the world.”29 As the students’ organization grew in number and in its capacity to 
unveil disciplinary mechanisms, the spectacular expression of their discontent raised 
concerns in the government and did not go unnoticed. The system had to respond in 
order to stabilize these potent pressures. In the humanities, the solution adopted was a 
chaotic shift towards the innovation of teaching and the opening of new disciplines. 
The birth of the University of Trento, one of the few private institutions in Italy, 
specializing in sociology, was probably the most interesting and groundbreaking 
experiment in this sense. Innovating standard curricula, the University of Trento was 
the first to import the achievements of the most advanced Anglo-Saxon and North-
American sociological schools which had so far received scant attention in Italy. 
However, against the intentions of its creators, such as Christian Democrat Flaminio 
Piccoli (1915-2000), Trento turned into one of the most turbulent environments for 
student contestation. It was precisely Trento’s innovative approach that attracted all 
those students who were escaping the suffocating cage of standard university 
programs. Marco Boato and Mauro Rostagno started their political activism here, and 
Renato Curcio, who later founded the terrorist group Brigate Rosse [Red Brigades] 
studied at Trento as well. Marco Boato recalls:  
                                                 
27 Arcangelo Leone De Castris, ed., Ideologia letteraria e scuola di massa. Per un’analisi sociale 
dell’organizzazione didattica (Bari: De Donato, 1975), 11. 
28 Qtd. in Wright, 82. 
29 Roberto Di Marco, “Per un’analisi dialettica della contraddizione universitaria,” Che fare? 4 (1968-
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 From education demands we went to laying claims to the 
transformation of society in a revolutionary direction. We 
became Marxist without ever have been Stalinist or 
dogmatic. Marxist tradition reached us through the 
Frankfurt School of Adorno, Lacan’s psychoanalysis, 
Wright Mills sociology. We established contacts with 
factories: Michelin in Trento, Marzotto in Valdagno, and 
other universities.   
 
The microcosm of Trento as the involuntary breeding ground of revolts shows how the 
Movement was keen on detecting the contradictions that were shaking Italian society, 
and using them in order to launch its attack on the kind of modernization the elite had 
in mind for the country. Let us turn now to another concrete solution that the 
university, at a national level, put into play in order to buffer the revolutionary drive. 
The reform of the teaching of the humanities is exemplary. 
Against Croce and the New Formalism 
The Student Movement certainly did not oppose the democratizing of the 
oppressive and backward pedagogical methods of the time, but it soon realized that if 
the “old identity” of the university institution was fading away, a “new social identity” 
was not emerging.30 The old identity of the Italian Humanities was one built around 
the Croce and Gentile legacy: a historical model with a precise idea of what was 
literarily valuable, historically true and what was not. It was also a model which 
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placed art’s fundamental value in its separateness, which described it as a disinterested 
form of acculturation.  
The progress of technology and the decline of the primacy of the humanities 
undermined the neo-idealist unitary system and paved the way for a flourishing of new 
methodologies which were probably more tolerant and pluralistic (though still 
fostering a formalism that had little connection with the material contradictions that 
were fomenting the change). Making reference to the new trends of structuralism, 
sociological approaches, Arcangelo Leone De Castris argued that “in replacing the 
traditional psychological approach,” the new wave of pedagogical experimentalism, 
with its “formalistic interpretation of literary history, in actual fact updates the old 
[idealist] supremacy re-proposing it on the base of a scientific description of value.” 31 
The fragmentation of the field of humanism from the outset looked more pluralistic, 
but the heterogeneity of the methods was simply integrating within the state institution 
(i.e. within the university) the “generic and spontaneous contradictions of society” 
without examining them. The disconnected plurality of this supposedly 
interdisciplinarity thus represented a mere “hopeless alternative to [the university] 
crisis.”32  
In contrast, a positive transformation of the curricula and the institution itself 
would have entailed a redistribution of power and a new orientation in the academic 
research. Even scientific work had now to aim at investigating a specific social object 
which served also as a methodological control for the understanding of the 
transformation at work in society. This is the truly innovative reform of the university 
as institution: from the unproductive storage of reserve labor and passive registering of 
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social disaggregation to an active and “political role” of its cultural production and 
generation of knowledge.33  
The magazine Che Fare?, for instance, predicated this practice also in the field 
of culture and literature. Even though Che Fare? talked extensively of poetry and 
literature, it made clear that culture in capitalist society is “not a value” in itself, but 
only as a “commodity and as production of commodity.” In this sense culture is thus 
cognitively useless. It is a fetish, but if it becomes, as the magazine tried to make it, “a 
social practice of determinate negation of the capitalist system” it truly embodies a 
practical-critical valuable tool.34. This critical but comprehensive approach based on a 
distinct materialist perspective would play a major role also in other fields. 
Recomposing the Field of Knowledge: Science, Epistemology and Mao 
The outcomes of the Movement’s analysis were also visible in the scientific 
field. The chief goal for the Movement was to critique the objectiveness of science and 
thus to produce a paradigmatic change in the understanding of the production of 
scientific knowledge. The Chemist Student Collective of the Polytechnic of Milan, for 
instance, declared that the division of the cultural field into disciplines had to be 
recomposed “substituting the latter through thematic investigations. In this way 
general principles are induced from concrete reality. Every issue is assessed from 
several points of view, included that of the relationship with social reality.” 35 The 
                                                 
33 De Castris, 38. One last and more general remark regarding the debate between Pasolini and the 
Movement with regard to knowledge. Contrary to what individual behaviors might have suggested, the 
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34 “Intervento del gruppo promotore della rivista «Che Fare» in sei paragrafi,” Che fare? 5 (1969): 85. 
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this critique […] It is the determinate negation of ideological values of the reality that expresses a 
positive knowledge of real values; that is to say of the social dialectic that in those values appeared as 
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35 Collettivo Universitario Studenti Chimici della Facoltà di Ingegneria del Politecnico di Milano, 
“Controcorso universitario e operaio su Porto Marghera,” Sapere, 774 (1974): 28; see also Catia Papa, 
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mystified nature of technology thus was disclosed as a socially determined operation 
directed not completely towards universal truth, but mostly driven by profit-making 
and reason of state.   
A group of scientists and intellectuals such as the psychiatrist Franco Basaglia, 
the biologist Ettore Tibaldi, the physicist Marcello Cini articulated this position in its 
full potential through a popular scientific journal called Sapere, which they 
transformed into the avant-garde publication of leftist science. The editorial of the first 
issue of the new series lays out the epistemological break they sought. The problem is 
that neocapitalism and the way it organizes scientific research “repeats and projects 
from factories and laboratories a unified command that broadens itself reaching every 
space and time of life.”36 Against this system of power that merely reproduces itself, 
the Movement developed a radical counter-discourse.  
Hence the turn to a subjective understanding of science against the supposedly 
neutral and objective approach, which was in fact the direct result of capital’s 
command, pushed Sapere to give voice to “those who have been excluded from 
scientific knowledge by bourgeois hegemony.”37 In this we see realized Gramsci’s 
program of a modern philosophy that understands what is objective as subjectively 
determined, which is to say that explains any “historical fact, as the historical 
subjectivity of a social group.”38 Lower social groups could now become part of the 
production of knowledge not because they are simply assimilated or integrated in a 
new program of acculturation, but because they are the embodiment of those 
contradictions and sets of problems that society needs to face. They live in their bodies 
                                                                                                                                            
“Alle origini dell’ecologia politica in Italia. Il diritto alla salute e all’ambiente nel movimento 
studentesco,” Fiamma Lussana and Giacomo Marramao, eds., L’Italia Repubblicana nella crisi degli 
anni settanta. Culture, nuovi soggetti, identità, vol. 2, (Catanzaro: Rubettino, 2003), 401-431.  
36 Editorial, Sapere 768 (1974): 3. 
37 Editorial, Sapere, 3. 
38 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (London: ElectBook, 2001), 496. 
179 
the malfunctioning of society, the expropriation and exclusion on whose base capital 
realizes always higher profits. 
The new editorial line of Sapere demanded attention since it reflected the 
ambition of “concretely overcoming disciplinary boundaries.” 39 It was a collective 
effort transforming Sapere from a typical cultural product of capitalist society, into a 
critical tool capable of divulging new scientific findings in a unitary fashion, that is to 
say contextualizing them in the complexity of historically changing human societies. 
Hence the choice of creating a supplement entitled Medicina e Potere (Medicine and 
Power) which focused on health issue and work. Here the aim was not simply to 
denounce the illegal and dangerous conditions in the working place, but also to 
divulge “the initiatives and struggles that, born out of a class vision of health issues, 
already contained the elements for a generalization and creation of a true counter-
power of the lower strata.”40  
Finally, the range of topics discussed in the first year of the new series cast 
light on the task that this group of scientists had set for themselves and that echoed the 
Movement’s expectations. The first issue was dedicated to the study of the catastrophe 
of the Vajont dike in Friuli-Venezia Giulia (1963) when private interests and 
miscalculation led to a flood that killed 2,000 people. The study laid out the ground for 
future research, stating that “from examining these facts it follows that it is not 
possible to speak about science as a neutral tool, whose bad use is due to incapacity, 
heedlessness and negligence of some professionals, but rather that scientific theories 
are elaborated by those who want to use them, directing research towards precise 
goals.”41 Deploying this new subjective approach to science, the next issues were 
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40 Editorial, Medicina e Potere supplement of Sapere, 1 (1974). 
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focused on topics such as: the energy crisis, technology and informatics, the 
environment, the food industry, water, genetics and so on.42  
This subjectivist approach to the construction of a unitary field of knowledge is 
based on a solid class-based criterion. To conduct class struggle in the realm of 
science meant dealing with knowledge and its production “in terms of liberation 
against authority,” and of a “revolutionary side” against the “conservatives.”43 Here 
we notice the use of a common Maoist practice that became popular within the 
Movement. It consisted in always distinguishing between the two poles of the 
dialectic, progress and regression, and from this analytical split building a solid 
criterion conducive to action. This methodology deserves attention especially today, 
given that our society seems ruled by a supposedly positive rhetoric of pluralism “with 
its unexamined valorization of the open (freedom) versus its inevitable binary 
opposition, the closed (totalitarianism).”44 The Movement applied the Maoist precepts 
to daily life, even though the real understanding of the Chinese revolution was not so 
well settled. Mao Tse-tung had drawn attention to the fact that the materialist dialectic 
resided in the movement of contradiction, which always knows two sides:  
 
When we speak of understanding each aspect of a 
contradiction, we mean understanding what specific 
position each aspect occupies, what concrete forms it 
assumes in its interdependence and in its contradiction with 
its opposite, and what concrete methods are employed in 
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the struggle with its opposite, when the two are both 
interdependent and in contradiction, and also after the 
interdependence breaks down.45
 
Thus practice had to resort to this dualistic-interdependent vision driven by what 
became popularized as “the concept of dividing one into two.” Every object of 
investigation was referred back to its law of opposite, and the subaltern element 
played the part of the active agent in the movement of contradiction. This immanent 
analysis and critique through which every phenomenon was scrutinized and divided 
into two opposite fields of forces in the end granted a secure moral criterion for 
evaluating a situation. Yet this methodology was never final, but dynamically 
“proceeded towards further evaluations, further critiques, and divisions […] towards 
the often tormenting search for the causes of oppression within the couple, and then 
the individual.”46 As the poet Francesco Leonetti remarked, the employment of Maoist 
dialectic pressed for a “categorical mobilization of judgment and of behaviors” in light 
of a profound analysis of the socio-economic totality.47   
This is also why the subjectivist approach to knowledge in 1968 is for Peppino 
Ortoleva always characterized by a syncretic tendency, more than by an eclectic 
shuffling of knowledge. 48 It is an effort to analyze (dividing one into two) and then 
bringing together and gaining a pragmatic perspective. Thus, as political avant-garde, 
1968 defies the usual gesturing towards the new that necessarily and violently 
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dismisses older forms of knowledge and cultural practices. The effort to understand 
the interdependence between opposites and then to work out the negation did not 
imply the simple destruction of bourgeois culture, but rather its evacuation. Analysis, 
critique, re-composition and action: this is the rhythm of the working class science 
developed by the Student Movement. 
This syncretic tendency bears witness of the complexity of 1968 as a historical 
fact. It is up to those who think it is important to study it, to comprehend the task of 
reading “the processes of formation and then of dissolution of a field of knowledge 
and identities” that appeared to be “at least for a brief period, as consistent and 
relatively coherent.”49 It is probably only through a combination of Pasolini’s critical 
remarks and the revitalization of the achievements of 1968 that one can begin such an 
investigation. Both positions can be bridged, especially when it comes to the 
syncretism of the reorganization of the fields of knowledge and the critique of 
consumerism and luxury, along with the attempt to build relationships in which things 
do not take over human life and orient the progress of new social needs. In other 
words, if the biopolitical transformation of Italian society is studied as a unitary 
phenomenon, a more solid understanding of its consequences for our contemporary 
society will certainly emerge.  
 
3.2 A New Subjectivity: Refusal of Work and New Social Needs 
If the Italian university was rapidly changing, in the productive field things 
were also on the move. The enlargement of industrial production in the north called 
for the employment of an external workforce. Just as in the aftermath of World War I, 
the composition of labor changed quickly and absorbed former southern peasants who 
were employed as unskilled workers. These workers had no affiliation with the union 
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or political parties of the left, and were displaced from a kind of semi-feudal 
oppression in the fields to an equally brutal mechanical discipline in the factory. This 
laborer became known as the mass worker. The mass worker “possessed three decisive 
attributes: it was massified, it performed simple labor, and it was located at the heart 
of the immediate process of production.”50 It was the mass worker’s spontaneous 
rebellion, often in opposition to the interests of the previous generation of skilled and 
politicized workers, that shook the foundations of a system of power where unions 
played a minor role, as their political platforms suffered from the strong interference 
of the parties of the left, and their power in the factories was minimized by the slim 
numbers of members under the granitic command of the industrialists.  
In 1962 the spontaneous and unorganized insurrection of Piazza Statuto in 
Turin and its neighborhoods was led and fought precisely by these unskilled workers 
who were outraged by the new agreement signed between the unions (UIL and SIDA) 
and FIAT. Piazza Statuto confirmed the emergence of a new conflict embedded in the 
working class beyond the control of the leftist organizations. For three days, from July 
7 to July 9, a large group of workers who had gathered in front of the headquarters of 
the UIL, engaged in a furious battle with the Padova Battalion of the State Police. The 
police charged and indiscriminately arrested numerous protesters.51 The Communist 
and Socialist Parties who backed the peaceful strike against FIAT, blamed the police’s 
conduct as well as the workers’ violent response, arguing it was anti-democratic and 
regressive. Writing for L’Unità, Paolo Spriano censured the revolt led by 
“uncontrolled and exasperated individuals,” and praised the success of the strike 
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warning that “the uproar of speculation and provocation will not erase the real truth: 
the energy and combativeness of the workers’ consciousness.”52
This unexpected rebellion was instead picked up by few intellectuals who read 
it as fully integrated in the larger strike against FIAT, rather then the result of the 
plotting of “professional intriguers.”53 Furthermore, they understood that it was 
precisely in the rude and spontaneous rebellion of unorganized and unskilled workers 
that they could find the revolutionary potential that neither the overwhelming power of 
neocapitalism, nor the stabilizing function of the official left had yet completely 
neutralized. Even in its most primitive political content, for scholars and militants like 
Raniero Panzieri, these forms of struggle rapidly evolved from the simple claim for 
higher wages to the questioning of “the general [complessivo] relationship between the 
working class and capital.” The consequence was thus theoretical and political at the 
same time. As Panzieri realized, there was a need for “overcoming a fragmented, 
badly empiricist vision and to take up once again a Marxist vision of reality: so that 
what is real is not the empirical data – a given factory seen as an atom – but capital, as 
it reveals itself in a specific situation.”54 It was through the magazine Quaderni Rossi 
[Red Notebooks] that Panzieri along with other younger scholars like Mario Tronti, 
Antonio Negri and Alberto Asor Rosa, the think-thank of what would be known as 
Italian operaismo or workerism, drew from this analysis a different concept of the 
class composition, that is to say the behavioral dimension of the proletariat 
“determined by the interplay of the technical structure of work, the psychological 
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pattern of class needs and desires, the institutional environment in which political and 
social action takes place.”55  
Thanks to sociological inquiries in the factories operaismo re-established the 
theoretical ground for worker’s autonomy from Capital. Workers and capital appeared 
now as two alterities, that is, two antagonists connected by an objective factor: class 
struggle. Now, after 1963, when the metalworker protests were defeated, Panzieri 
adopted a more cautious view regarding the actual independence of worker’s 
subjectivity. 56 Mario Tronti instead pushed in the opposite direction, codifying “the 
scandalous novelty of the new workerist ideology: the reversal of primacy between 
capital and labor.”57 According to operaismo, labor and class struggle are the motor of 
social transformation. Capital’s reorganization is simply a synthesis out of which one 
needs to chisel the past affirmative moment of the oppressed groups. The supremacy 
of the working class sets in motion a reversal which in a Hegelian fashion shows how 
the oppressed and marginalized are in fact the holders of a totality. Thus, for Tronti, 
the modern working class “has only to combat itself in order to destroy capital. It must 
recognize itself as political power, and negate itself as productive force.”58  
Here we notice the distinctive difference between the revolution of the Factory 
Councils and the new one that was in preparation in 1968. The Factory Councils 
aimed at the re-appropriation of production in order to win the war against misery. As 
I observed in my reading of Notebook 22, Gramsci also gestures toward a new phase 
in which the worker would become a collective entity. Tronti and its group stated that 
this moment had finally arrived, now culminating in the figure of the mass worker. 
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“Individually interchangeable but collectively indispensable,” Tronti agued, “the mass 
worker personified the subsumption of concrete abstract labor characteristic of modern 
society.”59 Once generalized, this condition had direct consequences on the forms of 
struggle adopted. Collectively, the mass worker already represents the totality of 
production. In order to fight, the mass worker cannot appropriate work (for there is 
nothing to appropriate), but rather negate or refuse to work. According to Tronti 
“passivity should be understood as an instance of class antagonism, a form of 
organization without organization.”60 Spontaneous acts of sabotage were even clearer 
moments of this fight, which had to be extended and understood in its revolutionary 
potential. So if the 1920 Factory Councils aimed at giving back production to the real 
producers, now these exploited producers could only block production or refuse to 
participate in it. All this occurs because “only those who actually produced surplus-
value could block its accumulation, and with it the reproduction of the capital 
relation.”61 This radical line of thought was extremely influential for 1968, and 
constituted a common ground for uniting students, workers and women in the 
following years.62  
The refusal to work as the daily practice of indiscipline colonized the factory, 
the school and also the family. Breaking away from these sacred institutions meant 
exploring other forms of collective life responding to totally different needs. It is a 
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different form of sociality that is generated through this generalized disobedience. 
Expressing a strong critique against capitalist production, “for the second time in 
Italian history the issue of workers’ control established out of the Turin industrial 
monopoly.”63 A modern version of the Factory Councils mushroomed in the Fiat plant 
spreading throughout the industrial north. Echoing delegate structures of the 1920s, 
the Factory Councils “was accepted as the new unit of organization in the factory, but 
on the condition that the union branches and the internal commissions set them up, 
while continuing to represent workers in their own right.”64 The extent to which the 
Councils were effective in determining a new industrial policy is discussible. In 1972, 
they gained some accomplishments, but not in terms of recognition of the Factory 
Councils.65 What is noteworthy is instead the new demands that the workers put on 
the table. For synthesis’ sake, I will explore its political form by considering the 
example of Lotta Continua, a political organization that theorized and practiced the 
politicization of social needs.66  
LC represents the perfect political creature to emerge from 1968. It was formed 
by students and workers and had a significant feminist component. It made its 
appearance during the so-called “hot autumn” of 1969 in the FIAT shops later to 
become a journal in the same year. As a political party its story was brief, since it had 
lasted only seven years when in 1976 it shut itself down after a convulsive national 
convention. Its charismatic leader was Adriano Sofri who had graduated from Scuola 
Normale Superiore in Pisa with a thesis on L’Ordine Nuovo and the Factory Councils. 
The organization had strong political affiliations in Turin and Rome and then spread 
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throughout the peninsula, organizing wide-ranging campaigns to mobilize prisoners, 
soldiers and urban lower strata.67
The pivotal element of the politics of a group like LC was precisely mobilizing 
“people around the worker’s subjective interests – housing, urban services, and quality 
of life.”68 With the slogan “riprendiamoci la città” (Take back the city), LC focused 
its political work on the social needs of the people. “It was from such campaigns that 
many of the urban Movements’ greatest successes came; from rent strikes by public 
housing tenants, to ‘self-reduction’ of municipal utility rates and public transportation 
fares, to expert and aggressive attempts to change urban general plans.”69 LC also 
promoted proletarian first care services [ambulatorio rosso] and the proletarian market 
[mercato rosso] that, opening for the first time in Pisa, were rapidly extended to 
Rome, Milan and Turin.70 The idea behind this strategy was to prepare for the 
revolution by revolutionizing everyday life. In that way every new social practice, 
“new material conquest has to be stripped of its capitalist covering and enjoyed, used 
and lived in a new proletarian way.”71 Strategically, the program also aimed at 
“strengthening workers’ unity” in order, as an editorial of the journal Lotta Continua 
advocated, “to attack the price mechanism and break the isolation of the worker 
outside the factory.”72
Against the critiques of the older generation of leftist militants who believed in 
the factory as the heart of class struggle, LC, along with other groups like Potere 
Operaio [Worker’s Power] promoted political actions that put the metropolitan space 
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at the center of the social conflict. The centrality of the factory was in fact rapidly 
vanishing. Under the pressure of social movements, new forms of life were sprouting 
that did not accept the subordination to the law of production, its work ethic and its 
patriarchal concept of the family. The establishment of places of counter-power was 
the sign of a quick transformation that tended to set up the metropolitan space as “the 
place of common social cooperation, of the re-composition of society’s fractions.”73 
From a spatial point of view, this implied a shift from the centrality of production (the 
factory) to that of reproduction (i.e. the fabric of society).  
Modern social needs had in fact changed greatly from the previous generation. 
In the 1960s poverty and disfranchisement of the lower strata of society had surely not 
disappeared, but the standard of living was very different from the immediate post-war 
years, let alone the social unrest of the two red years. The productive system was now 
able to sustain its own producers. The problem was not how to produce appropriate 
quantities, but how to equally distribute the mass of goods. The social inequality of the 
redistribution of wealth was the real contradiction in Italy’s access to a modern 
abundant society. In a bizarre twist of history, poverty was now generated by richness, 
rather than by scarcity. As Franco Piperno keenly pointed out: 
 
1968 represents a sort of exodus from the fear that the 
regime of the factory brought along with the beginning of 
modernity. With the private appropriation of agricultural 
spaces, million of peasants lost their social autonomy and 
were forced to rely on wage-labor to survive. It was 
hunger, or the fear of hunger that was the great discipliner 
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of human masses. […] Thus 1968 announced that the fear 
of hunger – as the collective feeling of the Western World 
– was on the verge of disappearing. The exemplar form of 
this announcement was the proposal […] of a citizenship 
income, of a life annuity.74
 
A common citizenship income detached from an actual job was one of the proposals 
that grew out of 1968. As I show in the next chapter, neo-feminist groups also put up a 
campaign for a wage for house workers. In general, all these claims came from the 
same intuition: the idea that wage was a variable that was autonomous, or independent 
from and of production. For the Movement it became clear that the independence of 
wage with respect to productivity represented the “class political awareness.”75 Now 
that a stronger and more combative alliance between workers, future workers 
(students) and women was gaining sway in society, the old mechanism of labor 
servitude (the extraction of plus value) became the target for a multiple attack. If the 
wage were to be detached from its hourly quantification and made autonomous from 
the quotas of production, its final amount was going to be subjectively determined 
through confrontation and negotiation. In other words, instead of resulting from a 
negotiation based on the relation between time and production it was going to be 
calculated, in its most favorable cases, through an agreement in which the force of 
labor dictated its conditions to capital. Furthermore, workers’ requests for higher 
wages converged progressively towards equal raises independent from different jobs 
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or qualifications within the work process itself. Here we see worker supremacy 
coming to full maturity, for as the theory of Tronti’s workerism discloses: if capital is 
“set in motion by labor-power… labor is the measure of value because the working 
class is the condition of capital.”76  
In the cases where salary negotiation was not effective enough, the automatic 
reduction of the price for commodities or standard services, also called proletarian 
expropriation, became a widespread practice. Inflation rapidly eroded the purchasing 
power of the working class, so that leftist political organizations collectively practiced 
expropriations of common commercial items that the very working class was 
producing and selling but could not afford to buy.77 As the attack against wage-labor 
disclosed the fact that there is no real quantitative fairness in any compensation, it is 
only a question of levels of power, commodities too, as the product of that unfair 
exchange, become a contentious territory where what is legal was subjected to a 
collective decision. Commodities and consumption became the yardstick to measure 
the strength of the collective, for they showed how the collective could exercise a sort 
of political power in deciding the allocation of the portion of the wealth produced.   
The radical questioning of the objectiveness of wage-labor was precisely one 
of the key elements that the struggle of the 1960s and 1970s laid out again, gaining a 
consensus that echoed that of the Councils Movement after World War I. To be sure, 
the demand for more money, for higher wages and a larger share of the wealth that the 
country was producing did have some of the consumerist nuances that Pasolini 
criticized. The increase in the consumption of material goods was part of it, for the 
new generation was already appealing to many as a new market. The music industry, 
                                                 
76 Qtd. in Wrigth, 84. 
77 See Lumley, 15. The workers’ variant of proletarian expropriation within the realm of production was 
called “autoriduzione” that is “worker-controlled reduction in output,” 189. As we have seen in Chapter 
1, this strategy was not new, it was adopted by the Fiat workers during the 1920 factory occupation 
following the IWW notion of a “go-slow,” see Chapter 1, 43. 
192 
especially Rock and Roll, started to score great profits, but also the fashion industry 
changed drastically, becoming a global mass industry thanks to a new market 
constituted of young buyers. Thus, not surprisingly, when we speak of 1968, music 
and fashion became the two things the media like to dwell on, followed usually in 
casual relation by the sexual revolution. A drastic change in social habits: this is what 
today society of spectacle likes to recall and reinvigorate for the collective memory. It 
is a distorted and very partial view of course, but it points to an element of truth. This 
element articulates the very thin line between the empowerment of lower strata of 
society and the use that capitalism makes of their achievements. For, as Robert 
Lumley put it, certainly “style took political connotations” and “commitment was 
worn on the sleeve for all to see,” but their recuperation into the commodity exchange 
became real as soon as the Movement’s activism decreased in intensity.78  
The protagonists of 1968 like to emphasize the first and more positive side of 
the argument. Franco Piperno writes that “it is true that […] somehow 1968 
contributed to the emergence of a new productive system. But it is also true that this 
system leaves its power relations untouched, in that it maintains, unchanged, the 
capitalist’s power to arrange the time and labor of others.”79 Piperno attributes the 
ultimate defeat of the Movement to the integration into the system of consumption and 
the new behaviors and social practices. As I mentioned earlier, Pasolini condemns 
students for being integrated in a buyer’s culture and for recreating a mass subculture 
grounded on consumerism. Yet his critique is based on a notion of scarcity that comes 
out of the exceptional material conditions of the war and post-war years. Pasolini’s 
counter-system is what he calls the “age of bread” as opposed to the age of 
abundance.80 To be sure, the capitalist system was already producing with great 
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distortion and injustice the conditions of possibility for a society of abundance. But the 
real innovative element that 1968 attempted to urge forward was not the return to a 
previous stage of development, but rather a different use of those means of production 
that were wrongly solving the problem of scarcity and a different way of consuming, 
one not based on the exploitation of others and profit-making.81  
Connected to this view on consumption, the Movement rapidly drew linkages 
with the ways in which power functioned and relied on “the ideology of abundance on 
which the real lack of capitalist society is founded.”82 Power thus was referred back to 
rarity. The rarer the power, the more unbridgeable and “natural” becomes the 
difference between those who have and those who don’t.83 The democratization of the 
decisional centers discovered that the student assembly, along with the immanent and 
self-reflective focus of every development of 1968 cultural production, synthesized 
this permanent oppositional practice. Yet in order to carry it out, production also had 
to be revolutionized. 
The aim of the struggle thus shifted. On one side it had to do away with the old 
productivist solution. On the other, it had to fight “mercantile alienation generated by 
unrestrained industrial production.”84 This is a radical change in terms of social 
practice because it pushes the objective of the revolt towards a completely different 
direction. Expropriation and misery generate specific redemption fantasies of the 
lower strata, so that with their rebellion the subaltern groups pursue shares of power 
and wealth that they do not have access to. But in an age of abundance, the Movement 
cannot and will not theorize this kind of reclaiming. Instead of laying claims to what it 
did not have, the Movement put forward the idea of “experimenting with life forms 
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and different kinds of consumption less characterized by the waste of human and 
natural resources.”85 This new typology of consumption is not simply integration into 
the dynamics of consumer society. It must be connected to the idea of refusal of work. 
The radical negation of work meant in fact the subtracting of time from “the alienation 
of wage-labor and its subordinated social relations.”86 It meant also refusing relations 
of production characterized by “exploitation” and placed emphasis on social 
cooperation, on the “unity of social productive labor.”87 With its social reproductive 
practices this new conviviality represented a liberation based on the sharing of 
affective and social wealth.  
This in turn involved a different kind of production and consumption not 
synchronized to the mechanical rhythms of the Fordist machinery. The extended 
dimension of non-working time added a peculiar slowness to communal life, as well 
as a whole set of creative activities which were based on political activities. The 
reconceptualization of time will become more crucial. By the mid-1970s, when this 
new sociality was now involving a larger segment of urban life, the line between 
production and reproduction blurred into communal practices. The refusal of work 
functioned as a multiplier of new territories of human activities that exceed 
production; as Lanfranco Caminiti noted, this non-workingness produces a “liberated 
time as productive force.”88  
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Contesting Power, Songs and the Last Celebration 
The various groups that grew out of 1968 did more than practice forms of 
alternative social consumption. Their conviviality was intensely political and active in 
contesting the bourgeois display of power, and the typically Italian ideal of the dolce 
vita of the 1960s. A usual case of this form of remonstration, called “contestazione,” 
implied direct actions aimed at disrupting high class social rituals like opening nights 
at the prestigious Milanese theatre La Scala.89 After the police opened fire on farm 
laborers in Avola in Sicily, Milan students stormed the La Scala theatre shouting “the 
farm laborers of Avola hope you enjoy the show,” and threw rotten eggs against the 
wealthy audience.90 Another bloody confrontation took place near Pisa, during New 
Year’s Eve of 1968, when the well-to-do celebrated the end of the year. As a famous 
song recalls what happened:  
 
That night in front of La Bussola, 
a cold San Silvestro night. 
That New Year’s night  
we will never forget it. 
Gentlemen coming in  
their shiny cars  
looking spitefully at 
workers and students. 
They were the same gentlemen 
that exploit us all year long, 
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those who make us die  
in the factories nearby. 
They came to have a toast, 
after a year of exploitation, 
to have a toast to the new year.91
 
Organized by Potere Operaio, the protest against the display of luxury in an exclusive 
club, La Bussola in Forcelle, near Viareggio, was smashed by the police, who shot 
several rounds, injuring a militant, Soriano Ceccanti, who later remained paralyzed. 
Sang with a fierce and angry pitch, this song performs a true example of oral counter-
history that is extremely effective in turning upside down the accounts given by the 
press and the media in general. Deploying the point of view of the protesters, it 
supports the construction of a collective narrative in which the oppressed joined forces 
in a radical critique and de-legitimizes the ruling class who, in order to protects the 
lavishness of its celebration, did not hesitate to use arms.  
This is just one example. Valle Giulia, a song performed by Paolo Pietrangeli 
and Giovanna Marini, became a true counter-account of the battle near the Faculty of 
Architecture and true popular rival to Pasolini’s poem. In the joyous choral refrain 
“non siam scappati più!” [we did not run anymore!], the song turns around Pasolini 
indictment of students as “bullies,” and “blackmailers.”92  
 
They [the police] grasped their clubs 
and hit us as they always do, 
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but suddenly something occurred 
a new fact, a new fact 
a new fact: 
we did not run, we did not run anymore! 
 
It is the cry of a multitude of subjects who, in discovering their collective power, a 
new fact, authentically portray themselves as a social entity. The recognition of the 
“we” stands out not as the boasting of a fistful of bullies, but as the choral expression 
of counter-power.  
The circulation of these songs, which worked as educational tools for the new 
waves of militants, proved very effective for the Movement. They established a public 
memory which the Movement could control, shape and spread at a minimal cost with 
great benefits in terms of identity politics. They became part of the new rituals and 
social practices that the various political groups were spreading. Especially for the 
creative, but still engaged moments of aggregation, they performed the double role of 
entertaining audiences and elaborating foundational moments for the new counter-
culture.  
These artists usually grouped around songbooks [canzonieri] and had their own 
counter-circuit of concerts and happenings. The Cantacronache, for instance, was an 
organization based in Turin which carried out the groundbreaking archaeological and 
anthropological work of collecting and preserving of Italian folk and partisan songs. 
Most of the components of Cantacronache were in fact intellectuals such as Italo 
Calvino, Franco Fortini, Umberto Eco or independent scholars like Paolo Pietrangeli 
and Ivan della Mea who only later became singers. It was this fertile research that 
provided for these non-professional musicians a repertoire of rhythms and intonations 
of popular songs which they readapted and re-created out of the urgency of telling 
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their own stories.93 From the ashes of Cantacronache were born the Nuovo 
Canzoniere Italiano in Milan and the Canzoniere Pisano. Their political affiliation 
was also quite clear. After 1968, Il Canzoniere Pisano was renamed Il Canzoniere 
Proletario and became the musical branch of LC. The singers that joined it 
participated in political initiatives, contributing to the renovation of Italian music, 
precisely by skipping the usual process of selection and control of the record 
companies.  
Music, but also comics, theatre and radio program--the first and most 
important being Radio Alice in Bologna--creatively addressed and practiced the social 
issues and aspiration for change incarnated by the Movement. This part of the counter-
culture became the most visible element along, of course, with the most superficial 
aspects of its manifestations, such as fashion. But singers like Ivan Della Mea were 
first of all militants of the Movement. As artists and singers they contributed to the 
broadening of its influence, not merely as propagandists, but as real producers of 
knowledge.94 It was a knowledge that tailgated reality, which wanted to have an 
impact on it. With the circulation of cultural products like songs, these artists can be 
taken as an example of the new counter-culture militant-laborer. 
The difference between propagandists and producers of culture is one that 
needs to be clarified. It descends directly from the biopolitical changes I have 
underlined throughout this study. In a society where culture served merely as the 
reproduction of its own establishment, art appears to be solely a super-structural 
element. With the term super-structural I do not mean to downplay art’s role which in 
fact remains highly political especially in its propagandist function. Yet in a society 
                                                 
93 See Alessandro Portelli, “Avanti note alla riscossa,” il manifesto, 5 Febr. 1998; Paolo Pietrangeli, 
“Zaccagnini - Pietrangeli: in Viaggio tra Musica e Politica,” reinbo.tv, April 2008, now in 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jq3R3z-yYe4&feature=related>. 
94 On the inventiveness of the cultural revolution of the Movement see also Pio Baldelli, 
“Comunicazioni di massa,” Enciclopedia Feltrinelli-Fischer (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1973). 
199 
where reproduction becomes progressively the motor of production, artists or 
producers of culture become laborers in their own right. Because they are involved in 
that same process of immaterial production that society as a whole is gradually 
experiencing, they also form an avant-garde within the Movement itself. People like 
Ivan della Mea or Paolo Pietrangeli were producing and living the conditions of their 
labor. But as intellectuals who talked to a large, young and proletarian public, they had 
the freedom and the burden to make art. It was an art that did away with the burden of 
tradition and the circuit of cultural reproduction that the market imposed and, for a 
period of time, their songs also remained significantly impermeable to consumerist 
logic.  
Consider another popular song that plays with the slogan and the political goals 
of the Movement, especially the program of Lotta Continua, Ma chi ha detto che non 
c’é? [Who said it doesn’t exist?] by Gianfranco Manfredi. Its success relies in the 
blending of nostalgic and romantic tones, converting the song into a political call to 
embrace the revolution. Ma chi ha detto che non c’é? is constructed through an 
anaphoric progression in which this thing, the revolution which is never directly 
named, is read back in the particulars of daily life. First in the sexualization of the 
female body –as a side note here we must remember that neo-feminism would harshly 
rebuke the Movement for its many instances of concealed sexism. “It exists in the 
awakening of the body, in the end of sin, in the warmth of your breast, in the depth of 
your abdomen.” Then it is predicated on symbols of past violence, “the blazing rifle” 
of the resistance, or of the present “it exists in the crossbars against the fascists, in the 
rocks on police jeeps;” and finally in new forms of struggle like the “refusal of work,” 
the “re-appropriation of commodities,” or the collective celebration “festa 
collettiva.”95 I have discussed the relevance of the first two: the refusal of work as an 
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exodus from the factory and its liberating capacity in terms of non-productive 
activities and the re-appropriation of goods, as practices aimed at breaking the bond 
between the wage-labor, production and the satisfaction of social needs.  
Celebration deserves close attention. It was a much celebrated moment of the 
new social practices of 1968. Opposed to the notion of party as escape from boredom, 
celebration implied the “regaining of the wholeness of being, where nothing exceeds 
or excludes.”96 Celebration does not fear waiting, loitering. It does not have a real 
determined structure, nor does it point to an outside of itself. It is not an escape from 
alienation. It was meant to be an extended time of collective aggregation that effected 
an ideal of fusion, which politicized being together more than it did individual 
relationality. Celebration involved music, debates, drug consumption and an open 
enjoyment of sexuality. “These festivals and events were expressions of a revolt 
against the ideology of crisis and the austerity plans propounded by both the 
government and the Communist Party.”97 Unfortunately, this new political dimension 
will show all its weakness during the Festa di Parco Lambro in the summer of 1976 in 
Milan. Antonio Negri describes the gathering as a “carnival of the poor” which, unlike 
a normal carnival, “could not settle for rituality exalting and nullifying practices in the 
exception.”98 However, the utopian dream of three days of unrestricted joy and 
revolution sadly ended up in what was later called the “last celebration” of the 
Movement.99 Lootings, violence and assaults on the stage transformed the place in a 
battlefield. The very food stalls of the political organizations were assaulted and 
suffered proletarian expropriations. The organizers retreated chaotically, realizing they 
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had no control over the new young proletariat they claimed to represent. Immediately 
after, Marisa Rusconi wrote that “the desire for liberation turned into desperate 
anger.”100  
It was a sad awakening and Pasolini here seemed to have been more than right. 
The Movement had not considered that an island of non-capitalist life in the outskirts 
of Milan was not impermeable to larger and deeply rooted social dynamics. These 
theories elaborated by the Movement had not fully explained how to protect the germ 
of non-consumerist consumption from the libidinal attachment that commodities 
generate. It had not fully explored how the self-regulative mechanisms of the new 
proletarian would grow spontaneously as a reaction to the impoverishment imposed by 
the system. This is not to say that the official left was immune from this same social 
conditioning. With the economic boom, the Gramscian idea of the national popular 
culture that the PCI assimilated in an a-critical and static way led toward the most 
ruinous capitulations. As I showed, Pasolini’s analysis of communist Bologna 
described this contradictory situation: consumerism was the driving force of 
development.101  
The Movement also disingenuously celebrated the liberating power of the 
body, the force of a new immaterial production that this new generation had helped 
maturing with its struggles. In his most provocative fashion, Pasolini had again 
pointed at this dreadful possibility. He saw how the liberalization of sexuality was 
drifting toward its neutralization. In his obsession with fascism, Pasolini perceived 
(without fully elaborating it) that the biopolitical wager at stake was high. Power 
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conceded a liberalization of sex that made it become progressively more neutral, 
almost impolitical in its daily occurring. Once it had lost its taboos, sex began to 
resemble an object of consumption, leaning toward an utterly impersonal quality just 
like any other exchange of commodities. What was left untouched, though, were the 
material prerogatives of oppression based on gender and women’s positionality in 
society. This neutral quality was not negative in itself, but to the extent that it sided 
with consumerism it lost its revolutionary potential. As Pasolini argued, a revolution 
had occurred, but it was a revolution without a revolution. Said it in Gramscian terms: 
a passive revolution.  
Closing the Debate: Pasolini’s Reasons, the Movement’s Discovery and Limits 
Recounting the story of 1968 is a difficult task. Compared to the 1920s factory 
occupations, 1968 has no linear narrative. It has no highlights or turning points that 
condense the possibility of a general insurrection. There is no climax to which one can 
build up chronologically like the 1920 Milan national council when the revolution was 
voted down. To be sure, expectations for a revolutionary event were no less intense 
than in 1920, but the temporal development of the Movement’s struggle shows how 
1968 was far less linear and cumulative. This is also, however, the peculiarity of the 
political configuration of the various movements. The Movement was in fact de-
centralized, spreading its influence in many sectors of Italian society. Ultimately it 
was not interested or willing to pursue a unilateral attack on the state or to constitute a 
unified organism equipped for such a task. The longstanding and oscillating debate on 
how to organize the Movement never found a viable solution. At times swerving 
towards the idea of a Leninist Party, at times towards a more fluid blending with 
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workers’ organization, 1968 was never able to establish “a unitary and permanent 
structure.” 102 It crashed before any real solution was carried out.103  
This is the second reason why parallels with the 1920s are problematic. The 
1920s Councils Movement defined itself as a distinct subject in competition with 
others, namely the state, the Industrialists, the Unions and, to a certain extent, the PSI. 
But the Movement’s lack of a solid articulation, its fluid relations between students 
and workers, and the complexity of a society like 1960 Italy make 1968 the 
protagonist of “an impossible revolution, a revolutionary movement without 
revolution.”104 The only parallel one can find with its 1920s historical antecedent is 
possibly the much less ambitious participation to the election in 1976 under the 
electoral cartel of Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy) which turned into a 
political disaster and led to the dissolution of LC. 
The kind of peculiar flexibility that the structure of the Movement privileged, 
or adopted is in part the result also of the kind of society the Movement was trying to 
overturn. The stabilizing capacity of the capitalist system had progressed immensely 
from the 1920s as Gramsci had already foreseen in his Prison Notebooks. The 1968 
revolution was a rupture that happened mostly at the level of reproduction, that is, at a 
biopolitical level which modern society had in embryo and that, at the same time, was 
preventing from developing in the direction of the expansion of immaterial capacities. 
1968 is neither simply the effect nor the cause of the outstanding development of the 
biopolitical dimension, that is to say, of the potentialities and the burden of increased 
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degrees of oppression that we now suffer.105 But in its horizontal and disseminated 
nature 1968 is truly the experiment that preceded our current society.  
A slightly different story is possible if we take up the so-called 1977 
Movement and the siege of Bologna. It was a ruinous and mostly defensive struggle 
by a specific area of the Movement that took roots in Bologna and in the North-East of 
Italy. Despite the sharing of political practices, militancy and even political cadres, the 
leaderships of LC, for instance, bluntly refused to acknowledge the 1977 Movement 
and its connection with 1968. Adriano Sofri, the leader of LC, remembers: “as I was 
looking at the Movement 1977, I thought that one day I could have proudly told my 
grandchildren: I was not there.” Guido Viale accentuated even more this position: 
“1977 was a revolt against what was left over from 1968: politics, workerism, 
ideology, groups.”106 LC had closed down only 4 months before. The Bologna 
experiment, though, deserves a close scrutiny, precisely in that it intensifies the social 
practices that were born out of 1968. The emergence of the biopolitical element can be 
traced in an even purer form. 
 
3.3 1977: Alice and Boccalone 
In the 1970s, even if dominated by a “red shopkeeper” mentality, Bologna 
looked like an exceptional place swarmed by an unprecedented cultural flourishing.107 
It was one of the centres of the neo-avanguardia: Umberto Eco and Angelo Guglielmi 
taught at the university. Other scholars like Piero Camporesi, Carlo Ginzburg, and 
Gianni Celati would leave a permanent imprint in the study of Italian literature and 
                                                 
105 Luc Ferry and Renaut, Alain, La pensée 68: essai sur l’anti-humanisme contemporain (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1985). 
106 Qtd. in Cazzullo, 279. The occasion for a new upsurge of students protest was once again a school 
reform. See Lumley, 295-297.  
107 Enrico Palandri, Claudio Piersanti, Carlo Rovelli, Maurizio Torrealta, eds., Bologna marzo 1977 ... 
fatti nostri (Verona: Bertani Editore, 1977), 11. 
205 
history. Others like Roberto Dionigi (1941-1998) in Philosophy were equally 
important. Between 1970 and 1971, the University of Bologna had also established the 
first Department of Art, Music and Theatre in Italy. Better known as DAMS, it 
provided a fertile environment for that re-shuffling of disciplines that the academic 
institutions were endorsing. Innovative artists like Andrea Pazienza (1956-1988) and 
writers like Pier Vittorio Tondelli (1955-1991) and Enrico Palandri graduated from 
DAMS.  
Bologna was also the capital of the so called “creative wing” of the Movement, 
the hybrid metropolis where the twilight of the standard mass worker gave birth to a 
new proletarian and marginalized figure. Antonio Negri called this figure the 
“socialized worker” [operaio sociale], a figure who devotes his or her time to “the 
multiplication of socially useful labor dedicated to the free reproduction of proletarian 
society.”108 Thus a myriad of political-artistic formations populated the social scene. 
Here I also want to mention: the neo-dadaist group A/Traverso, the militants of the 
magazine Rosso, the situationists of the group Indiani Metropolitani, and the collective 
that ran Radio Alice, a benchmark in the self-management of the media that will later 
be shut down by the police during the March insurrection.109 The broad political 
referent for these groups was the autonomia and its operaist assumptions. These 
students and young urban proletarians were immersed in its theory and practice. 
Refusal of work and its ethics, no delegation of power, critique of authoritarianism – 
all of these key concepts were practiced daily with special emphasis, they were 
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reworked in light of the playful and corrosive irony that the Bologna Movement 
invented and used as a new weapon.  
During the police repression of 1977, for instance, the students, acquainted 
with the trigger-happy Italian police, marched in the streets with a piano carrying a 
sign that said “Don’t shoot the pianist.” Others dressed up as clowns and improvised 
street performances built on “mockery and reversal which became the customary 
language of the Movement and that substituted political idioms with logical 
paradoxes, rationality with nonsense.”110 University buildings were covered by these 
slogans, satirical writings and graffiti. One took issue with Luciano Lama (1921-
1996), the general secretary of the CGIL, who had been openly contested during a 
conference in Rome because of his reformism and collusion with the government. The 
unknown writer mimicked the title of a famous song of the time, Dite a Laura che 
l’amo (1967), a cover of the American original written by Jeff Barry and Ben Raleigh 
Tell Laura I Love Her (1960). The funny pun became: “dite a Lama che Lamo 
(Andreotti)” (Tell Lama I Love Him, signed Andreotti). A witty paronomasia full of 
political sarcasm, if one admits the poetic license of the misspelling of L’amo. Another 
slogan, a parody of the LC slogan “more money and less work,” became “more work 
and less money.” It quite realistically described the curve of salaries after the 
economic miracle.111  
All these witty imaginative interventions scrubbed off many layers of daily 
state propaganda about the development and the need for sacrifices that the nation had 
to make because of the 1970s oil crisis. The corrosiveness of the Movement invested 
heavily in these practices that cast light on the irrationalities and arbitrariness of the 
socio-economic transformation. This was a time, moreover, when the PCI was rapidly 
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moving away from the Movement and any of its hypothesis of social change. 
Supported by the popular consensus and the strength of the Student’s and Workers’ 
Movement, the official left had cashed a series of reforms that fulfilled its social-
democratic program and, in the case of abortion, pushed it beyond its leaders personal 
convictions. In addition to the legalization of abortion, the reforms that became law 
thanks to popular referendums were: the legalization of divorce, the new chart of 
workers’ rights [Statuto dei Lavoratori], the law on Decreti Delegati and the reform of 
the psychiatric system with the closing of the asylums. But this is truly the legal 
legacy that 1968 left to the future generations and its main contribution to the 
democratization of the country.112 This series of reforms led the PCI into believing 
that a political alliance with the Christian Democrats was not just possible, but was in 
actual fact the only way to avoid a military coup, like the ones that had just occurred 
in Greece and Chile.113 We now know, for example, that Herny Kissinger considered 
the Chilean solution of extreme relevance also for a country like Italy.114 The 
communist leaderships thus elaborated the famous doctrine of the compromesso 
storico [historical compromise] with the Christian Democrats that would supposedly 
give the PCI access to the government. Consequently, the discrepancies with the 
Movement widened as did the isolation and misunderstanding for the latter. In its 
distancing, the PCI was also taking away from the students and workers the 
sympathies and benevolent look of the popular support that the party controlled. A 
solid, ubiquitous shade hovered over the Movement and was reinforced by the media, 
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by the parties and the state. Bologna embodied this claustrophobic situation and “the 
most dramatic instance of the breakdown in communication between the Movement 
and the local institutions.”115 After the Movement was militarily disbanded in the late 
1970s, the generational gap escalated, falling into aphasia, the desperation and the 
heavy drugs that killed many in the 1980s.  
At the threshold of this passage, Enrico Palandri wrote Boccalone, a book that 
immediately became a cult for the Movement. Boccalone is indeed a generational 
book, naïve at times, but full of energy and honesty. It captures the transformation of 
the biopolitical dimension and the kind of subjectivities that this passage gave rise to 
just before they were stabilized and put under tight control by capital. Boccalone 
represents this junction indirectly. The exploration of this biopolitical threshold is not 
thematized, which is to say it is not a real content in the narrative. The biopolitical 
dimension is instead immanent in the writing. It is already that writing. With 
Boccalone we have a complex archaeological object that crystallized the rising of the 
biopolitical force at a particular stage of Italy’s modernization.  
The story takes place between May 1977 and March 1978, precisely after the 
military repression of the Movement with the siege of Bologna, and during the 
subsequent roundup in the rest of the country.116 Yet the references to these major 
events are scant. Boccalone deals almost exclusively about a love story. More 
precisely, it is an account written in the first person by Enrico Palandri, alias “big 
mouth” for his uncontainable verbal fluency. This is openly stated from the beginning 
and the reader is made aware of the sad conclusion of Boccalone’s love story. In what 
sense does a sentimental love story relate to a collective, stratifying elaboration of 
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forms of struggle and contestation of capital’s control like the one carried on by the 
creative wing of the Movement? Is this another instance of what Pasolini called the 
hedonism of this new generation? How political can an unhappy love story be? How 
political is the verbal swarming a young man who suffers for love?   
Notwithstanding its popularity, few literary critics have investigated Boccalone 
in depth. Part of the reason is that it owes too much to the social milieu of Bologna 
and its time, thus this chronological limit for the book also undercut its theoretical 
value.117 Its documentary value as well as its spontaneity and directness, certainly do 
not encourage the Italian literary canon to pay attention to a text that at the most is 
seen as testimony, or as folklore. On the contrary, I want to make an argument for its 
theoretical relevance. One of the discoveries that 1968 made and the next waves of 
generations of militants elaborated is that love is endowed with a highly political 
dimension. Pasolini embraced his theory on the anthropological mutation of Italians 
precisely after exploring the changes of their sexuality. This said, I want to investigate 
the formal representation of this love story as the complex staging of the biopolitical 
energy of the new subjectivity in relation to the dramatic repression the same 
subjectivity suffered.    
Replacing Gramsci with Alice: a New Figurality 
In order to write about Boccalone, we need to start from another literary figure, 
the little protagonist of the most famous oeuvre written by Lewis Carrol: Alice in 
Wonderland. It is not in the scope of this essay to provide an exhaustive analysis of the 
relevance of this figure for the Movement. One could map a wide circulation of the 
figure of Alice, the latter making its first appearance in the counter-culture milieu 
probably with the anti-Vietnam war song Alice’s Restaurant Massacree (1967), later 
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adapted in a movie by its composer Arlo Guthrie, who co-authored with Arthur Penn 
Alice’s Restaurant (1969). After that, Alice migrated to other films such as Alice in the 
Cities (1973) by Wim Wenders, Alice Doesn't Live Here Anymore (1974) by Martin 
Scorsese, and finally reached Bologna, in February of 1976, when a group of young 
militants of the Movement established a Radio station called Radio Alice.118  
Alice in place of Gramsci? For the Movement it seemed that Alice provided 
something that the father of Italian communism could not provide. On the back cover 
of Alice Disambientata, Celati parodies the famous exchange between the queen and 
Alice on the croquet ground. He writes: “What’s with these people who put Alice in 
place of Gramsci? Off with their head!” Referring to the leftist intelligentsia and 
particularly to the leadership of the PCI, Celati condenses in this witty parody many 
things at once. The PCI represents the law, and its violence, but it is also the custodian 
of a bulk of knowledge and power that used the figure Gramsci as a secular icon. As I 
hope to have shown, this is not the Gramsci discussed here, rather is the Gramsci 
domesticated by the guidelines of the reconstruction era period. To be sure, though, 
coming in the wake of Alice was a repertoire of notions and historical insights that 
made her absolutely crucial politically. 
So in the fall of 1976, a group of students assisted by Gianni Celati gathered 
around the Alice/DAMS collective and held a one year-long seminar discussing Alice 
in Wonderland (1865). Enrico Palandri took part as well. The documents that grew out 
of this work would be later collected in a book titled Alice disambientata: materiali 
collettivi (su Alice) per un manuale di sopravvivenza (1978) [Displaced Alice. 
Collective Materials on Alice for a Survival Manual]. From a narrative point of view, 
it is easy to notice how Alice becomes the starting point for Boccalone. The parallel 
between the two characters runs as follows: just as “Alice is born in the age of steel, of 
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machinery and mechanism, of the great development of industrial automation” and her 
wanderings are the ambiguous attempt to slip out of this mechanical oppression, 
Boccalone represents the intense desire of the new movement to break way from the 
Fordist cage.119  
In the first chapter, I spoke of the role of figurality in Gramsci’s philosophy of 
praxis. To a certain extent, 1968 readdresses this notion and the related one of 
translatability. In Gramsci, figurality is developed through a gap; there is a residue of 
emptiness that allows the movement of translation. The act of translation is precisely 
this very human and social determination of a relationship between two events such as 
the Russian Soviets and the Turin Factory Councils. In short, this comparability needs 
to be established and then organically developed. It is always a conscious historical 
act. 
The new figurality that arises after 1968 is not a transplant, but rather an 
already-always-present mechanism. Examining the paintings of Francis Bacon, Gilles 
Deleuze has said that in his work figures as the “material,” and “the body” ignites a 
process called “becoming-Animal.”120 It is precisely this process of “becoming-
Animal” that defines figurality. The latter is not representative. It does not double up 
into content, nor is it an illustration of the process. The movement of the figural is not 
a “figuration,” for “it must have nothing of the represented object.”121 It is instead a 
progression, not a progress, a tension that rhythmically and elastically moves and 
traverses the environment. Figure is the closest adherence to the environment, just like 
the life of an animal that moves confidently in its element.  
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Alice makes the case for such Figure, or figurality as I called with relation to 
Gramsci. The Alice/DAMS group defined figurality in these terms linking the 
immanent movement of “becoming animal” to a collective-subjective moment. This 
figurality does not imply in fact a leap into the post-subjective dimension, since it still 
frames this transformation through social, collective agency. The movement of this 
new figurality follows the rhythms of something expected that is profoundly desired 
and awaited, but which knows no final synthesis; rather it constantly changes into a 
“figure of a non-congruence [non coincidenza].”122  
 
After the first joint: waiting-figure-falling-happening − i.e. 
the automatism of the response to desire − how can this 
positivity go forward? This is to say, what happens after the 
satisfaction made you fall down in the event, in the situation 
or into the longed-for adventure? […] How do you raise the 
positive intensity of the adventure when confronted with the 
fears and perils of a standstill or of a fall into the drama? The 
second mechanism we call the figure of non-congruence.123
 
The fall here refers to Alice’s descent into the rabbit-hole and her consequent 
wanderings. Falling, wandering and being displaced in space and time [disambientare] 
are the lines of development the new subjectivity is searching for and experiencing. 
This willed disorientation articulates a different idea of social change, one that has no 
modeling capacity, but rather is fully immanent to its own movement of wondering. 
“No, I am not looking for a program or a menu” says Negri, “a menu is still a menu, 
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and until proofs to the contrary appear, the ones who end up eating best are still the 
bosses.”124 Desire is thus paramount, for “there is no happening without the craving 
for something to happen, without the joy of following the trace of a figure.”125 This is 
the subjective moment. But once the awaited event occurs, one needs to avoid any 
blockage or fixation of the desiring élan which could potentially freeze its intensity 
into a representative element. One needs to follow the paths of figurality, an errant 
loafing, a constant slippage that does not cling to a final solution: “the figure is the 
trace one follows when slipping into an event.”126  
In this the movement of the figural, one the Alice/DAMS group defined as a 
“figural tale,” resembles the pattern of a dream.127 The comparison is appropriate. As 
poet Bob Perelman writes in the poem Here “it is well known that there are no final 
surfaces in dreams.”128 The amniotic dimension of dreams is all-comprising: while it 
happens, there is no real outside of dreaming. Gregory Bateson pointed out that 
dreams are articulated through metaphors whose “relata remain unmentioned;” for the 
“patterns of dreams are timeless” so that there is “no framing of action” nor any 
“metacommunicative frame.”129 In dreaming, since “the pattern is the thing,” there is 
no real doubling, no illustrative content. The immediate coextension between subject 
and its element is ubiquitous.130 We come back here to Deleuze’s concept of 
“becoming-Animal,” which Alice disambientata reads precisely as the “absolute 
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movement of displacement,” [disambientazione assoluta] and “deterritorialization” 
that Alice undergoes in her wanderings.131  
If Gramsci translated the figurality of the Factory Councils into the 
architectonic goal of building “a representative apparatus that has all the hallmarks of 
a State,” the 1977 Movement was emphasizing instead circulation, nomadic errands, 
and transitory moments, flights from anything that seemed stable, heavy and 
foundational.132 We are now in a position to follow Palandri’s figural tale so as to 
measure the political relevance of his book. 
Boccalone: a Love Story 
Waiting-figure-falling-happening: the rhythm of figurality agitates Palandri’s 
pages from its opening. This is how the book begins: “Every night I leave my little 
house in the centre of the city whistling a joyful song to the beautiful May moon. […] 
Days go by, I know I can loaf around.”133 Immediately after, a trace emerges. This 
figure takes up the form of a young girl:  
 
Anna wears white overalls and a red jacket, not always of 
course, only at times. I fell in love with her eyes very early, 
almost immediately. If it will ever happen to you to see a 
person with hands redden by the cold, a thin impolite 
voice, and to remain in raptures for a while looking at the 
way she moves, who she talks to, […] that person will get 
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under your skin instantaneously and it will be awfully 
difficult to forget her. […] 
So this beautiful May made me happy and lost me to Anna 
whom I saw moving around from a distance, whom I spied 
in her courting and hoped to kiss.134
 
There is nothing particularly exceptional about Boccalone’s falling in love. Even the 
act of admiring from a distance the love object falls into the normal range of love 
literature, at least from the middle age courtly love tradition of Chretien de Troyes 
(1135 ? – 1190 ?). But it is not the distance in itself that is crucial here; separation and 
sublimation are not the fuel of the desiring machine. In these opening lines one reads 
instead how it is the trailing of a figure that inspires action. Separateness is not willed. 
It is rather just the starting point. This distance is progressively reduced with the 
drawing near of Anna and the savoring of her traits as well as her ways of being. It is 
the following of this image that becomes a process of familiarization and learning for 
Boccalone.  
This pursuing seems open-ended. Boccalone seeks no “consolatory 
reconciliation,” nor some kind of “personal or collective originality.”135 Anna is the 
content of desire, but her figural nature prohibits stoppage and implies a loosening of 
the subject and a surrendering to the mere action of adhering to that figure. The effect 
is a powerful reshuffling of the order of things.  
 
The enormous energy of sex that is capable of not letting 
you fall asleep forever escapes the norms that we give 
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ourselves, winter norms we need in order to face the 
misery and fears of solitude. […] In spring, organized 
orgies become cops and allow us to feign a concreteness of 
desire where instead lies only an abstract scheme that 
separates words and things in zones dealing separately with 
sex, intelligence, love … “divide et impera!”136  
 
The disciplined space of neocapitalist modernity rules over social reality, marking it as 
a sort of chessboard that connects elements through a rigid compartmentalization of 
life: things that can be done and not, and things that are not allowed but can happen in 
a localized zone of transgression. The couplet “organized orgies,” for instance, is a 
perfect oxymoron Palandri employs to capture the nature of modern society. This 
mechanization of sexuality blocks any redemptive power because it constructs and 
channels desire into a locality which serves in the end to reinstate power. So orgies are 
forbidden and oppose morals, but once organized and assembled as the moment of 
transgression, they become useful outlets of potent subterranean impulses.  
It is the famous Julius Caesar’s dictum “divide and conquer!” updated through 
the modern division of labor that extends its range of action to the whole of social life. 
Against this sectorialization of the social in separated realms, the Student Movement 
had operated a syncretic turn. In Palandri’s book, it is the very nickname of 
Boccalone, the protagonist, literally big mouth, that furnishes the model for the 
overcoming of limitations and reductions of the intensities of desire and their 
multiplication into a social wholeness which is emotional and linguistic. Boccalone 
confesses that “my mouth is large and leaks continuously.”137 This is how the new 
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way of dwelling in a space takes place: as an overflowing or encroachment of 
emotions [traboccamento].  
 
Overflowing takes place instead when the zones in which 
you defined yourself are completely emptied out. When 
categories vanish like air. When, while talking, you realize 
that you can affirm every single thing and its contrary and 
even other things that have nothing to do with it.138
 
Every time that Palandri uses expressions that deal with a geometrically closed space 
desire suffers a blockage. Constraints, discipline and fix determinations must be 
rendered fluid. The spatialization of desire freezes its metamorphic power, whereas its 
opposite, the temporalization of desire represents the molecular structure of figurality. 
Hence the heightening of excess over containment, overflowing over delimitations and 
most importantly a powerful affirmation of multiple elements of life over a clear-cut 
distinction and categorization. Vincenzo Binetti rightly pointed out that, in Boccalone, 
we are dealing with “nomadic situations” in which “deterritorialization” destabilizes 
“urban space rigid borders” and give rise to “rhizomatic processes” generating 
horizontal and non-hierarchical relations. 139
From a literary point of view, the temporalization that figurality fosters defines 
a distinctive style of writing. Going beyond the momentary linguistic break that 
Palandri’s style introduced into the cultural scenario especially for young writers, 
temporalization, in rendering fluid writing, underscores a specific use of the present 
tense. At times Palandri collapses the story into the present which is disconcerting for 
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the reader who does not really know what happened before and what happened after. 
Enrico Minardi has keenly suggested that we are confronting a sort of long shot that 
although it is cut by chapters, unfolds following a choral continuum.140 This is 
precisely the point. What I call the presentness of Palandri’s grammar does not 
obviously mean a coagulation of the narrative into a blocked present. Present here 
means an immanent inhering in life and one that follows the pattern of figurality: 
Boccalone desires Anna even before knowing her. Linearity and development are 
dissolved in the temporalization of figurality. As in one of several meta-narrative 
moments of the story, Boccalone remarks: 
 
I must break the grammatical chain that binds the first person 
to the past tense. In this way it resembles the tale of an old 
man that looks at his past from a point of synthesis, who 
rearranges memories only in order to control them.141  
 
It is becoming and change that make resonate the present, and not its symbolization. 
Narrative needs to vibrate along the chords of this non-symbolic movement. I want to 
emphasize that this stylistic choice is functional within the larger argument I made for 
the new kind of figurality that emerges out of the Movement. This anti-literary stance 
is not the sign of a mere literary innovation. It is not even a customary avant-garde 
position. The Movement despised such a modernist stance, since an artistic innovation 
detached from its popular milieu ultimately reflected the reinstatement of separateness 
and autonomy of art through a process of aesthetization of life.142 1968 fought such a 
perspective with all its might and 1977 endorsed such a postulate. It was instead 
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thanks to the full usage of a new fluid relationality that a secularized art could be 
dissolved into a multiple and self-generating communication. Boccalone’s narration 
thus is like a  
 
Light hum, a tale that does not concern anybody and 
simultaneously that talks about everybody. […] I believe 
this is a collective object. But the collective does not 
belong anymore to the project, it is part of my dreams, my 
way of passing time, living life, being in deep shit and 
trying to get out of it.143
 
Beginning with the subheading of the book A True Story Full of Lies, Boccalone’s 
language constantly foregrounds contradictions. This tale does not address anyone in 
particular but rather is collective, Boccalone says. Throughout the book this series of 
contradictions is reflected mostly in the spoken dimension. For instance when 
Boccalone says things like Anna and I “did not talk much. I would speak many words, 
she didn’t. Both of us didn’t talk much,” one may be tempted to think of the difference 
between the words and speaking; for if the talking involves some resolution, some 
meaningful talking out of a problem, or even worse, talking somebody around some 
issue, Boccalone is certainly more prone to speaking understood as the dispersed flux 
of words and sentences. 144 Yet the unreliability of this narrator has something iconic 
in the way it unfolds. Boccalone does not heighten the artificiality of language or 
representation and is not interested in the theatricality of the love act. The dream-like 
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dimension of desire knows no outside; everything is already simultaneously artificial 
and true because it is contained within the same sphere of intensity. Within this kind 
of figurality, desiring is “a vast coiled skin, where slits are not entries, wounds, gashes, 
openings, but the same surface following its course,” and here contradictions are 
merely a rippling of the skin.145  
As I have emphasized, the articulation of the figurality of desire is not a 
voluntaristic act of the subject. It is instead connected to the set of conditions that 
consumer culture created. The commodification and control of every domain of social 
life produced a landscape of “devastated cultures.”146 The metaphor Palandri uses is 
one recalling Allen Ginsberg’s famous poem A Supermarket in California. Boccalone 
says: 
 
Imagine a supermarket of words, with pieces of books one 
read, brands of cigarettes, overheard sentences, all that 
flows in the guise of words and sentences. So what one 
says is truly a commodity: I love you, and he puts in the 
cart a box of washing machine detergent. I live, should I 
buy cocoa? I want a pair of sneakers, blue herons crossing 
the sky… Perhaps I didn’t make myself clear. Everybody 
obviously lives in the supermarket in their own way. There 
are those who steal and those of pay, and those who don’t 
care because they are not interested in consumer society.147
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This reality made of ruins and fragments is the secularized reality of neocapitalism 
Pasolini pointed out. As Palandri would later make clear, this devastated landscape 
generates a sub-culture in which knowledge is compartmentalized and divided into 
aggregates “that are disconnected from a world view that is coherent and expressive 
[articolata].”148 To beat back this fragmentation, to break compartmentalization 
through a re-appropriation of social space was the revolutionary goal of the 
Movement. The LC campaign to “take back the city” was one of such attempts, even 
though its goal of establishing alternative communist structures smelled already too 
much like a foundational practice. Especially in Bologna, the 1977 Movement mixed 
forms of re-appropriation with a politics of flight and exodus. The organization of any 
kind of political structure was based on a politics of exodus and the emptying out of 
institutional power. It is the same form of figurality that prescribes a politics of flight 
and displacement.149 The expanded dimension of time liberated from work demands a 
new sociality that cannot be frozen in institutional practices. There are institutions 
everywhere; militants in Bologna lived in an environment that thought highly of itself 
because of the cooperatives and the various self-managed organizations that the left 
was able to build over time. So the Movement took what it had to take from it with a 
sort of vampiric joyfulness. As Negri argued: “On the terrain of reproduction, the most 
immediate form taken by the refusal of work is that of the direct appropriation of 
wealth, either on the commercial level or on the institutional level.”150   
Next to the emptying of places of power, stands a new economy based not only 
on proletarian re-appropriation, i.e. stealing, but also on a practice of gifts giving. This 
exuberant description captures the nature of this new political economy: 
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My desiring machine is not synchronized with the labor 
machine […] my synchronization is incontrollable, my 
complementarity, my falling in love, all I do and live 
through is beyond the law. I wait for you even when you 
will not come […] I will invent myself […] in a language 
that still belongs to us which is not that of exchange. Desire 
knows nothing about exchange; desire knows only theft 
and gift. Ten felonies per day, my love, and we’ll be 
ours!151
 
It is a different form of circulation of objects and libidinal contents, one that opposes 
legislation of spaces and time which are in fact arbitrary and the result of a fixed 
power structure. This is a new form of conviviality based on theft and gift. If the 
former is clear in its reference to proletarian expropriation, what does the gift entail? 
The Alice/DAMS group dedicated some time to the investigation of the notion of the 
gift. The gift is a tale, just like the book Alice in Wonderland was a gift for a real Alice 
that Lewis Carrol knew. A gift can be the giving back of something that is not yours, 
“your inquietude passes through me and I give it back to you in the form of a tale, 
where your inquietude rises to a positive movement.”152 This is a pendular movement 
which takes in order to pass something around. It goes back and forwards in an 
endless circulation, thus recapitulating in itself the dynamics of figurality. Here we can 
appreciate the re-articulation of the theory of workers’ autonomy on the terrain of 
reproduction. Once the quantitative relations of wage-labor break loose, what is left is 
the efficacy of the act of power. The new constituent subject can decide and put into 
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practice another form of sociality that “defines its own laws and practices on the 
military occupied terrain of the bourgeois.”153  
Furthermore, the desiring machinery represents an attempt to turn over a world 
reduced to objects, and elevate their mechanical capacity to a revolutionary potential. 
How close we are here to Gramsci’s figure of the medieval copyist. Given the new 
context of a society of abundance, in which the Taylorization of production has 
slipped out from the factory, the processes of abstraction of labor are now at work in 
the biopolitical dimension of the social. In the 1988 afterword, Palandri sums up this 
stance by saying that this presentness and immanence of desire gestures towards a 
“fluent anonymity” signaling the “intention of living on the planet anonymously, just 
like plants and things.”154 It is the impersonality with which life encompasses itself as 
the flow of the undistinguished. As it is, it is neither linear nor progressive; it knows 
intensities, rippling, crests and sudden vacuums. In its impersonal vital quality, it 
represents life that, rising to a new potentiality, regulates itself and expands.  
Boccalone’s love story is a book born out the formation of this new biopolitical 
dimension. It registers the biopolitical transformation of increased levels of vitality, of 
an increasingly more powerful potentiality of the human. The unruliness and the 
unwillingness to fixate this new potentiality into an act of power, or the institution of a 
new law represent the platform that the Movement adopted. Not a very Gramscian 
perspective, if I may add, but certainly one that equates, as Piperno says, social “life 
forms” to “biological forms.” Just as any organism is “autonomous to the extent that 
the production of desire coincides with the process needed to satisfy it;” the autonomy 
                                                 
153 Moroni and Ballestrini, 436. 
154 Palandri, Afterword, Boccalone, 151. 
224 
and the constituent power that Boccalone’s community of feelings represents points 
toward this remarkable interpretation of the social as a non-essentialist natural.155  
The Persistence of a Gloomy Ending  
Although Boccalone’s recollection defies linearity, there is still a narrative to 
be accounted for. From the beginning we know that this love story will not end well. 
The presentness of Boccalone’s language that incorporates present, past and future 
constantly reminds the reader that this will be a sad love story. The disturbing effect it 
produces is that the joyous and exuberant description of the falling in love with Anna 
and the various travels and wanderings of the two is paired with the knowledge of a 
gloomy ending. Yet this narrative device does not reestablish any form of teleological 
linearity in the story. The reader is not following a series of admonitions or hints to 
reconstruct the final synthesis. Love and pain are present simultaneously. Palandri 
does an excellent job here in exposing the precariousness that a love story entails. 
From the start love expresses the possibility of its end, so that the latter persists as a 
shade throughout the relationship without defining its meaning. Palandri’s rendering 
of this temporal twist through the idea of an organic presentness of past and present, 
where beginning and ending blend, is a convincing way of expressing the unprotected 
nature of love. Love’s fragility and contingency is assumed as an immanent, self-
determining force. It is the explosion of life with all its dangers. This is a quality that 
definitely snatches the work away from an all too easy labeling of Boccalone as the 
instant book of the Bologna Movement.  
Enrico Minardi argues that there is a tension between the healing effect of 
writing, which is always individual, and the meta-literary inflection of the novel.156 
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Thus, in the end, Boccalone therapeutically works to cure the wounding that love may 
produce. Yet I detect a broader significance for this linguistic therapy. The story in 
fact also works out the collective and personal trauma of the military repression of 
March 1977. There are few instances in which this event is recalled, but one cannot 
help noticing how in such cases the individual dimension is directly linked to the 
collective one, especially given the political nature of desire that I have explored so 
far. Historical intrusions pop up at topical moments. A recollection of one of the 
common direct actions or happenings in Piazza Maggiore in Bologna salutes the birth 
of Boccalone’s love. Here it is in the usual colloquial language (i.e. full of anacolutha)  
 
We were building air balloon with Giuliano, then we would 
fly them high above singing songs. One afternoon I was 
coming out one of these weird things that I don’t know 
how to call, where we would make work whatever we had, 
jumping like nuts, screaming “fly! fly!!” or “burn!! burn!!” 
I was very happy, in that state of love overflowing 
[traboccamento] which spring produces.157  
 
Boccalone cannot find names for these creative practices that were indeed political to 
the extent that they represented “the total utilization of wealth in the service of 
collective freedom.”158 The collective and the personal here are indistinguishable 
because they coalesce in the political dimension of desire. “Piazzas are the power 
plants of desire” Boccalone says early in the novel.159 But when he proposes marriage 
to Anna and she does not answer, the episode is associated with the killing by the 
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police of a young militant of LC, Francesco Lorusso, shot down in via Mascarella 
during the March riots. Boccalone comments “I am under the impression that since 
March the political project that the state has in mind for us is… destruction.”160  
A similar link between the individual and the collective is established with the 
pun political prisoner and love prisoner. Escaping for a vacation, Boccalone needs to 
face Anna’s family, and the repressive law of the state. Anna is under age, and so she 
cannot go abroad with him. In a comic autobiographical moment of recognition, the 
protagonist confronts family authority and pleads guilty for his subversive activity: 
“my name is Enrico Palandri. I belong… to her, who you don’t even know who she is. 
I declare myself a political prisoner!”161 This declaration would became sadly 
common in the years to come and will characterize the dismantling and imprisonment 
of the structure of the Red Brigades who had chosen the shortcut of armed struggle. 
But here Boccalone pleads guilty to the excessive nature of his desire, which appears 
illegal and subversive when confronting authority. 
Finally, after the end of the relationship with Anna, Boccalone begins another 
long journey, this time full of desperation, but equally disorienting as his falling in 
love with her. In a small town in Liguria, Boccalone thus ends up spending New 
Year’s Eve by himself in the old paternal home. He lights a fire thinking that “1977 
ended without a celebration” or a festa as the Movement called it. The collective 
desire has been ripped apart and confined, imprisoned just like Boccalone seeks refuge 
in the family dwelling alone as if in a vain return to a spatialized moment of peace. 
But there is no restoration of stability, let alone a past one like the return to the family 
origins or the authenticity of the past; nor does the ending of Boccalone’s wanderings 
seem to be representable. The closure of the story is consumed in a continuous deferral 
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of its natural course. The temptations of synthetically grasping the love relationship 
into one scene, into a definite conclusion are always defied. Perhaps the persistence of 
this narration has a meaning that goes beyond the mere individual difficulty of 
accepting the end of a relationship. It is the inextricable bundle between love story and 
collective emotionality that fuels the narration. 
The narrator thus mobilizes a series of devices to avoid a closure. He cites the 
ending of Woody Allen’s movie Annie Hall (1977), where after the final re-encounter 
between the protagonists, the tension dissolves without implying the continuation of 
their relationship. Yet, this potential conclusion is contradicted by another literary 
model, that of the Carmen (1845) by Prosper Merimeé with the killing of the beloved. 
The latter is also dismissed. It would represent the worst possible ending, one that 
contradicts the movement of figurality and of the politicized nature of desire. A 
seeking that destroys its object would annihilate any fruitful oscillation between theft 
and gift. So Boccalone continues, admitting that “there is no end then. It all started in 
May, but before that there was April, it beautiful too. So it all ends in March while 
telling the last happenings, and recording them in the confusing murmuring of these 
pages.”162  
But the intensity of desire cannot stop even here. Next comes Bob Dylan’s 
song Mama you have been on my mind (1964). As on other occasions in the book, the 
lyrics are inserted in the narration and are part of a true soundtrack of the book, an 
innovative practice this that will inspire other writes like Pier Vittorio Tondelli. A gift 
from a friend who taught Boccalone how to play it, the song seems to gesture towards 
the acceptance of a future where this relationship is finally over. The final lines picture 
the beloved in front of the mirror while the lover wonders: “I’d just be curious to 
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know if you can see yourself as clear. As someone who has had you on his mind.”163 
However, in this final act of cognition, the lover is actually imposing his view on the 
beloved. It is he who owns the narrative of their relationship. It is he who has captured 
with his act of love the essence of the beloved, and hence his superiority in the gaze. 
Not surprisingly this ending is disrupted once again by other meetings with Anna, and 
more suffering. The story is over, but the narrator continues in his narration, deferring 
a resolution. 
 
It is the journey of my disorientation [spaesamento] of 
writing and of my autonomy. I believe it was good for me. 
Maybe not, perhaps it was better to cry more. However this 
is also one of the things that happened in this last period.164   
 
The pedagogical, curative nature of literature is once again negated, though not its 
disorienting and swarming reproduction. The real conclusion of the book is a series of 
writings on the walls that Anna had supposedly written: “shit,” “Enrico Big Mouth,” 
her initials and “I love you.” It is graffiti on the wall, an utterly public and hedonistic 
communication. But as an inscription it represents the point of juncture between 
something completely individual, and an external, impersonal trace. Those words will 
be on the walls for a long time, but nobody will really own them, nor would anybody 
who reads them resolve their meaning in their individual contingent act of reading. 
The same happens with the slogans and satirical writings on the walls of Bologna: 
they embody an affirmation that will not be fixated in a monumental ornament. Its 
transitory form will not be ruled. Neither the state nor the media will command their 
                                                 
163 Bod Dylan, “Mama you have been on my mind,” Rec. 6 Sept. 1964. The Bootleg Series Vol. 1-3. 
Sony, 1991. 
164 Palandri, Boccalone, 140. 
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meaning. It is only up to the defeated, if they will be able and willing to exert it, to 
own the narration of their story. Just as Boccalone feels down and wounded by the 
crashing of love, the Movement will quickly kneel to the military repression of the 
state. But the songs, the books, the radio programs and the voices of those who 
survived keep that story moving. 
The Fixation of the Sexual as Male Objectivization  
As a coda to my reading of Boccalone, I want to conclude briefly by discussing 
the link between Boccalone’s private love story and its biopolitical dimension insofar 
as it regards sexuality. It will serve as a bridge to the neo-feminist theories that will 
heighten the political element of the act of love that I will explore in the next chapter. 
In Boccalone, the understanding of the functioning of the love act as a biopolitical 
movement registers the transformation in the potentiality of the body of the new 
subjectivity. Once again I make reference to the Alice/DAMS group to support the 
theoretical import of Boccalone’s wonderings. I already highlighted the parallel that 
the group establishes between Victorian society and its closed mechanical form of 
production, and the reality of neocapitalism. The same perspective holds for sexuality. 
Working on the studies by Steven Marcus The Other Victorian (1966) and Ronald 
Pearsall The Worm in the Bud (1969), the group underscored the collusion between a 
restrictive moral on sexuality and the possibility for the male to transgress it. The 
impressive number of prostitutes that England registered in the Victorian period is the 
result of the displacement and expropriation of the lower strata from their peasant life. 
But the creation of whole neighborhoods where sex was sold to the upper class points 
also to a social imaginary that progressively rotated around “fantasies of infinite 
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power that Victorian society articulates through its great steel buildings, its faith in 
progress and reforms.”165  
Against this dominating phallocentric ideology of love and sexual relationship, 
the new generation attempts to articulate a liberating set of practices. The critique they 
carry out against phallocentrism aims at displacing the fixating of sexuality on the 
sheer genital elements with a circulatory movement that translates “the erotic 
investment from pubis to the eyes.” Here we encounter a “fantasy that tries out a 
circulatory investment through images.” In short, it is an intensity that does not 
coalesce “on fixating mechanisms,” but that grows “on minimal short-circuits in 
progression.”166  
Now, it is true that the very expression “falling in love” indicates a “fall” in 
which one tends to lose his or her identity. As the Alice/DAMS argued, in the falling 
in love the quest regards a hypothesis, “values that we are hunting or we are awaiting 
to appear (but do you love me?)”167 The Movement strongly criticized any genital 
objectivization of desire and the figure of Alice represents the prototype of this 
dynamic. The pursuing-wandering of Alice is the seeking not of “a-sexual figure, but 
of a pre-sexual one. That is to say a figure that comes before the preestablished sexual 
investments that necessarily led to penetration and coitus.”168 If it is reasonable to see 
the act of falling in love as an open-ended movement, one that is hypothetical and not 
apodictic, it is harder, though, to overlook its dualistic exclusive relationship. To be 
sure these texts go beyond a mere libertine ideology that fosters a simple de-regulation 
of the sexual field. As I mentioned, the critique of transgression as the reinstatement of 
a solid phallocentric (and Victorian) symbolism is clearly laid out by the Alice/DAMS 
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group. Furthermore, even if the libidinal element is central in the story, in Boccalone 
there is not any form of aesthetization of sexuality, nor is there of possession or 
manipulation. Apart from the cumbersome hint at Carmen, sexuality is always 
represented as extremely vital and joyful flux.  
Yet, Boccalone stages a male protagonist as the seeker. Anna is mostly an 
impalpable, unreachable figure, one that, as Binetti argues, resembles Ludovico 
Ariosto’s fugitive but ever present female figures.169 To what extent does the liquid 
figure of Anna safeguard the danger of a fixation on the beloved? Is it thanks to her 
incorporeal nature as a subject? Are we predicating the defeat of a male symbolic 
objectivization on the base of the weakness of the female subject? Flight is certainly 
one of the strategies to avoid objectivization. Women practiced it, and the Movement 
embraced it. But there is more to it. A feminist group that participated in the 
Alice/DAMS seminar warned against the positivity of this representation of the female 
figure. They disputed the violence of the “projection on the others of our own 
images.” To which the group responded that “women too fall in love” and that this 
violence discloses a “margin of non-lawfulness that can never be re-absorbed in a 
contract between two persons.”170  
This is an interesting move. Equality is predicated on the basis of a natural act 
of love-violence which falls outside the iniquity of society. In other terms, by 
removing this act from the social relationships of a given society in which gender 
relations are well defined and patrolled, and by projecting it on a natural-changeless 
dimension, love is reconciled in the acceptance of what happens daily. Now women do 
love, that is a fact, but how and what is the context for their love? This will be the 
question of neo-feminism that I asses in the next chapter. For now I want to stress the 
                                                 
169 Binetti, 68. 
170 Alice/DAMS, 144. 
232 
answer these texts give to the question of sexuality. Sexuality is flexibility and 
circulation; it is the mechanism that eschews a reduction to the order of things. This is 
true for the majority of 1968. But here we are still in a progressive phase of the 
emergence of a new subjectivity. The biopolitical dimension is heightened by the 
agency of this subjectivity and its constituent force, because it is still an area of 
affirmative struggle to which capitalism has to find forms of negotiations and 
profitable ways of incorporation. When capitalism finds a way to put to work those 
very impulses and free forms of sociality, the biopolitical itself will take up a more 
ambiguous form. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PERSONAL IS (BIO)POLITICAL! A STUDY OF ITALIAN MARXIST 
NEOFEMINISM  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Going beyond any historical judgment of what 
capitalism has represented, its continuing 
existence today means barbarism, not only 
because it represents the theft of non-wage work 
from women – who are obliged to live in 
isolation, semi-dependent on men – but also 
because it is the theft of non-waged work from 
the man. Women are forced to work for capital 
through the individuals they love. Women’s love 
is in the end the confirmation of both men’s and 
their own negation as individuals. 
 
(L. Fortunati, The Arcane of Production) 
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4.1 A Genealogy of Italian Marxist Feminist Thought 
During the “two red years” and the Councils’ struggle, the avant-garde of the 
worker’s movement responded to a specific situation that I have called the age of 
material scarcity. This movement had an advantage since the know-how and the 
capacity to produce was still largely in the hands of the producers. The ordinovista 
goal was to collect, improve and progressively liberate it from the oppressive character 
that marked capitalist society. At the same time, workers understood that this objective 
had to be practiced daily through a political organization that would lead to a new 
form of collective life. Here labor-power would have eventually developed into a more 
human and richer dimension, where every activity had a social and collective goal, i.e. 
where production was rationally tailored on the needs of the masses. But as we saw 
the society of the time still lacked the material base (and the political strength) to 
dismantle class privileges and change the necessity of labor into freedom.  
With the defeat of the movement, what Gramsci called “the passive revolution” 
slowly produced the conditions with which to solve the problem of scarcity, 
preserving though a system of oppression. After World War II, with the reconstruction 
and the economic boom, the Italian industrial structures were rebuilt and modernized 
and standards of living improved. As Gramsci had foreseen, it was a conservative 
revolution for it preserved and even perfected the domination of one class over the 
others. Thus exploitative relations and coercion remained the motor of development, 
but the progressive decline of the incidence of scarcity changed the face of poverty. 
For lower classes the problem was not the predatory command that provoked 
malnutrition or unhealthy conditions (although pockets of real misery still persisted in 
Italy), nor was it just poverty as shortage of goods, but that of the satisfaction of more 
advanced social needs like education, voluptuary goods, proper living.  
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The shifting from a period of scarcity to an epoch of abundance, or post-
scarcity also changed the terms of the political dispute, so that the new stabilization of 
life necessarily provoked new forms of antagonism. Moreover, the role and the 
strategy of the official left that survived the fascist dictatorship and that became the 
protagonist of the war of resistance were largely determined by the geopolitical 
situation of the cold war. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) lead by Palmiro Togliatti 
was in no position to lead a revolution; strategically, military and even politically this 
was never really an option for the party. Class struggle continued in ambiguous ways 
within the limits of parliamentary democracy. For the party and its militants it became 
a long march toward a revolutionary future built on a series of advanced democratic 
reforms. The PCI was indeed substantially different from the party that Gramsci had 
led during the advent of fascism. The PCI was organized as an anti-fascist inter-class 
alliance, whereas the PCd’I, built after the split from the Socialist Party in 1921, was a 
class party, which relied on class cleavage as the real political novelty that would 
correct the PSI failure to lead the revolutionary struggle.1  
Togliatti was adroit in avoiding a disastrous military confrontation. He 
reinforced the base of the party and its consensus on vast sectors of the Italian society, 
but during the years of the reconstruction, the project of the Italian way to 
Communism invested heavily on two points that ultimately contradicted legitimate 
aspirations of its Leninist base. They are both crucial for my genealogy of Italian neo-
feminism and they are clearly stated in this document that communist members of the 
National Liberation Committee (CLN) posted on the walls of the FIAT plants, shortly 
after the same workers had defended them from the Nazis’ ruinous retreat.  
 
                                                 
1 See Costanzo Preve, “Da Antonio Gramsci a Piero Fassino,” part 5, “Palmiro Togliatti e le scelte 
strategiche del periodo 1943-1948,” Kelebek, <http://www.kelebekler.com/occ/prevefassino.htm>. 
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The clandestine period and sabotage… are over. I think it 
is important to remember the courageous efforts of 
everyone, from the director to the very last one of us; 
however we need to work and stick to the instructions of 
our bosses who have their share of responsibilities in 
production. They will not obviously rule as despots, 
rather they will give their necessary input, maintaining 
discipline with equity and good sense… We trust the 
work of those who have been appointed… Let us 
remember that bosses are necessary. We all have a house, 
a family and if paternal authority, that sometimes asserts 
itself with a deserved slapping, would fail then the family 
would wreck.2     
 
The Fiat Soviet of the fall of 1920 seems to have sunk into oblivion. The statement 
bluntly lays out the party line concerning the public (production) and the private 
sphere (household). This insistence on work ethic and the need to make sacrifices 
represents the spirit of the reconstruction period and the years of the economic boom. 
The PCI strongly supported the dogma of productivity and discipline, believing that 
the backwardness of the country could have been defeated only through economic 
(and social) development. Thus the party’s policy was directed toward the protection 
and advancement of disciplined and skilled workers who were instead rapidly 
                                                 
2 Qtd. in Leopoldina Fortunati, “La famiglia: verso la ricostruzione,” Brutto ciao. Direzioni di marcia 
delle donne negli ultimi 30 anni (Roma: Edizioni delle donne, 1976), 73. Until 1952, four high 
esteemed members of the PCI serve as directors with the approval of the Agnelli family. One of them 
was Battista Santhià who took part in the April occupation in 1920 and was later fired by FIAT. See 
Piero Montagna, Introduction, Con Gramsci all’Ordine Nuovo, by Battista Santhià, (Roma: Editore 
Riuniti, 1956), 8-9. 
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disappearing because of the new automation of production.3 Not realizing that Italy 
was indeed on the forefront in the application of certain mechanisms of advanced 
industrialism, the PCI dove into the ideologization of the inner virtuousness of a 
supposedly union friendly system of production.  
Closely linked to the relations of production one finds the acceptance and 
insistence on the moral life of the family. As the call to authority in the factory and in 
the family shows, the party generally embraced a conformist and Puritanical moral on 
domestic issues.4 The average communist militant thus developed a “curious sexual 
and family” mentality, fighting “for more human relations within an almost unchanged 
family” structure.5 Notwithstanding Gramsci’s early effort to elaborate the link 
between production and sexuality, the PCI never really went much further, settling for 
the expansion of female work and more advance networks of healthcare and social 
services.  
Even if Togliatti maintained that “the emancipation of women [wa]s tied to 
that of the workers,” directing women toward the same coercive system represented 
                                                 
3 Nanni Balestrini and Primo Moroni, L’orda d’oro 1968-1977. La grande ondata rivoluzionaria e 
creativa, politica ed esistenziale (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1997), 18; this is how Francesca Pieroni Bortolotti 
summarizes PCI political line during the reconstruction: Palmiro Togliatti “left aside Marx’s and 
Engels’ considerations (the family that destroys, dissolves itself, that must be subverted theoretically 
and practically, the increase of male and feminine polygamy etc.) for the same reason that he left aside 
State and Revolution, Lenin had talked about the end of the state after the foundation of the Soviet 
state.” See Socialismo e questione femminile in Italia 1892-1922 (Milano: Mazzotta, 1976), 15; also 
Romano Luperini argues that with the reconstruction “the communist and socialist parties” rendered the 
“working class the main collaborator to the capitalist development of our country.” See “Gli intellettuali 
di sinistra e l’ideologia della ricostruzione,” Ideologie, 8 (1969): 69.     
4 The electoral competition with the Catholic center played a crucial role too, for the communist 
leadership in the attempt to conquer larger shares of the catholic vote censured any libertarian viewpoint 
on sexuality. On the PCI Puritanism see Diego Giacchetti, Nessuno ci può giudicare (Roma: 
Deriveapprodi, 2005), 165-166; Sandro Bellassai, La morale comunista. Pubblico e privato nella 
rappresentazione del PCI (1947-1956) (Roma: Carocci, 2000); Anna Tonelli, Politica e amore. Storia 
dell’educazione ai sentimenti nell’Italia contemporanea (Bologna: il Mulino, 2004); Guido Crainz, Il 
paese mancato. Dal miracolo economico agli anni ottanta (Roma: Donzelli, 2003), 503.   
5 Biancamaria Frabotta, “Femminismo e lotta di classe in Italia.” Franca Bimbi, ed., Dentro lo specchio. 
Lavoro domestico, riproduzione del ruolo e autonomia domestica (Milano: Mazzotta Editore, 1977), 
219. 
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only a partial answer for two reasons.6 First, it ignored the specific struggle between 
the sexes (including those in a proletarian family), and secondly, it disregarded the fact 
that the proletarian subjectivity as a whole was suffering from the intensification of the 
rhythm of production of the passive revolution. If the entrance into the factory life 
offered a new (public) ground for social struggle that housewives never had, it also 
condemned them to carry a double burden: the fierce routine of factory exploitation 
and the tediousness of domestic work.  
The two key points of the party politics (the relationships production/labor-
force and man/woman) belong to the Gramscian problem of the formation of 
subjectivities. But what was missing in the PCI analysis is properly the Gramscian 
definition of the philosophy of praxis, that theoretical understanding of the conditions 
of possibility of the subordinated subjectivity that leads to a social transformation. The 
PCI was in fact paralyzed by the cycles of struggles of the hot autumn of 1968. 
Theoretically, the party’s strategy was to achieve social change through work, 
industrialization, and eventually its socialization, practically instead, it was through 
“formal politics, where accommodation with other social groups was a prerequisite for 
participation.”7 Meanwhile the class struggle that served to mitigate capitalist 
production reinforced the objectivity of the forms of production. Worker’s subjectivity 
became derivative, with class struggle a mere reactive concept.  
 
We too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist 
development first, and workers second. This is a mistake. 
And now we have to turn the problem on its head, 
                                                 
6 Palmiro Togliatti, Problemi dell’emancipazione della donna (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1955), 10.  
7 Steve Wright, Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism 
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reverse the polarity, and start from the beginning: and the 
beginning is the class struggle of the working class. At 
the level of socially developed capital, capitalist 
development becomes subordinated to working class 
struggles; it follows behind them and they set the pace to 
which the political mechanisms of capital’s own 
reproduction must be tuned.8
 
This distinct emphasis on the centrality and autonomy of subordinated subjectivities 
will re-emerge only at the margins of the PCI. As we saw in chapter 3, it will be 
carried out by a few intellectuals belonging to the left of the PSI, those constituting the 
operaista circle, and by a Marxist component of the neo-feminist movement, Lotta 
Femminista which will develop this perspective with regard to women’s subjectivity. 9 
In this chapter I will address the results of this radical movement, starting from the 
analysis of sex and economic relations disciplining female subjectivity. I will use as a 
literary example Adele Cambria’s work on the women of the Gramsci family, Amore 
come Rivoluzione (henceforward Love as Revolution) and then move to a more cogent 
analysis of the female condition developed by Lotta Femminista.  
The statement “the personal is political,” which is the general working 
principle of neo-feminism, and that Lotta Femminista will theorize in a particular 
innovative way, summarizes the complex system of unequal distribution of power that 
constitutes the hidden ground of female subordination. It is within the private sphere 
                                                 
8 Mario Tronti, “Lenin in England,” Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/it/tronti.htm>. 
9 The new post-war movement is commonly called neo-feminism or “second wave feminism” to 
distinguish it with the original feminism emerging at the turn of the eighteenth Century. See 
Biancamaria Frabotta, “Femminismo e lotta di classe in Italia”; Giachetti, 11; Franco Restaino and 
Adriana Cravero, Le filosofie femministe (Torino: Paravia, 1999), 49-81. 
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of domesticity that capital exercises a deep, albeit indirect control, over the social 
exchanges among individuals. Reproduction thus emerges as the hidden object whose 
control influences and causes contradictory movements, unexpected concessions as 
much as drastic discriminations. Disclosing the genealogy of this process of 
expropriations also helped feminist scholars to outline the stages of women’s 
submission and spaces for a future liberation. As I show this terrain is properly 
biopolitical, since the regulations of sexuality/reproduction are measures governing 
life qua the general capacity to work (labor-power). Hence the pun of the chapter’s 
title: the personal is biopolitical.  
Before we move into this new understanding of the biopolitical terrain of 
control that neo-feminists brought to the foreground, it is useful to briefly recapitulate 
the general reflection on women’s status as it was articulated by the Italian official 
left, specifically within the historical context faced by Gramsci and the new born 
Communist Party. It will give us a larger theoretical breath and allow the reader to 
appreciate the innovations that the movement will produce in a mutated context – i.e. 
the passage from an age of scarcity to an age of abundance.10
Towards a Politicization of the Impolitical 
As any other patriarchal society, Italy was characterized by the plunging of 
female subjectivity into the realm of nature. The pre-historical defeat of matrilineal 
forms of kinship, together with their relative economic and political forms of power, 
determined “the supremacy of men over woman” as a “natural principle.”11 In a 
                                                 
10 In this, my reading departs radically from Donald Mayer’s seminal work in the history of women’s 
movements which fixates its Italian side to a peculiar unchangeable identity: “the context for Italian 
women’s condition was an emphatically Italian one, saturated with the Italian past and riven with all the 
tensions and dilemmas of Italy’s painful course in modern times,” Sex and Power. The Rise of Women 
in America, Russia, Sweden, and Italy (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 632. 
11 Restaino and Cavarero, 113. I use the term matrilineality because recent studies have criticized a 
supposedly original form of matriarchy and the scientific data that Engels used. These feminist scholars 
argued that matriarchy as freedom and decisional power over the most important actions of the group 
241 
patriarchal society women are imprisoned in the private dimension of the house, while 
men dwell in the open space of public life. The private is the locus of passivity; the 
public that of activity. Men are the motor of history, politics…in short of social 
development. Women are generally excluded from it. Only briefly are they allowed to 
peek out and play an ancillary role in society. Their relegation to the impolitical is the 
reason for their approximation to nature; their de-subjectification coincides with their 
burial into nature.12  
This notion of the impolitical domain of femininity resembles Roberto 
Esposito’s idea of life as a dimension that is not invested by the binary representation 
of modern politics characterized by one-sided valorizations: us (good) vs. them (bad), 
democracy vs. totalitarianism.13 But the sphere of women’s de-subjectification 
resembles only formally what Esposito proposes as a critique to modernity. It might 
appear that what lacks here is modernity with, as the patriarchal myth likes us to 
imagine, the feminine standing as an uncontaminated oasis of the facticity of life. And 
women’s real of reproduction is indeed a reservoir, but one which is tightly connected 
to capital (and modern politics) in a much direct and consequential way than what it 
seems.  
                                                                                                                                            
never really existed. See Donata Lodi and Diana Perrone, “Matriarcato,” Lessico politico delle donne: 
teorie del femminismo (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2002), 163-168. But independently from the historical 
data and interpretations that Engels used, “the significant point for women’s status is that the household 
was communal and the division of labor between the sexes reciprocal; the economy did not involve the 
dependence of the wife and children on the husband.” Eleanor B. Leacock, Introduction, The Origin of 
the Family, Private Property and the State, by Frederick Engels, (New York: International Publishers, 
2001), 33.  
Some other Italian feminists believe that the origin of patriarchal society resides in the temporary 
exclusion of women from production during maternity, yet here too there are studies that show how 
certain society incorporate temporary exclusion of men through fake menstruation without changing the 
social hierarchy. See Marcella Gramaglia, “Il marxismo e la donna,” Femminismo e lotta di classe, 
Biancamaria Frabotta, ed., (Roma: Savelli Editore, 1973), 207;  Leacock, 4.  
12 Adele Cambria, In principio era Marx (Milano: SugarCo Edizioni, 1978), 42-44, 46; Restaino and 
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intricate series of pulsions: they are animal-like (passional and irrational), they are disposable objects, 
but naturally unruly. 
13 See Roberto Esposito, Categorie dell’impolitico (Bologna: Il mulino, 1999). 
242 
To be sure female de-subjectification pre-exists capitalism, but within the latter 
a whole new set of contradictions come to the surface. The most obvious and 
persistent one is the oscillation between the promise of formal equality and its 
reiterated disappointment. There is no linear progression, no real planned 
advancement in this march towards democratic rights, such as the right to sell yourself 
as labor-force on the market. Capital simply requires at times higher degrees of 
liberalization of the female workforce, and at other times stricter control. Only the 
result of the cycles of struggle decrees the amplitude of the freedom that women were 
able to steal from capital’s transformations. In this sense, the politicization of the 
impolitical proved to be a fundamental, preliminary step towards this goal. 
As it appears from women employment rates, the path from restrictive to 
liberal policies was not linear. At the turn of the eighteenth Century, notwithstanding 
an authoritarian form of monarchic government, Italy had one of the highest figures 
for the employment of women in Europe. It was drastically reduced by the end of the 
nineteenth Century when heavy industry took hold, and then skyrocketed again during 
the labor shortage of World War I.14 Without a specific analysis of the structural 
reasons for these changes, i.e. without the understanding of capital’s expropriation of 
women’s work as producers and reproducers, the generic claims for equality are 
constantly in danger of being neutralized by the backlashes of patriarchal beliefs or 
shelved by the need to solve more pressing matters.  
The PSI is a good example of these inadequacies. The party’s leadership 
condemned feminism as a bourgeois deviation, but never really developed a 
knowledge of the function and position of women in a capitalist society. As a result, 
                                                 
14 Camilla Ravera, La donna italiana dal primo al secondo Risorgimento (Roma: Ecs, 1951) 65-66; see 
Luciana Capezzuoli and Grazia Cappabianca, Storia dell’emancipazione femminile (Roma: Editori 
Riuniti, 1964), 51; Alessandra De Perini, “Alcune ipotesi sul rapporto tra le donne e le organizzazioni 
storiche del movimento operario,” Dentro lo specchio, Franca Bimbi, ed., 236-238. 
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despite the efforts of eminent politicians and intelligent woman leaders, the party 
suffered the resurgence of traditionalism and sexism.15 The party inherited Engels’ 
proposition that “modern family is founded on the open or concealed domestic slavery 
of the wife.”16 Hence, against the traditional bourgeois family of the time, the party 
supported a kind of “free union” (unione libera) that was tolerant and flexible.17 
Unfortunately, in a situation of quasi dependency on man, this only meant a higher 
degree of precariousness, and thus emotional proneness to the male companion. The 
party however trusted that the revolution, as a transcendent event, would inevitably 
crumble capitalism and, at that point, women would be liberated with the rest of 
exploited groups. Not surprisingly efforts to pass laws ensuring woman democratic 
rights were very discontinuous.  
Take for instance what took place in 1917 in Turin. During World War I, 
women replaced men in the factory, working under the strict military discipline, and 
simultaneously taking care of domestic work. When the wait to purchase bread was so 
long that they could not buy it before starting their early morning shifts, they stormed 
bakeries and refused to enter the factories, demanding food and immediate peace. 
Barricades were erected everywhere in Turin, and the army intervened causing a 
bloodbath.18 The PSI was afraid of this disordered reaction and thus they cooperated 
to normalize the situation. Even a leader of the Turin woman branch of the party, 
Maria Giudice (1880-1953), who firmly opposed the war, could not help proposing a 
solution that was “certainly more human, but still hinged on the division of roles: men 
                                                 
15 See Frabotta, “Femminismo e lotta di classe in Italia,” 211. 
16 Engels, 137, 223. 
17 Michi Staderini, “Sessualità e marxismo i limiti storici della famiglia borghese,” Effe, 8 (1975): 16; 
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18 See Teresa Noce, Rivoluzionaria professionale (Milano: La Pietra, 1974), 20-27; Camilla Ravera, 
Diario di trent’anni (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1973), 18-22. 
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shall come back from the front to return to the factory; women from the factory shall 
return home.”19 
Sexism blurred positions independently from political affiliations and it 
coalesced around a series of traditionalist religious dogmas, economic rationales, and 
positivist assumptions. The exclusion of women from work was, for instance, 
supported by reformist and maximalist socialists on the account of “the diversity of 
natural duties.”20 Some thought that women’s physical inferiority made them 
unsuitable for work, while others honestly believed it was civilly to spare them from 
the harshness of a job. More pragmatically, most socialists justified their opposition to 
women’s right to vote on the account that they were viscerally conservative. Replying 
to a questionnaire submitted by the feminist organization Unione Femminile, the 
famous socialist criminologist, Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909) asserted that he would 
give the right to vote only “where, for culture and costumes, women could be 
considered almost equal to men, not where they looked apparently inferior because of 
men’s own fault. In this case, he glosses, they fall under the fatal influence of priests. 
For that matter, woman will always vote conservative.”21 Despite their consistent 
activism and participation in strikes, this prejudice remained a veritable mantra within 
the official left and, to a certain extent, was also inherited by the PCI. Few escaped the 
circularity of the argument: on the basis of a future progress, basic democratic rights 
were denied in the present. The emancipation of women would paradoxically be 
obtained through their temporary disfranchisement.   
                                                 
19 Pieroni Bortolotti, Femminismo e partiti, 33. Also Anna Kuliscioff (1853 or 1857- 1925), probably 
the most influential feminist since the eighteenth Century suffragette movement, “would not connect 
this battle to the battle for peace,” and this even if in her long career she was always consistent in 
“directing parliamentary initiatives toward suffragette objectives. Pieroni Bortolotti, Femminismo e 
partiti, 39. 
20 Pieroni Bortolotti, Socialismo, 8. 
21 Qtd. in Mariachiara Fugazza and Silvia Cassamagnaghi, Dossier Italia 1946: le donne al voto 
(Milano, 2006), 2; even Socialist Reformist Filippo Turati who supported the right to vote for women 
was convinced that in the short run it would hurt their electoral outcome. See Capezzuoli and 
Cappabianca, 78. 
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Women suffered even more violent attacks when the post-war crisis reached its 
peak and unemployment skyrocketed. Mail carriers, factory workers (about 200,000) 
and bus drivers who had replaced male workforce during the war were the first to 
come under the fire of the anti-women discourse and the physical violence of the new-
born fascist squadrons claiming work for veterans.22 These episodes did not trouble 
public opinion much. The common sense that never stopped seeing women working 
outside the home as (at best) an emergency measure, and the legitimating force of an 
official announcement of the government ordering the firing of 4,000 women from 
public offices annulled any jolt of egalitarian principles.23 From the typical right wing 
traditionalist to the middle class shopkeeper, from the socialist gentlemen to the 
jobless veteran, an old male alliance was resumed against women, namely against a 
new sector of the work-force that was becoming a potential competitor. The argument 
that unemployment was due to women’s work was pure misogyny, but its sexist base 
was solid. As the saying went “ladies worked to buy silk stocking,” veterans instead 
remained unemployed.24 Only few men were really immune from this discourse, and 
since the PSI and the unions’ prime concern was the defense of male jobs, they 
collaborated with the government in replacing female work-force, swapping work for 
a special compensation.25     
The paradox is that the socialists had committed themselves to women’s 
emancipation very early on. By 1910, the XI Socialist Congress passed unanimously a 
serious and well-organized motion that Anna Kuliscioff redacted, regarding the 
                                                 
22 Pieroni Bortolotti, Femminismo e partiti, 20-21 and Socialismo, 129.  
23 Qtd. in Capezzuoli and Cappabianca, 111. 
24 Nadia Spano and Fiamma Camarlinghi, La questione femminile nella politica del P.C.I (Roma: 
Edizione donne e politica, 1972), 25. 
25 Spano and Camarlinghi, 26; see also Camilla Ravera, Breve storia del femminismo in Italia (Roma: 
Editori Riuniti, 1978) 102. This inequality was monolithic. A uncompromising Teresa Noce tells in fact 
the story of the special compensation as a victory of her Fiat colleagues; as she recalls: “Surely we 
could not lay claim to occupy men’s jobs […] it was right that they would take back their occupations 
upon returning from the war front, but it was likewise right for us not to be thrown in the street 
overnight,” 32.  
246 
relations between the sexes, the double burden of women’s work and the 
undervaluation of their work under capitalist rule. For the first time, the socialist 
motion argued strongly in favor of concrete universal suffrage that would include 
women, and so recognized the community of intents and political interests that united 
proletarian men and women.26 By 1919, the right to vote for women made it to the 
third position in the PSI political agenda and the party also proposed a law to legalize 
divorce.27 But notwithstanding a transversal agreement and the parliamentary strength 
of the PSI, the senate rejected the so called “Martini and Gasparotto law.” Later, the 
new political crisis that lead to the election of the following November put an end to 
the possibility of women voting. The incapacity in taking any significant step toward 
basic democratic freedoms that many other bourgeois governments had already taken 
reveals the layering of anti-woman sentiments that pervaded Italian society. It also 
reveals the weakness of the Socialist Party and the merely propagandistic role that this 
issued had for its political strategy.   
Anna Kuliscioff, writing in the party magazine Critica Sociale, said that “the 
day in which women were pressed into the circle of productive and industrial labor 
[…] that day they had also acquired their political rights.”28 The reality instead was 
that the patriarchal order in Italy was a solid system of power so that not only 
women’s employment could change drastically in a matter of a few years, but also the 
gains in terms of social power that they slowly acquired as producers could be swept 
away by simple prejudice or economic crises.          
                                                 
26 See Capezzuoli and Cappabianca, 81-84. 
27 With the French Revolution the dispute over the intellectual and moral equality sustained by 
feminism becomes practical, and the battle for the right to vote represents the primary goal for women. 
In Italy, it was repeatedly disregarded even if it was assessed from the birth of the Italian state. See 
Capezzuoli and Cappabianca, 13, 43-50; the PSI, for instance, had already tried to extend the right to 
vote to women in 1912, when the government extended for the first time the right to all men who could 
read and write that were at least 21 years old or had complied with the military draft.  
28 Qtd. in Capezzuoli and Cappabianca, 57.  
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These visceral forms of discrimination were so strong because they were also 
reverberations of deeper economic mechanisms directed at governing women’s 
processes of socialization. Recently unified, economically weak and notoriously 
inclined toward the outermost exploitation, the Italian bourgeoisie needed to milk as 
much as they could from their work-force. No concessions were allowed. Women 
were economically profitable when they worked: they were underpaid and always the 
first workers the union or the party would trade off. They were even more profitable 
when pushed outside production, one pay check (the male worker’s) would provide for 
the whole family, while any attempt to change this situation was erased by the denial 
of their basic political rights. Sexism was thus the outer skin and the ideological glue 
that allowed a weak system to survive on, to generate those profits that production was 
still not able to create.29 It was the vast and obscure domain of reproduction that was 
fueling economic growth. The impolitical dimension of domesticity (housecleaning, 
emotional relationships, child bearing) represented the widest margin of profit that a 
weak capitalism could exploit while it could rely on an interclass alliance, owners and 
workers united together, based on gender.  
The PSI was complacent with this system of exploitation for two reasons. First, 
its abstract scheme of revolution did not compute worker’s subjectivity as an 
explosive factor, let alone the capacity of a sector of the class (women) to produce a 
revolutionary change; secondly it was caught in the same partiality of analysis that 
made its leadership privilege one sector of the working class over the rest of the 
proletarian class. Its leadership followed the same logic it would later apply to the 
much detested idea of “proletarian freedom” that Gramsci proposed with the Councils. 
Political power for recently immigrated non-organized workers, among whom women 
                                                 
29 The church played a vital role in this sense, see Capezzuoli and Cappabianca, 119-123; Pieroni 
Bortolotti, Femminismo e partiti, 62-75. 
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who had been employed and were now kicked out: this notion went beyond the party’s 
political horizon. No wonder the party lacked a real political will to push the 
parliament to approve a law on women’s suffrage. The senators considered the topic 
just another problem that would be solved once the revolution they conjured up in 
their inflammatory speeches would come. Domesticity remained the realm of the 
impolitical, buried in an unchanging repetition of natural facts like death or birth. The 
contradictions it generated were negotiated among males, producing a divergence 
between ideal statements and practice that repeatedly disappointed women’s 
aspirations.    
Loyal to the principle of radical democracy and to the idea of revolution also as 
a “moral revolution,” the young socialists of the L’Ordine Nuovo were instead aware 
that the discriminations against women had to be fought vigorously.30 A number of 
young women joined the group, and later held important charges in the Communist 
Party – among them we can recall Camilla Ravera (1889-1988), Teresa Noce (1900-
1980), Rita Montagnana (1875-1979) and her sister Elena, Felicita Ferrero (1899-
1984). Together they were rigorously moral in their lives and political activity, 
censuring the costumes of the older socialist generation, among whom heavy drinking 
and the frequentation of brothels were widespread.31 Thanks to the new perspective 
that L’Ordine nuovo was developing, they were also in a better position to analyze the 
situation of women’s oppression. Although they were influenced by a certain degree 
of familism, they could avoid the paternalist relapses of the socialist leadership and, at 
                                                 
30 Antonio Gramsci, Pre-Prison Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 31. 
31 See Mario Montagnana Ricordi di un operaio torinese (Roma: Edizioni Rinascita, 1949) on the 
Puritanism of the new generation see also Giorgio Bocca, Palmiro Togliatti (Roma: Laterza, 1973); 
Daniela Pasti, I comunisti e l’amore (Roma: Espresso, 1979), 50-51. L’Ordine Nuovo gives emphasis to 
the decision taken by the Industrial Workers of the World to declare ineligible for two years any union 
member who was seen drunk in public. L’Ordine Nuovo 12 (1919): 94 [now in Milano: Feltrinelli 
reprint 1966]. 
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the same time, respond to some egalitarian claims of the bourgeois Italian 
feminist/suffragist movement.32
The first contributions by the L’Ordine Nuovo to the analysis of women’s 
condition started immediately after the group elaborated its own autonomous political 
line with the discovery of the Italian soviets in the factories of Turin. The first article 
published in January of 1920 was a rather canonical piece against the commodification 
of love within the bourgeois family written by Zino Zini (1868-1937), a philosopher 
and militant of the PSI. But in the following issue, L’Ordine Nuovo translated Lenin’s 
The Emancipation of Women.33 Lenin praised the advances of Soviet Russia with 
regards to the position of women, giving examples of the concrete ideas that 
communist society had transformed into laws. He argued that, in only one year of 
power, the Soviet Union had “actually razed to the ground the infamous laws placing 
women in a position of inequality, restricting divorce… denying recognition to 
children born out of wedlock… laws numerous survivals of which, to the shame of the 
bourgeois and of capitalism, are to be found in all civilized countries.”34 The second 
part of the article focused on the socialization of domestic work (public institutions 
such as nurseries, kindergartens, catering establishments) as means to begin liberating 
women from their secular serfdom. Lenin’s work and the first legislative steps took by 
the Soviet state were the starting point for the ordinovista group.35 Following the 
guidelines of the Second Congress of the Communist International (July-August 
1920), on February 24 1921, the magazine opened also a regular space dedicated to 
                                                 
32 For instance they supported the celebration of the 8th of March as international day of struggle 
against the socialists who saw it as a merely bourgeois deviation. 
33 Zino Zini, “Decadenza Borghese,” L’Ordine Nuovo 33 (1920): 258; Vladimir Illich Lenin, 
“L’emancipazione delle donne,” L’Ordine Nuovo 34 (1920): 271. 
34 Lenin, “A Great Beginning” The Emancipation of Women (New York: International Publisher, 1984), 
63. 
35 A few months later, L’Ordine Nuovo publishes a detailed account of the new welfare of the soviet 
state with precise measure directed toward the protection of women and children. See A. Vinkuf, 
“L’assicurazione sociale nella Russia dei Soviet,” L’Ordine Nuovo 12 (1920): 93-95. 
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the emancipation of women entitled “Tribuna delle donne” (henceforward Women’s 
forum) which Camilla Ravera directed. 
Unfortunately the first years of the birth of the PCd’I were rather troublesome. 
The split from the PSI narrowed the ranks of the militants, and with the rise of the 
fascist regime the first goal became merely survival. Consequently “the theoretical 
elaboration d[id] not always wave closely together with the practical activity.”36 For 
instance, on the Women’s forum an important article like “I diritti politici delle 
donne” [Women’s political right] did not mention women’s suffrage.37 Later, in “Il 
nostro femminismo” [Our feminism], probably the most important and articulated 
document on women’s emancipation elaborated by the PCd’I of the time, Camilla 
Ravera argues against Engels, that even in a future communist society, the family will 
not disappear, and that the woman “shall carry on a specific work from which she will 
not (for we do not want her) to abstain.”38 Centuries of ghettoization made difficult for 
even the most emancipated vanguard of the proletariat to dissociate maternity from 
self-realization of women as free individuals. As Pieroni Bortolotti recalls “in a 
country where no one ever expanded the use of contraception, the idea that nine 
months of pregnancy not only made women unable to work, but also conditioned their 
whole life, did not look absurd at all, since life appeared precisely to be made of a 
cyclic succession of pregnancies.”39  
To buttress her position on abortion, which was already legalized in Soviet 
Union, Camilla Ravera quoted the case of a French worker who was convicted 
because she decided to have an abortion after her seventh child. Only after this 
dramatic example, could she declare that as long as “society will not consider 
                                                 
36 Spano and Camarlinghi, 22. 
37This position could be however a consequence of the alliance with the Bordiga’s fraction that was 
firmly abstentionist. 
38 Camilla Ravera, “Il nostro femminismo,” L’Ordine Nuovo, 10 March 1921. 
39 Pieroni Bortolotti, Femminismo e partiti, 106. 
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maternity a social function and take measures to remunerate it, maintaining women 
economically independent, it must be let to the worker’s decision whether to have 
children” or not.40 The heightened value that maternity held in Italian society 
prevented the ordinovista group from seeing clearly through the material meaning that 
the reproduction and care of labor-power had in a capitalist society. This is why, at a 
certain point, the search for the specificity of women’s oppression swerved “toward 
nature, instead than toward society.” The PdC’I organized the “Comitati delle madri 
proletarie” [Association of proletarian women] in order to solve the contradiction 
between “sex and class,” but these attempts were both theoretically and practically 
ineffectual. 41 What was missing in the new party was “the political experience” to 
fight against the stereotype of “the woman as mother and wife that every reactionary 
could use against single mothers or single spouses” trying to realize themselves 
outside the family.42 Notwithstanding these limitations, the political life of the 
organization showed evidence of more courageous positions, especially thanks to 
those young female factory workers who were finding in the party a more useful and 
open instrument of class struggle than in the unions or the PSI.43  
In any case, despite a certain degree of familism, the real novelty introduced by 
the Turin group was class cleavage [frattura di classe]. The PdC’I clung to the idea 
that it was through a fully democratic and equalitarian access to labor and producer’s 
control that workers would be emancipated. Hence the party never hesitated in 
defending the principle of equal pay for equal work, and was always firmly opposed to 
the forced return home of women.44 Yet it was not only through labor that women’s 
                                                 
40 “Il mestiere della maternità,” L’Ordine Nuovo, 10 May 1921; as Camilla Ravera recalls, Gramsci 
himself was suggesting to be prudent on the matter, see, Inteview, Le compagne (Milano: Rizzoli, 
1979), 59. 
41 Pieroni Bortolotti, Femminismo e partiti, 76. 
42 Pieroni Bortolotti, Femminismo e partiti, 106. 
43 Pieroni Bortolotti, Femminismo e partiti, 107. 
44 “Concorrenza femminile sul lavoro,” L’Ordine Nuovo, 10 May 1921. 
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independence was to be attained. Following Lenin’s and Alexandra Kollontaj’s work, 
the Women’s Forum began investigating certain features of domestic oppression. 
Outflanking the Socialist position, they stated that women’s subjection was due to 
unpaid domestic labor. This labor was still considered unproductive because it created 
use value and not material products, but its recognition as labor marks the first step 
toward the politicization of a dimension that was previously seen as impolitical. The 
work of reproduction was socially necessary labor and women did it without any 
recognition. For those who were also working in factories, this meant a double burden, 
or double serfdom. Camilla Ravera clearly marked the difference between this and 
Anna Kuliscioff’s approach, recognizing that “woman’s entrance into production did 
not solve the problem of her liberation; it is in fact its cornerstone.”45  
The project the party put forward was to socialize the private work carried out 
in the house and to integrate it into a public industry that would liberate women from 
their “unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, stultifying and crushing drudgery.”46 Very 
little was done to develop these structures because workers’ organizations were under 
constant attack, but the search for practical solutions helped clarify and deepen some 
of the theoretical points that Gramsci would later touch on in his discussion of 
Americanism and Fordism. As the dispositions of the first national conference of the 
communist women, March 22 1922, Rome, declared: 
 
Proletarian families strongly dislike restaurants and 
commercial cooked food. This is due to the fact that 
restaurants and eateries, because of their commercial 
nature, do not care for food salubrity […]  but were their 
                                                 
45 Ravera, Breve storia, 102. 
46 Lenin, “A Great Beginning,” 64. 
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commercial nature eliminated along with the distributors 
of food, these institution would save women a good deal 
of their most unpleasant toil.47  
 
Food is one of the pillars of domesticity. Its preparation falls outside the realm of 
commodity production because it involves a labor (usually feminine) that, as Lenin 
stated above, is unproductive. It does not produce commodities to be exchanged but 
use values for the benefit of the family. In other words, it helps in reproducing private 
relations within the family, hence the emotional charge that explains the mistrust that 
proletarians had towards a nutrition largely based on cafeterias’ food.48 As for 
Fordism, the new party upheld its own program for the modernization of society. This 
meant rationalizing not only production but also all those activities involved in 
reproduction that constituted added labor for women. Intervening on the matter meant 
breaking away from the daily work of preparing food and becoming more active 
within the collective life of the community. In an age of scarcity, consumption of 
goods was a key element of emancipation. Consequently the construction of a network 
of services that provided more resources not for profit meant fuelling the process of 
socialization for the whole proletarian class and, at the same time, implied the 
beginning of the liberation of women from domestic work.  
The PCd’I followed the egalitarian premises of early Leninism and used it as a 
safeguard against the numerous climb-downs of the PSI. Gramsci’s reflection on 
subordinate subjectivities helped the communist members build concretely a political 
platform based on the recognition of the specificity of women’s subordination within 
capitalist society. To summarize: 1) “socially productive,” but unpaid domestic choirs, 
                                                 
47 Ravera, Breve storia, 121. 
48 Obviously we are talking about cheap cooking; real restaurants were off limits for the lower class. 
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had to be superseded through socialization; 2) economic independence had to be 
secured through access to labor without discriminations; 3) marriages were private 
contracts that could be dissolved; 4) women should decide on childbearing – this issue 
remained the most problematic of all. All these elements converged in the direction of 
a female subjectivity that has the concrete means to develop herself as a individual, 
who has the time and the possibility to avoid the subordination to the “flesh and blood 
convulsion” assigned to her by the patriarchal order. 49  
In the clandestine network of the party this stress on women’s subjectivity 
continued throughout the dictatorship and especially during the Resistance, when 
women also played a fundamental role militarily. During the war, because of the 
exceptionality of the situation and the regression caused by twenty years of fascist 
dictatorship, the last two points (divorce and abortion) were shelved. Similarly no 
progress was made during the reconstruction, for the PCI, rapidly enlarging its base 
and political influence, invested heavily on winning the Catholic vote that was 
resistant to these reforms.50 Yet in a society that was rapidly changing, the first two 
pillars of the PdC’I political platform were also wearing a bit thin. One thing is to 
create a network of services in a revolutionary environment where workers control 
production; another is to win small spaces of freedom, such as town kindergartens, or 
cooperative cafeterias in the context of a passive revolution.  
Notwithstanding Article 37 of the new constitution that decreed same salaries 
and equal rights to work, when women for instance began working again, they faced 
                                                 
49 On the problem of female subjectivity and patriarchal thought see Adele Cambria, In principio era 
Marx, 43-44. 
50 The PCI voted for instance the ratification of the Lateran Treaty (article 7 of the Italian constitution) 
thus recognizing the sacred and indissoluble nature of marriage, see Teresa Noce, 372-373; for a critical 
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the usual situation of being underpaid, while had to continue their never-ending toils at 
home. Here things did not improve much either. The Italian mentality was still largely 
molded by the fascist image of the woman as a guardian angel of the household. Even 
among the party, familism remained a taboo buttressed by a form of secular 
Puritanism and the imperative to reach emancipation through work in the factory. We 
return here to the double call to discipline in the factory and at home that the Fiat 
workers read on the walls of their plant after the war ended. 
Among the base of the party the situation was at times even worse. Old forms 
of prejudice reappeared. The Socialist adagio that the women’s vote was naturally 
conservative had to be publicly rebutted by Togliatti during the Conferenza nazionale 
delle ragazze comuniste [National conference of the communist girls] in 1955.51 
Despite electoral data showing the contrary, militants were still convinced that the 
women’s vote had caused the Christian Democrat to win. In certain industrial sectors, 
the very union legitimated the issue of underpayment. With the agreement of July 
1960, the CGIL agreed with the industrialists to enforce equal pay on the basis of 
professional qualifications. Jobs were classified as mixed duties, women’s duties, and 
men’s duties. Equal pay applied only to the latter where women were, as the 
qualification reveals, an absolute minority.52  
If the Gramscian stance could have avoided the same old PSI mistakes, the PCI 
was instead more likely to fall prey to the traditionalist discourse. The movements that 
emerged in the sixties strongly criticized this policy. The formula emancipation 
through work plus socialization of private work went around in circles. Confronted by 
a new generation of women, this plan quickly showed that it was not only ineffective, 
                                                 
51 Togliatti, 10. 
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but rather that it was part of the problem. Neo-feminism in particular, was very 
effective in attacking familism and here it made its most important theoretical 
discovery. This discovery was born out of the urgency of a more comprehensive 
understanding of the role of reproduction within capitalist society and of the role of 
the family and the power structure created by the social exchange occurring between 
the man, the woman and their children. The set of factors tied to reproduction were 
key for understanding the historical reasons for the disappointment of women’s 
aspirations by the political representatives of the proletarian class. These secular 
mechanisms of exploitation within the class itself had to be clearly mapped in order to 
build a new knowledge that would serve as the basis for a new political practice of 
liberation.  
This new capacity of analysis also meant a return to Gramsci. It was a reading 
against the grain and against the official communist vulgate and the link that Togliatti 
had impressed on Gramsci’s work as he proceeded to publish it.53 As Bianca Maria 
Frabotta wrote, it was “precisely with the subject of the family that one could face […] 
the complex Gramscian articulation regarding the relations between civil society and 
the state.”54 The new politicization of the private entailed the scandal of a solid 
critique of the sacredness of the family. 
                                                 
53 See Raul Mordenti, “«I quaderni dal carcere » di Antonio Gramsci” Letteratura Italiana Einaudi. Le 
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In the next pages, I will use Adele Cambria’s work Love as Revolution, an 
excellent example of this dialogue, as a point of entry for discovering the biopolitical 
nature of a woman’s work of reproduction. Love as Revolution is simultaneously an 
inquiry on the correspondence of the Gramsci’s family and its theatrical translation 
into a play entitled Nonostante Gramsci (henceforward Despite Gramsci). I will then 
expand my observations on this piece, including the neo-feminist re-formulation, 
based on the exploitation of sexual difference as well as of the whole system of 
production. It is also through a critical approach to Gramsci that some neo-feminists 
will elaborate a new theory about subordinate subjectivities. Gramsci had developed 
the latter beginning from factory workers. Neo-feminists instead, will elaborate it out 
of sexual difference and its vicissitudes in the private sphere of the household.    
 
4.2 Despite Gramsci: Love as Revolution 
The work of Adele Cambria (Reggio Calabria, 1931) grows out of the most 
intense years of the students’ and workers’ revolt. Their mass antagonism, with their 
slogans, songs and marches had something deeply theatrical in it, and theatre was in 
fact a popular and relatively cheap way to propagandize their attack on the status 
quo.55 Their critique of authoritarianism was directed toward all pillars of Italian 
society: the family, the state, the school. When perceived as authoritarian institution, 
the PCI also received its fair amount of criticism. Part of this effort aimed at re-
interpreting Marxist theory in light of the female question. Gramsci was no exception.  
                                                 
55 See Maricla Boggio, ed., Le Isabelle. Dal teatro della Maddalena alla Isabella Andreini, vol. 1, 
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In 1972 Maricla Boggio, an author associated with the same Roman feminist 
circle where Cambria operated, wrote with Franco Cuomo a play entitled Compagno 
Gramsci [Comrade Gramsci]. The play focused on the “rediscovery of the private of 
this leader of the historical left.”56 At about the same time, Adele Cambria began 
sifting through documents that where considered of no interest. The letters and 
interviews she collected became Despite Gramsci. The base of the play was Cambria’s 
research, but the theatrical work was conceived collectively. The project, which was 
initially only a theatrical piece, was born out of a meeting of the La Maddalena group, 
the first Italian feminist theatre and cultural centre which was publishing the magazine 
Effe. Adele Cambria worked together with Francesca Pansa, Gloria Guasti, Laura Di 
Nola, and Lu Leone (the last two abandoned the project after a series of 
disagreements).57 The play was eventually staged in 1974, but the critical apparatus 
(which included the play) was only published as a book two years later in 1976.  
Let’s first look at the book. Love as Revolution is a typical instance of a 
feminist reversal and re-interpretation, from a different perspective, of a revolutionary 
thinker who had been become a secular icon for Italians. Yet it is also a keen critique 
of the stratification of social constraints set up in order to check women’s 
individuality. The work resembles the same movement toward liberation – i.e. a 
process of de-identification and then of re-identification into a new subjectivity – 
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represented in a acute comic strip published by a feminist magazine of the time. Here 
women are portrayed as gift boxes with sad made-up eyes. As they meet in 
“consciousness-rising” [autocoscienza] sessions and build “real relationships,” they 
slowly strip off their bows and ribbons, growing faces, arms and legs. Finally, 
sketched in a fuzzy but visibly feminine figure, they are ready to sprint toward a new 
life.58 The comic strip portrays this transition in a few rapid passages. Things are 
much more complicated than that, however, for more than in any other conflict, here 
the dominated subject is emotionally attached to her own oppressor and her image. 
Her pleasantness, although mediated and negotiated in the long subterranean conflict 
between the sexes, is a crucial component of her oppression. The same struggle with 
the beloved – Gramsci, the father of Italian Communism – informs Cambria’s work. 
The latter is certainly not against Gramsci, but it does comply with the need to bracket 
him and to read across the limitations of his male-revolutionary image in order to 
reach the life of the women who were with him. As Cambria asserts:  
 
I was interested in verifying some hypotheses I made, that 
is to say that Julia was neither epileptic, nor suffered from 
cerebral anemia, in short that she was not crazy, but 
alienated by the kind of relationship that she had with 
Gramsci. Furthermore that this alienation was 
generalizable and that it was the exemplary fruit of 
women’s subalternity.59  
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It is the specificity of the struggle of women that forms the architectural element of 
this critique. But doing away “with feminine oppression” does not imply “suppressing 
the feminine,” nor does breaking away from males. It rather means assuming the 
partial point of view of the oppressed to construct a new identity, or as Gramsci 
himself put it a “new feminine identity.”60 Cambria’s aim is not to portray Gramsci 
and his family, but rather to sketch a “biography of affects” from the point of view of 
the women: Julia (Gramsci’s wife), Tania and Eugenia Schucht (Gramsci’s sisters in 
law).  
This reversal is also the practical realization of the key discovery of neo-
feminism: that the private of Gramsci’s women is of political import.61 The first 
political meaning of this inquiry is historiographical. As I mentioned Love as 
Revolution is the result of a previous archival work that Adele Cambria carried out 
leafing through the unpublished and forgotten letters written by Julia, Tania and 
Eugenia. It covers their epistolary exchange with Gramsci and their early 
correspondence as young ladies traveling between Russia and Italy. Tatiana’s and 
Julia’s letters were in fact left buried in the dust in the archive of the Istituto Gramsci 
in Rome, since, as the critics would say, they were letters that “only talked about jam 
and babies. Insignificant.”62 Cambria’s first contribution is to re-establish a 
historiographical matter of fact, for Gramsci’s letters are usually read as if they were a 
monologue, without taking into account its true dialogical nature.63 Secondly, 
Cambria makes a point against a male-oriented critique that considers the private as 
gossip (feminine non-value) and the public (male value) as the sole scientific 
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dimension worth inquiring about. But the added value of this women’s perspective 
consists also in digging out the stories of the authors of those letters, that is to say 
those “biographies that remain individual history.” Thus they are useless since, as it 
happens too often with women’s narratives, they are seized away from “that collective 
history, that common set” of experience, which women should instead employ to 
fashion “their own courses of life.”64  
Lastly, by taking into account “women’s reasons,” this inquiry also provides 
new insights into Gramsci’s prison’s years. 65 There are interesting questions 
regarding this period that usually remain in the shadow. For instance, why was 
Gramsci practically abandoned by his wife Julia after he was sentenced to twenty 
years of prison by the fascist regime? What was the nature of Tatiana’s help, who not 
only saved Gramsci’s notebooks but also “assured his very physical survival”?66 And 
finally what was the role played by the other sister-in-law, Eugenia, who practically 
raised Gramsci’s sons in Russia?  
These figures re-emerge from oblivion (or the crystallized image that history 
passed down) to tell their life. Cambria reconstructs the personal relationships, the 
affective dimension of this family, focusing on the sternness of the life of subjects who 
were in a perennial struggle with forces larger than themselves. It is what Adele 
Cambria calls the “dialectic of interpersonal relations between the colonized” that 
rules the interaction between Julia, Tatiana and Eugenia Schucht, who were raised 
following the bourgeois model of their time, in a high class Russian family in decline, 
during the turbulent years of the end of the Tsarist regime.67 For all of them those 
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bows and ribbons adorning the female figure were larger social constraints that 
determined their decisions, their goals and behavior. 
Cambria’s archival work strips away, for instance, Eugenia’s character – and 
the play will emphasize this point even more – of the kind of heroic aura that official 
history had created around her. Cambria is more interested in outlining the reverse 
process Eugenia undergoes: instead of liberation through politicization, she suffers a 
progressive enslavement, for she follows a masculine stereotype. As it appears from 
her early letters, in her youth, even if always quite independent, Eugenia was also 
sentimental and gifted with a humanitarian disposition. Only later, after her teaching 
experience in Poland, will Eugenia go back to Russia to be trained as a rifleman to 
fight for the revolution. She is the first to meet Gramsci and to become infatuated with 
him in 1922, when both were hospitalized in the Serebrianyi Bor sanatorium near 
Moscow. Already a dominating figure among her sisters, after the revolution she 
became the personal secretary of Lenin’s wife. Eugenia’s politicization does not lead 
to a real emancipation, but only to an acquisition of power and prestige. In Cambria’s 
analysis she becomes the paradoxical product of a “romantic education” that blocks a 
woman’s personality by binding it to the fantasy of marriage. The failing of this 
fantasy creates a crisis that emphasizes a typical “idealistic rejection of any bargaining 
with everyday life” that make her adopt a voluntaristic (almost patriarchal) attitude.68 
Her education followed her father’s prescriptions, Apollo Schucht, a Tsarist officer 
who, because of his hostility against the regime, was interned in Siberia.69 This is how 
Teresa De Lauretis summarizes Apollo Schucht’s late-romantic pedagogy: 
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a sense of duty toward the poor and dispossessed; contact 
with nature as a source of happiness, goodness, and 
personal fulfillment; the love of children idealized as a 
pure unspoiled manifestation of Good Nature; a 
sentimental attachment to Family as nest and shelter from 
the disorder and potential danger of the outside world.70
 
Pushed toward this unreachable ideal of love and family, unable to “realize her own 
affective life” and turned down by Gramsci, who fell for her younger and more 
beautiful sister, Eugenia reacts by emasculating herself, devoting herself to the 
Bolshevik cause and becoming the severe guardian of Julia and Gramsci’s sons.71 It is 
here that her process of emasculation culminates, when her initial “affective richness” 
turns into the morbid “possessiveness” over Julia and her sons.72 In Cambria’s 
dialectic of the colonized, Eugenia represents the subaltern who climbs the social 
ladder enough to push down those who are a step below. Cambria’s close scrutiny of 
Eugenia is more sympathetic than the theatrical representation: the goal is to 
understand the mechanisms that block her personality not simply to hold her up as 
negative example.   
Tatiana, commonly known as Tania, was the oldest daughter and studied 
medicine in Rome. She is the most obscure figure of the three sisters. It is difficult to 
trace her life after the whole Schucht family moved back to Russia during the 
Revolution. She remained in Rome, but hid from acquaintances, because she was 
supposedly afraid of receiving bad news about her family.73 Tania resurfaced from 
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depths of history thanks to Gramsci, who had been asked to look for her by the 
Schucht family. With Gramsci’s imprisonment and Julia’s departure for Soviet Union, 
she becomes a veritable double of Julia, the substitute of his wife, and the only 
channel that Gramsci had to reach his family. Tania is atrophied and limited in the full 
expression of her affectivity because of morals and Gramsci himself, who was still in 
love with Julia and would never consent to have a relationship with her.74 
Notwithstanding the strictly fraternal love with Gramsci, Tania takes care of him 
following all his transfers, working to provide for his basic needs, and does so nearly 
twenty years in total abnegation. Tania embodies another recurrent persona that 
society had constructed for women: the charitable figure, the nurse who sacrifices 
herself for her man.  
Finally we have Julia, the “most beautiful and feminine” of the sisters. At the 
beginning she seems to balk at Gramsci’s courtship, but then she falls for him not 
because of the typical masculine insistence, but because of Antonio’s sensibility and 
perhaps because of the projection of Eugenia’s desire. Since her young years spent 
studying violin in Rome, Julia was dominated by Eugenia’s stronger personality.75 
Things remained the same even after the beginning of her relationship with Gramsci. 
Cambria stresses Eugenia’s absolute power over Julia, especially when the former 
decided they all had to leave Rome – including the first born, Delio – at least three 
months before Gramsci’s arrest, when there was no immediate danger for them.76 
Julia’s figure emerges as a “mild and sweet woman” certainly subjected to more 
dominant figures, but with a “profound and yet frail will to rebellion.”77  
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If Tania chooses the almost gratifying role of total abnegation, Julia is instead 
crushed by the heavy demands that society imposed. Firstly as a woman and a mother, 
secondly as a Russian Bolshevik and lastly as the wife of Antonio Gramsci, Julia ends 
up in the cumbersome alleys of mental illness. This is how Cambria sketches the 
relationship between the two sisters and Gramsci: 
 
Tatiana is presence insomuch as Julia is absence, she is 
fullness as opposed to the void; but Tatiana gains the 
however still relative plenitude of her relations with 
Gramsci through sacrifice, abnegation the complete 
annihilation of herself. This is a situation which on the 
contrary Julia has tried to resist without having the capacity 
[…] retreating in the alternative of mental illness.78
 
During the various hospitalizations that punctuated her long life, Julia was treated with 
electroshock. Her silent resistance explains the key role in Cambria’s work. While 
Tania gives in to her sacrificial role, comforted by the “heinous-sweet right of not 
seeing her own oppression,” Julia instead lives through that irreconcilable situation 
until she slides into a desperate final de-personalization.79  
Adele Cambria decides to close Julia’s portrayal with her last letter, dated 1964 
and addressed to Gramsci’s brother (Carlo) that appeared on the red banners of the 
PCI during Togliatti’s funeral. At this point Julia talks about her beloved as “the father 
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of her sons” and “creator of the PCI.” 80 Gramsci blurs into his secular icon, while 
Julia fades away in the hospitalizations of the Soviet sanatoriums. Yet among the three 
sisters, Julia is the “most contemporaneous,” fighting a subterranean, almost 
spontaneous war against the insolvable contradiction inherited by her modern 
bourgeois family.81  
A peculiar episode of Julia’s life discloses her hidden war. While in prison, 
Gramsci had received allowance money for his job as a journalist and then sent it to 
Julia through a friend in Russia. When she received it she turned it down. In this 
instinctive refusal--which looks apparently irrational, since the family was going 
through hard economic times--Cambria reads, using the key of the unconscious, 
Julia’s opposition to “the legitimacy of an abstract paternity.” 82 With “abstract 
paternity,” Cambria alludes to the role of a pure economic tutor that the father plays in 
a patriarchal society, at least until his progeny actively engages social life. The long 
silence of Julia seems to be readable also as a response to the unbearable situation of 
Gramsci’s imprisonment. Those twenty years of absence she had to face could not be 
sublimated in the romantic rhetoric of distance and waiting: the true trial that it was 
believed to strengthen love. The concreteness of the relationship with her husband for 
Julia was a material necessity.83
 
Thus silence, not writing letters, even if she felt them as 
marks of a guilty impotence, were after all the only 
resources, the only way available for her to push back, or at 
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least refuse, the codification of the unreality that 
constrained her.84       
 
Applying Shulamith Firestone’s theories, Cambria foregrounds also the fact that the 
power distribution in their relationship was, as usual, unbalanced in favor of Gramsci, 
even if he was in prison and she was free in communist Russia.85 This remark raised 
scandal at the time not only because it seemed a specious argument to a male oriented 
audience, but also because Gramsci represented the figure of an intellectual who, as 
we have seen, did reflect on the relations between man and woman, and certainly was 
much more aware of the paternalistic approach that progressive intellectuals professed. 
But for Cambria the love relationship between Antonio and Julia can be read in light 
of a common social disparity, which would explain Julia’s behavior and illness.  
The object of Cambria’s work is not only the genealogical inquiry of these 
women. As she states from the beginning of her work, the key point here is also the 
question brought about by 1968: “how to love as a communist?”86 How to connect 
love and politics? It is here, Cambria argues, where the discrepancy between Julia 
Schucht and Antonio Gramsci arises. Gramsci had chosen the revolution and for that 
he was killed, Julia had chosen him and for that she slowly died alone. If it is through 
socialization that individuals grow and fulfill their emotional needs, in a patriarchal 
society, women, as segregated subjects, can do so only within the family, whereas men 
have several options, and politics is one of them.87 The absence of the object of her 
investment, Antonio Gramsci, and the “insolvable conflict” of its impossible 
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realization slowly devoured her until the end, as it did with many women throughout 
history.88  
The Play 
How was it possible to pass from the careful analysis of a series of 
correspondences, to a play? The group of actors, writers and the theatrical designers 
that collaborated at the staging of Despite Gramsci decided to hold on Cambria’s 
thesis, but the staging of this “thesis play” split the audience.89 While the public 
welcomed the performance, the critics rather were generally more skeptical. Adelaide 
Ceriaoli, for instance, argued that the play resulted in “a reading too strenuously 
biased and not completely justified when compared with the volume of the Gramscian 
epistolary.”90 Reading it today, the text appears less trenchant in its thesis, even at 
times poetic. After the pull-out of the two original directors (Laura di Nola and Lu 
Leone), the group opted for a self-managed direction that proved very effective, 
despite the technical deficiencies and the lack of means of the facility they had at their 
disposal.  
“Without a stage, with three barely raised platforms” the Maddalena Theatre 
was located in Stelletta Street in Rome. The place was a small U-shape basement that 
had been previously used as a print shop.91 There were no real funds available, but the 
way the group organized the theatrical space represented a good compromise between 
what they wanted to do and the physical obstacles they were facing. Besides a screen 
projecting slides and pictures, the traditional central stage was split into three 
separated spaces that broke the audience’s unitary vision. The collective used three 
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different platforms where the three Schucht sisters acted: the main central stage was 
occupied by Julia; Eugenia was on the right inside of the stage, Tatiana at the very end 
of the auditorium. The disruption of a fixed and central point of view followed the 
example of experimental theatre of the time, and put into practice the critique of the 
customary visual perspective that favored the power position, the highest and central 
point of visibility, that the sovereign held in Elizabethan theatre.92 It was also the 
incarnation of the philosophy of the Maddalena theatre, strenuously committed to 
giving “representation to all women,” including “those that who had never had the 
floor although they had voice and thoughts. Above all,” the group argued, “we had to 
engender their direct presence, rather than one narrated by others, as it had always 
happened until then.”93
As the sisters’ emotions and feelings took over the sequential structure of the 
biography the narrative linearity was dismantled. Voices had priority over movement, 
and the acting in itself lost importance as the engine of the story. It is the voices and 
the numerous quotations that, as “visualization[s] of theatrical words,” sustained 
narrative.94 Actors were constantly on the stage even when they were not involved in 
the scene. Their presence had thus to be engaged during long periods of non-action, 
devising a routine and a gestural expressiveness to fill in the time. The role of 
scenographic setting was enhanced also thanks to specific apparatuses: the truss-
structure [struttura-trousse or arredo-trousse]. This tall rectangular sculpture was a 
sort of cubicle that hosted the actor. It created a fluid space that mediated the “passage 
from the inside of the individual to the outside of the stage.”95 These structures re-
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enacted the paradox in which the characters dwelled. In the first act, never fully 
visible, Gramsci occupied a space that recalled his youth Sardinian setting, while in 
the second he moved around his cell. Eugenia, Julia, and Tania acted in a domestic 
environment.      
The only character who moved freely between the platforms and the public 
was the Girl. She represented the critical “counterpoint” of the whole story, the 
contemporary feminist narrator who dug out the three Schucht sisters from history.96 
She framed chronologically the story, addressed the characters, showed slides on the 
screens, and quoted feminist poems and Alexandra Kollontaj’s thoughts. Furthermore, 
she staged the Orpheus-Girl who rescues her sisters Eurydice. Even if embodying the 
didactic moment, the Orpheus-Girl was not exempted from a certain poetic allure and 
skepticism about the magniloquence of politics.  
In the play her interventions are scattered during the sequence of dialogues and 
the overall effect is that of a mosaic of voices that proceeds by way of consonances, 
more than on the progressive development of the narrative. This mosaic is then welded 
together by the Orpheus-Girl’s ideological slogans that condense the voices in a sort of 
theoretical rippling of the waves of language. These theoretical points follow to a 
certain extent the guidelines of Cambria’s book, but the didactic interventions of the 
Orpheus-Girl are the novelty of the play; they lay a bridge between the past and the 
present.  
Here I want to focus briefly on two of the Orpheus-Girl’s orations that disclose 
the problem of the political nature of the private and its historical stratifications.  
 
Women’s talks 
Butter and milk talks, 
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Soured at times, 
Staircase and kitchen talks 
Talks on the butcher’s balcony 
Or shouted 
From the hairdresser drier. 
Women’s talk 
Trivial talks 
Ghetto talks of 
lies and gossips. 
But if our private becomes 
Our political 
And the political the private 
entering in our blood 
Then you will know 
Why to hate the  
Mournful trophy of fascism.97
 
Women’s talks, gossips, in short domesticity as a reservoir in which women are 
confined is a microcosm expressing a whole system of social relations. The study of 
this domain will unearth the true political meaning of this relationality. The Orpheus-
Girl asks to politicize the private, but also to use that private as a political base. In so 
doing the dead-like nature of the woman fashioned by fascism emerges in all its 
articulations. Yet, what is this mournful trophy? And how are we to understand the 
Orpheus-Girl’s apparently circular argument of a private that becomes political and 
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vice versa? The link between fascism and the condition of women deserves closer 
attention. 
Among the many crimes consummated by the regime, the oppression of Italian 
women was probably the least noticeable one, especially in the Italian society of the 
time which, as I argued, was already ruled by patriarchalism. But the invisibility of 
this offence against women renders explicit the subterranean link between fascist 
mentality and women’s disfranchisement in contemporary society. The “mournful 
trophy of fascism” [“trofeo luttuoso del Fascio”] represents the climax of a series of 
behaviors and actions that, disguised as praise and protection of the natural virtues of 
womanhood, emphasized the strict control of femininity under the notion of maternity 
and the superior interest of the nation. Fascism is crucial for understanding certain 
apparently contradictory features of biopolitical control, that is, of a control that sinks 
into the personhood of the individual.  
The lack of political actions of the pre-dictatorship government was filled up 
by the strict measures of the fascist regime. Mussolini created and propagated a 
“mystique of natality” whose focus was the Italian woman who had to have more 
babies in order to increase the Italian population and reach the supposedly crucial 
number of sixty million people by the middle of the twentieth Century. Thus laws 
discouraging emigration were enforced and large works of land reclamations carried 
out in order to limit processes of urbanization and increase the peasant population that 
notoriously gave birth to more children.98 Until the war made it possible, the 
government drove women away from their jobs and pushed them back in the house. 
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Some of those laws (fiscal deductions, loans to families, and prizes for those who gave 
birth to at least three children) were passed as necessary protections for women and 
their welfare while, others punished directly those who did not contribute to this 
system. As a consequence, taxes were imposed on bachelors who had not procreated. 
Birth control was banished and abortion considered a crime against the race. 99 The 
fascist regime was intensely biopolitical in the control of life at its most biological 
level. Women were truly the trophy of this enormous plan of social engineering, for 
they were the prey that had to be domesticated and put to work. Their work was 
unambiguously reproductive, but once reproduction is invested with such legislative 
measures, its politicization is inevitable even if hidden by the rhetoric of the 
biological/natural role played by women. For neo-feminism the politicization of this 
private fact came thus now under a new light. It showed how little privacy there was in 
private lives, how reproduction and the woman’s body was a territory of the state 
apparatus.100
In this respect, fascism marks only a quantitative difference from the capitalist 
society of post-war Italy. This is especially the case when we consider fascism from a 
Gramscian perspective – that is to say, as a passive revolution, a modernization in 
which a certain redistribution of wealth is carried on without changing the privileges 
and the hierarchy of the social structure. The importance of controlling the production 
of labor-power appears now explicitly connected to the changes in the mode of 
production (Fordism). Thus the emphasis on demographic policy reveals the ultimate 
plan of capitalist modernization that fascism carried out: Fordism “commanded a new 
conception of the value of labor force.” In the thirties, within industrialized countries, 
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there was a shift “from the protection of the working-woman (if she was young qua 
sexual commodity, if she was older qua producer) to the protection of the woman as 
mother in order to protect the progeny.”101 It is in the formation of a new labor-force 
that one sees the priceless commodity on the market, so that even if the fascist 
propaganda seemed more inclined toward an anti-capitalist (ruralist) policy, it did 
contribute to this trend globally. The ideological support for this plan was the return to 
a feminine figure completely defined by her productive role and the strengthening of 
families as “state controlled units of social stabilization.”102   
This is the biopolitical novelty that the Italian case shows in an amplified form: 
the mass use of a “political subject (women)” homogenized by “the determination of a 
biological role as political role.”103 As fascism explicitly politicized the private 
dimension, neo-feminism could use it as a counter model to clarify the ways in which 
sexual oppression is articulated through a series of legislative measures and 
ideological apparatuses. The liberticidal actions of fascism went far beyond the fact 
that they were enforced by a dictatorship. As I will show, there is continuity between 
economic exploitation and sexual oppression. In this, the Orpheus-Girl’s claim that the 
private is political, and vice versa, acquires full meaning. The private is political in 
that it is the subject of a public intervention. At the same time, the political is also the 
private because of what the latter embodies: the conflict and exploitation occurring in 
the work of reproduction.  
Capital and state regulations are not only formal laws imposed on individual. 
They rely on a deep structure made of psychological necessities, sentimental 
attachments, personal aspirations, desire… one is generically called love. 
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Stating/knowing the contradictions of this form of love can only trigger the search for 
a liberation in which the mark of oppression is progressively erased, and where 
sexuality becomes a positive liberating force for society. Both Cambria’s play and 
book highlight this feature as they strive for a response to Gramsci’s question. This is 
the second oration that I want to explore. As the Orpheus-girl claims closing the play 
 
There are no answers, comrade Gramsci 
To your youthful question 
To Julia: 
If it is possible to love a mass  
when one has never had strong feelings for anyone. 
If it is possible to love a collective 
Without having loved anyone […] 
There are no answers, comrade Gramsci, 
Yet there is a choice we refuse: 
Love or revolution,  
Liberation for the masses or 
Liberation for oneself, 
Man, woman.  
 
Gramsci asked this famous question in a letter to Julia, articulating the deep unsolved 
emotional substratum that links politics with life. In a certain way, this represents a 
reversal of the fascist program: here the politicization of the private, of what is 
considered non-political is expressed in terms of relationality, as the caring for other 
individuals beyond the “pure mathematical calculation” that takes the politician 
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toward his or her goal.104 So the framing of the problem is correct, but the practical 
answers are still far away. Feminists felt that these answers had to come mainly from 
them, since the standard mentality of the male militants who were involved in 1968 
reiterated habits and behaviors that crippled the political dimension of love. 
Notwithstanding his repulsion against the idolatry of men, as a secular icon of 
martyrdom for the Italian left, Gramsci himself came to represent the example of a 
revolutionary leader ready to pay the highest price. It was inevitable that his ascetic 
aura provoked a certain desire for emulation among young and committed intellectuals 
of the Student Movement. But this old form of male engagement was in itself the 
result of a power position. Its cynical application lead to dangerous forms of politics: 
the sort of politics that was always ready to ask for sacrifices in the name of a higher 
interest.     
From the specific perspective of women’s subordination, the question that the 
Orpheus-Girl reformulates quoting Gramsci has several objectives. Within the private 
dimension, the same sexual intercourse is part of the oppression. Against a new degree 
of economic independence and sexual liberty (thanks to contraception), neo-feminism 
still gauged what Gramsci called the “unhealthy characteristics” of sex. Part of it was 
due to the difficulty in overcoming a female identity built “on beauty as a condition 
for social acceptability” (the bows and ribbons of the comic strip I mentioned) that 
males enjoy so much.105 A sexual image constructed and reiterated by a daily 
experience, in which one “perceives and comprehends as subjective… those relations 
– maternal, economic, and interpersonal – which are in fact social and, in a larger 
perspective, historical.”106  
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277 
Moreover it became clear, that even sexual emancipation was easily 
incorporated in the systematic exploitation that men carried over women. Especially 
within the movement, the rightful struggle against the sexual phobia of Italian society 
meant primarily a higher sexual availability for the comrade-in-arms. What at the 
beginning looked like an advancement, such as the partner’s new attention for 
women’s sexual pleasure, soon became another men’s trophy: the reduction of 
“female orgasm to an objective measure of his virility.” More and more women 
realized that “this revolution did not change love making; it made it simply more 
frequent, more possible, free, open and cheerful […] nevertheless [it was] still suitable 
for male sexuality.”107 This was not something new in the history of female 
oppression. Men had many times masked their calculations under the more pleasurable 
camouflages of good manners, or as sixteenth Century Italian poet Moderata Fonte 
(1555-1592) stated in her treaty on the worth of women: men always recur to such 
practices, “pretending to do through courtesy, what they really do by artifice.”108  
It is a narrow passage: you cannot deny your own pleasure, but this pleasure is 
also consistent with the emotional involvement with your own oppressor. Catharine 
Mackinnon said that “sexuality is to feminism what work is to Marxism: that which is 
most one’s own, yet most taken away.”109 This situation resembles in fact that of the 
proletarian under the iron heel of capital, who is pressed by the paralyzing power of an 
identity imposed by his or her oppressor.  
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The story of the Schucht sisters forms part of that feminist narrative that served 
as the purpose of women’s liberation. It was a typical example of how neo-feminism 
needed to reclaim spaces that were erased from history because they constituted only 
the private part of somebody’s history. But that private part was exactly the basic 
political dimension upon which a whole system of exploitation operated. The play 
may appear ungenerous to Gramsci, but even the preposition of the title, despite, 
discloses a bond which implicates the figure of the father of Italian communism. It is, 
in a way, an unavoidable dialogue, and a fruitful one I would argue. The theoretical 
break that Gramsci and the councils produced within the Italian political and 
philosophical scenario represents a pre-condition to any movement of liberation of a 
subaltern group. The difficulty that we too have as contemporary readers is that 
Gramsci’s reflection is read through the lenses of the reorganization that occurred after 
his defeat. It is hard to formulate a positive line of action once part of those theories 
(such as the Fordism upheld by the Councils) is the very cage that locks a subordinate 
subjectivity.  
But it is hard to formulate a positive line of action from the life of the Schucht 
sisters as well. There seems to be only a thin path that runs as a counter-relief to a 
thread of mistakes, losses and pain. This counter-relief signals what must be avoided 
and what must be criticized. It draws the contours of a social richness, a prolificacy of 
human relationships built “a non-dilapidated territory, or less dilapidated one, if 
compared to the increasing devitalization and drying up of the male.”110 In order to lay 
out the scheme of this new social engineering, neo-feminism had to take the necessary 
steps into the unraveling of the biopolitical dimension that the work reproduction 
displays in a capitalist society. Through the staging of plays, the marches, the songs, 
these steps were clearly stated, beginning with their personal experience. As Teresa 
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De Lauretis argues, the real question is “how to theorize that experience, which is at 
once social and personal, and how to construct the female subject from that political 
and intellectual rage.”111 This personal rage meant several things: 1) a re-writing of 
history that would represent women, and their function and positionality in a 
patriarchal/capitalist society (i.e. the full explanation of the political nature of the 
private); 2) the critique of the use that male (and science) had made of female capacity 
to procreate as the “biological element validating the natural inferiority of women.”112 
3) separatism (in the best Gramscian sense) as a way of defining clearly the systematic 
oppression that man exercised for centuries; 4) the awareness that women’s liberation 
would mean also man’s liberation; and 5) a set of concrete answers or actions to help 
this process.113 Let us turn to the specific analysis and solutions offered by Lotta 
Femminista.  
 
4.3 Reproduction as the Kernel of Biopolitical Control 
The Italian neo-feminist movement that grew out the turmoil of 1968 was 
highly heterogeneous. Scholars in fact prefer to use the plural “feminisms.”114 Neo-
feminism privileged small-group activity and was bound to specific geographical 
places such as Milan, Trento, Rome, and Padua. The first important organized group 
(1965) was a small Milan-based collective called Demau. Standing for 
Demystification of Patriarchal Authoritarianism, it had a remarkable influence on the 
student and worker’s movement, because of its anti-institutional and anti-authoritarian 
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critique. Closely associated with Demau, the Roman group of Rivolta Femminile 
[Female Revolt] the Trento group Cerchio Spezzato [Broken circle] and later the 
Diotima group in Verona worked mostly on practices of consciousness-rising 
(autocoscienza) and had fruitful exchanges with French psychoanalysis. As a rough 
categorization I would gather all these collectives under the label “self-awareness 
area.”115  
In addition to the Catholic field, and the official communist organization UDI, 
Unione Donne Italiane [Italian Women Union], the other main center of Italian neo-
feminism was Lotta Femminista [Feminist Struggle] known also as the Wages for 
Housework Movement. Originating between Padua and Ferrara, the group was active 
in Veneto and Emilia regions, but it also had closed relationships with a Milanese 
collective, Liberazione Femminile, [Female Liberation] and established another 
important centre in Rome.116 Most of their militants had formed their political 
experience in the Italian New Left. Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Leopoldina Fortunati, and 
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Alisa del Re all were important figures in Potere Operaio [Worker’s Power], and 
Silvia Federici was active in the Student Movement. Lotta Femminista became the 
national organization with international links (namely the USA) that mobilized women 
around precise objectives.  
As a innovative Marxist Feminist organization, Lotta Femminista felt the need 
to correct Marxism while using its basic tools. As the organization announced in one 
of their first manifestos, the two key points of the new Marxism of Lotta Femminista 
were: the investigation of “the subordination of non-waged labor to wage-labor that 
conceals the productivity of housewives” and the praxis of political autonomy as “the 
positive expression of the level of struggle of women.” 117 They directed their first 
correction towards the concept of emancipation through work. Among the several 
errors committed by the PCI, Lotta Femminista focused on the paradoxical union 
between two opposing beliefs that the idea of emancipation displayed: utopianism and 
a rigid, almost cynical reading of Marxism. According to the PCI leadership, the 
subaltern feminine condition was characterized more by the absence of work (i.e. 
underdevelopment) than by the exploitation of the capitalist system. The woman lived 
in a sort of reservoir, an oasis barely touched by capitalist exploitation; she was in 
brief a kind of colonized subject who had to pass through a capitalist phase to acquire 
consciousness and liberate herself. Under this abstract scheme of liberation, women 
would miraculously become an autonomous revolutionary subject through the growth 
of productive forces. Lotta Femminista overturned this utopian reading. Like the 
colonial subject or the citizen of the Meridione (the south of Italy), they argued that 
women were not suffering from the “backwardness of the economic relationships,” but 
that they were rather the “most advanced and contradictory facets of the world 
imperialist system” which always adopts against marginalized subjects a violent and 
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all-embracing power, plundering their resources.118 The PCI missed the structural 
importance of this form of depredation, believing all too easily that emancipation 
would take place through progressive adjustments of capitalism itself.   
At the same time, the teleology of this process recalls the cynical belief in the 
forces of capitalist development that characterized the old PSI. This objectivism 
invalidates the principle of emancipation through work – which hypothetically, could 
be a practicable way to reach economic independence – because it acknowledges the 
subject only as a passive element, that is, a function in the scheme of things. “Nobody 
believes anymore in emancipation through an assembly-line job, or a parceled off red 
tape employment.” If anything, women “are fully employed and for all their life as 
housewives.”119 This feminist claim was not a snobbish refusal, since it shed light on 
basic contradictions of the system of production which the official left could not see 
because it fell under the curtain of capital’s initiative.  
Lotta Femminista embraced instead the basic workerist principle that “every 
discovery of an objective social science can and must be translated in the language of 
the struggles.”120 The translation of this principle had to be made context specific. 
Within women’s work of reproduction lurked a long-lasting battle and it was here that 
the negotiation of their subject formation took place. According to this dialectical 
perspective, reproduction is not simply the locus of subjugation. Precisely because it is 
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the locus of a violent depredation, it is also the territory where the struggle arises. 
Hence its explosive potential and theoretical import.  
The starting point for the group was to investigate the roots of female reduction 
and submission under the logic of capital. This entailed a concrete change in the 
approach to the idea of domesticity. By 1970, Louis Althusser had already recognized 
that the family “intervenes in the reproduction of labour power,” i.e., that “in different 
modes of production, it is the unit of production and/or the unit of consumption.” But 
although realizing and laying emphasis that “production is […] the reproduction of the 
conditions of production,” Althusser never really took into consideration the role of 
the women in these processes.121 In Italy, the PCI followed instead the old communist 
position stating that the family was “a place of mere consumption or production of use 
values,” and a “mere realm of reserve labor-power,” and that finally what was 
performed within the family was only unproductive labor.122 Lotta Femminista turned 
this argument around, taking to its logical conclusions what Althusser had stated 
without taking into account the concrete labor of the subjects involved. Reproduction 
was not the auxiliary element of production, but rather it was its prerequisite. 
Reproduction, as the multifaceted activities carried out by women, generates in fact a 
very special article: labor-power. As I noted, Marx distinguished labor (the concrete 
activity) from labor-power as “the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities 
existing in a human being.” Labor-power is not exactly a thing, since “it exists only as 
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a capacity, or power of the living individual.”123 To clarify the point, Marx offers an 
analogy: “when we speak of capacity for labor, we do not speak of labor, any more 
than when we speak of capacity for digestion, we speak of digestion. The latter 
process requires something more than a good stomach.” This “something more” has to 
be constantly produced and preserved in time, so that once the individual worker is 
given over to the owner, “the production of labor-power consists in his reproduction of 
himself or his maintenance.” 124 Here the preposition “of himself” is true only in its 
genitive form, not as a causative preposition. For the work of reproduction that Marx 
attributes to the male worker is in fact carried out by women. It is the women who 
through their “labor of love” care for the physical and emotional life of the worker.125 
The work of reproduction is the postulate of that of production. 
For the worker and the capitalist, however, the value of the work of 
reproduction is obscured by the fact that labor-power never appears detached from the 
actual work. As a precondition to its execution, reproduction remains hidden, buried in 
the natural element. It appears as something outside commodity production (i.e. 
exchange value). It is considered natural that babies are born, raised and transformed 
into industrious workers. Once they have entered the field of production, they are 
subjected to the direct exploitation of wage work and begin creating value. Production 
then is established here as something public, for it carries a high economic value and 
is based on wage-labor. On the contrary, the work of reproduction is private, related to 
the sentimental sphere and thus not remunerated, or, as we will see, it is rather based 
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on “non-directly waged reproduction work.”126 Yet, “although reproduction appears 
as the creation of non-value, it clearly contributes to the creation of value as a crucial, 
integral part of the capitalist cycle.”127 As its prerequisite, reproduction is the 
condition of possibility for the capitalist realization of profit.  
Here the crucial role of women’s double burden emerges fully along with the 
illusion of emancipating women by pushing them into the factory. Women are 
exploited first as reproducers and then, when working, as producers. Domestic work is 
not simply an unpaid private performance that women add to their regular job. It is 
what makes labor possible. Thus the priority of the work of reproduction with respect 
to production is a sort of originating structure that pre-supposes the latter and at the 
same time accompanies it.  
This theoretical discovery provides Lotta Femminista with a privileged point of 
view that surpasses previous feminist analysis, since it allows them to comprehend 
woman’s positionality right at the intersection of multiple objectifying forces. The 
political discriminations, the alternating policy toward female work, the reduction of 
women to nature, to the private dimension of the household—all this was only 
partially explained by the politicization of the private that the older generation of 
feminists had established. I say “partially” because the symptoms were to a certain 
extent already marked out, but the complex sets of causes were still not connected.128 
The older generation of feminists (like Camilla Ravera) predicated women’s 
oppression on the basis of a stark social inequality. Thus the battle for more 
freedom/socialization aimed at politicizing what was considered impolitical. Both 
domestic work and women’s participation in the collective life had to be organized 
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within the larger scheme of the revolution as the ultimate horizon of liberation. In 
short, women were first proletarian, then a particular sector of the working class 
suffering from an additional form of oppression.   
Yet discovering the origin of female non-value as the motor of capitalist 
valorization involves a qualitative leap, for it discloses the ground upon which, as 
labor opposed to capital, an autonomous female subjectivity can organize its project of 
liberation on a mass scale. For Lotta Femminista this new form for female subjectivity 
was not in fact the task of a few enlightened members of the avant-garde, but involved 
a horizontal contamination among expropriated subjects. The need to reach a 
widespread consensus served also the purpose of creating an autonomous and 
organized social force that could resist the crushing defeats of the past like the age-old 
issue of the right to vote granted only in 1946, or the expulsion of women from 
production after World War I that the Socialist party and the union negotiated in order 
to protect the male workforce. The only chance to fight against the well-known 
proletarian/male inclination to abandon universal struggle, and seek privilege positions 
in order “to impose on capital some kind of special treatments” was to form a critical 
mass that could withstand the challenge.129
Obviously the threshold of modern political rights remained a necessary 
condition, and the fight of previous feminists was a fundamental task. Yet according to 
this new perspective, female subjectivity now looked like a mass that could be 
organized on the basis of its labor, intersecting class struggle with the struggle 
between the sexes. Lotta Femminista called this new subject house workers [le operaie 
della casa]. As official statistics showed, in the early 1970s house workers constituted 
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more than 8,607.000 people among a population of 53 million citizens.130 Lotta 
Femminista set out to study their reproductive cycle as an indirect valorization of 
capital. They argued that: 
 
The value of labor-power is […] like that of any other 
commodity found in relation to the fact that abstract human 
labor is objectified within it. Thus value is the 
materialization, the objectification of the abstract human 
labor incorporated into labor-power during its process of 
reproduction when it gives life to its own existence as a 
commodity. If this is taken as true, it becomes possible to 
compare labor-power with every other commodity, despite 
the fact that it is produced for its use-value and not for its 
exchange-value, and its value can therefore be 
expressed.131   
 
Reproduction involves a vast series of activities such as: procreation and the 
satisfaction of the worker material and immaterial (emotional) needs. All these tasks 
produce use-values (utility) that are consumed by the worker. Through the satisfaction 
of these needs, the worker reconstitutes (his) labor-power in the present, and through 
his progeny that of the future. Reproduction produces use-values that are part of 
capital’s valorization. Consequently, reproduction is subjected to the extraction of 
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surplus-value. 132 This is what capital indirectly takes away from the working class, 
that is, it is capital’s primary source of expropriation when profitability shrinks.  
Modes of Socialization: the Family  
The naturalization of “the content of the relations of production within 
reproduction,” that are economic in their nature, represents a great victory for capital, 
because their fulfillment is completely bestowed as a duty on the individual family.133 
Everywhere childbearing is held in high regard, but it is ultimately considered as an 
individual choice, at times even the result of the insatiable sexual desire of irrational 
creatures. Positing “the whole sphere of reproduction [a]s a natural process” helped 
obscuring the real battle that capital was fighting over the female.134 Leopoldina 
Fortunati clarifies this point by suggesting that the capitalist family is an environment 
in which “different subjects involved in reproduction enter into mutual relations 
apparently as individuals connected by family bonds, but in reality as subjects of 
different relations of production.”135  
Whenever human behaviors are assumed to be natural (semi-animal like), one 
needs to find its social/historical nature, even there where the most private and 
spiritual elements hold sway as with sexuality, interpersonal relationships and 
feelings.136 For example, the fascist law that ruled abortion as a crime against progeny 
conceived the generation of life as a sacred act; yet the sacralization of this social 
process is nothing but the concealment of a sensitive structural element: the 
production of labor-power. The reclaiming of life’s political nature against capitalist 
society (and the religious institution as its intermediary) is the countermove that 
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discloses the biopolitical configuration of generational processes, i.e. the fact that 
when life comes under the control of the state, it is not because of its sacredness, but 
because of its value as labor-power. As Silvia Federici notices  
 
Much of the violence unleashed is directed against women, 
for in the age of the computer, the conquest of the female 
body is still a precondition for the accumulation of labor and 
wealth, as demonstrated by the institutional investment in the 
development of new reproductive technologies that, more 
than ever, reduce women to wombs.137
 
This is why it is on the terrain of women and their capacity to reproduce that capital, 
through the State apparatus, works out its policies of containment or expansion. 
Capital’s accumulation needs labor-power like farmers need seeds for their crops. 
The other great advantage that capital has over reproduction is that the 
extraction of surplus-value happens through a middleman, it is thus indirect. Let us see 
why. As the notion of surplus-value reveals, salary does not remunerate the entirety of 
the work-day of the laborer, but only a small portion: the rest is profit. Salary 
represents the mystified equality between the capitalist and the worker. In the case of 
house workers, capital does not even provide that partial remuneration. The 
reproducers of labor-power need to live off the wage of their male worker. Through 
that wage, the capitalist employs at least two laborers, the worker and his wife. Now 
there are other forms of indirect salarization of reproduction (services, retirements 
etc.), but what is important here is that it is the worker who receives the pay check and 
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then provides to its allotment for the family expenditures.138 He thus holds the 
economic lever of the family and through that, he exercises his authority over the wife 
and children. It is the “woman’s differential location within social reproduction as a 
whole” that determines her subordination first to men, and then to capital.139 The wife 
and the children are in fact subjected his command and discipline just like he is under 
his boss in the factory. As Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma Jones, maintain with “the 
non-payment of a wage […] the figure of the boss is concealed behind that of the 
husband.” Consequently, “the husband and children, through their loving involvement, 
their loving blackmail, become the first foreman, the immediate controllers of this 
labor.”140   
This is how “capital disarranges the tendentiously convergent interests” of the 
worker and the house worker. Both are exploited subjects, but within the family they 
are locked into a set of constraining factors that reproduce the “economic and social 
control of men over women,” a valuable instrument to “preserve capital’s 
expropriation of women as workforce.”141 This partial form of control over women 
produces a series of consequences within the family as a union of production. Let us 
examine the repercussions at the emotional level for their partners and children. 
The comrade-in-arms/husband is placed in a particular contradictory situation. 
He honestly fights capital. He is the motor of class struggle and “he can confront his 
capitalist boss and impose some limits on his exploitation.”142 Yet, just as the “male 
worker [who] is subject[ed] to the authority and discipline of capital, in the family he 
holds the formal authority, and administers capital’s discipline to the woman and 
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children.”143 What he does not realize is that his “authority within the family is not 
intended as a way of valorizing himself, but of valorizing capital; it is the real form of 
the authority exercised by capital over housework” that is to say over the reproduction 
of labor-power.144 Because of this distortion the male worker falls prey of a “double-
faced behavior” that an inquiry among militants of the seventies described in detail.145 
Here both PCI-affiliated workers and militants of the New Left who criticized the 
party’s “mechanist interpretation of reality” seemed to act in similar ways with respect 
to their companions. The seemingly more advanced position of the leftist militant did 
not translate indeed into any real concrete change from the attitude of the standard 
party member. They both asserted a traditional form of control that pushed women 
away from “the life the husband lives outside the home,” excluding them “from real 
political activity.” As a consequence even their children tended to direct their affection 
and admiration “towards the father, requesting from the mother the mere execution of 
services.”146  
The causes of these regressive behaviors were similar. For the PCI member, it 
was mostly the paternalist attitude due to the abovementioned belief in the 
underdevelopment of women, and their secondary function in the class struggle. For 
the New Left militant, it was certainly the latter, but another cause was the 
discrepancy between the affirmation of total equality and the difficulty in letting go 
“the privileges acquired over centuries of male domination,” that is to say the 
reconversion of women’s new sexual liberties into an advantageous condition for the 
male.147  
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As I already mentioned, sexual emancipation in fact tended to be neutralized 
by the unequal division of power. Within the movement, women were expected to be 
sexually emancipated, that is to say they were expected to be always available for 
intercourse within or outside the couple. If they refused they were considered still 
under the grip of an old morality and thus stigmatized with the old refrain of women’s 
natural regressive predisposition: “the virgin is not marketable” as a girl of the 
movement writes in a pamphlet of Lotta Femminista.148 But the male contradiction of 
this presumed egalitarian stance also emerged in those cases when women did enjoy 
sexual freedom. It was not uncommon that their partners felt threatened and did not 
accept the open relationship they had previously agreed upon. Instead of liberation, the 
larger portion of sexual freedoms acquired after 1968, were rapidly channeled into a 
general process of genitalization, that is to say female sexual intercourse became one 
more available article that men could use to prove their virility. Notwithstanding how 
committed these militants were, the vestiges of male domination over women keep on 
remerging as powerful and binding as ever. 149 As Maria Luisa Boccia states the 
movement’s rebellion was in fact “ambiguous,” since its critique and refusal of 
patriarchal society was walking together with the male temptation to become a new 
“oppressor.”150 The reasons for these behaviors seem to go beyond politics and 
capitalism plunging deep into some primordial cause. It is past time to explore 
sexuality in its biological and presumably a-historical dimension.  
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Sexuality: the Social Split of Humankind  
The biopolitical work of reproduction relies on the personhood of those who 
carry out this set of activities. Consequently a proper analysis of the biological 
background must be taken into account. For reasons evident to everyone, this is all the 
more true in the case of sexual intercourse where physiology appears to have a 
structural value. Now what is the most defining characteristic in the physiological 
dimension of sexuality across genders?  
The first distinction we must draw is not one between genders, but between 
species, that is, between the animal and the human. As Mina Davis Caulfield noted, 
“almost all our living relatives” show “physiological cues, triggers to arousal for both 
females and males that effectively limit sexual behavior to the periods of maximal 
probability for impregnation.”151 Humans instead do not experience a specific sexual 
season and copulate independently from natural cycles. The loss of a sexual season, 
that is, the loss of estrous cycles where female and male respond to sexual cues, is the 
result of the evolutionary change occurred in the transition from ape to man. Now this 
is a tricky subject, since a whole set of repercussions proceeds from this assumption 
and constitute the foundations of what was is commonly known as sociobiology. 
Donna Haraway has demonstrated how historically this discipline “has been central in 
the development of the most through naturalization of patriarchal division of authority 
in the body politic and in reduction of the body politic to sexual physiology.”152 
Arguments justifying man’s promiscuity and woman’s monogamy based on 
evolutionary patterns and adaptive choice are still widespread today. Yet it is not 
                                                 
151 Mina Davis Caulfield, “Sexuality in Human Evolution: What is Natural in Sex?” Feminist Studies 2 
(1985): 344-345. 
152 Donna Haraway, “Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Part I: A Political 
Physiology of Dominance,” Signs 1 (1978), 26. See also the second part of the article “Animal 
Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Part II: The Past Is the Contested Zone: Human 
Nature and Theories of Production and Reproduction in Primate,” Signs, vol. 2, 1 (1978), 37-60. 
294 
within the scope of my work to dwell in such reductionist setbacks. What interests me 
here is exploring this primordial element of sexual difference in light of our argument 
regarding labor-power and reproduction. 
Silvia Vegetti Finzi, psychologist and militant in the Italian women’s 
movement, stated that the woman is in fact a “domesticated animal” (the absence of 
estrous is usually a characteristic that mammals in captivity develop). Furthermore, for 
a woman “the loss of estrous does not simply imply asynchrony with respect to natural 
cycles […] but also estrangement with respect to her own body and desire.”153 If for 
men the consequences of this primary alienation seem straightforward: detachment 
from procreative ends creates the conditions for a socio-symbolic experience of 
sexuality, for women the matter is more complex. Women’s sexuality is still molded 
by reproductive processes, but since she simultaneously engages in non-procreative 
intercourses it is also directed toward a non-specified goal. This goal is a point of great 
disagreement. If this goal is defined as the taking care of herself and her progeny, i.e. 
as sexual favors in exchange for protection, one ends up in a social Darwinism 
upholding an implicit patriarchal view of society. If it is defined as an autonomous and 
liberating enjoinment, a feminist call for authenticity usually is at stake. Is this 
ambiguity between sexuality as women’s self-determination (protection, pleasure) and 
contemporaneously as their over-determination (procreation) the genuine difference 
between men and women? Is this what disavows any notion of class struggle in favor 
of a-historical gender conflict? However, didn’t we argue that the emphasis on the 
natural in the realm of reproduction was an index of patriarchal thought?  
Clues about this question can be found in the work of Slavoj Zižek. The 
Slovenian philosopher argues that at the bottom of Lacan’s formulas of sexuation, that 
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is to say at the core of the positions the subject assumes with respect to sexuality, 
resides the problem of the primary difference that is implicit in the loss and/or lack of 
estrous. Lacan’s inquiry investigates in fact the passage “from animal coupling led by 
instinctual knowledge, regulated by natural rhythms, to human sexuality possessed by 
an eternalized desire” qua the emergence of the symbolic order.154 This transformation 
cannot be articulated through a linear causal transformation. It is a derangement, a rift 
that breaks an established pattern. As with natural selection, this radical split illustrates 
the typical paradox of necessity. Necessity is always retrospective. At a certain point 
in time, something new has emerged. Yet this emerging contains two paradoxical 
characteristics: it must be thought as something that it did not exist before and 
simultaneously as something that was already posited and necessary for existence. 
This is the true non-teleological ratio of Darwin’s evolutionism: “contingent and 
meaningless genetic changes are retroactively used […] in a manner appropriate for 
survival,” thus “temporality here is future anterior, that is, adaptation is something that 
always and by definition will have been.”155  
The extinction of a regulated, overdetermined sexuality qua reproduction 
becomes a lack, a gap that transitions humankind into a new territory. This lack, 
however, should never be thought as a limitation but as an absence that gives rise to a 
new openness. For instance, the unhooking of the sexual act from its biological base 
opens up a great deal of non-reproductive practices that fuel “the development of 
shared and learned behavior and symbolic communication.”156 In this new field both 
genders inhabit their biological base in a more reflective way. “Sexual pleasure – for 
instance – which originally signaled that the goal of procreation was achieved, 
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becomes an aim-in-itself.”157 Detached from rigid natural patterns, sensuous pleasure 
is now invested with a whole set of meanings and values becoming the object of social 
negotiations. Sexuality is thus already on the human side of the rift. Its biological base 
is thorough ly complicated, traversed by social constructions and symbolizations. It is 
what psychoanalysis calls the symbolic order, which is grafted on the biological as a 
“kind of heterogeneous parasite that derails the natural rhythm of coupling.”158  
I believe that this is the most natural element we can capture at the bottom of 
sexuality: the grafting on the biological base of sexuality as a social complex. It would 
be pointless to look for something more natural in the institution of sexuality apart 
from this grafting which retrospectively bears witness to its necessity. It is the self-
positing work of humankind that in relation with (i.e. influencing and responding to) a 
complex and fluctuating environment experiences morphological changes. To quote 
again Engels famous saying “the hand is not only the organ of labor, it is also the 
product of labor.”159 Morphology is self-causing. Sexuality is part of this set of self-
transformative activities in dialectical relation with environs.  
Any archaic animal residue still informing women’s sexuality bears testimony 
to concrete historical arrangements. In a society where reproduction is crucial and 
those who perform that job are powerless, the pseudo-natural pressure of sexuality as 
procreation will hold sway. So the specific positions that males and females assume 
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with regard to sexuality with its different goals (pleasure and procreation) and the 
scrutiny of their imbalances follows the path of exploitation.160 Avoiding a determinist 
reductionism as well as a relativist form of constructivism, I believe the real task here 
is to explore and unmask the biopolitical work of reproduction (which involves much 
more than sexuality qua procreation) and its consequences in the historically changing 
context of a society.  
To jump back to our inquiry, as to its objective social condition, in the context 
of Italian modernization, the male working class was not immediately progressive 
with respect to sexuality. And within the unit of production and consumption, the 
family, different subject positions created contradictions and conflicts. It is once again 
the nature of labor the key to understand how individuals, men, women and their 
children, are socialized and simultaneously fight these forms of socialization.   
Emotional Conflicts: Mothers and Daughters 
With May 1968 women’s positionality produces, for instance, a series of 
contradictions and conflicts between the mother and her children, especially with the 
daughter exposed to the feminist discourse who is rapidly becoming self-conscious 
and at war with the system of oppression/exploitation that surrounds her. The mother 
is the first figure against whom the daughter had to rebel. Some feminists believed 
they could fashion a new self out of this total rupture, but the idea of a “feminism born 
out of the desert” of previous forms of struggle was not only unjust, it was also 
dangerous from a theoretical point of view, since it lead directly toward a 
“voluntaristic” approach to the definition of a new subjectivity.161 Only an approach 
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that took into account reproduction as the terrain of capital expropriation could 
reconstruct a genealogy of conflict and a collective history of struggle. Upon a closer 
look, the daughter “interiorizes the mother” as the ambivalent representant “of an 
expropriated and repressed subject, who in turn represses and controls her.”162 The 
mother’s socialization thus represents an early training for the daughter, as the latter 
usually takes part in house chores from very early on, while on the contrary male 
children are usually exempted from it. Consequently, the daughter turns against her on 
account of new social needs and aspirations of freedom.  
Yet mother and daughters are both expressing different points of 
insubordination against the family as the subjects of capitalist exploitation. Part of the 
mother’s space for revolt is represented precisely by the daughter as a component of 
the sphere of domestic relationships that constitutes the work of reproduction. This 
seditious act is paid by the daughter in terms of emotional lack that, for the mother, 
represents instead a small victory in terms of less time spent to work. The daughter, 
for her part, rebels against the authoritarian imposition of her future role as unpaid 
laborer in the reproductive field, and clashes directly with the mother as the first 
representative of such discipline. These are stark material contradictions that on the 
surface look like dysfunctional behaviors, and were later justified by an easy 
sociologism under the label “generational conflicts.”  
It is important to understand the proper material ground of these conflicts in 
order to assume their potentiality of rebellion as a new affirmative territory. Provided 
that mother and daughter avoid the “absolutization” of the respective “alternative 
identities,” their strife could become “the base for their re-composition insofar as, by 
affirming their own exigencies, they acquire the instruments to negate each other as 
                                                 
162 Bimbi, “Sociologia della famiglia,” 51. 
299 
subject of present and future expropriated labor.”163 Both subjects not only suffer from 
capitalist expropriation, but they express and increase their level of power through the 
negation of the former. Here arises the possibility for solidarity between two 
subordinated subjects who can share a narrative of female resistance. The task is 
arduous, for the fight against the immediate operator of the induction of labor 
undoubtedly represented the quickest and spontaneous answer. Yet by the mid-1970s 
some feminists choose to recuperate the lost threads of this continuity. Consciousness-
rising meetings became one of the most effective methods to investigate these 
conflicts and employ their contents of freedom as productive elements. Aware that 
psychoanalysis in itself was a discipline which carried the hallmarks of power and 
hierarchy, these meetings tried instead to understand the particular knowledge that 
every illness carries. They circulate knowledge of these conflicts, avoiding the usual 
institutionalization that the figure of the psychoanalyst, from his or her position of 
power, produces.164 Several other workshops began collecting oral accounts about 
women’s participation during the Resistance, as well as their experience in factories 
and as farmers. Even traditional rural figures such as the tireless peasant mothers of 
Emilia Romagna were re-evaluated as an example of strength and power in light of the 
present.165  
This said, what happens in the relationship with men? At this point it is clear 
that a man’s rule over the rest of the family is a consequence of his position of power. 
His authority is simply the reverberation of capital’s command over labor-power in 
general. Thus the male worker, as “capital’s representative within the family, is not 
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simply an overseer, a supervisor of the process. He too is a reproduction worker.”166 
He restores his strength to work for the capitalist and procreates to supply future 
workforce. It is in his interest to carry his struggle outside the workshop and start 
seeing society as a whole, as a vast factory feeding on his life.  
The economic nature of interpersonal relationships is now fully brought in the 
foreground. Their character is ultimately oppressive because they function as conveyor 
of capitalist expropriation. The exchange that takes place between man and women is 
one marked by this exploitation. They do not exchange services for themselves but for 
capital. As Fortunati argues “all family members – even within the “love” of the family 
– are not protected from but remain subject to capital’s will and discipline.”167 
Women disclose though a particular form of this subjection, i.e. reproduction, that so 
far men had discovered only in the realm of production.  
It is now necessary to examine the specificity of capital expropriation of 
women’s work of reproduction and the full articulation of its structure in terms of 
extraction of value. Women’s oppression unearths the kind of exploitation we all 
suffer, an exploitation that is based on a biopolitical ground. This will enable us to 
explain more effectively the historical transformations of the work of reproduction that 
led to our present condition as well as the solutions that Lotta Femminista imagined 
for the liberation of house workers.   
 
4.4 The Extraction of Absolute Surplus-Value 
Gramsci understood that Fordism was a reaction to the increasingly smaller 
margins of profits caused by the previous cycle of revolutions. Only an increase in the 
extraction of relative surplus-value, resulting from the shortening of the labor-time 
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socially necessary to produce a commodity, would have prevented the gradual fall of 
the general rate of profit. As I noted previously, capital’s organizational answer was 
the introduction of scientific management (together with the expropriation of worker’s 
knowledge and the intensification of the rhythms of production), and a series of 
services that would make up for workers’ extra work.168  
What Gramsci did not consider was the use of an enormous, subterranean 
supply of an “older” form of extraction of value: the imposition of longer periods of 
working time that constituted the always stretchable line of domestic work. The 
(usually violent) imposition of more labor time (surplus-labor), Marx says, produces 
absolute surplus-value which is typical of the initial phase of accumulation, where the 
basic conditions of capitalism have to be developed. This form of accumulation, Marx 
calls it in German: ursprüngliche Akkumulation. I agree with those who believe it is 
better to translate Marx’s German term with primary accumulation, rather than the 
customary “primitive” which relegates the process to a definite remote past. Primary, 
or originary, accumulation has not a chronological, but rather a logical priority 
“indicating a precondition for the existence of capitalist relations as much as a specific 
event in time.”169  
During primary accumulation, Marx argues that capital operates a formal 
subsumption of labor, since this process “is distinguished only formally from other 
modes of production.” It does not involve any real technical advancement but rather a 
compulsion “to work more than the necessary labor time,” for the profit made thanks 
to the excess of work not paid by the capitalist comes from the lengthening of the 
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hours of work.170 Unpaid domestic work (reproduction) is thus an example of the pure 
extraction of absolute surplus-value: minimal technical advancements, a never ending 
capacity that makes the laborer dependent on the interminable continuation of that 
toil…  Surplus-labor is thus intrinsically feminine.171  
There are clear physiological consequences of surplus-labor. The compulsion 
to work more informs the typical form of female abnegation. Her early training in 
personal sacrifice works out a kind of very “productive passivity.” She “becomes 
productive insomuch as the complete denial of her personal autonomy forces her 
frustration in a series of continuous needs centered in the home, a kind of compulsive 
perfectionism in her housework.”172 This perfectionism knows no time, no 
quantitative goal. Instead it is a constant activity that feeds on itself, since its 
fulfillment seizes upon the drive to work more. 
Technology here deserves close attention. Especially during the economic 
boom, the production of progressively more sophisticated household appliances 
became one of the most profitable sectors of the Italian economy. Its application 
within the economy of the house changed housewives’ labor, making it less 
burdensome in terms of time and fatigue. Some militants of Lotta Femminista saw 
technology’s role as strategic; it was not liberating in itself but it could be used to free 
more time from work.173 For others instead, technology still followed the movement 
of capitalist reorganization. Modern domestic appliances, with their design and high 
degree of science stored in their mechanics, produced the image of the “household as 
the sphere of free creativity and relaxation,” and thus neutralized the struggle for 
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“economic independence of women.”174 While on the one hand, the technologization 
of domestic work served as a viable tool to reinstate a regressive form of subjectivity 
(a sophisticated version of the guardian angel of the household), some feminists like 
Fortunati saw in it instead as a new potential territory for freedom. Now Lotta 
Femminista in general did not support the technologization of housework as a goal, for 
it always criticized the various forms of objectivist ideologies that represented 
mechanization as an inherently progressive element. At the same time, the movement 
was never afraid to appropriate whatever it could from capital.  
Still in a proper reading of reproduction qua extraction of surplus-labor, if it is 
true that technology actually entails less physical fatigue, the same cannot be said 
about labor-time. To the extent that reproduction is a work performed with no ratio 
between hours of labor and compensation, technological achievement does indeed free 
more time for other domestic activities. The woman’s “working day is unending, not 
because she has no machines, but because she is isolated.”175 The whole issue needs in 
fact to be turned upside down. It is not technological progress that determines spaces 
of freedom, but the subjective intentionality that informs the former, the fact that 
women had been carrying a long battle to reduce their working time. Against a 
totalizing use of their life, of their feelings directed at creating the conditions for a 
good work for the husband, women got pregnant, cooked and clean less, and less. 
These were daily acts of insubordination, of individual refusal that grew steadily. This 
complex of new habits and mentality, not the dishwasher, pushed women to use their 
time for a more profound socialization, for consciousness-rising meetings, and for the 
sharing and circulation of knowledge and ideas among themselves.  
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With this being said let us turn back to the unifying field for women’s 
subjectivity: the extraction of surplus-labor and capital’s formal subsumption of labor. 
As Lotta Femminista understood, this presumably older process persisted also at the 
core of capitalist society and not only at its margins, or in the territories that still had 
to be subsumed under capitalist modes of production (the so called “developing 
countries”). This flexible way of operating explains the rapid and apparently 
contradictory changes of state economic policies toward women during the rise of 
Italy as a modern capitalist country. Capitalism has in fact at its disposal a “reservoir 
of potential “exceptions” […] that can be activated at any stage […] when the ordinary 
functioning of labor market appears to be interrupted.”176 The non-linearity of 
capital’s development (and thus the intrinsic weakness of a vision of economic and 
social advancements) is fully displayed by the history of women’s subjectivity. She 
represents in fact one of the most prominent subjects that capital has surreptitiously 
used and robbed to fuel growth, while publicly attributing this growth to the prodigies 
of the productive forces. Contrary to capital’s demystification, reproduction embodies 
the necessary persistence of the non-contemporaneous, or those pockets of exception 
that found the very possibility of the system.177   
For Lotta Femminista militants the puzzle of women’s oppression is clear. This 
is the recapitulation of the history of the feminine work during the slow process of the 
Italian modernization beginning with the introduction of large-scale industry.  
 
In this phase, the increate productivity of labor within the 
process of production goes ahead in such a way as to 
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swallow up the working day of the other process, a day 
reduced to the basic minimum, seriously damaging its 
production. […] Here capital’s avidity for surplus-labor not 
only reduces the necessary work time of re production to that 
work time necessary for the reproduction of the means of 
subsistence, it also usurps the woman – the prime work 
subject of reproduction – by forcing her to come into the 
factory as a worker, thus almost completely excluding any 
possibility of exploiting her as a capacity for 
reproduction.178
 
The period of large-scale industry coincides with the high employment rates of the end 
of the eighteenth Century, and with a general absence of state intervention on the work 
of reproduction. “Craft and manufacturing, as concomitant modes of production of 
agriculture” did not aim at regulating reproduction. 179 Here women were free with 
respect to their access to work and thus less subjected to the patriarchal order typical 
of an agricultural based family. In 1876, for instance, the silk industry was using a 
workforce made up for 90% of women and children. Capital gladly employed them 
because they constituted cheap and relatively unskilled labor. What was needed from 
them was their direct contribution to production. Therefore, the work of reproduction 
became secondary to the point that it fell outside capital’s immediate range of action. 
This more egalitarian policy towards women’s labor entailed a subsumption under 
production to the detriment of the work of reproduction that, although reduced, was 
still performed without any remuneration. When Italian industrialization assumed a 
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more modern character and labor-power became more important, capital through the 
state began to extend its control over reproduction. Hence the restriction to work, the 
pressure to increase birthrates and the first measures to ensure minimal care, which 
later resulted in the paroxysm of fascism and regulation of procreation and 
reproduction in general.  
With the final modernization of Italy during the reconstruction and the 
economic boom, the value of labor-power rises to a new level. The proletarian family 
is the unit that sustains production but through consumption becomes also the main 
agent that uses up what has been manufactured. In order to function properly, the new 
labor-power needs to acquire habits and expertise that are more sophisticated and 
characterized by a unique cultural quality. Reproduction acquires a strategic role. It is 
in the interest of capital to orient and safeguard procreation and the family. The State 
carries on this task. Prohibition is crucial: Women must procreate. Consequently 
abortion is prohibited and modern contraception is resisted: until 1971 the pill was 
forbidden as it was still considered a crime against the race.  
In 1950, thanks to the groundwork laid by Teresa Noce (a combative militant 
from Turin who held important offices in the communist party after the war), the PCI 
pressed the government to pass a law that banned the firing of pregnant women and 
secured 80% of the salary for the whole first year of life of the child.180 These 
institutional safeguards were of course not immediately beneficial to capital, for they 
subtracted resources and redistributed them via services. Ultimately though, the 
network of institutions and laws that aimed at protecting life performed a double task: 
the safety of life, and the disciplining of reproduction. Industry needed docile workers 
who had to be raised and educated. The family was the first phase of this training. 
After came the school and then, once in the factory, a whole set of services that kept 
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them healthy.181 Thus the welfare state constitutes the ground where reproduction 
faces its enemy. For women it is the “sign of the socialization of domination, […] but 
it is most of all the moment when the exploitation of the work of reproduction 
becomes social and measurable, hence a possible subject of negotiation.”182 Gains like 
the law sponsored by Teresa Noce had to be fought for. Once they were achieved, 
more work had to be done to prevent its institutionalization and bureaucratization. 
Nepotism, speculations, or authoritarism could turn the new collective space into self-
replicating areas of control and submission. Institutions become the frontline of 
conflicts.    
After World War II, in fact instinctive insubordination consistently challenged 
the relationship between subordinated groups and the institutions that were in charge 
of controlling them. Within the family, according to Lotta Femminista, the 
subterranean refusal to carry out the work of reproduction is proven by the fact that “in 
advanced countries, capital is not able anymore to command women’s optimal birth 
rates.”183 The “falling of the rate of fertility” is not caused by contraception, they 
argue, but by a drive toward a progressive acquisition of margins of non-labor, which 
is to say of refusal of work. Contraception is a scientific achievement only insofar as it 
is the result of proletarian knowledge. Once again, it is the cycle of struggle that 
determines technological transformations.  
                                                 
181 Althusser called these institutions Ideological State Apparatuses; their function operated at the level 
of “the reproduction of labor power” which “requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at 
the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order.” See “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses,” Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm>. 
182 Alisa Del Re, Introduction, I Rapporti sociali di sesso in Europa (1930-1960). L’impatto delle 
politiche sociali (Padova: Cedam, 1991), ix. 
183 Dalla Costa, Brutto ciao, 9. 
308 
Instruments of Struggle and Capital’s Reorganization 
The first revolution of 1920 was directed at gaining worker’s control over 
production. It was a revolution that would give power back to its rightful owners, the 
producers. The revolution of May 1968 expressed instead the extreme difficulty in 
subordinating labor to production. Thus if 1920 was the attempt to affirm a positive 
power over production, 1968 was preeminently a negation of it. As such it involved a 
reassessment of women’s position and identity in the process of the construction of 
Italy and its modernization. But most urgently it implied a set of concrete answers to 
this totalizing exploitation. Lotta Femminista did not have to look too far away to find 
the signs of a spontaneous opposition. As Mariarosa Dalla Costa states: “the 
unreliability of women in the home and out of it has grown rapidly […] and runs 
directly against the factory as regimentation organized in time and space, and the 
social factory as organization of the reproduction of labor-power.”184 For women the 
immediate objective to put an end to the endless forms of exploitation in turn called 
for an intransigent refusal to produce under these conditions.  
Lotta Femminista articulated this refusal through a strategic request: the 
acknowledgment of a wage to be given to housewives. As Silvia Federici and Nicole 
Cox argued, “Wage for Housework means first of all that capital will have to pay for 
the enormous amount of social services which now they are saving on our backs. But 
most important, to demand Wages for Housework is by itself the refusal to accept our 
work as a biological destiny, which is an indispensable condition for our struggle 
against it.”185 The claim for a wage would in fact join together numerous women and 
constitute a common front based on an immediate and easily understandable objective. 
Moreover, recognizing the enormous contribution of reproduction would also give 
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women economic independence that, if acquired through a regular job, would still be 
burdened by the exploitation of a wage-labor. Rewarding reproduction would also 
break with the false representation of women’s passivity, for their supposedly natural 
predisposition to perform this occupation – i.e. one of the traditional arguments used 
by men to legitimize women’s submission – would now have to be recognized as a 
regular employment.186  
The official left seemed to be deaf to these claims. It considered them 
regressive in their radical demands. If you women want to liberate yourselves from the 
prison of the house, they seemed to say, why ask money for it? Why not instead 
simply demand more kindergartens, common cafeterias? This was still the old PCI 
platform: emancipation through work and the socialization of housework. Among 
leftist women’s organizations these positions enjoyed a wide following. Thus they 
attacked the wage for housework campaign, arguing that it would actually strengthen 
the idea of traditional role for women and that a wage would be antithetical to the 
request for the improvement of a network of social services.187 As to the first point, 
there appears to emerge a typical unfairness in evaluating similar claims differently 
depending upon who poses them. Silvia Federici noted that demanding a wage for 
labor did not mean wanting to institutionalize its degrading character. As the 
“expression of the class relation, the wage always has two sides,” the side of capital 
containment of workers’ mobilization, but also “the side of the working class which 
increasingly is fighting for more money, more power, and less work.”188    
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Yet the ultimate goal was not to reform capitalism, nor was to achieve a more 
equal redistribution of wealth. Rather economic independence was the first step. The 
second was to put enormous pressure on the system as a whole in order to make it 
collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. Together with the workers’ 
struggle, the wage for reproduction demand was directed at smashing the link between 
labor time and a given compensation, by sparking off an uncontrollable chain reaction 
of more money and less work.189 Computing the enormous amount of work needed to 
reproduce labor-power and then to debit it to capital would have dramatically 
compromised the latter’s margin of productivity.  
Similar to workerist theory, Lotta Femminista believed in a kind of positive 
apocalypse, or the “opposite of a theory of catastrophe, since the force and creativity 
of social relations is already immanent, living life.”190 This means that creativity is 
already at work, but that it only has to be liberated through the undermining of the 
subjection of labor under capital. Not the equality of the same social condition for 
everyone, but difference as the line of development of each other; for each other and 
not at the expense of each other.  
Moreover, the critique of the idea of woman’s emancipation through work led 
to the reassessment of the PCI’s second answer to the problem of reproduction, i.e. the 
socialization of reproduction that Stalinism had already disproved. The dream of a 
total socialization of reproduction can easily turn into the nightmare of a military 
discipline: mass state institutions run with bureaucratic zeal. Meanwhile, in the harsh 
reality of a state where women are still a weak political entity, the few concessions in 
terms of social services tended to produce ghettoes, homologation to a state system of 
coercion, while still demanding supplementary work by women. Lotta Femminista’s 
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answer was instead a “real sociability” that fulfils individual necessities and that 
supports a social communication at a deep level.191 This real sociability must also 
break away from the family relations of subordination that constitute the first steps of 
a life-long training to become docile producers. Finally, it is not far away from 
Gramsci’s organic idea of a collective life where “human quality is raised and refined 
to the extent that man can satisfy a greater number of needs and thus make himself 
independent of them.”192   
The demand of a wage for house workers and a form of socialization that 
emphasizes individualities are both options that can be proposed only in a society of 
abundance, that is to say in a society in which scarcity is not the chief concern, and 
where the problem is rather what kind of consumption is socially more productive 
(and not production in itself). At this stage the struggle of subordinated groups pushed 
forward the development of the forces of production. This new dimension is of course 
still under the grip of capital, but its powerful mechanism appears now as an old 
vestige, a stubborn limitation to the real development of the capacities of individuals. 
The potential for a new human richness – what the operaisti called, quoting Marx, 
“general intellect” – seemed blocked and humiliated by the Fordist iron cage. Neo-
feminism captured the birth of this movement, that is, the point where “general social 
knowledge has become a direct force of production,” because women were 
historically the agents of the biopolitical labor of reproducing labor-power.193 In other 
words, they were that subjectivity involved in a form of production using the totality 
of the individual: the body and the mind in the symbiosis of the immanent task of 
producing reproduction. This form of labor and laboring literally would come to full 
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maturity at the level of production only later, after “the demise of the subsistence 
economy that had prevailed in pre-capitalist Europe, [when] the unity of production 
and reproduction which has been typical of all societies based on production-for-use 
came to an end.”194
The generation of this potentiality was properly taking place on their own 
biopolitical territory, that is to say, thanks to their struggle they were adding new 
qualities to labor-power. As I mentioned already, this “notion of labor-power [can] not 
be reduced (as it was in the time of Gramsci) to an aggregate of physical and 
mechanical attributes.”195 It involves a potentiality that is more virtual as it is attached 
to immaterial needs and operations. The creation, control and support of this labor-
power becomes fully biopolitical, in that life as such, “pure and simple bios” begins to 
“encompass within itself” rising to the level of the “life of the mind.”196    
Neo-feminism here read very early how the formal subsumption of capital in a 
mutated biopolitical discipline (that is to say of life as the substratum of human 
potentiality) forecloses total control, as well as the possibility for a total revolution. 
Some of these militants sensed the dangers of a widening among larger sections of 
population of the modalities of this integral expropriation. Capital had many weapons 
at its disposal. Although it was employed frequently and with deadly results, 
repression was not always seen as the proper solution. One lever was, for instance, 
prices control. The growing inflation of the 1970s held back the wage for housework 
struggle. It hit precisely the purchasing power of the proletariat that the movement 
used to cause the crisis of the system. This in turn provoked a new escalation of the 
struggle, now neo-feminist resort completely to the operaist theory of refusal to work. 
As Silvia Federici and Leopoldina Fortunati state “today it is the very refusal of 
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becoming workforce the motor of the process of liberation. Living-time is refused as 
the container of labor-time and rest directed towards wage.”197 The refusal to work 
had strong consequences, especially in the various struggles carried out by women 
“against the secular domination of men,” this would lead to improvements 
generally.198 It also valorized that expansive sociality that women already practiced 
under a patriarchal domination, what Cambria called in Despite Gramsci “staircases 
and kitchen talks.”199  
Having studied how neo-feminists understood the work of the reproduction of 
labor-power as the base for production, we can now claim that it was them who 
properly foresaw the contemporary biopolitical dimension of contemporary labor. But 
it is also here that we can capture the origin of capitalist answer. In the conclusion of 
The Arcane of Reproduction, Leopoldina Fortunati sums up this concept by describing 
what happens to reproduction in terms of extraction of value: 
 
The place for the production of absolute surplus-value moved 
from the factory into the house. It became secondary with 
respect to production. Within the entire cycle of capital, the 
passage to the production of relative surplus-value within the 
factory was accompanied by a corresponding passage to the 
production of absolute-value within the house.200  
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The structure of exploitation in Fordism is the following: within the factory 
automation of production increases the extraction of relative surplus-value, within the 
household the lengthening of work time “that tends to be the same as the woman’s 
living day” carries on the extraction of surplus-value.201 The cycle of struggles ignited 
by 1968 undermined both processes. Capital’s organizational answer was to take 
reproduction out of the house and spread it over the whole social ensemble. It thus 
generated processes of extraction of surplus-value that affected the whole social body. 
1968 ruled out the paradigm of production as a mechanical and authoritarian form of 
social cooperation and fought for a new reproductive dimension that fostered 
creativity, affects and, in general, the involvement of the whole human being into the 
construction and development of modern society. Out of the defeat of that cycle of 
protests, we inherited a reproductive dimension turned upside-down that resembles the 
kind of oppression suffered by women. Today, the feminization of work discloses the 
fact that what immaterial workers are now carrying out is surplus-labor.202  
As I noted, the disconnection between the production and reproduction 
produced the fall of women in a sort of natural realm, that of the kitchen, that of 
childbirth and so on. Here Fortunati points also out that “within reproduction, the 
dispersion of female house workers and the atomization of the place of production 
disperses” their potential union and political force.203 In the next chapter, I will argue 
that, with the rise of immaterial production, the multitude, the new proletarian will 
reach a social unity in the form of a linguistic and communicative cooperation while 
on the terrain of social relations and conflict it looks just as dispersed and 
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fragmented.204 Here too the feminization of modern work becomes the paradigm for 
post-Fordist society and the precarious, atomized condition of workers engaged in 
immaterial production.  
  
Precariousness is no longer a marginal and provisional 
characteristic, but it is the general form of the labor relation 
in a productive, digitalized sphere […] The word precariat 
generally stands for the area of work which is no longer 
definable by fixed rules relative to the labor relation, to 
salary and to the length of the working day.  
 
In this text, Franco Berardi calls immaterial labor “digital slavery” just like neo-
feminist described women’s condition as a pseudo-servile situation.205 What appears 
to be formally unified, the global space of social networks, of exchange and 
consumption of commodities, is built on the material fragmentation of the workforce. 
Today’s workers are dispersed and atomized through production. By relegating 
workers to a one-to-one interaction with the machinery, computer technology helped a 
great deal. The consequences in terms of power are formidable. Consider the 
similarity with one of the elements of exploitation displayed by women’s work of 
reproduction in the 1970s: “while no owner would ever dream of making his worker 
pay rent for his work station, they made us [women] pay the rent of our work place, 
because our work has never been seen as a job.”206 Hence the request of debiting 
accommodation expenses to capital through the wage for housework claim. Today, 
                                                 
204 Franco Berardi, “Info-labor and Precarization,” Generation-online, 
<http://www.generation-online.org/t/tinfolabour.htm>. 
205 Franco Berardi, “Info-labor and Precarization.” 
206 Collettivo Internazionale Femminista, 47. 
316 
instead, it is not uncommon for some call centers in Italy to charge the worker for the 
rent of his or her work station.207 The worker is exploited also, and in a direct form, at 
the level of fix capital, i.e. the instruments of production which the capitalist normally 
buys with surplus-value.  
What is formally unified at the level of social relations is denied at the material 
level of production. We are all involved in the processes of the global market but only 
as consumers, never as workforce. This also resembles women’s condition, for their 
task of regenerating labor-power was highly praised at a social level, but it 
disappeared as work, and thus as exploitation, at a material level. The regeneration of 
labor-power was mystified as something private and natural. Today too with the 
hegemony of reproduction as a mode of production, the natural comes to the 
foreground. Yet the impact of reproduction qua surplus-labor produces distortions that 
must be clearly laid out and stripped off their claim of being natural. The link between 
time and labor is one of them.  
 
When we move onto the sphere of info-labor [immaterial 
labor] there is no longer a need to have bought over a 
person for eight hours a day indefinitely. Capital no longer 
recruits people, but buys packets of time, separated from 
their interchangeable and occasional bearers. De-
personalized time has become the real agent of the process 
of valorization, and de-personalized time has no rights, nor 
any demands either. It can only be either available or 
unavailable, but the alternative is purely theoretical 
because the physical body, despite not being a legally 
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recognized person, still has to buy his food and pay his 
rent.208
  
The colonization of the totality of non-labor time is very subtle. “The cycle of 
production comes into operation when it is required by the capitalist,” consequently 
the intellectual worker must seize the opportunity when it comes around.209 At the 
same time though, he or she must fill in the discontinuousness of labor through a 
permanent job hunt and an endless process of self-investment to improve his or her 
marketability. The apparent freedom of choice is certainly less coercive than in the 
case of women, where social pressure to marry and reproduce was certainly superior, 
but the material needs of the immaterial workers are no less pressing. They are natural, 
what is not natural, but socially imposed by capital, is the toxic levels of surplus-labor 
they have to endure to survive. Again here what is urgent is, in the best feminist 
tradition, to raise awareness of the fact that surplus-labor is not a natural condition, but 
a social one. In other words, we must fight the idea that is fair and rightful for capital 
to remunerate immaterial labor just for the limited time of the work’s execution, while 
dumping on the workers the costs of training and of the work of reproduction. 
Women’s refusal to carry out domestic work had some impact on our social 
setting. The de-naturalization of domestic work as woman activity set in motion a 
renegotiation of identity roles that today appears as progress. Over the last few 
decades, capital became much more generous in linking gender to fixed social roles, 
not only because of women’s struggles, but also because capital linked sexual identity 
less tightly to the work of reproduction. Thus capital “has attempted to recuperate and 
compensate for women’s lower levels of housework by recreating the formal image of 
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paternity and marriage, presenting it as a new world for men from which they were 
once excluded but are now free to enter.”210 The fact that a larger portion of 
reproductive work is now carried out by men has certainly immediate positive 
consequences on women, but the fact that this labor bears the mark of unrecognized 
surplus-labor is a defeat for all. Behind the praise for the social advancements of a 
modern democracy lurks a subterranean exploitation that has no name. Neo-feminism 
disclosed it, but the large majority of today’s society seems to be oblivious and cannot 
even imagine debiting reproduction to capital.  
The stress on individuality, on the flexibility of production in terms of time and 
space, on a certain creative quality of immaterial work, and the centrality of sociability 
that was unknown to the mechanical production of the Fordist factory--all these 
features, which are common to today’s production, were instruments to attack the 
subordination of labor and incorporated it under its new restructuring. The biopolitical 
vitality of these social dynamics of production was bent toward a more intense 
productivity, while larger zones of society were submitted to a new phase of formal 
subsumption of labor. Only today do we see the full realization of surplus-labor as a 
structural element of production within advanced capitalist societies. With this comes 
the conviction that another discovery of neo-feminism is proven right. What we 
experience today is a new process of primary accumulation as the expropriation of the 
very personhood of individuals. 
Having laid out this set of problems, I turn now to the concept of the multitude 
as it emerged in recent years in the work of Antonio Negri. According to Negri, the 
multitude is the class-based subject that is progressively liberating humankind from 
capital’s oppression. My argument instead is that the multitude of intellectual laborers 
is a much more duplicitous subject than Negri admits. Following these last remarks, 
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the neo-feminist analysis of reproduction and Pasolini’s insight on consumer society 
and ecology, I attempt to articulate a notion of the multitude which heightens the 
potentials for liberation in opposition to the elements of oppression that I delineated so 
far. 
320 
CHAPTER 5 
A BIOPOLITICAL MULTITUDE AND ITS PLANET: ANTONIO NEGRI AND 
PAOLO VIRNO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sovietism, the demand for direct 
democracy and the re-appropriation of 
administration, the seizing of power 
through a radical democracy--all these 
are the last utopias of socialism. When, 
however, the proletarian subject becomes 
immaterial, intellectual, social and 
cooperative, it is not necessary to 
construct communism anymore, but 
rather to “constitute” or “express it.” 
 
(T. Negri, Quell’intelligente moltitudine) 
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5.1 A Movement of Movements: a Biopolitical Subject Going Global 
Multitudo, Imperium, Omnia sunt communia… when the Anti-Globalization 
Movement took its first steps in Italy, Latin acquired an unexpected celebrity among 
the new generations who typically were more interested in Italianizing English terms 
borrowed from computer science than digging into the bookish culture of classical 
letters. The terms Multitudo and Imperium became popular through the work of 
Antonio Negri. Providing an easily comprehensible counter-image for a positive 
globalization, the slogan Omnia sunt communia, all things are communal or 
“everything belongs to everyone,” did not come from a political treatise but from a 
novel.1 I believe that the enthusiasm that the epic tale of the German peasant’s war 
roused amongst many readers makes the novel Q (1999) key for understanding the 
antagonism of the so-called Anti-Globalization Movement.  
Written by a collective author, whose nome de plum at the time was Luther 
Blissett, Q is a fictionalized historical account of the wave of Anabaptist uprisings that 
shook the Protestant Reformation in sixteenth Century Europe. Marching under the 
slogan “everything is communal,” the peasants organized a massive popular revolt that 
threatened the temporal power of German princes first, and later would have 
reverberations during the Counter-Reformation in Italy. The inspiration for the 
uprising as well as the spiritual leader was a monk, Thomas Müntzer (1488-1525), 
who turned against Martin Luther because of religious and political reasons. Consider 
the description in Q of the spread of the Anabaptist movement and the organizational 
practices its followers deploy for the transmission of egalitarian doctrine:  
 
There’s a frenetic coming and going of people […] a day of 
important meetings: a ferment of contacts, dialogues, 
                                                 
1 Luther Blissett, Q (New York: Hartcourt, 2004), 27. 
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projects announcing new weeks of earthquake and 
revolution. […] And then, most important of all, there’s the 
printing press; that stupefying piece of technology which, 
like a dry and windy forest fire, is spreading by the day, 
giving us plenty of ideas for ways of sending messages and 
incitements further and faster to reach the brethren, who 
have sprung up like mushrooms in every corner of the 
country.2
 
Critics have devoted a great deal of time to interpreting the political references for the 
story, drawing upon comparisons with Italy in 1968 and 1977.3 But for the activist of 
the Anti-Globalization Movement there was no need to translate the historical fiction 
into some movement of the past, it was rather the present of his or her militancy. The 
description of a social network expanding through an innovative use of technology 
was compared directly, almost literarily, to the new ways for socializing the struggle 
through the internet and audiovisual material. Even from a narrative point of view, the 
“centrifugal” configuration of the plot followed “the logic of information percolating 
outwards, like the modern phenomenon of Internet message-strings.”4 In this Q 
facilitated a direct allegorical reading and produced identification with the themes and 
the epic force of the Anabaptist struggle which diminished the impact of the temporal 
gap between the fictional story of the past and the present of the Anti-Globalization 
protest.   
                                                 
2 Blissett, 89. 
3 See for instance Franco Bernardi, “The Last Novel of the Twentieth Century,” wumingfoundation, 
<http://www.wumingfoundation.com/italiano/rassegna/bifoonq.html>. 
4 Bharat Tandon, “No Logo Reformation,” The Times Literary Supplement, 9 May 2003, now in 
wumingfoundation 
<http://www.wumingfoundation.com/italiano/rassegna/times_literary_supplement.html>.  
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At the turn of the millennium, a new wave of social unrest was in fact shaking 
Italian society, one that, inspired by similar egalitarian principles, intensified 
communication and social cooperation. The intensive and innovative use of the 
internet and the idea of organizing the movement around networks sprouted almost 
naturally and found a proper instrument in the so-called social forums, popular 
institutions that organized marches and direct action. In this Q captured well the 
mounting wave of social activism that Italian society was experiencing. The long and 
adventurous story of Q offered an epic model that mirrored on the movement and its 
creative way of reinventing social confrontation during protest. Knowledge-sharing 
and increased social unity on a global scale were truly the base and aspiration for the 
Anti-Globalization Movement, whose international participation hinged on its 
extraordinary correspondence of objectives and solutions to the problems the world 
was facing as a whole. 5 Finally, it is not only the effectiveness of the narrative form, 
nor the epic élan that makes Q organic to the Anti-Globalization Movement. Q is in 
fact the fictionalized account of what Marx had called the process of primary 
accumulation.6 A similar transformation was taking place on a world scale, but 
simultaneously an equally powerful fight against it was also maturing.  
The planetary wave of Anti-Globalization protests produced a remarkable 
number of documents, most notably visual texts as well as critical analysis of 
globalization. Because of its extent and the fact that this Movement, in my opinion, is 
still very much in the making, it would be hard to frame and investigate it historically 
                                                 
5 Social Forums were public meetings, resembling 1968 Student assemblies, where various part of civil 
society discussed activities, direct actions and protests. A distinct emphasis was posed on avoiding 
forms most deleterious forms of leadership that marked the LC experience and 1968 in general. Social 
Forums included traditional organization of the left, such as several formations that survived the 
implosion of the PCI, part of the CGIL, several catholic associations, and the heir of the autonomist 
area. See Subscriptions to the Genova Social Forum, Genova Social Forum Website, 
<http://www.processig8.org/GSF/adesioni1.htm>. 
6 See chapter 4, 302. 
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as I did with the Factory Councils and 1968. And this is not my goal. Others have 
attempted it and I refer the reader to a more comprehensive understanding of what for 
its planetary extension has been called the Movement of Movements.7 Here instead I 
want to tap directly into the heart of this last wave of social unrest via a reading and 
critique of Antonio Negri’s work. The idea of the multitudo, or multitude is by far the 
most renowned conceptualization of the transformation of labor in a regime of post-
Fordism. Antonio Negri, along with Michael Hardt, was the first to develop and to 
connect the idea of the multitude to the biopolitical dimension that labor brought 
forward from its Fordist beginnings to the present day. I will explore this concept and, 
in the last part of the chapter, I will also provide a critique of it by drawing on the 
work of Paolo Virno.  
I will pay attention to two elements in particular. First, the twofold nature of 
biopolitics as the conveyor of processes of prime accumulation and, simultaneously, as 
the heightening of the potentiality of labor-power. This point refers to the Marxist neo-
feminist analysis of the work of reproduction and underscores the fact that the 
ambiguities of the multitude as a new biopolitical subject complicate its productive 
potential. Second, I explore ecology as a limit to human development and the role it 
must play in the struggle of the multitude. Ecology is dramatically absent in Negri’s 
thought. But, as Pasolini sensed long ago, it has such a crucial impact for our society 
                                                 
7 Tom Merters, ed., A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible? (London: Verso, 
2004); see also Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the 
New World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Juan Ramon Cappella, Entrada en la 
barbarie (Madrid: Trotta Editorial, 2007); William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Magic 
Logic of Global Capitalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); Justin Rosenberg, The Follies of 
Globalization Theory (London: Verso, 2000); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Eddie Yuen, Daniel Burton Rose and George Katsiaficas, eds., 
The battle of Seattle: the new challenge to capitalist globalization (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2001). 
For the Anti-Globalization Movement in Italy see Vittorio Agnoletto, Prima Persone: le nostre ragioni 
contro la globalizzazione (Roma: Laterza, 2003); Giulietto Chiesa, G8/Genova (Torino: Einaudi, 2001); 
Claudio Marradi and Enrico Ratto, eds., Da Seattle a Genova. Gli 8 non valgono una moltitudine 
(Genova: Fratelli Frilli, 2001); Mario Pianta, Globalizzazione dal basso. Economia mondiale e 
movimenti sociali (Roma: Manifestolibri, 2001). 
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that a theory of social change cannot ignore it. To be clear: Pasolini has a 
methodological value in my argumentation, I am not siding myself with his taste for 
primitivism. I frame ecology as the relationship between the human and the earth, as a 
protection from toxic behaviors that degrade both. Ecology does not mean “bordering 
[…] nature worship” as Negri writes.8 Quite on the contrary, by including it as a 
fundamental element in the way we foresee a new production, we begin to lay the 
basis for the subversion of capitalism. 
Multitude: the Motor of a Positive Crisis 
Gramsci and the Factory Councils had envisioned the potentiality of the 
Fordism operated and invented by the workers. The subject of this mode of production 
would have probably resembled a mass worker, but reversed. The problem is that we 
look at it at the end of its transformation and integration, that is to say, at a point when 
it becomes very difficult to posit the mass worker as something productive or positive. 
There have been too many mystifications and layers of defeats and compromises 
dictated by power. Furthermore, the fact that the following generations perceived that 
image, not only as something irremediably compromised and irretrievable, but also as 
a tool of oppression, bears witness to the degree of the integration of the figure of the 
mass worker within the system, and not to its inner possibility of development. The 
trajectory that Gramsci outlined, first during the insurgence of 1920, then during his 
detention, was one in which he grasped the processes of the emptying out of human 
content of labor, abstraction of labor, that industrialism had set in motion long before, 
and that was pointing towards the supremacy of reproduction as the full deployment of 
biopolitical capacities. From his cell, Gramsci had vigorously maintained that it was 
from “those on whom is imposed the burden of creating with their own suffering the 
                                                 
8 Cesare Casarino and Antonio Negri, In Praise of the Commons. A Conversation on Philosophy and 
Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 178. 
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material bases of the new order” that he expected the discovery of ways of turning 
“into freedom what today is necessity.”9  
Thus far, I have attempted to pull out this residue of positivity through the 
viscous fabric of capitalist stabilization. But the dialectic that these processes of 
affirmation and negation establish produces layering and superimpositions that make it 
difficult to crop out clear positive identities. Thus if 1920 was essentially an attack on 
wage-labor so as on the old means of production, 1968 assaulted Fordism precisely as 
the (negative) development of the Fordism upheld by the workers.  
The development of this historical tragedy, one that Gramsci described as the 
succession of “incredible acts of brutality,” has its proper tragic heroes.10 As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, they are the mass worker, the social worker and finally 
the multitude. This is the trajectory of the biopolitical transformation that Antonio 
Negri has sketched in his many years of work and militancy. In Empire, he and 
Michael Hardt call it precisely an ontological tragedy in which “being is produced and 
reproduced.”11 As we will see, in a very Nietzschean move, it is out of the 
understanding and affirming of this tragic structure of reality that a final positive 
affirmation results. For Negri this happens on the terrain of the biopolitical.  
The last radical turn in the Italian twentieth Century – the rise at the turn of the 
millennium of a biopolitical multitude – represents this final affirmative movement. 
The category of multitude is complex; it will take time for us to define it properly. For 
now, let’s say that even if Negri found instances of its actualization in several 
movements around the globe, it does not coincide with the Anti-Globalization 
movements and its protests. As he argues,  
 
                                                 
9 Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publisher, 2003), 317. 
10 Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, 298. 
11 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 47. 
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the concept of multitude is not very clear to me, and hence 
I use it – as well as advise others to use it – with much 
caution. This is why the current simplifications of this 
concept make me shiver! I am referring, for example to the 
way in which the phrase “the multitude against empire” has 
been appropriated and deployed as a slogan by some anti-
globalization movements.12
 
However, in the Italian context, the appropriation of the text Empire was overtly ironic 
and self-critical, and resonated with the sarcasm of the 1977 Movement. If it is true 
that, during the G8 protest, one could read slogans like the one mentioned above, it is 
also true that the process of self-identification with the concept of the multitude was 
always devoid of any claim of fulfilling in practice what Negri could hardly elaborate 
in theory: there was always a ironic filtering. For instance, a funny sign one could also 
note stated: “Spinoza and Totti united in the struggle! Hands off the multitude!” 
Spinoza holds a central role in Negri’s work. Francesco Totti, a famous soccer player 
for AS Roma, was instead the involuntary protagonist of a clever spoof-ad that 
circulated since the fall of 2000.13 The billboard modification that ridiculed the 
omnipresent slogans of the leader of the right-wing coalition, Silvio Berlusconi, “less 
taxes for everybody [tutti],” was changed into “less taxes for Totti” in which the name 
of the soccer player, Totti, punned with everybody [tutti]. The linkage of the two 
                                                 
12 Cesare Casarino and Antonio Negri, 93. Yet, Negri seems to be more open to such an identification 
when together with Michael Hardt quotes the slogan of the Anti-Globalization Movement “another 
world is possible,” Multitude. War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 
2005), 348. 
13 See Concita De Gregorio, “Anno 2000, la satira va su Internet,” La Repubblica, 8 Oct. 2001. 
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disparate elements reflected the creativity and joyful affirmation of the activism of the 
young protesters.14  
This said, I will argue that the Anti-Globalization Movement represented a 
historical incarnation of the new biopolitical subjectivity which stands in a more 
complex relation with the rupture provoked by 1968. Against Negri, I want to argue 
that these social movements lay claims that do not perfectly match with the 
intensification of the forms of subjectivity that emerged previously. The Anti-
Globalization Movement gladly accepted and employed the definition of the multitude 
because it captured its social composition as well as the differences that traversed it 
and its international aspirations. I don’t believe it followed Negri’s theorization, 
especially, as we will see, in his notion that the multitude’s strength could overcome 
dialectics. The ecological problem, for instance, was a key dialectical factor in 
developing an anti-capitalist platform. But before I can do that, I find it useful to 
follow Negri in his scripting of the ontological drama. This is for two reasons. First the 
emergence of the concept of the biopolitical in the Italian context must be attributed to 
his work. Second, it is only through a careful reading of his genealogy of the 
biopolitical that we can understand our current situation. In so doing, we also bring 
together the various contributions and ideas that previous social movements 
elaborated.  
The Law of Value and Capital’s Crisis 
I want to begin my reading of the biopolitical with a seminal work Antonio 
Negri published in the months of the military repression of 1977. Domination and 
Sabotage: On the Marxist Method of Social Transformation is a remarkable study that 
                                                 
14 This practice of culture jamming became a widespread phenomenon in Italy as a result of the 
intensification of the antiglobalization protest. However, collective groups such as Luther Blissett were 
already active in the nineties. See Adbusters Rivista di Ecologia Mentale 
<http://www.adbusters.it/pages/database.php>.  
329 
Negri wrote at the dawn of the defeat of the 1977 Movement. Here Negri re-articulates 
the operaist inversion of the autonomy of the worker with respect to capital, in a time 
of defeat and widespread pessimism. Just a few years before, the antagonism of the 
working class buttressed the notion of its subjective force in determining the 
transformation of the relation of production. In a declining phase of this antagonism, 
Negri set out to explain how that antagonism was going to be re-structured by 
capitalism and how, from that half-life, a new revolutionary spirit would rise. Capital’s 
readjustment meant a new imposition of the law of value. As Negri explains 
 
The continuing work of reinforcing the state-form – that is, 
of the imposition of the law of value (albeit in continuously 
modified form) as a measure and a synthesis of 
stabilization and restructuring – had never faltered. When 
we speak of crisis of the law of value, we must be careful: 
the crisis of this law does not at all mean that the law does 
not operate; rather, its form is modified, transforming it 
from a law of political economy into a form of state 
command. […] The rhythm according to which 
exploitation must dance, according to which the social 
mechanism of the reproduction of exploitation must be 
stabilized, must be dictated by the law of value.15  
 
                                                 
15 Antonio Negri, Domination and Sabotage. On the Marxist Method of Social Transformation, now in 
Books for Burning: between Civil War and Democracy in 1970s Italy (London: Verso, 2005), 233. 
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The law of value is grounded in the definition of labor qua unit of time, that is on what 
Marx called the “labor time socially necessary” to produce a commodity.16 As I noted 
before, this is the site of the exploitation as well as the only means of survival for the 
worker. It is here that the worker can make demands and bargain for better conditions 
by increasing the value of his socially necessary labor time. In a reformist perspective 
this is all he or she can attain. For the Movement this was a lever to undermine the 
system as a whole. Operaismo theorized and practiced the radical autonomy of the 
working class and the fact that the wage gave the lie to the proper exchange between 
labor-power and the capitalist. Furthermore, the supremacy of the working class in the 
transformation of society brought the determination of the socially necessary labor as 
simply the resultant of political struggle to its logical conclusion. The law of value 
here takes up the form of a subjective decision, the result of a conflict, and not of 
abstract schemata or of a quantitative exchange based on a commensurable rationale.  
As these relationships became fluid again and under the control (at least to a 
certain extent) of the workers, capital’s reacted by re-establishing a steady mechanism 
of control. As Negri remarks “capital has often accepted that the workers’ struggle is 
the motive force of development.”17 As a result, capital’s response would be launched 
on the terrain of the workers. This is what Negri calls “state command,” which thins 
down the economic and boosts the political lever of power. Thus the law of value 
comes back in its exploitative dimension as an act of power and of command that 
draws on several devices other than the direct imposition of the rhythms of 
exploitation – such as, for instance, “monetary questions” (inflation) or the allocation 
of public services by the state.18 As I underscored, the neo-feminist movement had 
                                                 
16 Marx, Capital, vol. 1, ed. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm>. 
17 Negri, Domination and Sabotage, 232. 
18 Negri, Domination and Sabotage, 234, 252-253. 
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demonstrated how public spending was a part, even if always too small, of the 
quantification of the value produced by women in the labor of reproduction. Negri 
recognizes this claim and adds that public spending represents “the imposition of the 
recognition [of] the unity of social labor” and its new proletarian regime of 
production.19 The trend towards dismantling social services was thus a maneuver that 
aimed at controlling subordinated groups by expropriating indirect and non-monetary 
remuneration that they had achieved through their fight for better conditions. 
Two considerations stem from this point. The redeploying of capital on the 
workers’ ground, that is to say on the political ground of the capitalist response, does 
not establish a homology between the two: the capitalist use of power is different from 
that of the workers. As Negri warns us, assuming this homology implies surrendering 
to the idea “that the only meaningful linguistic horizon is [the one that] pertain[s] to 
the structure of capitalist power.”20 Once power is identified with capitalism, the 
working class loses any foothold for developing its new and radically alternative 
social order. Power becomes simply a compromise with the enemy or a lesser evil and 
so on. Still as we will see, Negri theorizes a radical separation of the working class 
from capital. The proletarian negation of the constituted order is a process of liberation 
endowed with a force that is powerful insofar as it disintegrates capitalist power. 
Secondly, Negri talks about the particular form that the capitalist application of the 
law of value takes; he consistently argues that its command becomes indifferent. 
Consequently, “state restructuring increasingly becomes an indiscriminate succession 
of acts of control, a precise technical apparatus which has lost all measure, all internal 
reference points, all coherent internal logic.” It is the new rationale of state command: 
                                                 
19 Negri, Domination and Sabotage, 250. 
20 Negri, Domination and Sabotage, 235. 
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“destructured, technical, and repressive.”21 What is the link between the fragmented 
nature of this command and its indifference? 
The Dialectics between Capitalist Command and Worker’s Process of Self-
valorization 
I believe that Negri anticipates an acquisition that would become clear in post-
colonial studies, for he shows how the dialectic between struggle and brutal command 
resembles mechanisms already at work on the terrain of the old colonial powers. If we 
follow Carl Smith, colonial domination is based on clear-cut political spaces in which 
subjects carry out conflicts inter pares. However, the foundation of their identity 
grows out of the difference established with the outside, that is, with the non-
European. It is an order established on a lack of order, on the nothingness of the 
outside which produces an absolute border, what Sandro Mezzadra has called a 
“metaborder.” By this Mezzadra signals the establishment of a spatial distribution of 
what is considered political and historical and what is not, what is purely barbaric, 
uncivilized and which can thus be subjected to the most brutal form of dominion.22 
Within Europe, conflicts are limited by the jus publicum aeuropeum. Outside of it 
European countries carry out a form of absolute and lawless war. When anti-
colonialist movements disaggregate this system of domination, the boundary is 
dismantled into a “multiplicity of borders,” and the logic that permeated external 
relations now operates within the old European territories.23 The state thus begins 
employing forms of discipline and control that go beyond the law. Violence, for 
instance, is unleashed and liberated from formal-legal constraints. Violence is not 
                                                 
21 Negri, Domination and Sabotage, 245. 
22 Mezzadra, “Living in Transition,” see also Carlo Galli, Lo sguardo di Giano. Saggi su Carl Smith 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008). 
23 Mezzadra, “Living in transition. Toward and heterolingual theory of the Multitude,” 
Translate.eipcp.net, Jun. 2007, <http://translate.eipcp.net/transversal/1107/mezzadra/en>. 
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established on a set of limits and distinctions, but rather it is condensed in its action 
qua command. It is in short indifferent.  
We have reached a point where we can clearly understand what Negri meant 
by the imposition of a new law of value. The new normalization imposed by capital 
after the long wave of rebellion that started with 1968 takes the form of the radical 
disrupting of the preceding system of wage-labor. As a reaction to the politicization of 
the economic relationships carried out by the working force, capital shifts to a strategy 
of command. Capital rules as a despot, relying not on formal-legal devices but rather 
on the indifferent use of force. Yet the implications of this response are less settled 
than they might seem. Negri underscores that this move towards a “technique of 
power” is the result of a crisis. Just as for the anti-colonial struggle, it is actually the 
“destructuring tension of these struggle (of the workers) [that] has a direct effect on 
the very rationality of capitalist restructuring, and eliminates this rationality.”24 What 
looks like an act of power, Negri discloses instead as a decision that is, on one side, 
overtly determined by the opponent and, on the other, that is based on the shaky 
ground of an internal weakness, that is, of a system that has lost its structure of 
reference.25 Here emerges the radical twist that Negri gives to the common 
understanding of capitalist normalization of worker’s struggle. From the outset it looks 
like just another defeat for the workers, but in the end capital’s reaction is 
subordinated to workers’ doings. Negri too admits the ambiguity of his proposition:  
 
I must, at one and the same time, show how the form of 
capitalist domination is subordinated to the process of 
workers’ and proletarian self-valorization – and also show 
                                                 
24 Negri, Domination and Sabotage, 245. 
25 See Negri, Domination and Sabotage, 246. 
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the resulting determination in the destructured separateness 
of command.26
 
Self-valorization is the key concept here. What does worker’s self-valorization mean? 
Capital’s valorization is clearly the extraction of more surplus-value from the worker 
and the increase of value of the products through their circulation on the market. But 
in what sense can Negri talk about worker’s valorization? To simplify his complex 
reflection: self-valorization is refusal of work. As the radical negation of capital, the 
workers can increase the value of his or her activity only if s/he unhooks it from 
capitalist production; otherwise s/he is simply adding on capital’s accumulation. 
Worker’s activity thus will be productive insofar as it increases social cooperation, and 
not profit. Let’s see how Negri reaches this conclusion. 
Through a new reading of Marx’s most far-reaching work, the Grundrisse, 
Negri extracts from the law of value the real material content of the worker’s 
productive struggle. In line with the assumptions of operaismo, Negri points to two 
distinctive discoveries that Marx made in this late work. The first is found in the so 
called “Fragment on Machines,” in which Marx foresees the qualitative leap of 
industrial production rising to such a generalized level that “the development of the 
social individual […] appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of 
wealth.” The general intellect, which Marx writes in English as if to “give emphasis to 
the expression,” reflects precisely this “collective, social character which belongs to 
intellectual activity when this activity becomes […] the true mainspring of the 
production of wealth.”27 The social unity of intellectual and scientific knowledge 
accumulated over centuries, and now serving as the material basis for production, 
                                                 
26 Negri, Domination and Sabotage, 247. 
27 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude (New York: Semiotext[e], 2004), 38. 
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constitutes the groundbreaking novelty of the general intellect. When the latter 
becomes a dominant tendency in society, “labor time ceases and must cease to be” the 
measure of labor, since the global “necessary labor of society” has been reduced “to a 
minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the 
individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them.”28  
Operaismo argued that this leap forward was produced precisely by the 
working class. Now the objective of the struggle was first to defeat the sediments of 
the law of value which capital is tempted to use “as the measuring rod for the giant 
social forces thereby created.”29 Furthermore, the working class had to liberate from 
capitalist control the potentiality of the “general social knowledge” which, Marx 
maintains, “has become a direct force of production,” positing “social life itself […] 
under the control of the general intellect.”30 In this context, the worker’s self-
valorization is hypothetically free from capital’s extraction of surplus-value. As we 
will see, this is not the case in our society.  
Marx’s second discovery has to do with the kernel of the revolutionary 
potential of worker self-valorization contained by alienation. Self-valorization here is 
expressed via a negative formulation, that of alienation. In establishing its condition of 
possibility, capital posits individuals as wage-earners. Once worker skills and 
capacities (living-labor) have entered this condition they need to be reproduced as 
such. This is the work of reproduction carried out by women and cast as something 
natural outside production. Interestingly enough, Marx seems to point at this 
                                                 
28 Marx, Grundrisse, notebook 7, ed. Martin Nicolaus, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch14.htm#p704>. 
29 Marx, Grundrisse, notebook 7, ed. Martin Nicolaus, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch14.htm#p704>. 
30 Marx, Grundrisse, notebook 7, ed. Martin Nicolaus, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch14.htm#p704>. 
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characteristic trait of reproduction underscored by neo-feminism, when he argues that 
in a capitalist society 
 
What is reproduced and produced anew is not only the 
presence of these objective conditions of living-labor, but 
also their presence as independent values, i.e. values 
belonging to an alien subject, confronting this living-labor 
capacity.31  
 
Absorbed in the process of production, the worker is first estranged by his or her own 
production, the machinery s/he operates and the commodities s/he contributes to 
manufacture. Second, the worker also looks at the life outside the factory as something 
detached from work, as a private sphere. We saw that this privatization has many 
consequences. It drags along with it the enslaving of the woman to domesticity, but 
also provokes the failure of the worker to understand his own fundamental inalienable 
essence that capital puts to work, i.e. labor-power. As I mentioned above, labor-power, 
one of the main effects of the work of reproduction, is the ability to work, and not its 
objectification in the execution of a particular task. Now living-labor, the worker’s 
activity, fulfils its capacity only in practice, but this practice is already alienated and 
expropriated in the form of wage-labor. As a result, “living-labor itself appears as alien 
vis-à-vis living-labor capacity, whose labor it is, whose own life’s expression it is.”32
                                                 
31 Marx, Grundrisse, notebook 4, ed. Martin Nicolaus, Marxists Internet Archive, 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch09.htm#p459>. The need to present 
the worker self-valorization via the negative route of alienation comes from what Althusser called “the 
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These multiple forms of alienation pave the way for a radical negation that in 
fact expresses a liberated form of living-labor. Because of its alienation to work, Marx 
glosses that “if capital were willing to pay it [work] without making it labor, it [living-
labor] would enter the bargain with pleasure.”33 Alienation provokes in the worker the 
typical refractoriness to work. The secret is to follow this unavailability to its end, as 
the sign of a positive element: the radical unwillingness to participate in production. 
For Negri there is no reconciliatory moment that mitigates alienation through the re-
appropriation of production, but only refusal and indisposition. Thus the notion of 
refusal of work is born at the intersection of Marx’s discovery of the general intellect 
and his rescuing, through the “most extreme form of alienation,” of the vital 
expression of the capacity of living-labor.34 The refusal of work is simultaneously the 
refusal to participate into the process of exploitation, but also the heightening of the 
capacity to work in an interconnected and extensive system of intellectual and social 
production outside capitalist relations of production. Refusal of work implies a social 
industriousness that increases circulation and exchanges in a non-exploitative 
direction. Just like the collective assembling of air balloons in Boccalone’s 
performance in Pizza Maggiore, this is a kind of production that involves conviviality 
and an open-ended creativity. This production has also assumed through and through 
“collective and scientific characteristics.” As Negri affirms, the refusal of work 
accrues “the maximum level of negation” as well as “the maximum level of 
synthesis.”35 It is in fact a form of liberation that constructs the positivity of a new 
collective mode of production upon the negativity of the destruction of the capitalist 
mode of production. The refusal of work is thus active in two senses: it destructs the 
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preceding order and generates an autonomous one founded on “abstract intellectual 
energy as a specific productive force.”36 It is along these two lines that a worker’s 
self-valorization is progressively realized in open-ended fashion. Discontinuity and 
invention remain the main traits of this process, and not homogeneity and convergence 
of objectives.  
Self-valorization obviously requires a continuous and formidable effort on the 
part of the working class. The problem of organizing the multiplicity of the questions 
at stake by the struggle was of primary importance. Negri stresses, in fact, the political 
element that the unity of this “social productive labor” also displays in the field of 
reproduction. Here, he argues, “the most immediate form taken by the refusal of work 
is that of the direct appropriation of wealth, either on the commercial level or on the 
institutional level.”37 In addition to proletarian expropriation and occupation of public 
spaces, Negri tends to present the social unity produced by the process of self-
valorization as a sufficient unitary terrain of struggle. The demand of wage for 
housework pairs that of a social wage for students with that of the unemployed males. 
These are all elements that erode the quota of power from capital and fuel the 
transition toward communism.38  
However, Negri never investigates possible discrepancies with regard to 
gender that might complicate this perilous march. The unitary dimension of the 
struggle provides the framework to deal with the three subjectivities that constituted 
the Movement: the students, the workers and women. It is true that it is a precise goal 
of capitalism to segment the working class and cannibalize its solidarity through 
strategic concessions, but women’s positionality in the articulation of the working 
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class cannot be overlooked. As I have shown, for women the refusal of work also 
implies the sabotage of the family as well as waging a not so subtle war precisely 
against that non-labor time that the worker was striving to liberate. Reproduction for 
women was already a domain of oppression and of a contentious practice. I will come 
back to this point in my conclusion, but here I simply want to highlight the lack of 
analysis in Negri’s assessment of this crucial issue. It reflects deeply his articulation of 
the organization of the political movement of the working class.  
To be sure, the question of the organization of the process of self-valorization 
of living-labor, i.e. the fight against capital, is a key element in Negri’s thought. In 
Domination and Sabotage, he believes that the positing of the question of a political 
organization is a crucial one. Even in its contradictory form, “the party today is the 
present reality of a real contradiction,” he admits, and so it is important to assess it 
properly. On one side, in the history of the working class, the party represents a true 
“nightmare,” since “there seems to exist a necessary relationship between 
institutionalization/reformism and the destruction of the independence of the 
proletariat, its betrayal.”39 Negri, in fact, observes that the “party is not an immediate 
element of the process of self-valorization.” As a result, it is confined to an ancillary 
role; it represents “a function of the proletarian force, conceived as a guarantor of the 
process of self-valorization. The party is the army that defends the frontiers of 
proletarian independence.”40 This solution, however, is unsatisfactory. Negri seems to 
capture part of the problem that is grounded on the very material composition of the 
Movement and its development, but he cannot develop it in an extensive and 
productive way.  
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The idea of a specialization of the party and of its restriction to pragmatic 
functions led, for example, to disastrous consequences for LC. It was from the ranks of 
its security section that Prima Linea (Front Line) recruited its troops and played a 
visible role in the dark season of Italian terrorism. The separation of functions within 
the organization cultivated, among the Security, a militarist ideology that was 
responsible for the dissociation between political analysis and collective struggle. 
This, in turn, led to the shortcut of the military solution carried out by a scant minority, 
mostly new militants who shared “resentment towards those who in their minds had 
given up and had a wrong idea of coherence.”41 Here I do not want to indict Negri of 
any of these developments – Italian law diligently carried out this task, framing him as 
one of the masterminds and primary mandator behind Italian terrorism. I simply want 
to point out that a basic organizing principle seems to be already at work within the 
self-valorizing process that reduces the party structure to a marginal element. This is 
why the question of the party will progressively vanish in Negri’s work, whereas the 
self-legislating power of the working force rises to an all-encompassing role.  
Disutopia: Constituent Power and Desire 
The second work by Negri I want to consider is Insurgencies. Constituent 
Power and the Modern State. Written in the wake of the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
book is remarkably free from the celebratory discourse about the new era of freedom 
that humanity was going to enjoy. Because of his long-run perspective, Negri’s 
analysis remains current today. The question of the party has by now withered away. 
The last sparks of the Workers’ Movement have been extinguished there where it all 
started: in the workshops of the Fiat. In the fall of 1980, forty thousand white collar 
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workers had marched breaking the thirty five days strike of the metalworkers. 
Realizing the defeat, the union then bargained a way out from the crisis that imposed a 
rotating system of wage subsidy for twenty-three thousand workers. A mass 
restructuring of the industrial production was under way that sanctioned not only the 
workers’ defeat, but also the end of their centrality in the system of production.42 As 
Robert Lumley wrote “the assassination of Aldo Moro in May 1978 and the defeat of 
the Fiat factory occupations in October 1980 signaled the end of an era in which social 
movements and social conflict had dominated the language and horizons of a 
generation as well a the political agendas of governments.”43
Fiat once again marked a turning point in Italian history. From the point of 
view of political theory, this defeat implied the loss of a central form of subjectivity, 
one that in fact had carried out the task of representing the cornerstone of socialist and 
communist projects of liberation. Antonio Negri did not suffer this paradigmatic 
change at all, since his theorization of the social worker had already shifted the weight 
of political action outside the factory. If anything, he saw his theories regarding the 
coming of a new mode of production based on the general intellect having been 
proven correct. This is why today, Negri can proudly state that “perhaps we are not 
good politicians, and for that we were defeated. But we are good scientists, and that is 
no small feat.”44  
Now if the worker is spread in the social fabric of post-modern society, what 
would his or her struggle look like? What directions and structure would the self-
valorization process take? The problem that Negri faces here is to articulate the self-
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legislating force and radical immanence of the struggle of the new subjectivities. The 
object of his investigation is thus sovereignty and its relation to living-labor, a term 
which we can equate with the worker’s process of self-valorization as he had 
previously developed it. The explanation of the historical task of living-labor is clearly 
laid out. Living-labor plays the same role as the process of self-valorization in 
“destroying the equivocal quality of the bourgeois theory of labor (consolidated, 
accumulated, dead labor set against the creativity of living-labor).” The novelty in 
Insurgencies resides in the fact that now “bourgeois theory of power” is reframed and 
thought through as “an overdetermination of living-labor by dead labor.”45 Out of this 
confrontation with the juridical, Negri begins to outline the instantiation of the new 
revolutionary subjectivity. The social worker is replaced by the multitude as the 
subjective unfolding of the new social unity of intellectual and social labor of the 
general intellect. 
Negri opens his analysis of the juridical by showing how the modern 
understanding of sovereignty as a foundational act that bestows power on a 
representative body or person, on behalf of a group of people, is illogical and absurd. 
In these theories the law is divorced from the power of regulating society, i.e. 
constituent power, and creates peculiar paradoxes that have enormous consequences in 
social terms. Usually the sovereign (the state) “can be defined as an immanent 
transcendence situated outside the control of those [the subjects] that also produced it 
as the expression of their own will” and form of protection.46 The particular zone of 
exception that inaugurates this genealogy haunts modern society, re-emerging in its 
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darkest moments as the suspension of the law and a return to this state of exception 
where pure decision and power hold sway.47  
Negri argues that the reduction of constituent power to a single historical 
moment, the writing of the constitution for instance, and its delimitation in terms of 
finality, the normative contents of the law, constitute the “mystification that juridical 
theory and practice take care to collect and rearticulate into the theories of sovereignty 
and representation.”48 He then lays out a clear set of oppositions: on one side, the 
mystification of bourgeois thought which develops into a repressive and negative form 
of sovereignty, on the other, the potency of living-labor in ever renewing liberating 
processes. Sovereignty is in fact finalized, limited in space and time, and ossified in a 
“formal constitution.” Sovereignty is “constituted power,” that is to say the juridical 
incarnation of the law of value.49 On the other hand, constituent power is 
“unfinalized.” It “implies a multidirectional plurality of times and spaces.”50 Negri’s 
analysis of the American, the French, and the Soviet revolutions follow this clear line 
of demarcation. Whenever the energies of constituent power are frozen by 
institutionalization or by the disconnection from the open process of the forming of 
higher degrees of cooperation, the sovereign and its oppressive rule will rise again. For 
“whenever the political does not allow society to understand itself, to articulate itself 
in understanding, folly and terror will triumph.”51
Discussing the classics of political philosophy, Machiavelli, James Harrington 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Negri traces a sort of phenomenology of the emergence of 
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constituent power. Because of the development of my argumentation so far, I will 
limit myself to explore the trajectory of constituent power as described in its relation 
to capital. Negri summarizes this transformation as follows: 
 
The historical trajectory of capitalist development from 
primitive accumulation to post-industrial society is nothing 
but a continual process of subsumption of society under 
capital, a process in which capital has been insinuated into 
every relationship and become the connective key of every 
apparatus, the finality of every initiative.52
 
As we know, primary accumulation is that violent phase in which capital establishes 
its own conditions of development by expropriating land and individuals from their 
previous mode of production. It is the moment when capital creates workers as wage-
laborers. Between this and capital’s later development, Negri also highlights the 
moment when the violence of primary accumulation gets articulated in a formal 
system of laws, a “juridical superstructure” that enforces “a mediated violence and a 
structure internal to the productive process.” It is here that we notice the birth of a new 
order. It is the “pervasive and customary world of discipline” which “changes humans, 
increases their productivity, and socializes them.”53 This is still a Fordist phase. This 
is the apparatus that Gramsci was fighting. When new subjectivities raise the stakes of 
the struggle practicing a widespread indiscipline and claiming more money for less 
work, capital enters into a crisis that leads it to become a form of direct indifferent 
command.   
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It is here that we encounter the radical inversion and the intensification of the 
creative social unity of society that will oblige Negri to declare that the time of “the 
dialectic is over.” With the rise of the general intellect “living social labor takes the 
place of the capitalist mise en forme of the social totality.” Now this is not the classical 
negation of the proletariat that turns upside down the capitalist order. Negri stresses 
that “there is no homology, no mechanical inversion,” since “this inversion is not 
something that happens between homologous elements, even opposite ones;” rather “it 
is an inversion that liberates creative force and that no longer defines the opposite as 
negative but only as residue.”54 The constituent power of living-labor is already in 
action, totally immanent to historical development. Its revolutionary movement is 
already inscribed in the social fabric, in the intensification of cooperative work. Thus, 
there is no need of a negative moment, of an antithesis that subverts the state of things. 
Rather, what is needed is an accruement that exhausts the residue of the past. The 
consequence for the juridical field is felt directly.  
 
In this context, which is our contemporary reality, the 
capitalist subsumption of social labor and the entire society 
is by now realized. But this means that social life has 
become immediately productive, that the sphere of labor 
corresponds to that of the political, and that economic 
rights and social rights coincide in any concept of 
citizenship.55  
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The political and the social coincide. They are welded together by the fact that 
production is now a process that increases social collaboration. But has the revolution 
happened and was Antonio Negri the only one to have seen it? If we understand 
revolution to be a concrete and limited fact, the answer is no. However, if we assume 
it to be a process in time, we can respond affirmatively to this question. The revolution 
is the base of our own social development. Here Negri asks us to perform a very 
difficult mental effort. Far from being a distant goal, the revolution is instead an 
existing, and mutating condition that has to be brought to its full potential. Negri thus 
notices the “strange paradox” of our condition, one in which “equality, in this process, 
does not present itself anymore as the aim but as the condition.”56
We have entered the realm of ontology, where liberation is the base of an 
ontological movement. If living-labor in its process of self-valorization was the motor 
of history, theoretically it was also the ontological base of becoming. What now 
becomes paramount, however, is the acceleration of this movement, which is still 
subjective, because it is the very multitude that repeatedly gives birth to new 
intensities through social reproduction. Quoting Spinoza, Negri recognizes that the 
acceleration of this process is desire, the “constituent passion of the multitudo.”57 In 
the movement of becoming, the desire of the multitude keeps on fighting against 
moments of fixation, crystallizations that aim at normalizing its strength.  
Fascism, for instance, is one of the most dangerous opponents of the 
constituent process of becoming, for it also bears the uncanny resemblance to the 
subjective determinations of the multitude. We have seen this point while discussing 
Gramsci’s philosophy of practice and its difference with Giovanni Gentile’s actualism. 
Negri is well aware of the relation. He warns that “fascism is this perverse conception 
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of constituent power.” It is “the brutal act of using force” which sums up “the fascist 
disfiguring of constituent power.”58 But increased socialization and desire are also 
traits of the fascist organization of society. Can we clearly draw a line between a 
positive and a negative passion of the multitude?  
For Negri, the difference between the always open becoming of the multitude 
and fascism lies in the polarization of fascism “in the dimension of its crisis,” in its 
being “absolutely inimical to any determination of the strength of the multitude.”59 
Here we are predicating, however, fascist difference on the basis of the multitude’s 
positivity. That means that the slide to fascism is very short indeed, so short that it is 
difficult to set apart the two. Gramsci had differentiated Gentile’s actualist philosophy 
from the methodology of philosophy praxis, by underscoring the alterity and 
resistance exercised by the environment against the subjectivity that aims at 
transforming it. This friction is tied to the production of a knowledge, which to the 
extent that is a plan of action, becomes power. Gramsci’s immanence is a process of 
finitization that is open to change, but which is in dialectical relation to capital. Negri 
has dissolved the dialectical moment in the immanence of the field of experience. This 
one-dimensional nature of historical becoming precludes any solution other than the 
intensification of its own development. As we will see the problem of 
indistinguishability reoccurs in Negri’s understanding of the multitude. 
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This planar and horizontal vision is better explained through the concept of 
disutopia as “the absolute affirmation” of a “substantial being [a]s a solid and full 
subjectivity recuperated and reconstructed within projectivity.” Rejoicing, Negri adds 
that “finally we are given a world, in a century where rationalistic idealistic dualism 
tears reality apart.”60 The prefix “dis” works as privative (in the sense of lacking) that 
does not negate or reverse the noun, as in dis-topia which conveys the meaning of a 
utopia turned upside down. The privative negates the utopian, unrealistic character of 
its realization, and simultaneously unleashes in the real its positive, revolutionary 
quality. Disutopia is another term for ontology and its constitutive process. It signifies 
the presence of utopia as the erasure of its utopian character. The latter obviously 
involves discontinuities, differentiations, and “innovation that, after having constituted 
the individuals into a multitude, determine the strength of the latter.”61 The limitless 
nature of disutopia stands against the “measure” and “limits” imposed by 
sovereignty.62 Furthermore, in this new environment, the constituent power of the 
multitude realizes a particular unification of “procedure” and “process,” where “the 
controls are exercised as active moments of the procedure and not imputed from 
outside. […] Procedure is the concrete form that each figure of subjectivity assumes in 
its relating to others.”63 The origin stands close to its development, since this is not a 
power constituted in a remote past, but rather it is the presentness of the becoming. It 
is constituent and constitutive of its own becoming.  
Here we fully understand Negri’s response to the paradox of the origin in 
modern state theory, where the foundational act is temporarily relegated to the past, 
but which keeps pressing in on the present with the re-emergence of the sovereign 
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despotism resorting to the state of exception.64 The insistence in the present of this 
foundational moment is instead fully assumed in Negri and disseminated in the 
movement of the multitude. Obviously, the presentness of constituent power is not 
realized and constituted once and for all in the determination of the present. This is a 
present in action that needs to be intensified and increased, since the world we live in 
now is not a world of “freedom,” but that of “liberation, disutopia in action, relentless 
and as painful as it is constructive.”65 Thus far Negri has articulated a theory of the 
subject – the ontological drama that leads from the mass worker to the multitude – and 
its political theory in terms of constituent power embedded in the liberation of living-
labor – i.e. transformation of Fordism into the post-Fordist epoch of the general 
intellect.  
Meanwhile, capital has not been immobile. Capital, especially at the 
ideological level, had been successful in its restructuring and stabilizing of the 
indiscipline of living-labor. It even embellished the new form of exploitation with the 
promise of endless development, freedom and wealth for the whole globe. It was the 
miracle called globalization. By the second half of the 1990s, a new planetary 
consensus seemed to have conquered the worldviews of political elites. What was 
global was positive; what was positive had to be global.  
 
5.2 Negri’s New Ontology of the Present  
During the gloomy days of his imprisonment, Gramsci elaborated upon the 
idea of fatalism. Contrary to what might be believed, Gramsci pointed out that this 
stance is not a passive attitude. Rather it “is nothing other than the clothing worn by 
real and active will when in a weak position.”66 This is a statement that Negri would 
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clearly endorse, for his belief in the vitalism of subjectivity never falters. As he recalls 
in a recent interview: “I was always struck by the fact that all the factory workers 
knew perfectly well that they were heading for total defeat and yet did not refrain from 
fighting, because they also knew perfectly well that there was an absolute irreducible 
creative element within their defeat.”67  
The creativity of their defeat shaped the basic features of today’s society. Negri 
was well aware of it even before the concrete defeat of the movement. In Proletarian 
and the State (1975), he pointed out the strongholds of capital’s restructuring. They 
were the implementation of technology, a constant process initiated already in the 
sixties, as well as the “socialization, tertiarization, and flexibility (decentralization 
etc.) of industrial labor.”68 The shift towards smaller units of production, what is now 
commonly known as the outsourcing of production, was quickly enforced along with a 
deregulation of standard labor contracts and rights conquered in the past. Part of the 
workforce was also reallocated into the service sector, a new field that, although it 
emphasized production based on communication networks, promoted, in the everyday 
life, an individualization of work and rendered more difficult any labor organization.  
Technology here too played a fundamental role. In an economy based on 
providing services, the supremacy of computer science masked this change in 
production with the shining promise of a new and free way of working. Reconfiguring 
work as a sort of artist-like occupation, it insisted on creativity and flexibility as 
positive elements. Meanwhile, local economies were increasingly linked to a wider 
global dimension: with the world market now finally rendered more homogeneous and 
cost-effective,  production grew exponentially in terms of transnational operations 
thanks also to a remarkable progress in communication and transportation. Italy 
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embraced rapidly this new stage of development, one that is now commonly known as 
post-Fordism and whose ideology is represented by neoliberalism.69 Neoliberalism 
also imposed a powerful worldview that at least for a decade, from the fall of the 
Berlin Wall to the opening of the new millennium, seemed to be hegemonic. 
It so happened that the kernels of disutopia – socialization, flexibility, 
creativity – were integrated into capital to such an extent that one may wonder if, in 
fact, living-labor gave birth to a neoliberal dystopia. Negri had warned that the 
multitude was not going yet to enjoy freedom. Rather the multitude was simply in the 
process of bringing forward its own liberation. But how can one account for the sort of 
freedom neoliberalism fostered? With what kind of freedom are we dealing with and 
in what ways is the multitude connected to it? In order to respond to this question, we 
need to consider two works that Negri has written in collaboration with Michael Hardt 
Empire (2000) and Multitude. War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (2004).  
Let us start with the much discussed Empire. Along with Naomi Klein No 
Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (2000), and independently from the critiques 
and the debate it raised, this was a book that enjoyed a vast influence on the Anti-
Globalization Movement. As the Clintonian years of humanitarian wars and new 
economy wane, Empire was a particularly interesting work that provided activists with 
a set of critical tools to analyze the powerful hegemony of neoliberalism. The most 
important of these tools was probably the concept of the biopolitical. Negri and Hardt 
provide a specific interpretation of it that draws on the “epochal passage” between 
what Foucault called disciplinary society, to the society of control.  
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Disciplinary society is that society in which social command 
is constructed through a diffuse network of dispositifs or 
apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and 
productive practices. […] We could say that the entire first 
phase of capitalist accumulation (in Europe and elsewhere) 
was conducted under this paradigm of power.70  
 
Disciplinary society is thus coercive and mechanical in the application of its 
principles. Its system of production develops from the first manufacturing industries to 
the application of Fordism. Chronologically, it thus embraces a large breath of time, 
spreading until the beginning of neocapitalism. Things began to change precisely with 
the emergence of the new subjectivity of the Anti-Globalization Movement. Empire 
here is less precise in defining the specific junctures that lead to a change in the 
paradigm of power. What seem understated are the emergence of state command and 
its radical moment of brute force laid out in Domination and Sabotage. For when the 
new paradigm is established, the new society of control seems to rely on “mechanisms 
of command” that look “more democratic, ever more immanent to the social field, 
distributed throughout the brains and bodies of the citizens.”71  
We find ourselves already well within the neoliberal disutopia, without having 
passed through the violent imposition of a new order by the state. As a partial 
explanation for this simplification, I want to mention that the subject matter, as well as 
the public of Empire is international, so that the Italian contribution to the 
establishment of a new world order in some sense recedes to the background. 
Moreover, even for a large part of the new generation that contributed to the Anti-
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Globalization Movement, this lack did not have real consequence, since what seemed 
more urgent was understanding and criticizing the now of the disutopia. This entailed 
facing a subtle form of control that while proclaiming the empowerment of the 
creativity of the individuals was at the same time enslaving them in a more subtle form 
of domination. This is what Hardt and Negri call biopower, a form of control that  
 
Regulates social life from its interior, following it, 
interpreting it, absorbing it and rearticulating it. […] The 
highest function of this power is to invest life through and 
through, and its primary task is to administer life. Biopower 
thus refers to a situation in which what is directly at stake in 
power is the production and reproduction of life itself.72  
 
Biopower is thus the new connectivity that holds together a more flexible system of 
production, but in its descending into the body and the mind of the laborers, biopower 
becomes also volatile, being simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. It is so 
pervasive as to make it difficult to locate it. Biopower is the mechanism that keeps 
disutopia in check. As in Negri’s preceding works, here too we begin from the point of 
view of command in order to show how capital’s condition is in reality the 
mystification of a positive development of the subordinated subjectivity. This is the 
realm of the biopolitical, of which biopower represents a repressing force that acts 
through a “series of interventions.”73  
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Foucault against Foucault 
Before we move into the specificity of these interventions, let us briefly 
recapitulate what Foucault had actually said regarding the coming under control of life 
in terms of biopower and biopolitics. Foucault develops this new field of study in a 
series of public lectures. In these courses collected under the title ‘Society Must Be 
Defended’ 1975-1976, Foucault gestures towards the concept of biopolitics while 
exploring the notion of biopower. Here he connects biopower directly with “the right 
of the sword,” the sovereign’s right to “make live and to let die” that the state assumes 
as its prerogative,” and which can be dated in the “second half of the eighteenth 
Century.”74 As Foucault further explains “unlike discipline, which is addressed to 
bodies, the new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living 
man, to man as-living-being.”75  
Biopower is thus framed within the limits of disciplinary society, and in fact it 
involves classical apparatuses of state control “such as the ratio of birth to death, the 
rate of reproduction, the fertility of the population and so on.”76 Urban planning, 
demography, statistics, welfare, systems of immunization, as well as institutions like 
psychiatric hospitals and police, they are all “security mechanisms” that govern the 
population from above. They represent a vertical and static form of administration of 
life. This is confirmed by the introduction of the idea of racism that discloses the 
death-like shade of biopower. Power needs to differentiate and introduce “a break into 
the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and 
what must die.”77 Racism is not a simple war against the enemy, since biopower has to 
recreate within its domain the other in order to legitimately kill or let die. Biopower is 
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thus control and protection that resorts to violence and killing on the basis of the 
discrimination between the us and the other conceived as something dangerous for the 
well-being of a better society. 
Two years later, in the Lecture at the Collège de France (now published under 
the title The Birth of Biopolitics) Michel Foucault turns to the concept of biopolitics, 
but this time he is investigating governamentality as a new reflexive practice; as the 
conceptualization of a technique, with very little reference to population as the distinct 
modern element that comes under the control of the state. According to The Birth of 
Biopolitics the great transformation of these technologies of power occurs with the 
passage from political economy to economy, that is, from an external order imposed 
on production and exchange to a self-regenerative principle, one that marks the birth 
of neoliberalism. It is a portentous expansion of an economic ratio that becomes the 
yardstick to represent all non-economic territories: politics, law, education etc. As 
Foucault puts it, neoliberalism brings forward “the possibility of giving a strictly 
economic interpretation of a whole domain previously thought to be non-economic.”78
The subject of this mutation is labor. Through the study of German post-war 
and Chicago School Liberalism, Foucault stresses the transformation that the notion of 
labor suffers as it passes from wage-labor, whose price is determined by the law of 
supply and demand, to labor as the monetary gain that laborer makes by becoming 
human capital. To Foucault this change appears as the discovery of a human 
potentiality that the commodification induced by wage-labor had obscured.79 It is the 
activation of a procedure that fuels an exceptional dynamism.  
Once labor-power is conceived of as human capital and every worker is 
endowed with the capacity to produce gain, or to become a hub of “earning streams” 
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as Foucault argues, the typical capitalist process of accumulation is extended to the 
entire population.80 Every individual is now competing as an enterprise that produces 
profit, and invests it in order to remain competitive. Being competitive in turn, calls 
for the strenuous work of self-improvement and permanent self-valorization. Laborers 
are in fact “abilities-machines” who need to invest in themselves to produce income.81 
This is the biopolitical dimension that the advance of neoliberalism imposes. It is an 
immanent drive toward the development of labor potentiality that demands a constant 
capitalization of the individual.  
As an immanent, self-multiplying mechanism, biopolitics does not require any 
external authority for directing the operations. It is the twilight of politics, for politics 
withers away into the self-regulative operativeness of society. Civil society incarnates 
the progressive element of this biopolitical transformation of society not as a people 
united in a “pact of subjection,” but as a technique of government that promotes the 
multiplication of a “a distinct interplay of non-egoist, disinterested interests.” These 
bear a striking resemblance to the “multiplication of profit in the purely economic 
mechanism of interests” of neoliberal economy.82  
There are remarkable differences between what Hardt and Negri take from 
Foucault and what he actually articulates with the concepts of biopower and 
biopolitics. It is almost a reading of Foucault against Foucault, or a Deleuzian reading 
of Foucault. To recapitulate, in Empire, biopower is updated as a contemporary 
technology of control, whereas in Foucault biopower seems more a dispositive of an 
older phase of development, one clearly rooted in a disciplinary society. Biopolitics, 
instead, is the substratum of postmodern society, but it is mostly the result of a 
transformation at the level of capital. The spaces of liberation that Foucault detects are 
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merely a consequence to this economic transformation. There is no real agency of 
living-labor other than exploiting the “liberogenetic” mechanisms of liberal 
governamentality.83  
In Empire, we find the terms biopower and biopolitics closely connected, with 
the former as an updated version of Foucault’s disciplinary device. As a result, when 
Hardt and Negri talk about biopower and its interventions, they are actually employing 
Foucault’s discovery of the assumptions of the neoliberal art of governing of a 
biopolitical society, and not of what he calls biopower. Most importantly, in 
privileging the economic substratum of the biopolitical, Foucault’s argument seems at 
odds with Hardt and Negri who, as I stressed, give priority to the autonomy of 
subaltern subjectivities.84 This is not surprising, for as I later show, biopolitics is an 
ambiguous category, one that Negri too easily endows with a liberating capacity. 
Biopower Interventions and Immaterial Labor 
The interventions of biopower are multiple and vary in relation to their 
operative domain. Let me begin at a geopolitical level by addressing the operations 
dispatched on a global scale. If in Empire, Hardt and Negri discuss a certain type of 
application of biopower, with the rise of George W. Bush administration, they now 
have to make remarkable corrections to their analysis. Their second work Multitude is 
in fact a response to these changes. First let’s take up Empire and then make our way 
to Multitude.  
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Biopower here takes the form of humanitarian war or “just war” as a sort of 
primary “exercise of legitimate force,” one that serves to legitimize its new power 
partly through “the effectiveness of its use of force.”85 The difference with “the old 
international order” is blatant. The disintegration of clear cut spaces under the liquid 
and ubiquitous imperial rule exposes “the unbounded terrain of its activities, the 
singularization and symbolic localization of its actions, and the connection of 
repressive action to all the aspects of the biopolitical structure of society.”86 These 
military interventions, camouflaged as global police operations, are based on the 
pretext of protecting human rights and had their baptism of fire in 1999, in the 
territories of former Yugoslavia.  
In Multitude, Hardt and Negri need to face the mutation in the international 
relationships brought on by the Bush administration. War now becomes central; it is 
the “general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of domination.”87 
Empire’s more democratic mechanisms of control are set aside to make room for the 
gloomy spirit of the present. One notices a return to biopower in a strictly Foucaultian 
term, as the re-emergence of the right of the sword, except that the latter is 
disseminated indifferently across the social body. After having explored the 
relationship between the new US doctrine of war and its counter-response terrorism, 
Hardt and Negri argue that war aims at “accomplish[ing] a constituent and regulative 
function,” as “a procedural activity and an ordering, regulative activity that creates and 
maintains social hierarchies.”88  
The United States turn toward a sovereign type of biopower has relevant 
consequences for Hardt and Negri’s theory of imperial power. On one side, entering a 
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phase of constant and unlimited war, the American administration also altered its 
juridical legislation with regard to circulation and basic democratic rights. On the 
other, it forestalled the supremacy of one specific nation state that challenged the idea 
of a global, undifferentiated imperial space. Later on in fact Negri admitted that 
undoubtedly the “American ruling classes [were] tempted very much to transform the 
empire into an entity over which the United States could rule no longer as a republic, 
but as a specific nation.”89 This monarchical-national twist seems quite a stretch and 
complicates the progression that Negri developed in his work. He can only respond 
that “Empire is a tendency, and, much like all tendencies, it can be guided in a variety 
of ways.”90 As I soon show, one of the reasons of this difficulty in adapting his notion 
of Empire to the rapid change of reality is probably a residuum of linearity and 
modern teleology in his understanding of capital’s development.     
Another consequence of the unilateralism of the American administration is the 
rapid decline of global organizations that supported and safeguarded globalization. 
Before their decline, these institutions truly had a central role and neoliberalism 
invested heavily in their activity. When it did not resort to limited police operations, 
the Empire exerted “moral intervention,” through non-governmental organizations and 
juridical and economic interventions through a series of global institutions such as the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fond, or the World Trade Organization. For 
the Anti-Globalization Movement these institutions, and especially the G8 summits 
among the heads of the most industrialized countries, became the direct target of their 
protests. They represented a higher level of power in which decision-making was 
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simply the result of a business agreement among a few elite and for their own return. 
The impact of their policy had tremendous effects across the globe.  
These structural changes to which nation states had to conform were justified 
precisely on the assumption that economy had to be left free to follow its course in 
order to stimulate the production of global wealth. The dynamism of the market had to 
be preserved by removing barriers and protections. Hardt and Negri here are very 
acute on disclosing the reconfiguration of this ideology at a cultural level. They argue 
that “the ideology of the world market has always been the anti-foundational and anti-
essentialist discourse par excellence. Circulation, mobility, diversity, and mixture are 
its very conditions of possibility. Trade brings differences together.”91 Furthermore, 
differences are also produced as “cultural rather than political” elements.92 The goal is 
the production of the ethnic for marketing purposes and the intensification of 
commercial incorporation of everyday life on a global scale. Along this line, Naomi 
Klein revealed, how one of the pillars of globalization was precisely a new wave of 
branding, of creation of logos in order to sell that resorted on the ethnic and street 
culture as sources for ideas and models.93  
The homology with what has been called postmodern thought here is 
impressive. Consider the same anti-essentialist critique, the emphasis on 
contamination as the producer of novelty, the stress on indeterminacy and the 
artificial, a-referential nature of representation (such as the grand narratives of 
modernity) and against binary oppositions. Postmodernism and neoliberalism 
incarnate a radical critique of any limitation of foundation of a human activity that is 
not exclusively based on performance. As the great systematizer of this new cultural 
shift, Jean-François Lyotard, has argued “in contemporary society and culture – post-
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industrial society, postmodern culture – […] the grand narrative has lost its credibility, 
regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative 
narrative or a narrative of emancipation.”94 Performance here can be understood 
economically. Just like a stock that performs well on the market, knowledge “will be 
reproduced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a 
new production.”95 Performance implies a constant effort of innovation. Difference 
and novelty replace the homogeneity of the static totality of the old meta-narratives.  
Hardt’s and Negri’s critique brings postmodern philosophy back to its 
historical dimension. As they argue “difference, hybridity, and mobility are not 
liberatory in themselves, but neither are truth, purity, and stasis. […] Truth will not 
make us free, but taking control of the production of truth will. Mobility and hybridity 
are not liberatory, but talking control of the production of mobility and stasis, purities 
and mixtures is.”96 This signals also a slight shift from Negri’s previous positions. 
Here Negri’s emphasis on movement and the creative power of living-labor must be 
demarcated from the discourse on difference and contamination carried out by 
postmodernism and made consonant to the reappropriative move of the multitude. In 
this sense, they do not endorse an uncritical negation of postmodernism, but its proper 
historization. As a critique of “modern sovereignty,” postmodernism had its point and 
was a useful strategy, but now its analysis is beginning to wear thin. The failure to 
“recognize clearly the forms of power that have today come to supplant” modern 
sovereignty, engages postmodern intellectuals in a “battle against the shadows of old 
enemies.”97 For in fact, “the affirmation of hybridities and the free play of differences 
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across boundaries, however, is liberatory only in a context where power poses 
hierarchy exclusively through essential identities, binary oppositions, and stable 
oppositions.”98  
We are now moving closer to the analysis of the microphysics of biopower’s 
interventions. From the global sovereign dimension onwards, the new jurisdiction of 
Empire shapes behaviors and social practices, namely the biopolitical substratum of 
life. Hardt and Negri’s analysis of immaterial labor is still a decisive contribution and 
must be assessed in detail. They define immaterial labor as a productive activity 
typical of a society that gives priority to tertiary services, such as technology 
production, education, administration and so on. Immaterial labor unfolds as a model 
of a rich communication for it “produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a 
cultural product, knowledge or communication.”99 There are three kinds of immaterial 
production that inform today’s labor processes. The first is an “informational 
economy” and an industrial production based on a larger share of scientific knowledge 
and computer controlled machinery.100 The second is a broader category including any 
form of “analytical and symbolic tasks.” From web-design to “normal” secretarial 
jobs, from scientific research to old-fashioned teaching in an academic institution, all 
these activities display a peculiar tendency toward the breeding of capacities and ideas 
that are difficult to quantify and pin down to some material referent. Finally, the third 
category is one we have investigated at length in our previous chapter. It is the work of 
reproduction that involves the “production and manipulation of affect,” the oldest and 
most vilified form of immaterial labor that there is: domestic duties and personal 
care.101  
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The “three types of labor that drive the post-modernization of the global 
economy” bring about a deep biopolitical transformation. Women have experienced it 
since the institution of the nuclear family as the pillar of industrial society. Now the 
spatial and temporal dimension of immaterial work quickly colonizes the majority of 
the social body.  
 
Consider, for example, the transformation of the working 
day in the immaterial paradigm, that is, the increasingly 
indefinite division between work time and leisure time. In 
the industrial paradigm workers produced almost 
exclusively during the hours in the factory. When 
production is aimed at solving a problem, however, or 
creating an idea or a relationship, work time tends to 
expand to the entire time of life.102
 
These work relations produce a new temporality, one characterized by a zone of 
inseparability between labor and non-labor that swallows the whole of individual life. 
What was true for women’s domestic labor becomes true for the intellectual worker as 
well. First, any leap in technology is, in the end, an opportunity to work more. Second, 
the interiorization of a subtle work ethic that recalls the famous female abnegation 
fosters a compulsion to work indefinitely. Thus the endlessness of labor becomes a 
permanent condition. Here we reach the ultimate reversal. The colonization of social 
time by labor seems to have a limit only in the necessary moments of rest so as to 
restore physical energies. Yet since, as neo-feminism made clear, reproduction is 
already an activity out of which capital extracts value, this is the final mystification!  
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Negri and Hardt also underscore three other characteristics of immaterial labor 
that slightly diverge from domestic work. It is “flexible because workers have to adapt 
to different tasks, mobile because workers have to move frequently between jobs, and 
precarious because no contracts guarantee stable, long-term employment.”103 In this, 
immaterial labor recalls older forms of professional figures such as the day laborers of 
the 1800 more than the new and highly skilled jobs of the new millennium. To be sure, 
today’s workforce knows how to operate computers and sophisticated software. It 
masters languages and works in networks. But when it comes to basic rights, like paid 
holidays, healthcare, protection against unfair treatments on the job, the difference 
between typing on a laptop and waving a sickle in the field seem minimal.  
Yet this form of exploitation is not simply individual. Rather it involves, for 
Hardt and Negri, “the capture of value that is produced by cooperative labor and that 
becomes increasingly common through its circulation in social networks.”104 This new 
temporality is also the final proof of what Negri has been arguing for so long now: that 
the law of value has declined. With the vanishing of the law of value, though, it 
becomes impossible to calculate exploitation temporally.  
 
Surplus-labor time and the surplus-value produced during 
that time are the key to Marx’s definition of exploitation. 
[…] But today the paradigm of immaterial production, the 
theory of value cannot be conceived in terms of measured 
quantities of time, and so exploitation cannot be understood 
in these terms. Just as we must understand the production of 
value in terms of the common, so too must we try to 
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conceive exploitation as the expropriation of the common. 
The common, in other words, has become the locus of 
surplus-value. Exploitation is the private appropriation of 
part or all of the value that has been produced as common.105
 
The projection of exploitation to the larger plane of the common is a difficult concept 
to grasp and put into practice for it traverses the whole of the social unity the 
multitude produces. One of the solutions called forth by this analysis is social wage, a 
proposal that grew out of 1968, first in the Student Movement, and later also in the 
neo-feminist group of Lotta Femminista. Also the Anti-Globalization Movement 
developed this set of analyses, including the proposal for a social wage, and based a 
large part of its program on how to safeguard the environment, as well as the struggle 
against the privatization of natural resources or public structures such as education, 
healthcare and so on. However, I am not convinced that in Empire or even Multitude 
Hardt and Negri would endorse this idea of the common. There is scant reference to 
the environmental issue which was instead so central for the Anti-Globalization 
Movement. When outlining what is in fact the common, Hardt’s and Negri’s emphasis 
falls obviously on immaterial labor and on the capacity to produce value biopolitically. 
Now here we encounter another difficulty. If the common is the appropriation of 
surplus-value by capital that means that our goal is inextricably tied to capital’s 
process of accumulation. If the common is the intellectual laborer’s immaterial work 
that is under-paid in terms of salary, benefits and social protection, how can the 
multitude turn exploitation to its advantage? And in service of what? “Common is that 
which enriches the productivity of singularities [dei singoli]! Common is the fact that 
a lot of ideas come to me when you and I talk about something!” Negri says. Yet if 
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that cooperation is finally taken away, if in that sociality we are actually under the iron 
heel of capital’s exploitation, how then do we reverse it? In other words, as Casarino 
advocates, we need to “distinguish capital from its own foundation in the common.”106 
The overcoming of dialectics creates remarkable problems in this sense. 
Hardt and Negri also answer in another way, calling on the poor as the 
“paradigm of immaterial production” and “the flesh of biopolitical production.” The 
poor do not come from a specific part of the globe; they include or comprise the 
flexible, precarious intellectual worker as “the figure of [the] general possibility and 
thus the source of all wealth.”107 This is not, of course, the kind of poverty one expects 
in an age of scarcity. It is poverty in an age of abundance, that is to say a 
“phenomenon that has already absorbed and incorporated its own integration in the 
totality of the system.”108 In other words, it is a poverty endowed with a biopolitical 
capacity. Yet, as a kind of poverty due not to a lack of consumption, but to a massive 
libidinal consumption, it is also exposed the critique Pasolini made. This is a poverty 
that feeds on a consumerist subculture. Furthermore, against the relative unity and 
continuity at the level of the final social product, one notices that for the individual the 
precariousness and fragmentation of his or her working conditions does not exactly 
facilitate any mechanism of re-appropriation. Hardt and Negri never really investigate 
repercussions in the actual sociality of larger and larger number of people exposed to 
uncertainty, to the fragility of the everyday. According to them, the specific and 
complicated mechanisms of exploitation are subsumed under the unifying moment of 
the production of collective wealth which is already present and actual. One needs 
only to grab it.  
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If there is a lesson to be learned from the fundamental work produced by 
Marxist neo-feminism it is that in a biopolitical dimension what oppresses you is also 
what you love. Hence the need for a separation; hence a refusal that cannot be turned 
into another form of productivity. The decrease in the birth rate, for instance, is a case 
of subterranean, but effective, negation of productivity. In Empire, unfortunately, there 
is not much ground for such a dialectical move. Dystopia is all-encompassing. As in 
Negri’s preceding works, the only road to social change is an acceleration of the 
biopolitical towards a global communality.  
Capital has shifted from what Marx called formal subsumption to a real 
subsumption. Hardt and Negri argue in fact that if “modern accumulation is based on 
the formal subsumption of the non-capitalist environment,” now instead “postmodern 
accumulation relies on the real subsumption of the capitalist terrain itself.”109 In short, 
having used up the outside, having incorporated laboring practices that originated 
outside its domain, capital turns around, and capitalizes the ground covered through 
the previous modernization. This passage is once again “explained through the 
practices of active subjective forces.”110 The first movement, that of establishing the 
conditions of its relations of production (formal subsumption), is in fact “anticipated 
and carried through to maturity” by subaltern groups and then bypassed into the 
process of “real subsumption,” that is of integration of labor itself through 
socialization. This is because in the latter “were constructed conditions of liberation 
and struggle” that only real subsumption could “control.”111  
From the viewpoint of political thought, this also means that the multitude is 
“the self-erasure of the working class,” which, fighting to liberate itself from the law 
of value, disassembled the rigid and compartmentalized form of capital, pushing it 
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toward the global dimension of the Empire.112 If it was the working class that 
summoned Empire, it is now up to the Multitude to liberate the common, instituting 
thereby the republic of the general intellect. Biopolitics is the proper constituent power 
that through its intensification and acceleration will fuel this process of liberation. 
 
5.3 A Critique of Hardt’s and Negri’s Notion of Biopolitics 
Thus far I have explored the general argument that Negri developed from his 
early work of the 1970s to his recent collaboration with Michael Hardt. Terminology 
has shifted over the years, but we can point towards the appearance of immaterial 
labor as the biopolitical moment that gives substance to a process of liberation. The 
trajectory is clear. If the previous mode of regulation was informed by a Fordist 
organization of labor, along with Keynesian policies (welfare state), the shift to post-
Fordism and postmodernity is based on a greater flexibility in terms of the space of 
production (deterritorialization-delocalization), on a different temporality (the 
indistinguishability between labor time and non-labor time) in the organization of 
production, on the regulation (deregulation) of market conditions, and finally on a 
tendency towards immaterial production. All these changes have been summoned by 
living-labor in its attempt to liberate itself. Biopower represents instead all the various 
forms that buffer the full socialization of living power under non-exploitative 
relations.  
This hypothesis is not satisfactory. The passage from exploitation to liberation 
seems too smooth, as if the exploitative layering were only a formal element of the 
relation of production. It is as if it the mode of production of immaterial labor has no 
real impact in the deep structure of society itself, as if it did not sink its teeth into the 
latter, branding it with its mark of domination. There are a few points I want to make 
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in this regard. The first is a correction that may help us provide a better picture of the 
new context of immaterial production. One of the elements that Hardt and Negri 
overlook is the huge role played by financial speculation. The level of abstraction of 
labor is also a consequence of the push toward an economy that relies on investment 
and stock exchange more than on material production. Hardt and Negri point to that in 
Multitude when they argue that “the profits of finance capital are probably in its purest 
form the expropriation of the common.”113  
But I believe there are more comprehensive and detailed explanations for the 
contemporary “phenomenon of financial deepening or financiarization which occurs 
with the growth of financial transactions far exceed[ing] the growth of the underlying 
economic fundamentals of production and trade.”114 Giovanni Arrighi, for example, 
explored this shift, inserting it into a cyclical change of capital’s mode of regulation. 
Capital shifts from a phase predominantly based on a material growth (material 
production) to a phase of financial expansion. So where M=liquidity and flexibility, 
C=commodity, capital concreteness and rigidity, and finally M’=expanded liquidity, 
the systemic cycle of accumulation indicated by Marx would move from the MC 
phases (capital’s accumulation) to the CM’ phases of expansion. As Arrighi states: “in 
phases of material expansion money capital set’s in motion an increasing mass of 
commodities (including commoditized labor-power and gifts of nature: MC); in 
phases of financial expansion an increasing mass of money-capital set’s itself free 
from its commodity form and accumulation proceeds through financial deals” (1994: 
6). It thus reaches Marx’s abbreviated form MM’, where money is invested in finance, 
and where capital overlooks production and becomes abstract.  
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Hardt and Negri admittedly critique the “methodology of long cycles” because 
in Arrighi’s description “it is impossible to recognize a rupture of the system, a 
paradigm shift, an event.”115 Yet Arrighi’s analysis is grounded on capital’s drive 
towards accumulation, as a result, these shifts are not systematic changes led by 
capital itself, but the result from the shrinking of profitability due to the struggle of 
proletarian groups. Arrighi’s investigation of cycles does not seem as fatalistic as 
Hardt and Negri depict it, and it provides us with a more comprehensive view of one 
of the key factors in globalization.  
That said, it is in the implicit teleology that leads from formal subsumption to 
real subsumption that Hardt’s and Negri’s argument waver. I am not basing my 
critique on any sort of ontological claim. I will not suggest that Hardt’s and Negri’s 
argument is defective because it is tainted by the ignominy of linearity and teleology. 
There are probably more linearities that work at a regional level than postmodern 
philosophers imagine. My own argumentation is built on a dialectical progression, 
certainly one that cannot point to a final synthesis. It is in the dialectic between capital 
and labor that linearity and homogeneity have been dispersed into hybrid patterns. 
Superimposed to a consistent and causal narrative of progress and advancement, we 
now face a new temporality that collapses various forms of historical development 
into a co-presence. As Sandro Mezzadra and Federico Rahola write our temporality is 
one “in which the ensemble of pasts that modern capitalism has encountered in its 
course re-emerges in disorderly fashion, in a sort of universal exhibition.”116 This is 
why I find two problems in Hardt’s and Negri’s explanation. The first is that they rely 
too much on a spatial notion of subsumption. To be sure, the process of primary 
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accumulation to which formal subsumption is linked, and that Marx describes with the 
expropriation of land called the process of enclosure, is also a conquest of concrete 
space.117 The extension of the global market is in part also the subjection under the 
rule of the market of a larger portion of spaces. Yet relying too much on this spatial 
paradigm may lead to problems. Once the globe is colonized, once there is no more 
outside, capital seems to have finished its task and can only move to a different set of 
actions. This new stage establishes a progression with respect to the former. But 
capital’s expansion is not only territorial, nor is it merely extensive. It is always 
intensive insofar as capital must constantly reproduce its condition of existence even 
within its older domains. Depending on the level of resistance, capital deploys 
different forms of intervention. Hence the key role played by formal subsumption 
which often makes use of the violent modalities of primary accumulation.  
The formal moment of subsumption of labor aims at establishing the condition 
of possibility of capital’s realization primarily on the level of relationships of 
production. It is a process of homogenizing and molding the material conditions of 
subordinated groups that happens mostly at the social level. This is the terrain where 
capital wisely exerts violence and despotism. In the making of the labor force, capital 
socializes individuals under a new form of power. Primary accumulation is incarnated 
also in the law of command that is continuously reinstated to check the different 
generations who are socialized to work. Hardt and Negri speak mostly about living-
labor as if it was already formed, that is, as a hybrid creature that suffers exploitation 
but that is already liberating itself via biopolitics. They overlook the fact that formal 
subsumption directly affects labor-power and namely the capacity to work. This is the 
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productivity that must be socialized for capitalist use. It is the biopolitical that 
undergoes a process of primary accumulation. 
Therefore, it might well be that there is a residue of finalism in their analysis of 
the progression of capital which alters a better interpretation of the biopolitical 
capacity of the multitude. Formal subsumption does not vanish, nor does it simply 
become marginal, once real subsumption is at work. As Sandro Mezzadra has argued  
 
This is the main reason why primitive accumulation cannot 
be considered to be only a historical moment: it is rather to 
be regarded as a kind of reservoir of potential “exceptions” 
[…] that can be activated at any “stage” of capitalist 
development when the ordinary functioning of labor market 
appears to be interrupted.118
 
This co-presence of different strategies and tools grants a different temporality that 
strips away any illusion of progress. Negri describes it well in its account of the crisis 
of the law of value and the rising of a new rule based on command, but in the leap 
forward to biopolitics, this paradigm seems to lose its importance. It is in the inherent 
positivity of the biopolitical reign of immaterial labor that his analysis loses its grip on 
reality. Hardt and Negri do not mention, in fact, that the despotism that oppresses 
immaterial labor is very similar to the one experienced at length by women. The 
multitude is collectively dominated by the extraction of absolute surplus-labor just as 
women are dominated, as a subordinated group, under the conditions of the work of 
reproduction. This is where the productivity of living-labor is marked by exploitation 
                                                 
118 Mezzadra, “Living in Transition.” Mezzadra makes a similar argument against Hardt and Negri in 
La Condizione Postcoloniale. Storia e political nel pensiero globale (Verona: Ombre corte, 2008). 
373 
and by a toxic unbearable subjection to profit and toil. Hardt and Negri never mention 
fatigue, stress, or exhaustion. These are terms that seem relegated to the past and to the 
mechanical age of Fordism, as if the pixels of a computer’s monitor would not tire out 
the eyes of the immaterial worker, as if the flaw of electronic information would not 
scratch his or her nerves and retinas.  
If Hardt and Negri clearly identify the fall of the law of value, however, they 
seem to underestimate a basic fact. Wage-labor still exists, and it is indeed perceived 
as the very last anchor saving workers from starvation. Consequently, “labor time is 
the unit of measurement in use, but not the only one true unit of measurement.”119 
Furthermore, what Hardt and Negri define as productivity, now dispersed outside the 
bounds of a measurable ratio, capital simply does not take account of. This work 
undergoes an enormous subterranean extraction of value that is enforced through non-
remuneration. Wage-labor becomes the citadel of minimal, albeit exploitative, order 
and commensurability. Outside there is only a never-ending hustle that is perceived as 
non-work, or self-valorization of one’s own human capital. This reversion of what is 
actually exploitative into an illusion of protection and fairness immensely complicates 
the struggle of immaterial labor. But this is a concrete problem of survival. For if 
Hardt and Negri are right in bringing to the foreground the inexorable crisis of the law 
of value, the surpassing “of the society of labor occurs in the forms prescribed by the 
social system based on wage-labor,” that is to say based on extraction of value.120 In 
other words, when labor time is indistinguishable from non-labor time, we are not 
enjoying the joy of an endless, festive day, but quite the opposite. We are in fact stuck 
in the indefinite temporality of non-festivity. This means that the larger portion of 
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production falls into non-remunerative work, hidden work, which impoverishes the 
laborers of the multitude through and through.   
It is not only everyday drudgery here that I want to point to here. As we have 
seen in the case of women’s subjection to surplus-labor, the weakness of their 
position, and their dependency on the wage earner, also increased to the degree to 
which their work resembled a sort of servitude. That is to say, the obligation to work 
becomes unmediated, just as in servile work the servant is subsumed directly under the 
rule of his master. How is it possible that in an age in which production is based on 
knowledge and advanced technology, we see the reappearance of serfdom but only 
dressed up differently?  
The first and most obvious answer is that, at least in Italy, the process of 
originary accumulation has specifically invested the few formal accomplishments of 
the long cycle of struggle that began with 1968. It is a restructuring imposed in order 
to dominate the militancy of that decade, as well as to create new conditions of 
profitability. Neoliberalism is in a nutshell a vast project of deregulation, which was 
sold to the public as the dismantling of old privileges of parasitical groups. But the 
erosion of a whole set of institutional safeguards instead meant the expropriation of 
collective forms of social relationships and organizational mechanisms that had 
ameliorated the conditions of exploitation. This is the most obvious point that one 
notices in the progressive elimination of traditional rights such as pensions, the right to 
health coverage, the just-cause clause that prevents indiscriminate firing. The new 
precarious work and their juridical definition deny these basic rights.121  
The vanishing of these formal mediations exposes the new worker to perils that 
he or she need to face from a weak position. This point becomes more evident in the 
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parallel I traced with regard to the work of reproduction, since the distortions that we 
encountered in that case constitute a remarkable paradigm for understanding our 
present condition. As I argued, in modern society women produce a vital set of 
services, in fact the most indispensable in capitalist terms: the reproduction of labor-
power. They were considered to be non-productive agents and, for the complicated set 
of reasons I outlined above, were not granted equal social rights. Yet the social value 
of their work was truly communal, for it meant generating and preserving human 
capacities for the benefit of the social whole. But the social value of their product was 
denied and remained hidden, for the sociality they reproduced (labor-power) was 
registered only afterwards under the unifying network of capital which, as the buyer of 
labor-power, regulated any social transaction.122 There is a profound break between 
the sociality of the work of reproduction which is captured, and thus hidden, and the 
public sphere of production. In other words, the work of reproduction, which was 
already socially productive and unifying, was disjointed from what was instead 
recognized as the sole political dimension: the society that is formed around and on 
production. To say the least, reproduction was politically under-represented, hence the 
feminist and neo-feminist struggles to politicize the private.  
What happens in a society based on the production of the general intellect? The 
march toward the politicization of the private sphere has advanced a great deal since 
neo-feminism discovered the biopolitical nature of the work of reproduction. 
Immaterial labor is now paradigmatic for production as a whole, and with it the social 
skills and creative knowledge-sharing mechanism we have already explored. Thus the 
“publicness” and commonality of work “is evoked over and over again in its role as 
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productive force.” However “it is suppressed over and over again in its role as public 
sphere (in the proper sense of the term), as a possible root of political Action.”123 The 
social cooperation that is at work at the level of production magically disappears at the 
political level, that is to say, in the proper place of decision-making. The same holds 
true for the condition of women: the public nature of their work met no collective 
representation at a political level. This is also why feminist organizations always 
supported and solicited proper institutional reforms granting equal political 
representation.  
Continuing our parallel with women’s labor, the lack of a political dimension 
and formal mechanisms of control that the public sphere organizes fosters a scattering 
of power that condenses around individual acts of force. Women had agreed-upon no 
formal mechanism, or once won over, they usually fell under the rule of the husband. 
It is here that, as Paolo Virno notices, immaterial work takes the homologous “form of 
universal servile work.” As in the case of the work of reproduction, 
 
It is just […] the very labor which produces the surplus-
value […] what takes on the appearance of servile labor. 
When the product is inseparable from the act of producing, 
this act calls into question the personhood of the one who 
performs the work and, above all, the relation of this 
personhood to that of the one who has commissioned the 
work or for whom it is being done.124     
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The biopolitical ground on which the work of reproduction is carried out represents 
the matrix of our contemporary form of immaterial labor: it involves one’s personality 
as a whole and, in so doing, it allows exploitation to descend to a molecular level. 
Consequently, it is important to sift through the negative elements of oppression and 
behaviors that shape the multitude before we affirm or try to accelerate its biopolitical 
potential. Servility is part of the common cores molding social relationships in an 
environment where formal mediation falls apart, and where the structural crisis pushes 
individuals to face scattered and regional forms of power. Hierarchies proliferate into 
a “thick net” of relations.125 The parallel I draw between intellectual workers and day 
laborers may appear exaggerated, but the precarious ground they both traverse is 
structurally similar. 
Sifting through Multitude’s Ambiguities: Paolo Virno 
Biopolitics thus represents a much more ambiguous and problematic generator 
of contemporary forms of life than Hardt and Negri like to imagine. There is a need to 
distinguish and to negate certain lines of development. This is the dialectical goal of 
our analysis. To do so, I want to turn to the work of an author, Paolo Virno, whom I 
have already occasionally cited, but whose work now, together with neo-feminist 
contributions, is necessary to assess at length.  
Virno, in fact, investigates what he calls the “emotional situation in which the 
contemporary multitude finds itself.”126 He is always careful to underscore the 
ambiguity of the actual responses of the multitude, and in so doing he helps 
differentiating negative, non-productive elements from those that can be instead 
weathered and positively developed. Virno states that the multitude’s emotionality 
today is characterized by “bad sentiments” which are the results of the kind of 
                                                 
125 Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, 68. 
126 Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, 84. 
378 
socialization to which it is subjected. The extreme volatility and unpredictability of 
today’s order is conducive to the development of certain attitudes such as, for 
example, opportunism and cynicism.127
In a society based on the general intellect, measurability fades away in the 
efficacy of rules relative to specific spaces and situation, and in the ever-shifting 
ground of the conventional. On one side, the lack of durable patterns of behavior 
supports the forming of personalities that “confront a flow of ever-interchangeable 
possibilities, making themselves available to the greater number of those, yielding to 
the nearest one, and then quickly swerving from one to another.”128 The guiding 
principle for an opportunist is effectiveness, which is to say doing what is proper with 
regard to the rules of a specific situation. Opportunism is indeed a distinctive quality 
of “political action.”129 When looking for a notion of individual survival though, 
opportunism becomes detrimental. Zygmunt Bauman wrote that the loss “of 
attachment and revocability of engagement are the precepts guiding everything” in the 
life of the opportunist multitude.130 It is a form of rapacity that is productive only in 
economic terms, but that produces an unstable social unity. We can argue that 
opportunism is the reconfiguration or response to the law of command at the 
individual level, for when a stable order implodes, one must make use of every 
opportunity at hand.  
On the other hand, in a society based on the general intellect, the absence of a 
functioning “principle of equivalency” (such as the law of value for instance) creates 
the common experience of the arbitrariness of rules and their transitory nature. As a 
result, at a practical level this transformation requires the sharpening of opportunistic 
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instincts, while at a cognitive level it usually fosters a cynical way of relating to the 
world. Everyday life is manipulated (hetero-directed) in forms individuals can only 
partially grasp, where life becomes “nothing more than a place for immediate self-
affirmation – a self-affirmation which is all the more brutal and arrogant, in short, 
cynical, the more it draws upon, without illusions but with perfect momentary 
allegiance, those same rules which characterize conventionality and mutability.”131 A 
general inauthentic dimension at the level of labor and social relation thus generates a 
cynical attitude that leads to the expression of contempt for all that exceeds the 
singular affirmation of the individual. It also fosters a scornful and usually blind 
dismissal of what is considered past and void of any real value. Grafted onto a 
powerful opportunistic drive, a cynical epistemology becomes a great stimulus for 
innovation and dynamism. But again, the cynics’ productivity feeds on the 
accumulation of wealth for capital, while it is a serious obstacle for grounding 
communality as the proper environment for the multitude. Cynics and opportunists are 
in the frontlines of multitude’s innovation and dynamism.  
That said, we now have to reconsider the very concept of biopolitics in its 
relation to the multitude. Hardt and Negri equate biopolitics with living-labor and 
project onto biopower all the administrative and disciplinary constraints of 
governmental apparatuses. But from what we have said, the fabric of the multitude is 
much more duplicitous than what Hardt and Negri describe. The reason can be found 
in the way the multitude lives, works and suffers which, in turn, has to do with the 
biopolitical substratum, that is, the very personhood that is today put to work during 
the process of immaterial production. When it is the capacity to work that is subsumed 
by work, labor-power itself becomes productive, and as such the biopolitical comes to 
the foreground. As Paolo Virno says,  
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 Where something which exists only as possibility is sold, this 
something is not separable from the living person of the 
seller. The living body of the worker is the substratum of that 
labor-power which, in itself, has no independent existence. 
“Life,” pure and simple bios, acquires a specific importance 
in as much as it is the tabernacle of dynamis, of mere 
potential.132
 
The bios of the multitude is linked to the transactions of capital and to the extraction 
of value. Bios has to be regulated, not strictly disciplined, but certainly organized by 
capital towards the full use and enrichment of its potentiality. The implication of this 
change is significant and requires a short digression. Virno argues that the biopolitical 
dimension of labor bears testimony to how our society has entered a phase in which 
the biological is fully exposed and realized via human sociality. In other words, the 
subsumption of bios under capitalist relationships of production taps into the 
“revelation of human nature.”133 Let us elaborate this point a little further for it 
clarifies how the biopolitical nature of today’s labor articulates the exploitation of an 
anthropological trait of human nature, one that defines human mode of existence in the 
world. 
Echoing Giorgio Agamben’s reflection on the distinction between human and 
animals, Virno argues that our current biopolitical mutation realizes the properly 
human condition of being defective but simultaneously open to the world.134 The 
animal is instead absorbed by its own environment. To the extent that the animal is 
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fully integrated into a systematic immediateness of stimulus-reaction (instincts), its 
interaction, even in the most astonishing degree of complexity, seems to be perfectly 
(but also inflexibly) functional to the environment. Humans instead, do not properly 
live in an environment, but in a world. Their life is articulated around capacities more 
then instincts, for they are never organically captured in the stimulus-reaction structure 
of a natural setting. They confront a vast system of possibilities, a world. “Our 
species,” Virno argues, “has an indefinite character, that is to say it shows a lack of 
specialized instincts.” This lack is very dangerous, since humans are exposed to 
adversities without the possibility of relying on a set of procedures that have been 
fixated into instincts through selection. Thus in order to survive, humans too resort to 
the establishment of patterns and systems of protection (technical inventions and 
social comportments able to predict change) which delimit and define the world into 
“an artificial niche,” that is to say a habitat which grants orientation.135  
For Virno these “pseudo-environments” are typical of pre-biopolitical modes 
of production, where life is administered following a fixed regularity such as in a 
peasant society. But to the extent that Taylorism aimed at producing a trained gorilla, 
Fordist society too duplicates this fabrication of stability.136 Now the biopolitical 
nature of immaterial labor has crushed this continuous reduction of the world, as a 
place of potentialities, to an environment, as the limited domain of actions. With 
“post-Fordism […] society takes charge of the indefinite character of the human 
animal and exploits the absence of any determined environment.” It is here that 
“human nature emerges at the social level,” precisely as its potentiality is put to work 
to produce profit.137  
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Biopolitics and the Natural 
Two considerations stem from this point. The first deals with the light 
biopolitics casts on the natural-biological dimension at play in human labor and how 
this gets articulated by reductionist and constructivist perspectives in contemporary 
debates about ecology. This argument echoes the discussion on what is natural-
invariant in sexuality that I provided in chapter four. Phenomena such as reproduction 
have occurred unchanged since times immemorial. From the point of view of a 
reductionist perspective thus, the biopolitical substratum foregrounds a natural 
dimension that cannot be explained by concepts such as surplus-value, class struggle 
etc... From this perspective, it is science with its neutral set of instruments, theories 
and data that holds sway capturing the bios.  
Post-modern environmentalism follow a more agnostic (but equally 
reductionist) philosophy, and Hardt and Negri couldn’t disagree more with it. Post-
modern conservationist environmentalism, for example, critiques Marxism because of 
its modernist assumptions in which human activity implies earth’s domination, and 
demands “nothing less than the rejection of modernity.”138 At times, even sectors of 
the No-global movement adopted versions of this naturalism in hope of turning upside 
down the priorities of neoliberalism. Interestingly enough, in so doing, the Movement 
resumed the old position of the so-called “true socialists,” a group of German utopian 
intellectuals of the mid-1840s who “predicated on the idea of reestablishing true 
humanity and true nature, all the while ignoring the material basis of human 
development.”139 These calls for a return to nature as such are, even in the best 
intentions, wrongly relying on a crude determinism. 
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Be it on the side of a pristine nature or on that of an all-powerful science, 
reductionism is usually rebuked by a subjectivist critique which embraces a 
constructivist stance. Arguing that all that falls into human experience must be a result 
of human activity, constructivism maintains that even the biological is constructed and 
mediated socially. Negri would probably not agree with this labeling, because of his 
distrust of culturalist and linguistic approaches, but in his claims to be a true “Po 
Valley Philosopher,” one that sees no nature left untouched by human intervention, he 
echoes constructivism.140 So where does Negri stand? Since nature was historically a 
disquisition for conservative elites, it was usual for Operaismo to mistrust ecologist 
movements. Campaigns to preserve the environment lacked class character and 
resorted to a sort of ecumenism depicting capitalists and workers together in the 
communal effort of preserving a liveable environment, protecting endangered species 
and natural reserves. Operaismo, but this is true also for orthodox Marxism, thus 
always framed environmental concerns from the viewpoint of working conditions, 
workers’ safety, health hazard and so on. This is probably why Hardt’s and Negri’s 
theory lacks a full articulation of the objective and subjective elements at play in the 
environmental complex. This results though, in the very scant attention dedicated to 
the ecological dimension as the starting point for the analysis of the conditions of 
subsistence for the multitude. As with constructivism, for Hardt and Negri, the danger 
is in fact to fall pray of a hidden form of humanism, one that erasing the natural into 
the humanlike forgets that the former constitutes humanity itself.  
Keeping a historical perspective on the transformation of labor-power is key to 
keep the two dimensions (the historical and the natural) together. For when talking 
about biopolitics we are dealing with the reproduction of the condition of production 
of which human labor and nature are constituent elements. Marx noted that from the 
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point of view of capital, nature may not have value in itself, but the “creation of value 
is transformation of labour-power into labour,” thus “labour-power itself is energy 
transferred to a human organism by means of nourishing matter.”141 This nourishing 
matter is nature, the earth. Just as labor-power is obscured by the wage-labor 
relationship so is the natural element. The task is to unearth the relationship between 
production and our relation to the environment, and from there formulate 
environmental politics foregoing reductionist and constructivist positions.  
This is the first corrective to Hardt and Negri and I will come back to it again 
exploring it further. The second element that stands out from our understanding of 
biopolitics is that the latter is not in itself liberating, since it is the “reverberation,” or 
the “articulation” of the “the commerce of potential as potential.”142 Biopolitics stands 
at the crossroad of oppression and intimations of liberation. There is no intensification 
here to be prompted that is not already mobilized by capital. There is instead a need of 
distinguishing vectors of force and behaviors that are sociologically interconnected 
with our ways of production. Katja Diefenbach has stated this problem in clear terms 
when she says that 
 
A proto-communist multitude that has productively 
appropriated the tools and knowledge of cooperation only 
rarely becomes visible in the North and South, in the huge 
poverty economies, in home working and in the mass 
misery of self-entrepreneurship. What is revealed instead is 
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142 Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, 83-84. 
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the basis for the connection that the neo-liberal self-
entrepreneurship of poor and rich can enter into with racist, 
political-religious and ethnic ideologies.143
 
We need to study the harmful consequences of biopolitical control through its line of 
differentiation: what happens at the level of gender, what happens to migrants, what 
happens to what has been called the “cognitariat,” the intellectual worker?144  
One question that I have asked, for instance, concerns sexuality. I raised the 
issue of sexuality in my research of Gramsci, Pasolini and neo-feminism, because it is 
the site in which reproduction anticipates the biopolitical turn of contemporary 
production. It is within the complex interaction of sexuality that the body, as well as 
the living person, becomes indistinguishable from the activity performed and the value 
that this generates. From this analysis and critique a new praxis must emerge that 
activates mechanisms of liberation.145 It is the formidable work of positing and 
articulating the difference between capital’s capturing and its socialization of the 
biopolitical, as well as a concrete liberating communality that remains the collective 
task we need to carry out.  
For instance, can we keep ignoring what Pasolini said about the flexibility 
demanded by consumer culture and its consequences for sexuality? Do we want to 
ignore the logical conclusion that can now be drawn from the fact that biopolitics 
                                                 
143 “New Angels. On postoperaist messianism and the good fortune of being communist,” 
After1968.org, 
<http://www.after1968.org/index.php/texts/view/9#text9>. As for the libidinal biopolitical element, one 
must recall also what Žižek says about necessary limitations, that is “the fact that the obstacle to our 
fulfilment (our finitude) is a positive condition of (a limited) fulfilment,” Organs Without Bodies, 187. 
144 Franco Berardi, “Info-Labor and Precarization,” Generation-online, 
<http://www.generation-online.org/t/tinfolabour.htm>.  
145 As Herbert Marcuse claimed this would entail a whole new form of life, with a “different language 
[…] different gestures [..] different impulses,” these new modes of being together “would be shaped by 
men and women who have the good conscience of being human, tender, sensuous, who are no longer 
ashamed of themselves,” An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). 
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involves a process of managing the substratum of life and thus of the body in its basic 
drives? Finally, do we want to celebrate the strength of the body and its libidinal 
powers as the motor that will take us to the other side of the Empire?  
It seems to me that here one can apply the same argument that Hardt and Negri 
use against postmodern thought, when they argue that, although precious, the work of 
postmodern intellectuals targeted ghosts of the past. When the empowerment of the 
libidinal dimension is thought of as a weapon against repression, I wonder what 
enemy one is here resuscitating from the depths of the past! When even the 
organizational solutions for the multitude embrace anti-essentialist circuits of libidinal 
energy as a paradigm, I wonder what benefits they bring to the re-appropriation of 
common spaces. 1968 did wage a just war against sexual phobias and in that moment 
that struggle was certainly progressive, but to the extent that a liberalization of sexual 
habits is now part of the new mechanism of production, I wonder who benefits from 
the proclamations of the political power of free libidinal circulation. Years ago, neo-
feminists showed how the male fellow travelers were already taking advantage of this 
change. Today, certain positions of privilege (usually male’s) are certainly still feeding 
on the valorization of free sexuality. Yet it is important to disclose how the 
mechanisms of immaterial production require precisely this valorization.  
The instability and transient nature of a love relationship is based on the 
extreme volatility of our social and working order.146 On one side, if individuals are 
human capital that needs to invest in its social value in order to remain profitable, 
sexuality becomes one of the conveyors of this capacity. It is not opposed to work as it 
was opposed in a Fordist economy, where non-labor time offered the possibility of rest 
and sexual pleasure outside of one’s work. Now the social skills required by 
immaterial production are at work in the same way, whether one is selling his or her 
                                                 
146 Bauman called it “liquid modernity,” 1-4. 
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labor-power at a job fair as in the case when one enters a club and engages in 
courtship. Furthermore, the idea of sexual activity as an exchange of pleasure, from 
which one earns one’s share and then moves on toward more profitable sources, 
resembles the circulation of communicability that is already employed during 
immaterial production. Now re-proposing models of marriage as eternal bliss, or love 
in itself as the purest and most natural form of human expression is simply the effect 
of an entertainment industry interested in selling products and relics of an ideal of life. 
Capital knows how to exploit the need for security that itself has created. Pseudo-
environments proliferate as substitutes and simulacra of protection. The revival of 
traditionalist ideas of marriage and of a comfortable and secure domestic life based on 
property and consumption are caused by a social order besieged by insecurity and 
precariousness.  
These practices represent the multitude’s falling back on pseudo-solutions. 
After a long apprenticeship in keeping afloat in the sea of transience of post-modern 
life, one seeks refuge in the relics of the past. But these simulacra of stability are all 
the more dangerous because they are set up as individualist paradigms that re-propose 
roles and functions that restrict sociality and the capacity of the multitude to mobilize 
labor on the basis of equality. Moreover, a critique of sexuality based on the liberating 
model of the libidinal seems already outflanked. For pseudo-environments are already 
ruled out as the society of spectacle also projects at the same time the opposite model, 
that of transgression, of total freedom and enjoyment of change as the motor of self-
affirmation. On the other hand, as Virno lays bare, there seems to be a need for “being 
sensually at ease with one’s vital context,” for a kind of temporality in which 
potentiality does not engender feebleness, but ease and amicability. But this nostalgia 
388 
for a locus amoenus is not a return to the past, nor is it an intensification of the 
mechanisms for capturing the biopolitical, but a “task” for the future.147
So what is political in sexuality and what is not? What can be used to give rise 
to a different commonality, one in which the capture of bodies as the repository of 
potentiality brings together a non-exploitative sociality? I believe that sexuality must 
be rescued from a commercial and alienating circulation without slipping into the 
traditionalist discourse on monogamy. It must find a more human dimension. To be 
clear: I am carrying out an argument at a discursive level, which is to say at the level 
of the linguistic articulation of the discourse of love and emotionality and not vis-à-vis 
regulation of daily practices. Finally, I am not calling on the return of an updated 
model of the Fordist family. I say this because I am aware how easy it is to critique 
this position even at a theoretical level, accusing it of endorsing some sort of 
repressive, centralized nightmare of sexual administration. Yet, I believe this would be 
a superficial critique, one that does not take into account the problem of the capturing 
of the biopolitical in an age of immaterial work. Only those who coldly seek their own 
well-being and advantage as intellectual laborers, the cynics I mean, only they could 
rightfully advocate this position. But the cynics are more royalist than the king, for 
long ago they gave up a different idea of communality, when consciously or 
unconsciously, they decided to protect themselves from the precariousness of the 
world by embracing surviving, not living.     
For those who have decided to live up to the hope of a different form of life, 
the path is no less risky. It is also a collective task, one for which the following 
considerations are only a small contribution. So how can we begin to untangle this 
political and historical knot? I want to return to Gramsci in these closing pages, to an 
                                                 
147 Virno, Scienze sociali, 42. 
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anecdote that ends a beautiful play by Maricla Boggio and Franco Cuomo that was 
staged in 1972, only two years before Adele Cambria’s work.  
Gramsci Fell Asleep 
The closing scene of Boggio’s and Cuomo’s Compagno Gramsci [Comrade 
Gramsci] stages the dying revolutionary in his cell, together with three other prisoners. 
In a frenzy, Gramsci talks about the immortality of the soul in historicist terms, that is 
to say “as the natural surviving of our useful and necessary actions.”148 In one of his 
delirious talks, he pronounces the word pjatilekta. It is the Russian term for planning. 
One of the workers wants to know what planning means, so Gramsci proceeds to tell 
the story of a child and a mouse who, feeling guilty for having drunk his milk, sets out 
on a quest to find it. It is a laborious work that involves the construction of a whole 
economy to satisfy the needs of all the children and not just of his little friend. But the 
same worker, discouraged, complains that planning will not do much for them and 
laments: 
 
When will we get out of here? 
What planning could we ever come up with here in our 
situation? 
 
Gramsci responds by telling another story entitled A Men in a Ditch. A man, who got 
drunk after a night out, falls into a ditch and gets stuck in there. Gramsci continues  
 
it was very dark, his body was wedged among rocks and 
bushes; he was a bit frightened and he didn’t move, for fear 
                                                 
148 Maricla Boggio and Franco Cuomo, Compagno Gramsci (Padova: Marsilio, 1972), 156.  
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of falling even further. The bushes close over him, large 
snails slithered over him, leaving a silvery track, (perhaps a 
toad came to rest on his heart, to feel its throb because it 
thought it was still alive).149
 
Four characters pass by: a scientist, a peasant, an artist and a priest. Each of them has 
something to say to the man, but eventually no one helps him. Each of them is right in 
his own limited view. The scientist holds a purely technical truth, so all he can offer is 
the explanation of how gravity works; the peasant holds a moral truth, so that he 
angrily accuses him of having misbehaved; the artists admires the beauty of the silvery 
track and the wonderful piece of embroidery made by nature; finally the priest has 
compassion for the man and denounces the lack of charity of the people, but the only 
thing he offers is pray for him. Left alone, the man begins to realize how he fell into 
the ditch, how the bush had closed upon him, from where and how he could get out. 
All he needed to do was to understand “what the ditch consisted of and what to do,” 
Gramsci glosses.150 But at this point he falls asleep. 
The prisoners are left alone and begin their discussion. They follow the 
allegory: they are in the ditch, the party is in the ditch, and they need to explore it. But 
how does one translate the allegory? What is the bush and where are the walls and 
supports to climb up? Gramsci is asleep. One of the prisoners opens one of his 
notebooks and reads:  
 
it is necessary  
                                                 
149 I quote from the original letter to Julia, where Gramsci recalls the apologue written by Lucien 
Dieudonné (1870-1908), Letters from Prison, vol. 2, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 
188.  
150 Boggio and Cuomo, 168. 
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to burn all of the past 
and invent  
a new life […]  
and avoid  
being lead astray 
by nostalgia.  
But 
it is also necessary  
to know how to discriminate and choose,  
to preserve at least  
what good we had,  
that which was constructive 
or even only beautiful… giving attention  
to the things we loved  
before dismissing them  
because 
if we really loved something  
it must have been worthwhile […]  
Getting out of the ditch  
also means  
casting away the toad  
from one’s heart. 
 
The beauty of Boggio’s and Cuomo’s ending may be found in Gramsci’s silence and 
in the suggestion of a project of liberation that grows out of it. The three prisoners are 
the twilight of a new community that translates Gramsci’s work not into a political 
392 
doctrine, but rather into the open process of planning as a constituent and democratic 
practice. It is the idea of the immortality of the soul realized in historical terms, that is, 
as a necessary praxis. In this the conclusion of the play constitutes a skilful way out 
from the common representation of Gramsci as a pseudo-religious icon. In religious 
veneration, ultimately the meta-historical event of the death of the individual leads to a 
proliferation of an abstract cult of the person. The sacred, in fact, performs the 
function of explanation and compensation, but it also crystallizes everything into the 
repetition of acts of reverence, that is into a liturgy. The absence (death) of Gramsci is 
filled, instead, with the thoughts of the prisoners and their cooperation in the reading 
of his work. Death is not denied, but rather reformulated critically as an event that, 
insofar as it is necessary, it is also meaningful. We have seen this positive notion in 
Pasolini when we criticized its static, sacral element. Yet what is necessary in this 
praxis? Gramsci’s response is: a critical relationship with the past, that is, with what 
we have loved as a task for the future.  
Today the links between production and reproduction, the ambiguities that the 
new subjectivity registers, the biopolitical as the site of the dialectic between 
oppression and spaces of affirmation--all these are crucial, necessary points we need 
to articulate collectively. There are elements that we need to critique and others that 
can be recuperated. There is a way of casting away the toad from our heart without 
forgetting what was worthwhile. In general terms, I want to formulate this point as 
follows: the multitude must recognize what is detrimental in its own process of 
affirmation and what is productive. Only the very praxis of discrimination can 
engender a new ethic.    
Thus, there is a perspective that is dramatically absent in Hardt’s and Negri’s 
study of the multitude. Negri argued that he “never believed that there could be 
something that could place us outside of that historical process which is capitalism,” 
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for he believes that nature is always “fully cultivated and fully historical.”151 Yet if we 
connect the ecological problem that Pasolini raised in the pages of Scritti corsari to 
the biopolitical dimension of labor we avoid any risk of sliding into some kind of 
romantic arcadia. Connecting the ecological to the biopolitical nature of labor implies 
two things. First, it raises the problem of the planet and the ecological catastrophe we 
are hastening. Now this is a fundamental issue that concerns the planet and us, not the 
earth in itself, for “the planet has billions of years ahead, and at a given point it will 
continue without us.”152 The problem of the earth lies in its private negotiations with 
its star, the sun, not with us. What is at stake here for us is relationality: among us 
humans, and among humans and the planet. This is what a young Karl Marx wrote 
when speaking, not surprisingly, about estranged labor: 
 
the universality of man manifests itself in practice in that 
universality which makes the whole of nature his inorganic 
body, (1) as a direct means of life and (2) as the matter, the 
object, and the tool of his life activity. Nature is man’s 
inorganic body – that is to say, nature insofar as it is not the 
human body. Man lives from nature – i.e., nature is his 
body – and he must maintain a continuing dialogue with it 
is he is not to die.153
 
                                                 
151 Negri and Casarino, 178, 180. Because of this Negri claims to be a true “Po Valley Philosopher,” 
181. I wonder, however, to what extent the cultivated fields are also the result of the peasants’ study of 
the Po river and the knowledge they developed in an organic relationship with it.   
152 Wu Ming 1, “New Italian Epic versione 2.0. Memorandum 1993-2008: narrativa, sguardo obliquo, 
ritorno al futuro,” Wumingfoundation, 
<http://www.wumingfoundation.com/italiano/WM1_saggio_sul_new_italian_epic.pdf>, 28. 
153 Marx, Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, ed. Martin Mulligan, Marxists Internet 
Archive, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm>. 
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Marx crops out the material limit that our theories always need to maintain, for any 
attempt to divorce materialism from the realm of nature is in danger of falling into the 
essentialization of the subject. It leads to a belief in the subject’s unrestrained powers, 
and Hardt and Negri at times seem to fall into a subjectivist depiction of the multitude. 
We need to “avoid a radical social constructionism that failed to consider the natural-
physical conditions of existence,” for this is the first limit and a very historical one I 
argue.154 It is the historical mode of relation with the earth as a result of the 
transformation of our society. This is also the re-articulation of the principle absolute 
immanence of praxis from the point of view of natural history. In a convincing work 
on Marx’s and Engel’s ecological thought, John Bellamy Foster has investigated the 
natural science in coevolutionary terms arguing that  
 
the understanding of the evolution of human beings from 
their primate ancestors could be explained as arising from 
labor, that is, from the conditions of human subsistence, and 
from its transformation by means of tool making, simply 
because it was t this level that human beings interacted with 
nature, as real, material, active beings who must eat, breathe, 
and struggle for survival.155  
 
We need to surpass a radical constructivism as well as objectivist reductionism. 
Our dialectical relation with the environment tells us about our pre-history as well as 
our contemporary history. The human dimension is one of self-transformative activity. 
                                                 
154 Foster, 228. 
155 235. Bellamy Foster also recuperates the idea of a “logic of emergence” which explains evolution 
from primordial times as a temporal process based on contingency and accidents which create necessary 
properties explaining human evolution. See 232-236. 
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In a Fordist society, it is the mechanic, human-like aspect that is exposed. In an age of 
immaterial labor, it is as if we were returning to a more natural outlook of life itself. In 
both ages though, extraction of value is at work. 
Thus, we also need to reframe the notion of biopolitics in light of this 
materialist limit. It is precisely the biopolitical dimension of production that forecloses 
the biological and the ecological as socially marked (and not as non-human) entities. 
But here, as Virno argues “the direct manifestation of the biological invariant in 
contingent economic, social domains shows with precision the terrain of political 
conflict.”156 When bios is subsumed as a category of social practice, the cleavage 
between the historical, social (human) and the natural (organic-inorganic) is redefined 
in light of a totally new unity. The world of humans now properly reveals that of 
nature. “Political theories,” Virno glosses, “give great attention to the occasions when 
human praxis [labor] engages in the most direct way with the sum-total of the 
requisites [biopolitical substratum] that renders human that praxis.”157 The difference 
lies in the conclusions that each political theory draws.  
Neoliberalism, for example, gives the lie to unrestrained productivity and 
consumption as absolute value. Neoliberalism is economic freedom naturalized into 
forms of limitless production. Neoliberalism thus mystifies our relationality with the 
planet by assuming the point of view of the planet itself. The non-human scale of 
earth’s life is thought of as our own temporality. Limits will be ruled out by 
technological advancements, profit-making will push society towards higher and, at 
the same time, sustainable standards of living. To a certain extent, Pasolini was right. 
In this unbounded will of the subject to incorporate and manipulate all of the real, we 
get a glimpse into a new form of fascism.  
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157 Virno, Scienze sociali, 91. 
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The multitude has thus far revealed the natural invariant of biopolitics in 
contradictory ways. The cynical, opportunistic approach does not place any 
confidence in the neoliberal utopia. Accustomed as it is to the conventionality and 
transitory nature of rules, cynics scorn this revival of technological essentialism. Their 
awareness, though, does not lead to any action other than seizing the opportunities that 
one may (if s/he enjoys the benefits of a proper social niche) have at hand. Other 
sectors of the multitude, those who protest and challenge the authority of 
neoliberalism through radical opposition, deployed a concept of the earth as the 
absolute ontological limit. Following a Chomskian perspective, the Anti-Globalization 
Movement generally elaborated an idea of the biological as something inherently good 
and thus endowed with the natural right to establish a better society. Discarding the 
dead end of cynical opportunism, Virno instead argues that the multitude is right when 
it stresses the centrality of a biological element, as a meta-historical invariant, that is 
as a prominent feature in our society. It is mistaken, however, when it assumes a 
primitivist approach, positing the biological as the immutable ground upon which a 
new and righteous society can be worked out.158 It is rather the biopolitical outcome of 
the dialectics between labor and capital that exposes the “ontological (and material) 
priority of the natural world.”159 This is the field in which the multitude needs to act.  
This said, it is true that our inorganic body is still the substratum for the 
biopolitical. Destroying the former means sawing off the branch on which we sit. As 
endless accumulation, capitalism is thus antithetical to our survival. Here I mean to 
say that capitalism is antithetical to the life of our organic and inorganic body. It is the 
toxicity of capital in itself that stands out as a point of no return. Unrestrained 
consumption and material growth, although a necessity for a large part of the planet 
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living in abject poverty, must be renegotiated outside the framework of capital’s 
accumulation. Services and immaterial work are key factors for accruing social 
wealth, but we must pose clear ecological limits. These limits must preserve not only 
the environment, the inorganic body, but also the health of our organic bodies while 
allowing their growth in social terms. Wage-labor and extraction of surplus-labor are 
still our main concern which grows in importance in a globalized and ecological 
dimension.  
Assuming these limits means retrieving a critical form of humanism, one in 
which ecological limits are included in our modes of living. Priorities need to be set. 
The multitude needs to keep on elaborating ecologically and politically informed 
analysis and from these develop concrete organizational answers. Framing in a critical 
and comprehensive way the sets of problems we face is the most urgent task. This will 
involve a remarkable amount of planning. But every society has the possibility of 
visualizing its problems as it is able to solve them, for “the problem itself arises only 
when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the 
course of formation.”160 This was Marx’s discovery.  
The solution is obviously not one and it cannot be determined once and for all. 
As Pasolini knew, the outermost limit is our death, not simply the singular death of an 
individual, but our collective death, our extinction as a race. The task is then to 
“struggle against extinction with dignity and deferring it as much as possible.”161 This 
is not a philosophy of desperation. There is much hope in it, but it is a fully human, 
and thus limited, mortal hope. It is the process of the historicizing of death that opens 
the potentialities of human capacities for the human as a limited, but socially rich 
                                                 
160 Marx, Preface, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, ed. R. Rojas, Marxists Internet 
Archive, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm>. 
161 Wu Ming 1, 29. 
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communality. Who knows, while working our way out of the ditch, we might even 
find that Gramsci had simply fallen asleep.  
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